I keep hearing some scientists and philosophers claim that consciousness is an illusion. This has to be one of the silliest claims I've heard. Having an illusion requires consciousness, i.e., it's a necessary feature of having an illusion that there be a conscious self. You can't deny the very thing that gives rise to an illusion. It's like doubting that you exist. Who exactly is doing the doubting?

"Can we live in doubt?" It depends on what you mean by "...live in doubt?" I'm going to repeat some of what @Banno said, because we are largely in agreement, with some minor disagreement.

First, I believe Wittgenstein worked much of this out in his final notes called On Certainty. If you want to understand the concepts of knowing and doubting, there is no better work, as far as I know. My whole framework of what it means to know and doubt is built on W. final notes.

These two concepts work hand-in-hand, i.e., they must be seen as working together. Both are built on a framework of arational beliefs, so both knowing and doubting arise from a place beyond knowing and doubting, which is why I'm saying that they are built on a framework that's arational. The framework is much of the reality that surrounds us. A lot of work needs to be done in terms of what that framework is, and how it can change, but we have a good idea as to what some of these arational beliefs are. The classic examples are, "I have hands," "There are objects," "I live on Earth," "There are minds," etc. These beliefs form the backdrop of the reality that we find ourselves in. Think of these beliefs, as those that can't normally be doubted, there are exceptions, but generally they are foundational arational beliefs that form the substrata of our talk about knowing and doubting. Which means, that they arise out of the reality we find ourselves in. We can't make sense of these concepts apart from this reality. This means that there are limits to what can be known and doubted, given the limits of language. Although the limits of language is not static, i.e., it's not a set boundary (I'm not claiming this is all based on Wittgenstein, some of it is, some of it isn't, but I think it follows from much of what W. said.).

So, again, you have to think of language as the soil (Language itself, grows out of the basic beliefs that form the reality that surrounds us.) that gives birth to the concept of doubting. Without that soil there would be no doubting, period, end of story. So, doubting is a linguistic phenomena (primarily), and as such, it takes place in a language-game (If you aren't familiar with language-games, there are plenty of threads that talk about it. More importantly, read the PI.). The language-game of doubting is very similar to the language-game of knowing. One of the primary drivers of these language-games (knowing and doubting) is justification, viz., do you have the proper justification for your knowledge, and do you have the proper justification for your doubts? Descartes missed the mark completely, that's all I'll say about that here.

So, to partly answer your question, "Can you live in doubt?" If you mean perpetual doubt, no. But, there are rational doubts, and this is a healthy thing. However, sometimes people doubt, where there is no justification for the doubt, and it's here that confusion about doubting happens. There are also areas where it's not so clear, in terms of whether its rational to doubt or not, so this is not always black and white. The same is true of what we know.

If you want to learn more, read On Certainty, and what spawned On Certainty.

Employments of language which do nothing, which serve no purpose. It is one thing to move the rook qua rook in the 'wrong way'. It is quite another to throw the horse shaped piece across the room and call it chess. In the one the piece at least has a role. In the latter it does not (incidentally, the issue of "role" appears over and over and over again in the PI - and it is almost criminally under-remarked upon - unlike 'misuse' which, again, doesn't appear even once in the entire book). The 'philosophical problems' that Witty diagnoses belong entirely to the latter category. — StreetlightX

So, it's one thing to correct someone who moves the rook the wrong way on a chess board, but it's quite another thing to correct someone who throws the piece across the room. Which is to say, that the former has a mode of correction, the latter doesn't. In the latter example, there is no mode of correction because you've removed the piece from all context of correct and incorrect.

This makes sense in terms of how Moore uses the word know, in, for example, Proof of an External World. The word know serves no purpose, it has no role in Moore's context, which means that it's not functioning in a language-game, which by definition, means it has no function. It appears to have a function because we are fooled by the grammar. Wittgenstein is saying that what Moore is doing is not epistemology at all.

The problem, it seems to me, is that in the chess example, i.e., throwing a piece across the room, that doesn't even look like a move in chess. At least in language, it appears that you are doing something with the word, because of the grammar of language. Maybe the chess example should involve something not so radical, to bring it more in line with what's happening in language, but I'm not sure what that would be. Maybe something like, after you have learned the moves, you keep trying to move the rook diagonally, to fit some notion you have about rooks. I'm not sure.

