Is there somewhere in the text where Witt states that hinge propositions, or indubitable propositions, are neither true nor false? — Luke

No, but I think it follows from his ideas.

The negation of 2+2=4. Maybe you haven't been following everything that's been said. I've been pointing out that these basic mathematical propositions are hinges, so that generally we don't say that they're true or false, except in particular contexts.

Wittgenstein points out that one of the ways we can see how unclear the sense of Moore's proposition is, is to point out its negation. I think we can do this generally with all hinge-propositions, which is why I said to consider its negation. It's false that 2+2=4.

Hi Luke,

One thing is for sure much of this depends on context, even Moore's proposition "I know this is a hand," has a use on particular occasions, Wittgenstein stipulates this. This seems to be what he's saying in OC 10 when he says, "'2x2=4' is a true proposition of arithmetic--not 'on particular occasions' nor 'always,'"
although, to be honest, I'm not sure. Again, though, consider its negation.

Wittgenstein found Moore's common sense approach as a reply to the sceptic interesting, as it had similarities with his own nascent thoughts about hinge propositions. However he disagreed with Moore's use of the word "know". — RussellA

My interpretation and the interpretations of others who agree is that Wittgenstein found Moore's statements interesting because he found something special about them, not because there were similarities in their thinking. In fact, Wittgenstein goes to great lengths to point out the contrast between the way Moore is responding to the skeptic, and the way he might respond, or the way we should respond to the radical skeptic. It is true that Wittgenstein disagreed with Moore's use of the word know, this we know for sure.

Moore could have said "here is one hand", meaning that ontologically in the world there is an object "one hand". For Wittgenstein, "here is one hand" is a fact in the world, it is not an interpretation, it has no truth value right or wrong, is therefore not open to doubt, is therefore not open to the sceptic and therefore a hinge proposition. — RussellA

For Wittgenstein, even the statement "There are physical objects (OC 35)," is nonsense. He goes on to ask, "Is it supposed to be an empirical proposition?" Moore did say "here is one" in the sense that you put forth, but that still would have failed (if I'm following your point). Moreover, Wittgenstein isn't saying that "here is one hand" is a fact in the world. Do you see somewhere where he says that?

We do not question their truth we accept it. — Fooloso4

It's true that we accept hinge-propositions, but we don't accept them because their true, truth has nothing to do with it. In fact, they're not even propositions in the true sense of the word, which is why Wittgenstein refers to them in many different ways. If Moore had said "It's true that I have a hand," it would have been just as unintelligible. In order to see how unclear the statement is, consider it's negation (as Wittgenstein points out in OC 4), "It's false that I have a hand," and here we see just how senseless the statement is. Only in certain contexts would these statements make sense, just as in certain contexts Moore's statements would make sense, but generally to utter these kinds of statements is a misfiring attempt to say what cannot be said.

And, most, if not all of the quotes you give that you think lend support to your position, don't. However, I'm not going to go through each quote when all that is needed is to look at the beginning of OC. He spells out the problems with these kinds of statements.

I may later address some of these quotes, but not at the moment.

Hinge concepts are indubitable. That is, they are not to be subject to doubt; hence, they are "outside our epistemological concepts of true and false"... I don't think Sam is overdoing it here. That 12x12=144 is not subject to doubt; it could not be false, and hence is outside our considerations of true and false... that's how I am reading Sam, and I think WItti thought along similar lines. — Banno

This is correct. As soon as you allow true and false to enter the picture it destroys the idea of what a hinge is supposed to be. It allows the doubt to enter the picture. If I ask how you know it's true, or how do you know it's false we are back to Moore's mistake. Hinge-propositions are what support our language of epistemology. They provide the foundation to epistemology.

A bit of personal information before I go: I have more than a passing acquaintance with this text. I did my dissertation on Wittgenstein. It is gratifying to see that in the years since I presented a new generation of scholars have come to see things as I do. — Fooloso4

That's great that you did your dissertation on Wittgenstein. I too welcome you to the discussion. I also have more than a passing interest in OC and Wittgenstein. I've been studying W. off and on for over 40 years. Moreover, I can cite plenty of scholars who agree with how I'm interpreting W. However, this doesn't mean that either of us can't be wrong. There are many scholars who have misinterpreted W., the universities are littered with them. To be honest though, in all my readings, I've never encountered your interpretation, that's not to say that others haven't interpreted W. the way you do. I just have never encountered it in my readings.

I don't believe QM violates the law of non-contradiction either. I suspect that most physicists don't believe it, but I'm not sure. Much of this depends on how one interprets QM, and/or what theory of QM you believe. None of us are experts in QM, so I think we're a bit out of our depth.

