And the afterlife is one of many imaginaries. To say personal experience is evidence for it (as per Sam26) is no more coherent than saying my memory of my dream is evidence my dream really happened. — Baden

This is what someone would say who never examined the evidence. First, dreams, hallucinations, or delusions don't describe real events as do NDEs. One can verify the accuracy of NDE testimonial evidence by talking to doctors, nurses, and family members who can verify or corroborate the evidence. This kind of response also shows a particular bias, because they don't respond to the arguments, they just give their uneducated opinions.

Post 10 (Final post of summary, as incomplete as it is.)

To conclude this basic summary of the Tractatus is to conclude that philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. Philosophy is above or below the natural sciences, but not beside them (T. 4.111). This follows from 4.11, "The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science." This conclusion is was arrived at long before the publication of the Tractatus in 1918. It goes back to 1913 in his Notes on Logic given to Russell.

Wittgenstein is saying that philosophy gives us no truths. "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. [It] is not a body of doctrine but an activity (T. 4.112)."

Even in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein is still aiming at the logical clarification of thoughts. Albeit, a different logical method is used. His later method in the PI isn't as rigid as that of the Tractatus, but is more flexible, which is more in conformity with how language works.

"Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries (T. 4.112).

"Philosophy settles controversies about the limits of natural science (T. 4.113).

"It must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards to what cannot be thought (T. 4.114).

"It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said (T. 4.115)."

Understanding what Wittgenstein is doing should clarify what he means in 6.54, i.e., he has shown us what cannot be said, by setting a limit to language, so, you can throw away the ladder that reaches beyond the world of sense into the world of the senseless, and even further into the realm of nonsense.

For Wittgenstein the only facts are the facts in the world, there are no metaphysical facts for language to grasp hold of. If someone tries to say something metaphysical, you would show him using Wittgenstein's picture theory and his truth-function theory that he has not managed to say anything; they've gone beyond the boundaries of the world, beyond the boundaries of language. This is why Wittgenstein says, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (T. 7)."

No, this isn't about religion. I'm not religious, but I do think there is plenty of testimonial evidence that supports the idea of an afterlife. If you have the time read all of my posts.

I wrote a thread on this very subject. There is plenty of evidence of an afterlife.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1980/evidence-of-consciousness-surviving-the-body/p1

Perhaps that is what is nascent in ↪Gregory. — Banno

Perhaps.

Okay that should be enough for now.

Post 9

As we've said the other central idea presented in the Tractatus is the truth-function theory. It goes hand-in-hand with the picture theory. "A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (T. 5)." Therefore, if you are given all elementary propositions, then you can construct every possible proposition, which fixes their limits (T. 4.51). My understanding is that this sets the limit of language, or sets a limit to what can be said.

A full appreciation of this thesis requires an understanding of truth-functional logic. It suffices for our purpose to point out merely that a compound proposition, compounded of the propositions P1, P2,....,Pn, is a truth-functional compound of P1, P2,..., Pn if and only if its truth or falsity is uniquely determined by the truth or falsity (the truth-values) of P1,..., Pn. In other words, the truth-value of a compound proposition is completely determined by the truth-values of its components--once the truth-values of is components are given, the truth-value of the compound proposition can be calculated. Wittgenstein claims that all propositions are related to elementary propositions truth-functionally (K.T. Fann, p. 17).

Therefore, what follows is this: "If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which false (T. 4.26)."

In the Notebooks Wittgenstein says the following: "In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally (Nb, p. 7)." This idea apparently occurred to Wittgenstein when he observed or read about a model of a car accident that was used in a Paris court of law, that is, they used dolls and other objects to represent the facts of the case. The model was a picture of reality; and so it is with the proposition, it is a model of reality as we imagine or picture it (T. 4.01).

Before I end this post, I just want to say that I believe that many of our propositions are pictures of reality, but again, this is not the only way propositions state the facts. Many people think Wittgenstein repudiated this idea, but I think he merely was saying that language does more than this. Just as language does more than use the ostensive definition model.

If propositions can only picture facts in the world, then it would seem to make sense that propositions of metaphysics, which go beyond the world of facts, can't picture anything. There is nothing for the proposition to picture. Right?