Actually even the word "knowledge" is problematic, to such an extent that we even say that justified true beliefs constitute knowledge. But this is highly problematic. One can have a justified true belief, but not have knowledge:

Imagine you watch the finals in the NBA and team A beats team B. You saw it and reached this conclusion. Unbeknownst to you, what you were watching was a replay of a previos game in which the same team wins (team A) against the same opponent (team B). In the actual finals team A does beat team B, but you were watching a replay, not the actual game. So you had justified true belief, but it wasn't knowledge. — Manuel

It's just another kind of Gettier problem, and I believe Gettier is just wrong about this. Believing one is justified, is not the same as being justified. It's the difference between a claim, especially probability claims, which always carry with them the chance that your claim is incorrect, and what we mean by justification. Just because my sensory experiences usually lead to correct conclusions, doesn't mean they always do. It's the difference between believing that X is a fact, and X actually being a fact. If I make a claim that X is knowledge based on a particular justification, and you later find out that your justification was unwarranted, then it doesn't fit the definition, viz., it wasn't justified. We may have a good ground for our conclusion, and that grounding gives us a warrant to believe the conclusion, but if later you find out that your grounding is unwarranted, then you don't have knowledge. You may have the right to claim it's knowledge, but that right is dependent on what reality actually is. However, this is a bit off topic.

that is, to obey a rule is to act; but the act governs the rule. — Banno

Ya, I see what you're saying. That's probably a better way to say it.

The temptation is to think of language games as discreet, and hence in terms of explicit rules. A few things mitigate against this. — Banno

I'm not sure I follow your point in terms of what I was saying. It seems that the rule and the use go hand-in-hand. The pawn in chess would would be quite useless without the rule, or a rule that governs its moves. So too, it seems in language-games, the grammatical rules (implicit or explicit) govern how we use the words, or in chess how we move the pieces (correctly or incorrectly).

If I understand @StreetlightX, his contention is that a language-game is analogous to a chess game, i.e., you're either playing chess or not. To say you're playing chess, when you're making the wrong moves, is not chess. It's not that you're playing chess incorrectly, you're not playing chess at all. My contention is that there are incorrect moves in the game of chess, so if you move the rook diagonally, then you're not playing chess correctly. If you're teaching the game of chess, then it seems obvious that there are correct and incorrect moves based on the rules. I think it can be looked both ways, but maybe @StreetlightX is giving a more nuanced interpretation.

Ya, that's a good point.

It's their attempt at a language-game. It would be like playing chess, but not understanding all the moves correctly. It appears to be the game of chess, but certain moves are missing. It's true that Wittgenstein doesn't talk of these kinds of language-games, but the implication of incorrect and correct uses of words is something implied, especially in terms of learning, you either learn the word correctly or you don't. Your use of the word demonstrates if you understand how it's applied.

Let me give you an example. I was arguing with some religious people recently, and their epistemological language-game was such that they have knowledge based on some inner knowing. Something that only they have access to. My contention is that they have not properly understood the use of the word know, i.e., the concept as they were using it, is vacuous. It doesn't matter that they have created a language-game that they use together to try to convey meaning. The way they use the word is just incorrect, language-game or not.

This second sentence doesn't follow. If I am trying to assert something, I should not use language in the manner of a command. And vice versa. What constrains the 'proper use of language' is what one is trying to do. But to ask if commands or assertions are 'on equal footing' or 'not on equal footing' is not a question that is sensical. — StreetlightX

All I'm saying is that you can't just create any language-game, and then suppose that you have somehow meant something by your words. This doesn't make any sense. Concepts can't be used just any old way, even if they're used in a language-game created by a group of people, and even if they're are trying to do something with their words.

The standard of the 'correct use of a word' just is the language-game. You seem to be implying that there are 'correct uses' that stand outside of language-games. But this is exactly what the entirety of the PI is geared against. — StreetlightX

No, I'm not saying that there are correct uses that stand outside of language-games, that's definitely not correct. I'm saying that not all language-games are on equal footing, some convey incorrect uses. If this wasn't so, then anything goes in terms of meaning.

