words lack essences — TheMadFool

I think we first need to be clear on what an essence is. We can start by tracing the philosophical idea of essence through history. Then a good strategy would be to start an inquiry why Wittgenstein rejected the idea of essences.

I think we first need to be clear on what an essence is. We can start by tracing the philosophical idea of essence through history. Then a good strategy would be to start an inquiry why Wittgenstein rejected the idea of essences. — Wheatley

An essence to my understanding is anything that sums up the true nature of a thing whatever that thing is. For example, let's stick to water, the essence of water (the referent of "water", not the sign/word "water" itself) is that which makes water water. :grin:

true nature of a thing whatever that thing is. — TheMadFool

essence of water — TheMadFool

is that which makes water water. — TheMadFool

:chin:

words lack essences — TheMadFool

Is it true that there is nothing that makes words words?

there's an, what I like to describe as, arbitrariness to words. There is no logical reason, no rationale, why "water" should refer to H2OH2O. — TheMadFool

I think what you are describing here is called a rigid designater, not an essence.

Is it true that there is nothing that makes words words? — Wheatley

Words are signs, they stand for things. What they stand for is up to us, whatever we fancy that is. That's Wittgenstein.

true nature of a thing whatever that thing is.
— TheMadFool
essence of water
— TheMadFool
is that which makes water water.
— TheMadFool — Wheatley

The essence of a thing is not the same as the essence of a word used to refer to that thing.

I think what you are describing here is called a rigid designater. — Wheatley

I don't think so. I'm attempting to go beyond the words, to the things themselves the word stands for.

Words are signs, they stand for things. What they stand for is up to us, whatever we fancy that is. That's Wittgenstein. — TheMadFool

That's just an assertion.

The essence of a thing is not the same as the essence of a word used to refer to that thing. — TheMadFool

I never suggested otherwise.

I don't think so. I'm attempting to go beyond the words, to the things themselves the word stands for. — TheMadFool

But you do mention words in your OP.

Words are signs, they stand for things. What they stand for is up to us, whatever we fancy that is. That's Wittgenstein.
— TheMadFool
That's just an assertion. — Wheatley

Do I have a choice?

The essence of a thing is not the same as the essence of a word used to refer to that thing.
— TheMadFool
I never suggested otherwise. — Wheatley

:ok:

I don't think so. I'm attempting to go beyond the words, to the things themselves the word stands for.
— TheMadFool
But you do mention words in your OP. — Wheatley

And...?

Do I have a choice? — TheMadFool

Well, you can quote Wittgenstein to support your argument.

I don't think so. I'm attempting to go beyond the words, to the things themselves the word stands for.
— TheMadFool
But you do mention words in your OP.
— Wheatley

And...? — TheMadFool

Okay, it's not a rigid designator. My mistake.

I don't know what I should've done. I'm just groping in the dark as far as I can tell.

Wittgenstein seems to be making a point on language - that words don't possess an essence or, positively speaking, meaning is use, and we could be, given that is so, talking past each other but language and philosophy are entirely different subjects. I'm left wondering though whether we can do any philosophy without language and this reminds me of noumena and phenomena.

Meaning is not use. You have to be a bit more precise.

And, why would you wonder if we could do philosophy without language. Of course we couldn't. It would be like asking if trains could pull themselves without the locomotive.

Meaning is not use. You have to be a bit more precise. — Sam26

The notion itself lacks exactitude. You can't fix a blurry image by getting corrective glasses.

And, why would you wonder if we could do philosophy without language. Of course we couldn't. It would be like asking if trains could pull themselves without the locomotive. — Sam26

IF you're right, all hope is lost.

:flower:

Meaning is not use. You have to be a bit more precise.
— Sam26

The notion itself lacks exactitude. You can't fix a blurry image by getting corrective glasses.

And, why would you wonder if we could do philosophy without language. Of course we couldn't. It would be like asking if trains could pull themselves without the locomotive.
— Sam26

IF you're right, all hope is lost. — TheMadFool

I said you have to be a bit more precise, not exact. In language, sometimes a blurry image is just what we need. However, in this case, if you're correct that meaning equates to use, then any use of a word in any context would necessitate its meaning, and this isn't true. What about incorrect uses? People use words incorrectly all the time, is their incorrect use driving the meaning of the word? No.

Language is the main tool of philosophy, it's where philosophy lives and breathes. Why would you suppose that all hope is lost if this is the case?

The aim of philosophy is to get to the truth. Language is both friend and foe in this enterprise. By helping us form mental pictures (maps) it allows us to analyze reality (territory) but as it so happens, it has its peculiarities, it's too flexible I guess.

I said you have to be a bit more precise, not exact. In language, sometimes a blurry image is just what we need. — Sam26

It's the same thing in my book. That's precisely/exactly what I meant too.