Post 8

In previous posts I talked about names being the simplest component of elementary propositions, and that names referred to objects, and objects make up atomic facts. The question came up about how we could make sense of a proposition if there were no corresponding objects, and thus, no corresponding facts. According to the Tractatus a proposition pictures reality, so if we are to understand a proposition that refers to unicorns, it is because the proposition displays a picture, and that picture either matches up with reality or it does not. If it correctly mirrors reality, then it is true, if it does not mirror reality, then it is false. So, to understand the sense of a proposition it is a matter of picturing the proposition, and this occurs quite apart from there being a corresponding facts in reality.

A picture or proposition presents a fact from a position outside of it, or separate from the fact it is displaying. Just as a picture of the White House presents the White House from a position outside it, or quite separate from reality or the state-of-affairs. Any picture either accurately or inaccurately presents a certain state of affairs (T. 2.1). And as we keep repeating, propositions are pictures according to the Tractatus. For example, consider any painting that displays a picture, the picture may or may not actually match up with a corresponding state of affairs (shown in the picture), and yet whether it does has no bearing on whether we understand the picture.

"The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way. Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture (T. 2.15)."

The pictorial form is the form a picture shares with a fact. The form of the picture has to do with the arrangement of the elements in the picture. "What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in the way it does, is its pictorial form. A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spacial picture can depict anything spacial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc. A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it (T. 2.17 - 2.172)."

There is a shared logic between the picture and the fact (T. 2.18).

How does a proposition correspond with reality? "Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.

"That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.

"It is laid against reality like a measure (T. 2.151-2.1512)."

Each person, truck, bridge, house in the picture represents those things in the world.

So how do we tell if a proposition is true or false? We must compare it with reality (T. 2.223).

The sense of a picture is the arrangement of the things in the picture, which supposedly correspond to the arrangement of things in the world (T. 2.221).

The way one verifies the correctness of a proposition is by inspecting the proposition to see if it indeed reflects reality (T. 2.223).

According to Wittgenstein a thought is a logical picture (Wittgenstein does not believe that we can think illogically), it uses the form of logic to represent a fact (T. 3 and 3.03).

"In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses (T. 3.1)." So the logical picture is made by logical units, such as, visual marks or auditory marks.

Therefore, a proposition says that 'a' is in a certain relation to 'b', i.e., 'aRb'. For instance, Sam is standing next to Jane.

I guess I should get busy and post a little more.

Banno quit making things up. :joke:

We haven't even scratched the surface of all that is in the Tractatus, not that I'm going to go into that much depth.

Is there anything praiseworthy? Yes, its originality, and based on Wittgenstein's premises it follows logically. It also led to Wittgenstein's critique of the work, and to a better way of looking at how language functions. I also like the idea of propositions picturing facts or states-of-affairs, because I think it is true of many propositions (although not in the way of names connecting to objects). There is much in this work, i.e., many novel ideas, besides his picture and truth-function theories, that could be thought through. What I mean is that there are a lot of side issues that he touches on that might deserve a look at. What I find interesting, is where his thoughts led him in the end. And, ya, we might find some of his ideas silly today, but that's true of many subjects that are over 100 years old.

Is everyone bored, like MU? :wink:

This phrase seems to have two possible interpretations: attempts to say things about what kinds of things are not able to be said, vs attempts to say things which attempts are doomed to fail because the things one is attempting to say cannot be said. — Pfhorrest

In other words, it attempts to go beyond the world of language. Language, in terms of making sense, is language that describes the world. So ya, your latter interpretation.

Post 7

More on what can and cannot be said according to the Tractatus.

You can think of it this way. First, you have the world, and that includes all that we can talk about sensibly. Next you have what’s beyond the limit of the world, and that’s what cannot be spoken of, the mystical.

Language is a mirror image of the world, and the terms sense, senseless, and nonsense are related to saying, i.e., propositions. Within the boundaries of language (saying) we say things with sense. If we attempt to talk about the limit or the boundaries of language, then we are saying things that are senseless. However, if we attempt to go beyond the boundary, then the result is nonsense. The failure to understand these three categories (sense, senseless, and nonsense) results in misunderstandings of the Tractatus. Early interpretations failed to understand the distinction between senseless (sinnlos) and nonsense (unsinnig), and this can be seen in the first translations of the Tractatus. The distinction between senseless and nonsense was lost on many who first read the Tractatus.