The simple fact is that Witty doesn't talk about correct or incorrect use. Ever. Okay, a lie, he uses the term 'correct use' once at §146, and literally no where else in the entirety of the PI. 'Incorrect' use actually makes no appearance at all, ever. As for the postulated assistant who brings the pillar, sure, one can argue semantics over whether to call it an 'incorrect use' or simply not having learnt the use at all, but the latter is simply more in accord with what Wittgenstein actually said. — StreetlightX

So, I'm arguing semantics, I suppose that's meant to mean that it's trivial, or that I'm avoiding the point you're making. Incorrect use,would be, "...not having learnt the use at all." If anyone is arguing semantics, it's you. Surely, W. implies that there are correct and incorrect uses of words, whether he uses that phrasing or not. Let's use Moore's use of the word know in On Certainty as an example. What would be more precise? To say, Moore hasn't learned the use of the word know, or that Moore is using the word incorrectly in that context? I would say the latter is closer to what W. is trying to point out. Obviously W. is pointing out other more subtle things in the context of the PI, but this doesn't take away from what I'm saying.

And there is, moreover, excellent reason for that. The full phrase is: "meaning is use in a language -game". In other words, 'use' is always relational. To even talk about misuse simply makes no sense. Which is why the word 'misuse' also appears exactly zero times in the PI. To see this, simply try to invert the statement: "Meaninglessness is incorrect use in a language-game". But no language-game specifies 'incorrect use', because 'use' is a function of, let's call it, felicity ("The signpost is in order a if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose"). Either a use fulfills its purpose, or it does not. If it does not, it is not a use at all. Not only does introducing (and lets be clear, it is an extra-textual introduction that does not exist in the PI) 'correct and incorrect use' have practically no textual warrant at all, it also confuses things. It makes it seem as though 'use' could, even in principle, be something not in accord with a language-game. But Witty makes the point over and over and over gain that this is exactly what one cannot do. — StreetlightX

Of course, "meaning is use in a language-game," and of course it's "always relational," but that doesn't mean that any language-game conveys the correct use of a word. Groups of people create their own language-games all the time, especially religious people. I wouldn't go so far as to say they haven't learned to use the word at all, because in some contexts they do use the word correctly. However, in other contexts they're using the word incorrectly, and to say so, is in keeping with the PI, as far as I can see.

Use is always in accord with a language-game, but you seem to imply that there aren't language-games that don't accord with the proper function of words. Hence, language-games that don't convey the correct use of words, and here is where we disagree.

It seems to me that the inner sensation is useless. It doesn't matter if we all have different beetles in our boxes or if some of us have no beetles. — hanaH

It can't be useless. For example, if there were no inner experience of pain, then there would be no language of pain, no outward sign. It depends, I guess, on what you mean by useless. Even the beetle has a function, albeit not the one most people think, in terms of meaning.

Incorrect use" makes no sense in the context of the PI. There is simply either use, or not use at all. Witty never talks about the "incorrect" use of words. Only words which lack use entirely. — StreetlightX

I would definitely disagree with this assessment of the PI, viz., that "incorrect use makes no sense in the context of the PI." First, my point in pointing out to @TheMadFool, that use doesn't equate to meaning, is that it's imprecise. It's "correct usage" of words/concepts that drive meaning, i.e., a concept has various uses (incorrect and correct) driven by rules (implicit and explicit rules) within a given cultural language-game.

If we look at the first example of a language-game in the PI, we can clearly see there are correct and incorrect uses of words. We observe that if the assistant doesn't respond appropriately to the call "slab," then the assistant has not learned the language-game, and by extension has not learned the proper responses to the calls. Would you say that if the assistant brought a "pillar," that the assistant is "correctly" understanding the use of the word or the call "slab?" Obviously not. So, the obvious implication in this and other language-games is that there are "correct" and "incorrect" uses of words.

When teaching a child the correct use of the word cup, would we say there is no incorrect use? It's true, of course, that W. says that words go on a holiday, i.e., that they lack a use, but this is no argument against what I'm saying. If a philosopher is using the word illusion out of it's normal setting in which the word gets it's meaning, then not only does the word "lack use" in that context, but it's incorrectly used. ""Lacking use" surely also implies incorrect use, as opposed to correct use.