However, in this case, if you're correct that meaning equates to use, then any use of a word in any context would necessitate its meaning, and this isn't true. — Sam26

Ignoratio elenchi. Wittgenstein, and I too, am talking about words and not meaning.

Language is the main tool of philosophy, it's where philosophy lives and breathes. Why would you suppose that all hope is lost if this is the case? — Sam26

Language is a tool alright, a good one at that, but not the best.

I agree, language can be friend or foe depending on your understanding of how language works. I don't think that language is used to give us mental pictures to allow us to understand reality. I'm not saying we don't get mental pictures, but this isn't something we should rely on to understand reality. Who's mental picture is correct? In many ways it's correct to say that propositions picture reality, or mirror reality, but this isn't the same as a mental picture. You're close to falling into the hole of words equating to mental objects.

I'm not going to argue about this issue. It's been argued about a millions times in this forum.

I agree, language can be friend or foe depending on your understanding of how language works. I don't think that language is used to give us mental pictures to allow us to understand reality. I'm not saying we don't get mental pictures, but this isn't something we should rely on to understand reality. Who's mental picture is correct? In many ways it's correct to say that propositions picture reality, or mirror reality, but this isn't the same as a mental picture — Sam26

You're contradicting yourself but I get the point.

You're close to falling into the hole of words equating to mental objects. — Sam26

Thanks for the heads up. :up:

I'm not going to argue about this issue. It's been argued about a millions times in this forum. — Sam26

Suit yourself.

Nothing personal, I just don't want to keep repeating myself.

Nothing personal, I just don't want to keep repeating myself. — Sam26

Same here! Most of my ideas/thoughts seem to belong to someone else if being the original thinker amounts to owning an idea. If you have any issues, go talk to them. Thank you.

Update

The so-called linguistic turn in philosophy, allegedly initiated by Ludwig Wittgenstein, is said to have reduced philosophy to language. In other words, philosophy is an aspect of language lacking, to my reckoning, any distinct identity in and of itself. It's kinda like saying physics is, all said and done, just math. :chin:

I haven't really familiarized myself with Wittgenstein in detail but from what I've gathered, I basically agree with everything he says about language.

I think his main issue is that language was made for things we can grasp. As you say, language was a map of the territory. But what territory does it display?

Now, I always say context is important. Wittgenstein believed so too. Even a map is useless without context. What part of the territory is being displayed? What do the symbols display? Where am I on this map? How do I have to align the map so that it matches my direction?

Our human context is the experiences we gather through our senses. That is to say, the context of our language map is the physical world we live in. Everything we can touch, smell, feel, see and hear. Eventually we started incorperating elements into our language that can not be perceived though. It shifted from being representative to descriptive - and in the process a whole lot of "things" have been made up.

The word "metaphysical", meta standing for beyond or rather above physical, says it all. If language is a map of our world, how can it describe something that is beyond our world? How can we talk about something that we can neither touch, nor smell, hear, feel or see?

We do manage somehow. Partly. But there's definitely a point to be raised how philosophical discussion in large parts consists of people debating words, arguing about their definition for things that have no real world counterpart.

This is by no means a new problem though. Prominently, Plato comes to mind - where in Euthyphro, Socrates diligently and patiently tries to learn the meaning of "being pious" from Euthyphro only to go around in circles and ultimately not finding an answer to what the word "piety" and all it entails represents.

I haven't really familiarized myself with Wittgenstein in detail but from what I've gathered, I basically agree with everything he says about language. — Hermeticus

That's interesting, because from what I've gathered, there's a great deal of disagreement about what he means, among those who have really familiarised themselves with what he said.

That's interesting, because from what I've gathered, there's a great deal of disagreement about what he means, among those who have really familiarised themselves with what he said. — Daemon

Which again showcases what Wittgenstein is trying to say about philosophical discussion. There is a great deal of disagreement about any topic concerning the non-physical. Regardless of how much anyone entertains themselves with such ideas.

There's an, what I like to describe as, arbitrariness to words. — TheMadFool

Saussure liked to describe it that way too. All of linguistics since Saussure likes to describe it that way.

And Shakespeare:

A rose by any other name would smell as sweet

You can go back to the Cratylus for some arguments pro and con.

Grice distinguished between natural meaning (clouds mean rain) and non-natural meaning ("clouds" in English means clouds).

There's a bit more to Wittgenstein than recognizing the arbitrariness of the sign.

There's a bit more to Wittgenstein than recognizing the arbitrariness of the sign. — Srap Tasmaner

What might that be?

Now, I always say context is important. Wittgenstein believed so too. — Hermeticus

This is problematic. The significance of context was known way before Wittgenstein was even born. His theory of language games must be about something else entirely; if not, why all the fuss? Is this much ado about nothing? Something was/is probably lost in translation?