An example of senseless propositions are the propositions of logic, they say nothing (T. 6.11). However, they are not nonsensical for they show “…the formal logical properties of language and the world, i.e., they show us the limit of language and the world (T. 6.12, and K. T. Fann, p. 23).

According to Wittgenstein the propositions of philosophy are not empirical propositions (propositions of natural science). They are attempts to say what cannot be said (for the most part). Wittgenstein believed that most of the propositions of philosophy are not false but nonsensical. They are attempts to say how reality is. Philosophical propositions are similar to asking if the good is more or less identical with the beautiful (T. 4.003).

Wittgenstein also believed that the reasons for why we misunderstand the differences between these propositions (those that make sense, vs those that are senseless, vs those that are nonsense), is that we misunderstand the logic of our language, viz., the logic displayed in the Tractatus.

“Religion, ethics, art, and the realm of the personal are, like metaphysics, concerned with what cannot be said—that which transcends the world (K. T. Fann, p. 23, 24).”

Right, when you get to the end of the book, Wittgenstein admits that it's all wrong — Metaphysician Undercover

This is incorrect. Wittgenstein is NOT admitting that it's all wrong. He says at the beginning of the Tractatus, "On the other hand the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive (T. p. 4)."

"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them [metaphysical propositions] as nonsensical, when he has used them--as steps--to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) (T. 6.54)."

Wittgenstein's famous last words have caused more problems for those who read the Tractatus than any other passage. Philosophers from Bertrand Russell to present day philosophers have misunderstood the significance of this passage. After all, Wittgenstein seems to have said a great deal about what cannot be said according to Russell. There have been other accusations that Wittgenstein was illuminating nonsense, according to Pitcher in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Ramsey also had some remarks about this passage in the following: "And again we must then take seriously that it is nonsense, and not pretend as Wittgenstein does, that it is important nonsense (F. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics (London, 1931), p. 263)!"

My understanding of this passage is the following: By examining the propositions in the Tractatus, the reader comes to understand that he/she must transcend the propositions (metaphysical propositions) in order to see the world aright. Once this is done, one can then discard the process because Wittgenstein will have accomplished his purpose - that of showing you the way. Once you see enough of what is nonsensical, hopefully, you will have a clear picture of what can be said and what cannot be said - i.e., what propositions have sense. So, the question now becomes, how do the propositions of the Tractatus show us the truth contained therein? One might answer the question this way - just as music and art show us something important, so do the propositions in the Tractatus.

Wittgenstein defines for us which propositions have sense, and which do not. He demonstrates both in the Tractatus. There is a difference between saying and showing. Once we understand the difference between those propositions which have sense, those that refer to states-of-affairs, then we are able to have a clear view of those propositions that are senseless, viz., those that go beyond the limit of language according to the Tractatus.

Post 6

I want to give credit to K. T. Fann (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy), because I’m using his book as a guide through this, along with, of course, the Tractatus.

The question arises, what are names? Wittgenstein does not mean names like chair, cat, or Socrates. His idea is that a name is a primitive sign, i.e., something that cannot be analyzed any further by means of a definition (T. 3.26). A name is something simple, not complex. For Wittgenstein, this idea comes about by logical necessity.

Wittgenstein never gives us an example of a name, or for that matter, an elementary proposition. He did not think it was his job as a logician to give such examples. However, Wittgenstein was not unaware of the problem. “Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one (Nb. p. 62).”

Remember, Wittgenstein holds to the traditional view at this point in his life, that names refer to objects. “A name means an object. The object is its meaning (‘A’ is the same sign as ‘A’ (T. 3.203).” The configuration of names in an elementary proposition conforms to the configuration of objects in atomic facts. There is a one-to-correspondence to the facts in logical space, which is why propositions are pictures of facts. If we use Wittgenstein’s logic, “A propositional sign is a fact (T. 3.14).” This is why all true propositions (all empirical propositions, propositions of natural science) are equal to particular facts in the world.

“In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.

“Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak about them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are.

“The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate (T. 3.22, 3.221, 3.23).”

Tractatus is best viewed as a poem. It is elegantly written and tells a story, it describes a framework of ideas. But it is not strictly logical nor does it solve any problems, at least none that are not contrived. — A Seagull

Nowhere is there evidence that Wittgenstein thought of the Tractatus as a poem, and he sure didn't wish us to think of it as a kind of poem. And, the idea that the Tractatus is "not strictly logical" belies all the logic in the book.