I'm going to back up a bit and try to clarify. Why is it that Wittgenstein writes OC? It's specifically in response to Moore's papers (Proof of an External World and A Defense of Common Sense).

I'm going to reference Ray Monk's book The Duty of Genius because it's probably one of the best researched books ever written on Wittgenstein's life.

"Wittgenstein's own view of scepticism remained that succinctly expressed in the Tractatus: 'Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked.' And it is in connection with this view of scepticism that he found something philosophically interesting about Moore's 'common sense propositions'. They do not give examples of 'certain knowledge', but, rather, examples of cases in which doubt is nonsensical. [This is the hallmark of a hinge-proposition.] If we could seriously doubt that Moore was holding up two hands, there would be no reason no to doubt anything else, including the trustworthiness of our senses. And in that case the whole framework in which we raise doubts and answer them would collapse: 'Certain propositions belong to my "frame of reference". If I had to give them up, I shouldn't be able to judge anything.' One such proposition might be the statement: 'That's a tree', said while standing in front of a tree:...

"The idea that there are certain judgements (among them, some of Moore's statements of common sense) that belong to our frame of reference [another hallmark of a hinge-proposition], and as such cannot sensibly be doubted, was developed by Wittgenstein in the work written during the eighteen months left of his life following his visit to the United States [referring to On Certainty] (pp. 557, 558, Duty of Genius)."

In OC 1 Wittgenstein comments that "If you do know that here is one hand, [taken from Moore's two papers] we'll grant you all the rest." So, Wittgenstein is challenging Moore's use of the word know in Moore's statement. However, keep in mind that the idea of a hinge-proposition doesn't even come up until later, he hasn't yet developed the idea, but if you read OC carefully you'll see how the idea immerges from Wittgenstein's thinking.

In OC 2 we again see one of the hallmarks of a hinge-proposition, "What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it." Doubt what? Doubt Moore's proposition, given in OC 1. In OC 4 Wittgenstein gives another example of this kind of statement, i.e., a statement like Moore's. "I know that I am a human being." In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider it's negation." Considering the negation of a hinge-proposition is a way of seeing how unclear it is to doubt the statement.

OC 6 asks, "Now can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.--For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused." The point is that we don't know what Moore claims to know in these statements, they are unusual to say the least, and Wittgenstein points this out as he tries to figure out the nature of Moore's propositions.

So, there is a reason Wittgenstein doesn't call Moore's propositions hinges, he hasn't yet developed the idea fully. In fact he dies before ever developing the idea fully.

Most interpetations of OC include Moore's propositions as hinge-propositions. I just don't see how you can read OC without coming to that conclusion. It seems rather obvious. I've read a good deal on this subject and it seems to be the consensus.

I'm not asking you to leave, I'm just saying that maybe you have something important to say, and that might be done in a different thread. You can continue making comments makes no difference to me.

I think that you have grossly inflated the significance of what is nothing more than a statement of the obvious. More importantly, this traditional picture of foundations is rejected by Wittgenstein. He reverses the order: — Fooloso4

Maybe you should start your own analysis in another thread.

OC 66 begins the second of four divisions in W. notes.

"I make assertions about reality, assertions which have different degrees of assurance. How does the degree of assurance come out? What consequences has it (OC 66)?"

In the language-game of epistemology, which is what OC is concerned with, we make assertions about reality. For example, Moore's statement that "This is a hand," his own hand that is, is just such a statement. However, let's consider other such statements in different contexts. For instance, I'm in a room that isn't well lit, and I think what I see is a hand, I say, "I think that's a hand," as you strain to see what it is you're looking at. Another instance might be seeing what a magician presents as his hand while doing a magicians illusion. You're not sure what it is you're looking at. These kinds of statements give us differing degrees of assurance based on context. Much of what we think we know is based on "degrees of assurance," i.e., it's probability based.

One way that different degrees of assurance comes out is based on context. Are there good reasons to doubt in both of my examples. Yes. In my first example there is insufficient light, which gives rise to the doubt. In the second example we're watching the performance of a magician, whose is purposely misleading you. Again, good reasons for the doubt. However, in Moore's example one wonders what a doubt would look like. The case for a doubt in Moore's presentation seems lacking, to say the least, which is probably why Moore uses the example. "[A]re we to say that certainty is merely a constructed point to which some things approximate more, some less closely? No. Doubt gradually loses its sense. This language-game just is like that (OC 56)." This is just the way we describe what we mean by hand in English, it's part of the logic of language. It's part of linguistic training. How do you know this is a hand? It's what we mean by hand. When we teach a child how to use the word hand correctly a doubt might arise about whether the child has learned to use the word properly.