There is no way to know if our inner experiences are the same except through our common reactions to these experiences. It's our cries coupled with language that gives life to these experiences (e.g. pain experiences) in a public way. The evidence for the experience is the commonality of reaction, whether it's non-verbal or verbal. The same is true of consciousness itself, viz., how we know someone or some other living organism is conscious is by the way they act (acts referring to language or other kinds of nonverbal acts). So, these concepts don't describe pain or consciousness, they simply show that I'm having an inner experience of some kind, in which I react the same as you, or similar to how you react. We can't peer into the mind to observe these inner experiences, and looking at brain activity does little to help in the way of describing the experience.

So, essentially you're saying it's like a brain that's biologically alive, but shows no evidence of consciousness, because all that makes it conscious (metacognitive stuff, or the stuff of consciousness) is not there. For example, it would be like turning on a radio, but there are no electromagnetic radio waves for the radio to pick up. Is this what you're implying?

Death, defined as the end of consciousness can't be distinguished from consciousness that isn't conscious of anything. As far as I'm concerned, a person who exists but is not doing anything can't be told apart from a person who doesn't exist. — TheMadFool

What's "...consciousness that isn't conscious of anything[?]" If your conscious, then being aware (in some way) is a necessary feature of consciousness. Maybe you're thinking of someone who is in a coma (or something similar), so they're unconscious, or they're not aware of anything. Sometimes people who we think aren't aware, are indeed aware, as has happened in some cases. Even if a person is in a coma and not "doing anything" that's much different from a person who doesn't exist, whatever "doesn't exist" means in this context (I assume you mean dead.).

Yes, I do agree that generally "...the implausibility of a claim tends to undermine the credibility" of that claim.
— Sam26
The point I was considering is that the implausibility of a claim tends to undermine the credibility of the witness who makes that claim. If the expert can't provide enough support to make the claim seem plausible, but persists in asserting the claim, this tends to count against the expert's credibility. The witness must be able to provide some reasonable account of the justification or basis for the claim, and that account must stand up to scrutiny. If it stands up to scrutiny, it's plausible. If it doesn't stand up to scrutiny, then on what grounds would the expert affirm it? — Cabbage Farmer

I agree, that an implausible claim undermines the witness making the claim. I will go a step further, and say, that a claim given by a group of people (say, as part of their worldview) is also undermined when it's implausible. Whether some claim is implausible also depends on who is making the claim, i.e., are they an expert in the field, are they in a position to know, are they giving a good argument, and what are they relying on to justify their claim? So, there are many factors (including psychological factors) that drive why people consider some claims implausible or not.

I agree generally with the last part of your statements above, but I would add that justification isn't always about giving good reasons (logic). There are other ways of justifying a belief. For example, sensory experience, testimony, and linguistic training. When I think of reasoning (specifically, correct reasoning), I think of inductive and deductive arguments. But yes, if someone's claim fails to give a good justification, then it's certainly suspect. It must also be pointed out that whether some claim is plausible or not, doesn't equate to the claim necessarily being true or false, it just means they don't have a good justification. And, it's also true that any claim must stand up to scrutiny, so I agree.

However, I don't think that because something seems implausible, that it follows that it is.
— Sam26
Do you mean something like this:

The fact that a claim seems plausible to me or to anyone does not entail the claim is true. Likewise, the fact that a claim seems implausible to me or to anyone does not entail the claim is false.

Plausibility is always plausibility relative to some epistemic context. Our evaluation of the plausibility of a claim is in principle open to revision. — Cabbage Farmer

Yes.

Many discoveries have been overturned in science because people considered what most find implausible. So, there has to be the right kind of balance, we tend to get to invested in certain worldviews, which can impede new discoveries.
— Sam26
What's the right sort of balance?

There's always the problem of allocation of resources. There's always the problem of prioritization. It would be as disastrous for our global society as a whole, as it would be for any single person, to continually commit a significant share of resources to every conceivable investigation.

