Not all language-games or all uses are correct. If I teach a child how to use the word pencil, and later the child points to a cat, and says, pencil, then their use of the word is incorrect, even if it's used in a particular language-game. — Sam26
However, this is not to say that all language-games have the same force, or that we can arbitrarily make up any language-game and derive meaning from it. The same is true of use, I can't arbitrarily use words the way I want without the loss of meaning. — Sam26
The radical skeptic (I'm referring to a specific kind of skepticism, not all skepticism) is not playing the game correctly. And, this must be viewed from outside our subjective view. It's viewed by looking at the community of language users, not one's personal interpretation. One's personal interpretation may or may not line up with the community, and this corresponds to the correct or incorrect interpretation. When I say correct and incorrect, I'm speaking generally, if it wasn't true generally, language would simply fall apart. — Sam26
The radical skeptic (I'm referring to a specific kind of skepticism, not all skepticism) is not playing the game correctly. — Sam26
Did he? — Banno
The radical sceptic makes a valid point in pointing out that whilst Wittgenstein argues that each language game has its own set of hinge propositions, he did not justify why one set of propositional hinges should be more exempt from doubt than others. — RussellA
but I would also agree with Grayling that the biggest philsophical problem with On Certainty is OC 2, in that the framework within which propositional hinges operate are themselves relative, and hard to resist against radical scepticism. — RussellA
I agree that in On Certainty Wittgenstein did not use the words "the language game corresponds to a reality" — RussellA
You are close to what I think is a key unsettled issue for such exegesis: are language games incommensurable with each other? — Banno
First, hinge-propositions, or what I call basic beliefs or foundational beliefs (foundation carries other baggage though), are outside any of our epistemological considerations (I think this is an accurate interpretation of W.), so they (the hinges) don't require any justification, nor can they be said to be true or false. — Sam26
"The Earth revolves around the Sun" is a hinge proposition. But at one time "the Sun revolves around the Earth" was a hinge proposition. It was not simply a matter of correcting a mistake. The fate of man hinged on it. — Fooloso4
This is the whole point of Wittgenstein's challenge. — Sam26
As you know, the only example of a hinge proposition is a mathematical proposition. To exclude mathematical propositions from what is true or false is problematic to say the least. — Fooloso4
We do not doubt hinge propositions because they are somehow beyond doubt, but rather because of everything that hinges on them. To call them into question would be to call everything that revolves around them into question. It is fundamental to the logic of our investigations that certain propositions stand without question. It is fundamental to our way of life that certain propositions are not called into question. "If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (343)." — Fooloso4
I'm not sure why you would say these are the only examples of hinges. — Sam26
The reason the book is written is because Wittgenstein is saying that there is something special about Moore's proposition, — Sam26
... there are many other hinge-propositions. — Sam26
I didn't exclude mathematical propositions from being true or false, only hinge mathematical propositions. — Sam26
If a proposition by its very nature is a hinge, then it's not doubtable. — Sam26
If these things were not fixed, then no linguistic culture, no language-game of epistemology. — Sam26
:up: :up: :up:96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became
fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I
distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.
98. But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be wrong. Yet this is
right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at
another as a rule of testing.
99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or
deposited.
152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility. — Fooloso4
If a proposition by its very nature is a hinge, then it's not doubtable. — Sam26
language game — Banno
Moore has found something significant though, and Wittgenstein respects Moore's for this. Moore has pointed out something special about these kinds of statements (Moorean statements or facts). They seem to provide a kind of foundational belief that is not only fundamental to epistemology, but fundamental to language. — Sam26
I think that you have grossly inflated the significance of what is nothing more than a statement of the obvious. More importantly, this traditional picture of foundations is rejected by Wittgenstein. He reverses the order: — Fooloso4
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