The radical skeptic seems to think that his doubts can take place in a rational argument, but the truth is that this kind of doubting undermines all arguments, especially the ones put forth by the skeptic. When the doubts reach this level, you can't even be sure of the meaning of your words. It's self-defeating. The doubt loses all meaning. There are rational doubts, but these must be distinguished from the doubts of the radical skeptic.

Is it even possible that the world around us doesn't exist? Is it possible that we've miscalculated in all of our calculations (OC 55)?" The answer is obvious with a little thought.

The fact that you are doubting your existence, shows your existence. The question, in a Wittgensteinian way lacks sense.

As you know, the only example of a hinge proposition is a mathematical proposition. To exclude mathematical propositions from what is true or false is problematic to say the least. — Fooloso4

I'm going to make one more comment before moving on, because I don't want any confusion about what I'm saying. It's not true that the only example of a hinge proposition is a mathematical proposition. There are mathematical hinges, such as, 1+1=2 or 2+2=4 and so on. However, I'm not sure why you would say these are the only examples of hinges. The reason the book is written is because Wittgenstein is saying that there is something special about Moore's proposition, viz., "I know this is a hand," which is by definition, given the context, a hinge-proposition. Moreover, there are many other hinge-propositions. For example, the rules of chess are hinge-propositions.

I didn't exclude mathematical propositions from being true or false, only hinge mathematical propositions. Only propositions that are hinges (mathematical or otherwise) are excluded from truth or falsity.

We do not doubt hinge propositions because they are somehow beyond doubt, but rather because of everything that hinges on them. To call them into question would be to call everything that revolves around them into question. It is fundamental to the logic of our investigations that certain propositions stand without question. It is fundamental to our way of life that certain propositions are not called into question. "If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (343)." — Fooloso4

I agree with some of this, but not all of it. It's the first sentence of this paragraph that is problematic.

If a proposition by its very nature is a hinge, then it's not doubtable. The hinge stands in a certain relation to the reality around us (the objects or things that make up the world), and to all the other propositions that connect to hinge-propositions. It's the hinge that stays put (which is why it's not doubtable), just as the reality around us stays put, at least generally, and it's because of this unique status that hinges cannot be doubted. They're bedrock, i.e., they allow the door to swing. The door being all the other propositions that are not hinges.

Two things must remain solid in order for most of the propositions of language (including mathematical propositions) to function. First, reality itself (the door frame), second, the hinge-proposition (hinge connecting to the door frame), these two remain fixed, which in turn allows the door of our life of language to function. If these things were not fixed, then no linguistic culture, no language-game of epistemology.

Maybe this clears some things up, but I'm not hopeful.

"The Earth revolves around the Sun" is a hinge proposition. But at one time "the Sun revolves around the Earth" was a hinge proposition. It was not simply a matter of correcting a mistake. The fate of man hinged on it. — Fooloso4

I think this misses the point of what a hinge-proposition is. What makes something a hinge is not what people accept as true or false, which are epistemological ideas, but they are concepts that lie outside our epistemological concepts of true and false, and what it means to know. This is the whole point of Wittgenstein's challenge. If hinges can be said to be true or false, then it makes sense that we can doubt that the proposition is true or false. This idea allows Moore's problem (the problem as W. sees it) to creep back into our thinking.

An important part of Wittgenstein's analysis is how he looks at Moorean propositions. Propositions like "This is a hand," "There are physical objects," and "The Earth has existed for longer than five minutes," these propositions seem to have the form of an empirical proposition. "The wavelength of light is around 700 nanometers," is an example of an empirical proposition, and it is capable of being verified or nullified. However, Wittgenstein points out that a proposition like, "There are physical objects," is nonsense (OC 35). These kinds of statements form the logical structure that supports language, which seems to be why Wittgenstein refers to them as logical concepts. They are a kind of bridge between the world and our thinking, and language itself. They are the logical bedrock from which language gains its foothold, without which the language of knowing and doubting would have no meaning. It would be like playing the game of chess without the rules that govern the game.

"I know this is a hand," "...is a misfiring attempt to express what can't be expressed like that (OC 37)"

I can't imagine Moore responding to the skeptic in terms of just his conviction. Obviously he thought it was more than that. However, W. says that this is ultimately what Moore's propositions seem to be, viz., a conviction of sorts. W. probably wouldn't have responded to Moore's papers if they were just expressing a conviction. At least that's my guess. There is something special about Moorean propositions, but not what Moore thinks, and this is what prompts W. response.