When I lose my eyeglasses or my house keys, I don't book a flight to every city on Earth to track them down. I look in a few places nearby, beginning with the most likely. Sometimes they don't turn up and I broaden the search. Occasionally I've found my keys still in the lock on the door. Once I found my eyeglasses in the refrigerator. — Cabbage Farmer

In terms of balance, we should allow people, within reason, to freely pursue their intuitions (there are limits to this of course, like resources, etc), this helps to make advances in areas we wouldn't normally pursue. I generally agree with your statements, so for the most part we agree.

Nothing personal, I just don't want to keep repeating myself.

I'm not going to argue about this issue. It's been argued about a millions times in this forum.

I agree, language can be friend or foe depending on your understanding of how language works. I don't think that language is used to give us mental pictures to allow us to understand reality. I'm not saying we don't get mental pictures, but this isn't something we should rely on to understand reality. Who's mental picture is correct? In many ways it's correct to say that propositions picture reality, or mirror reality, but this isn't the same as a mental picture. You're close to falling into the hole of words equating to mental objects.

Meaning is not use. You have to be a bit more precise.
— Sam26

The notion itself lacks exactitude. You can't fix a blurry image by getting corrective glasses.

And, why would you wonder if we could do philosophy without language. Of course we couldn't. It would be like asking if trains could pull themselves without the locomotive.
— Sam26

IF you're right, all hope is lost. — TheMadFool

I said you have to be a bit more precise, not exact. In language, sometimes a blurry image is just what we need. However, in this case, if you're correct that meaning equates to use, then any use of a word in any context would necessitate its meaning, and this isn't true. What about incorrect uses? People use words incorrectly all the time, is their incorrect use driving the meaning of the word? No.

Language is the main tool of philosophy, it's where philosophy lives and breathes. Why would you suppose that all hope is lost if this is the case?

Meaning is not use. You have to be a bit more precise.

And, why would you wonder if we could do philosophy without language. Of course we couldn't. It would be like asking if trains could pull themselves without the locomotive.

You agree that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation completely, or you agree only that most people tend to think this? — Luke

I don't think that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation, but some people do think this is the case.

Do we not have an epistemic responsibility in life? If our actions have ripple effects, and our actions are largely an outgrowth of our beliefs, then isn't it irresponsible to believe in things that lead to harmful actions? Shouldn't we be more careful about what we believe in? — Xtrix

Once you come to understand that much or most of what people believe is a matter of psychology, which is to say, that beliefs, in general, are more influenced by things other than epistemology. Even people who are well trained in epistemology are quite susceptible to the power of psychological influences on their beliefs (their politics, their religious views, their friends, their family, the influence of their peers, etc.).

So, my point is that the subject of beliefs is much more complicated than you realize, including your own beliefs. Many philosophers can't even agree on what's good epistemology. If they can't agree, then how's the ordinary person trying to live their lives going to have any epistemic responsibility that's coherent. Most people have just enough understanding to live their lives and that's about it.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/58/The_Private_Language_Argument — Luke

Thanks for the article. It raised some very interesting points.

I think most people tend to dismiss the ("inner") sensation completely (it "drops out of consideration") and presume Wittgenstein to be identifying a sensation only with its expression. — Luke

Yes, I agree with this.

Geez, these arguments over tokens and types are torturous. :lol:

The funny thing is that there is never a contradiction if you only look at what arrives in the consciousness. Every consciousness carries out its own private collapse of the wave function (->Wigner's friend).

If every observer has his own wave function according to his state of knowledge, then the contradictions are cancelled. — SolarWind

Contradictions are about statements or propositions, reality itself is not contradictory. Contradictions only occur in language, i.e., when using concepts.

Man, if you don't believe I'll just die. Just do a little more reading, and you too, will agree. lol

I am right, this is a common misunderstanding.

It's a misinterpretation of Schrodinger's cat to think the cat is both dead and alive. You can never observe the cat in both states. And, once you do observe it, it's then in one state or the other, so no contradiction.

The measuring can happen in a variety of ways. It seems to be a kind of disturbance, conscious or otherwise. It's a disturbance of the wavefunction. The main point, though, is that there aren't contradictions happening, as far as I can see.