Ya, the skeptic would still get the same treatment as far as I can tell. OC probably wouldn't have been written if Moore expressed his argument in some other way.

If Moore was using "I am certain..." as a synonym for "I know.." it wouldn't make any difference (see OC 8).

The radical skeptic doesn't seem to understand the limiting use of the language-game of doubt. Both Moore's use of know, and the radical skeptic's use of doubt have limitations, just as all words do. Wittgenstein is pointing out these limitations by showing how the words break down, how they can lose their sense. He shows how the logic behind their use is lost. It's as if I've removed the bishop from the chess board and I'm playing on some other surface. It may look familiar because it seems to be moving diagonally, but it's deceiving because although it looks like a game, it's not. At least it's not a chess game. We've removed the bishop from its natural setting where it functions, into an unnatural setting where it isn't functioning. I'm making moves that lack coherent sense.

The radical sceptic makes a valid point in pointing out that whilst Wittgenstein argues that each language game has its own set of hinge propositions, he did not justify why one set of propositional hinges should be more exempt from doubt than others. — RussellA

First, hinge-propositions, or what I call basic beliefs or foundational beliefs (foundation carries other baggage though), are outside any of our epistemological considerations (I think this is an accurate interpretation of W.), so they (the hinges) don't require any justification, nor can they be said to be true or false. The only kind of epistemological connection they have is that they're beliefs, but even this falls away when considering non-linguistic beliefs.

Second, the nature of these basic beliefs, is that they're all exempt from doubt for the reasons he gives throughout OC. One being, if we are referring to Moorean propositions, the doubt lacks sense, or as W. points out "what would such a doubt be like?, and don't understand this straight off (OC 24)." All basic beliefs (or hinges if you will) have this characteristic. If they don't, then they're not basic. Moreover, if it makes sense to doubt "This is a hand," in a particular context, then it also follows that, it's not basic. I think Wittgenstein gives good reasons why all basic beliefs are exempt from doubt.

but I would also agree with Grayling that the biggest philsophical problem with On Certainty is OC 2, in that the framework within which propositional hinges operate are themselves relative, and hard to resist against radical scepticism. — RussellA

I think Grayling is incorrect about this. While it's true that basic beliefs are relative to the reality we find ourselves in, it's also true that the skeptic finds himself in the same reality, so their use of the word doubt is also dependent on that reality. The use of relative here needs to be clarified.

One use of "I know..." that I find particularly problematic in our culture is the tendency to think that only science can give us a firm footing when it comes to epistemology. This tendency limits the use of "I know...," and stifles what it means to have knowledge. No doubt, science is an important tool in gaining knowledge, but obviously it's not the only tool. However, the tendency is for people to use science as a cudgel, as if you don't really know until science investigates it. I don't need science to tell me there is an apple tree in my backyard, at least not generally, I can see it. I don't need science to tell me the orange juice is sweet, I can taste it. Much of our testimonial evidence is not backed up by science. For example, a friend comes back from a trip to England (assuming the friend is trustworthy), and tells me that he saw this and that, I take it as good evidence that what he said is accurate, unless there is a good reason to think otherwise. There are many other examples, but I think you get the point.

Even in mathematics we run into the same kinds of problems. Compare, "I know this calculation is correct (some long drawn out calculus calculation)," with "I know 2+2=4." It's easier to imagine the former use of "I know" being incorrect, than the latter. The latter use of "I know..." is akin to Moore's claim. What would a mistake in the latter proposition look like? What form would a doubt take?

"But can it be seen from a rule what circumstances logically exclude a mistake in the employment of rules of calculation (OC 26)?" However, Wittgenstein asks, "What use is a rule to us here?" After all if we can make mistakes in our calculations, certainly we can make mistakes in applying a rule.

Is there some rule that can be applied to Moore's propositions? No, there isn't, at best we can give something akin to a rule (OC 27), for e.g., "in normal circumstances." "And we recognize normal circumstances but cannot precisely describe them. At most, we can describe a range of abnormal ones (OC 27)."

"What is learning a rule?--This. What is 'making a mistake in applying it'?--This. And what is pointed to here is something indeterminate (OC 28)."

Understanding these points gives us a glimpse into why it's difficult to follow Wittgenstein's points about Moore. It's not clear cut, it's indeterminate. You have to wrestle your way to the finish line.

The purpose of this analysis is to try to dig deeper into Wittgenstein's thinking. Many of you know that I've done this before. However, in this analysis I'm trying to shed new light on Wittgenstein's thinking (i.e., new for me, not new in general).

My contention is that Moore's propositions are akin to strong beliefs and/or strong convictions (Wittgenstein seems to say the same thing). The tendency is for us to want to use know when expressing a strongly held belief or conviction, it seems to add some force behind our statement. However, words don't get meaning from some inward feeling or state. The constant contrast between the inner (the subjective), and the outer use of these words (societal or cultural usage) is a contrast one must keep in mind in order to get clear on the problem Wittgenstein is trying to convey. Losing this contrast causes much confusion.

Not only does Wittgenstein compare the use of know with the use of doubt, as pointed out in previous posts, but he also asks us how a mistake would be possible in Moore's use of know. Moore seems to be saying that a mistake is not possible, as he says, "Here is one hand." And, if Moore would have left it at that, he would have had a stronger case, but he attached "I know..." to the statement, and it's here that problems arise. One problem is the connection between "I know..." and doubting, and the other is the connection between "I know..." and making a mistake. Seeing these connections is important if we don't want the force of "I know.." to be such that one can leap from the utterance of a statement (OC 21) to the truth of a statement. As if I can't be wrong or making a mistake. The possibility of being wrong is logically connected to "I know..." in fundamental ways.

Wittgenstein pointed out though, earlier (OC 13), that we can infer from our own statement that we know, but not from the statements of others. It must be demonstrated that you know to others. "'I know' often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement," i.e., we want to make sure you're not making a mistake. What are your grounds (the doubt), let's double check this (making sure there is no mistake). This either leads to "Ahh, you are correct," or "There is a mistake here." The question arises, how does Moore's use of "I know..." allow for the correction? It doesn't. Moore's use of "I know.." is supposed to have the force of truth in and of itself, but that would be weird.

Moore has found something significant though, and Wittgenstein respects Moore's for this. Moore has pointed out something special about these kinds of statements (Moorean statements or facts). They seem to provide a kind of foundational belief that is not only fundamental to epistemology, but fundamental to language. For myself, I have concluded that it leads to non-linguistic beliefs, but I've said enough about that, let's not debate this again. :nerd:

It's tough on philosophers, to be deprived of obvious choices. I know between certainty and doubt, one has to go but to disallow both is going to leave even the best thinkers scratching their heads.

I can get a handle on how certainty can be questioned but to claim, if I read the OP correctly, that doubt ain't it too is as perplexing as it is depressing. — TheMadFool

Wittgenstein isn't disallowing the use of know and doubt, he is saying that in some cases philosophers are not using the words correctly. By the way, I know that in some cases we use the word certainty as a synonym for know, but to avoid confusion I stick with Moore's use of know.

Wittgenstein said that language has meaning within the context of its language game, meaning is determined by use, and the language game corresponds to a reality. A game such as chess has rules, but different games have different rules. A language game may be internally logically coherent and correspond to a reality, but each language game will correspond to a different reality. I look at the optical illusion "Rabbit and Duck" and see a rabbit, my reality is the rabbit. Another person looks and sees a duck, their reality is the duck. We may have the same perception but arrive at different interpretations. The sceptic may rightly ask for what reason should one interpretation have precedence over another. — RussellA

Yes, part of what Wittgenstein said is that language derives meaning within the context of a language-game, and that meaning is closely connected with how we use a word in language-games. However, this is not to say that all language-games have the same force, or that we can arbitrarily make up any language-game and derive meaning from it. The same is true of use, I can't arbitrarily use words the way I want without the loss of meaning.

Not all language-games or all uses are correct. If I teach a child how to use the word pencil, and later the child points to a cat, and says, pencil, then their use of the word is incorrect, even if it's used in a particular language-game. Furthermore, note that use gets its force within a culture of agreement, and even this has its limits. So, there is a kind of objective reality in our agreement (at least generally). If there wasn't we wouldn't be able to communicate.

If I understand you correctly, you seem to be saying that each of us has a different reality (a subjective view of things), which in turn causes us to interpret things differently. Without getting into your use of the word reality, suffice it to say that you, just as the child in my example, cannot derive meaning based on how you, personally, use words. No more than you can play the game of chess by using your own rules. No one would know what you're doing. You wouldn't be playing the game of chess, as much as you might protest. After all, you might protest, it's my reality.

Meaning is derived within our world of reality, but it's not subjective, i.e., it's not something I personally determine. Meaning is derived from the social nature of language within the confines of an agreed upon reality (the agreement is general in nature). The fact that the Earth has one moon cannot be seen in the same light as the duck rabbit illustration. I don't look at the moon and see two moons while you see one. Reality, in general, is not like the duck rabbit picture.

You seem to think that all interpretations are equal, and this goes back to your subjective view (or the skeptics subjective view as you presented it), as if my interpretation is the only one that counts for me. However, if I want to use language as a tool to communicate, then there are standards that correspond to the correct use of the words within that language. The standard is derived from a community of language users, not through some internal reality.