Does " belief' make any sense at all beyond the scope of personal meanings, and how can the idea of belief be seen in the wider scope of philosophy, especially in relation to objective and subjective aspects of thinking? — Jack Cummins

The idea that a belief is dependent on personal or subjective meaning is just nonsense. Meanings occur within a culture of rule-based linguistic use. However, don't confuse this to mean that there are no subjective experiences or mind-based states, they are two different things. If we are talking about beliefs as expressed in language, then we are referring to those beliefs that can be said to be true or false based on what we, as language users, mean by those words, viz., true and false. This doesn't mean that there can't be subjective truths. For example, "I like orange juice" is either true or false based on my preferences, but what we mean by true and false is not determined by your preferences or your subjective experiences. It's a matter of understanding the difference between conscious experiences and language about conscious experiences, or any language that describes reality. So, whenever we speak about anything, subjective or objective, the language we use as a community has an objective component to it, viz., the meanings of the concepts/words.

My own view is that there can be beliefs (states-of-mind) that are quite apart from language, and these are reflected in our actions (i.e., we know that such beliefs exist based on the actions of individuals). These kinds of beliefs are not true or false (true and false are reserved for propositions, states-of-mind are not intrinsically propositional, no more than a pain is intrinsically propositional). To speak of them as true or false is to bring them into a linguistic setting. Part of the confusion is that we don't always see the difference between these two kinds of beliefs, i.e., the different settings or environments in which they occur.

The electron is not in any state until it's measured, so there is no contradiction. One could think of it as the potentiality of states, or, there is the probability that it will be in this state or that state when measured. So, it's not that it's both up and down at the same time.

This reply is only meant to address some of your concerns. It doesn't address your comments or questions about Godel.

Yet I suspect that many philosophers are skeptical about Dummett's argument: it smacks too much of positivism and Wittgensteinianism

Something is odd here. — Banno

Yes, I noticed that too. Devitt seems to mischaracterize Wittgenstein, at least it seems that way from this statement. Positivism doesn't equate to Wittgensteinianism, if that's his point. Although I'm not completely sure of his point.

I'm now reading the paper by Devitt.

Dummett's arguments are confusing, to say the least. If you can't be clear, one wonders if you have a good argument.

So to the first section, in which Devitt characterises realism as the view that physical entities exist independently of the mental. Devitt notes with considerable glee that there is nothing in this definition about truth. He goes on to point out that truth is independent of the evidence at hand. "Truth is one thing, our means of discovering it, another". Hence, according to Devitt, "no doctrine of truth is constitutive of realism". — Banno

I read the SEP article, and if I was to align myself with anyone it would be Devitt. Truth it seems is a property of language (proposition claims). However, reality (that which exists independent of the mind) is not about what we claim (what we claim may or may not align with reality), but about facts or states-of-affairs (things that are generally considered to be independent of minds) quite apart from what goes on in language. This has been my understanding of this argument, and I believe it's why Devitt says, "no doctrine of truth is constitutive of realism."

Hell, some of Wittgenstein's comments confuse the hell out of me. They almost seem to break down at a certain point. I'm still learning Banno, maybe if I live another 71 years I might grasp some of his thinking.

Ya, I agree, how we refer to these experiences can be a bit muddled. However, I won't resort to saying your English is poor. :wink:

I mean, do you agree that the implausibility of a claim may tend to undermine the credibility of the witness who makes the claim? Do you agree that "extraordinary cases" like those you indicated typically involve claims that are considered prima facie "implausible", regardless of the general credibility and expertise of the witness who makes the claim; and that for this reason, something in addition to that testimony is typically required to support the claim in question? — Cabbage Farmer

Sorry it took so long to respond. I think we generally agree, with some clarifications, or maybe some disagreement. Yes, I do agree that generally "...the implausibility of a claim tends to undermine the credibility" of that claim. However, I don't think that because something seems implausible, that it follows that it is. Many discoveries have been overturned in science because people considered what most find implausible. So, there has to be the right kind of balance, we tend to get to invested in certain worldviews, which can impede new discoveries.

I do agree that more is needed than just a claim, i.e., we need some objective way to verify claims that seem implausible. I'm not sure you read my argument which was given further down on the first page, but I go into detail about what is needed to support my inductive argument, i.e., what drives good testimonial evidence.