If the skeptic replies "why should one interpretation have precedence over another," then one could answer, that not all interpretations are equal. In other words, in terms of language and the language-game, again, meaning is not a matter of your personal interpretation. The radical skeptic (I'm referring to a specific kind of skepticism, not all skepticism) is not playing the game correctly. And, this must be viewed from outside our subjective view. It's viewed by looking at the community of language users, not one's personal interpretation. One's personal interpretation may or may not line up with the community, and this corresponds to the correct or incorrect interpretation. When I say correct and incorrect, I'm speaking generally, if it wasn't true generally, language would simply fall apart.

I'm not denying the subjective, I'm simply saying that the subjective has nothing to do with how meaning is derived within a society of language users.

Note that if one claims to know, then it means that in some way he has verified his claim (as pointed out in the previous post). But more than this, it has to be possible for him to make sure that his claim is correct, i.e., that he really does know what he claims to know. However, in Moore's case what would it mean to make sure? Do I have a closer look at my hand to make sure it's not my foot? It's the making sure part that lacks sense in Moore's case.

If I claim to know the history of England, there are ways to verify my knowledge. And, note, that if someone doubts that you are an English historian, there are ways to remove the doubt, so to speak, by objectively verifying one's claim. The doubts of others is why one's claim to know needs justification. But what if one's claim to knowledge brings no doubt to mind. In other words, what if we generally can't doubt a particular claim (like Moore's claim, that he knows he has hands)? I'm talking about particular claims within specified contexts (for e.g. Moore's context). If Moore's claim cannot be doubted, i.e., we cannot imagine its justification, then it's not a knowledge claim. How we come to doubt someone's claim to knowledge is important in terms of understanding the correct use of know. Again, if it's not possible to doubt in a given context, then it's not possible to know. The proper doubts of others, is what tests our claims. This is why Wittgenstein points out the importance of the phrase "I thought I knew." It's the doubt that brings the negation of "I know." It's also the doubt that can affirm one's claim to knowledge.

"It's not a matter of Moore's knowing that there's a hand there, but rather we should not understand him if he were to say 'Of course I may be wrong about this'. We should ask 'What is it like to make such a mistake as that?'--e.g. what's it like to discover it was a mistake (OC 32)?"

"We just do not see how very specialized the use of 'I know' is (OC 11).

"For 'I know seems [my emphasis] to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression 'I thought I knew' (OC 12)."

There are clearly a variety of correct uses of the words "I know," and each of these correct uses reflects one of the several ways we are able to objectively verify how it is we know that something is or is not the case. Some of the ways we verify how it is we know, include, logic (inductive and deductive reasoning), sensory experience (I know the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it), linguistic training (I learn how to correctly use words through linguistic training.), and finally, testimony (much of what we learn and know comes through the testimony of others). These are some of the ways we learn to correctly use the word know. Each of these ways gives a justification to our claim to know. One must demonstrate or show that one really does know. The claim "I know," does nothing by itself. All it is doing is showing your conviction that you know. One's conviction is only an assurance, but surely that is not enough to make the claim that you know (OC 15).

Given that this is the way we use the word know, what is the problem with Moore's proposition? The problem (one of the problems) is that Moore is using the word know in conjunction with a statement that generally has no need of justification. There are some basic statements about reality that do not need any justification, i.e., in some way they are foundational. These propositions (more like pseudo propositions) have the function of supporting our language, and hence, the language-game of epistemology. Wittgenstein never really worked out how we should describe these kinds of statements. He refers to them in a variety of ways. He calls them hinge-propositions, bedrock propositions, foundational propositions, etc. In OC 415 Wittgenstein says, "...certain propositions seem to underlie all questions and all thinking." This is one of the reasons I refer to these propositions as a kind of foundation, without which we no language. It seems to follow from this that talk of knowing falls apart without these bedrock propositions.

I think what Wittgenstein is referring to is a bedrock or foundational belief that undergirds everything. I do not think they should be called propositions.

OC 9 brings up an important point about Moorean propositions. Do we in general makes sure that we know that this is a hand, or this is a tree, or that we live on planet Earth? This is not to say that there can't be instances where we doubt these propositions (OC 23), as Wittgenstein points this out, but we are not talking about contexts where it makes sense to doubt "this is a hand," but contexts, like the Moorean context, where a doubt doesn't normally arise. "Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand--my own hand, that is?" No. Do doubts normally arise about such things? And how far would we get if we did doubt such things? This brings us back to the supporting structure that gives language its foothold. The language of doubting is sustained only because the supporting structure (reality) supports it. Remove the supporting structure and there are no doubts, because there is no language. We learn to trust things first, then we learn what it means to not trust.

Moore said that these rules are the rules of common sense, and has been criticised for not justifying to the sceptic why common sense should be the basis for the rules. — RussellA

Yes, Moore did believe that his propositions were common sense propositions that all of us know, but Wittgenstein is challenging this idea. To most us it seems that Moore is correct. I mean if we don't know this is a hand, then what do we know?

OC 6 brings up an important point (Wittgenstein says an "extremely important" point) about mental states and the connection to Moore's misuse of know. I think to understand Wittgenstein's point one must understand the context of Moore's presentation, which is given before an audience. "Here is one hand," Moore's claim is that he knows this. Such a statement, as Moore holds up his hand, is what reveals the mental state Wittgenstein is writing about, i.e., according to Wittgenstein Moore's proposition is more of a conviction about what he believes, not a case of what he knows. In OC 42 Wittgenstein refers to the mental state of conviction expressed "by tone of voice in speaking, by gestures etc." Why does Wittgenstein see it this way? One reason is that Wittgenstein sees Moore's propositions as special kinds of propositions, that in given contexts can't be expressed in this way. Why this is the case is the subject of Wittgenstein's investigation in OC. We will try to bring forth these ideas as we move along.

In OC 7 Wittgenstein points out the important idea of showing a belief. He says, "My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on." Then he gives an example of showing, "I tell a friend e.g. 'Take that chair over there', 'Shut the door', etc. etc." These are only one or two examples of how we show a belief. The mere act of sitting in the chair or opening the door shows that we believe there is a chair or a door. Acts alone, show, or have the potential to show what we believe.

The idea that there is a supporting structure to language is very important if you want to understand Wittgenstein's thinking about knowing and doubting (and words in general). The supporting structure (reality, if you will), and the culture that develops within this structure, sets the limits of use. Just as a board in chess limits the use of its pieces within the game, although, language is a bit more flexible in terms of the use of words. But, not so flexible that we can do whatever we want with the words we use. The tendency is for us to think that there is something within (the inner subjective me) that controls meaning and/or the use of words. This isn't always easy to see or understand, Moore fell victim to it without realizing the implications of his use of know.

Once we understand the limits of language (how we use words like know and doubt), then we can see how some uses of words have gone beyond the board of use. It's as if we've removed the bishop from the board and are using it in our imaginary game. However, it's even more strange than this, because others are also playing the same imaginary game. When others join in, this gives us the illusion that we're really playing the game. There is a very subtle loss of meaning when we do this. It certainly looks like we're playing the same game. After all, we're using the same pieces (same words, i.e., they're spelled the same), but we're moving them in strange ways. Ways that violate the original intent of the pieces and their use.

Yes, good response.

The point Wittgenstein is making about Moore's claim to know is that it's a misuse of the word know. Moreover, he contrasts knowing with doubting because of the close association between the use of these words. "I know..." is suppose to have the intended effect of tamping down any doubts that you don't know. Both knowing and doubting must be reasonable, i.e., the implicit rules that govern these words must be followed. To doubt everything, as Descartes did, not only trivializes the concept of doubting, but shows a fundamental misunderstanding of how doubting logically works. To doubt everything as Descartes did lacks sense. There has to be a framework in which doubting gets its meaning. That framework allows doubting to take place, to gain a foothold. You have to at least be sure of the meaning of your words, otherwise what would it mean to doubt. Descartes didn't really doubt everything. He surely didn't doubt what it means to doubt.

Radical skepticism is incoherent. On the other hand, so is Moore's argument that he knows "this is a hand." The same thing that grounds the correct use of doubting, also grounds the correct use of knowing. Both inextricably rely on the backdrop of reality itself, otherwise there is no foothold for doubting or knowing to get their meaning. Just as chess relies on the board and pieces in order to play the game. If you doubt the board and pieces, where do you go from there? You can't play the game.

The rules of language, or the rules of correct usage, tell us how we are to use these concepts (knowing and doubting). They're not created in a vacuum, but in a culture of correct usage. We can't just create our own uses, as many people do, and expect something coherent. To be fair, though, it must be said that many incorrect uses have to be pointed out because they're very difficult to see.

"13. For it is not as though the proposition "It is so" could be inferred from someone else's utterance: "I know it is so". Nor from the utterance together with its not being a lie. - But can't I infer "It is so" from my own utterance "I know etc."? Yes; and also "There is a hand there" follows from the proposition "He knows that there's a hand there". But from his utterance "I know..." it does not follow that he does know it."

There's some beautiful analysis of first, second and third person accounts here.

Anyone care to unpack this? — Banno

Because someone asserts that they know, that in itself is not enough to conclude that one does indeed know. That one knows needs to be demonstrated in one of the language-games of knowing. Even if it's determined that your not lying when you utter the words "I know...," it still is problematic without the demonstration of how you know.

Can you infer from your own utterance that you know? Yes. I can infer that I know based on the evidence that leads me to the conclusion that I know. I know that I know.

"There is a hand there" follows from the proposition "He knows that there's a hand there." If he indeed does know there is a hand there, i.e., he knows the evidence behind the claim, then he indeed knows it. However, this is a far cry from concluding that one does indeed know simply from the utterance "I know X."

"The very act of sitting at a computer and typing shows my belief that there is a keyboard; that I have hands; that I am controlling my fingers; that what I type is saved to a hard drive, etc, etc. I don't even think about it, i.e., I don't think to myself and say, "Is this really a keyboard?" After all there is no reason to doubt it, and even if I did doubt it, would that doubt really amount to anything? That I am certain of these beliefs is reflected in what I do. We all act in ways that show our certainty of the world around us. Occasionally things do cause us to doubt our surroundings, but usually these things are out of the ordinary. I am referring to our sensory experiences, i.e., generally we can trust our senses even if occasionally we draw the wrong conclusion based on what we see, hear, smell, etc."
— Sam26

This is either naive realism or pragmatism. All it establishes is that we have a consistent experience of a world. It's not a defeater for skepticism, because the skeptic begins here, and then goes on to point out everything that leads to the problem of perception. — Marchesk

This criticism misses the point. It's our consistent experiences that make radical skepticism lack any force. The point is that doubting in some circumstances is unreasonable, i.e., our doubting needs good reasons, just as our knowledge claims do. Moreover, as Wittgenstein points out, "My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on (OC 7)."

Of course there are problems with perception, however, note that if I have a perception of X, and it turns out there was a problem with what I perceived, then obviously the doubt is warranted. Most of what we perceive is unproblematic, which is why I use the example of sitting at the computer typing. The so-called defeater for radical skepticism is in the unproblematic cases.

Just as Wittgenstein points out Moore's incorrect use of the word "know," Wittgenstein also points our the incorrect uses of the word "doubt," both have their problems. No one is saying all skepticism is problematic. One needs to come to terms with where these words break down (knowing and doubting).

This is an interesting video discussing among other things some of the objections to NDEs.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2OGtxV0a6f8&t=860s

One of the ideas I've been working on, as some of you know, is the idea of presenting the argument in this thread so that it allows me to make the epistemological claim, that, "I know consciousness survives the death of the body." So, I brought everything I knew about logic and epistemology together with what I believe to be strong testimonial evidence and made the argument. However, the problem is that unless you've had the experience it's difficult to see these experiences as veridical (coinciding with reality). It's much easier, depending on your world view, to write them off as hallucinations, drug induced, lack of oxygen to the brain, or some other brain induced phenomena. Each of these objections must be analyzed to see if there is any credence to the objection. I'm more than satisfied with my investigations to make the claim that none of these objections hold up to scrutiny. However, I'm also well aware that it's easy to write NDEs off as, say, a hallucination because they are so different from what we might call "normal" conscious experiences. It doesn't take much work to write NDEs off as hallucinations or some other brain phenomena because it's an easy way to dismiss them. It takes more work to study the nature of hallucinations, and how the psychiatric community generally defines hallucinations, then compare them to NDEs.

How do we determine whether a particular experience is veridical or not? Very basically it's done by agreement. Moreover, we also agree that other experiences have a nature quite distinct from our normal everyday experiences, such as dreams, hallucinations, delusions, etc. And, we use these words as a way to describe experiences that are not veridical, nonetheless real experiences. We tend to separate out these experiences because they are so subjective, i.e., we can't objectively verify these kinds of experiences. Whereas, if I say there is an apple tree in my backyard, there is a way for others to check the claim, viz., we can see it for ourselves. It can get more complicated, because what if I have a dream that there is an apple tree in my backyard, and there is really an apple tree in my backyard, does this mean the dream is veridical? Obviously not.

So, part of the problem, as in many philosophical arguments is weeding through the semantics of the argument. In many ways it's related to some of things Wittgenstein worked on, viz., how we use words. What do we mean by "real," "dream," hallucination," "conscious," etc? Understanding the use of these words can help clarify the argument and get us closer to the truth.

Don't really know what to say about ghosts. I try to stick to things that I'm currently working on.