I'll discuss more of this later.

Post 5

Language

“My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition. That is to say, in giving the nature of all facts, whose picture the proposition is (Nb, p. 39).” Out of this idea springs Wittgenstein’s picture and truth-function theories of language. These theories will answer the questions, how are propositions related to the world, and how are they related to one another.

Wittgenstein’s premise is that if we can talk about the world, then there must be propositions directly connected to the world. He determined that since these propositions (speaking of elementary propositions, which are a subset of ordinary propositions) are connected to the world, then their truth or falsity is determined by the world, and not other propositions. So, the question arises, how are they connected to the world?

“It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions which consists of names in immediate combination.

“This raises the question how such combination into propositions comes about (T. 4.221).”

Elementary propositions are further broken down into names, and names are the smallest parts of elementary propositions (T. 4.22). So, what you have are propositions broken down into elementary propositions, and further broken down into names. If an elementary proposition is true, then the state-of-affairs obtains or exists, if the elementary proposition is false, then the elementary proposition is false and the state-of-affairs fails to obtain or exist (T. 4.25). The truth or falsity of elementary propositions is dependent on the world, which is made up of facts or states-of-affairs. If you were able to list all true propositions you would have a complete description of the world.

Wittgenstein was convinced that in order for language to work there had to be this one-to-one correlation between language and the world. He is still operating under the old assumption that meaning is associated with the object it denotes. Hence, the idea that names (the smallest constituent part of elementary propositions) is directly connected with objects (the smallest constituent part of atomic facts). In fact, all true propositions are a mirror image of the world. It’s these ideas that Wittgenstein argues against in the Philosophical Investigations.

Thanks Banno.

Because you said that he solved all philosophical problems by analyzing propositions via their truth-functions. Philosophical propositions, pertaining to philosophical problems, and according to him, do not have a truth-function, they are neither true or false, right or wrong, but nonsensical, and so the best one can do with them, is to get rid of them. For example, the critique of pure reason by Kant, is a fine example of a nonsensical book. — Pussycat

Remember I'm talking mainly about the Tractatus, and it's clear if you read what he said about that book, that he believed he solved all the major problems of philosophy. It's in the Tractatus that Wittgenstein puts forward his theory of truth-functions, which I'll be talking more about as we go along.

I don't really see any major disagreement.

Yet, somehow, from this, positivism then says that 'all metaphysics is meaningless' and that therefore the only meaningful statements are those which can be validated with respect to sensible experience. Which is pretty well the exact opposite of Wittgenstein's attitude, in my opinion. — Wayfarer

Ya, the Vienna Circle got it wrong, as many did back then when reading Wittgenstein.

He believed in god, although not the sot that is found hereabouts. When asked if he believed in god, he replied "yes, I do, but the difference between what you believe and what I believe may be infinite". — Banno

Can you reference that Banno? I've read quite a bit, but never came across anything like that.

If you think that why are you in here posting?

:up: It is just a lot of confusion.

I don't think you could say Wittgenstein was religious, maybe in his very early years, but definitely not in his later years. He never ridiculed religion, and in fact, he admired some religious writings. He definitely had a mystical bent to his personality. Some misinterpreted this side of Wittgenstein as religious, but I would say not. The mystical for Wittgenstein would best be expressed between the ideas of saying and showing. He didn't think the mystical could be expressed, but only shown in our actions (e.g. praying and meditating). The mystical goes beyond what can be expressed in language. Wittgenstein believed that language has a boundary, beyond which is that that is senseless (not nonsense, but senseless). I'll talk about this later in my posts.

Post 4

Wittgenstein saw logic as something sublime in the Tractatus. “For there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth—a universal significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the sciences.—For logical investigations explores the nature of all things. It seeks to see to the bottom of things and is not meant to concern itself whether what actually happens is this or that (PI, 89).” Wittgenstein’s view of logic drove him in a particular direction, viz., the logical connection between the proposition (thought) and the facts (states-of-affairs in the world). For the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus there was an a priori order to the world, and that order would show itself in the connection between the proposition and the world. “The great problem round which everything that I write turns is: Is there an order in the world a priori, and if so what does it consist in (Nb, p.53)?”

In later posts we will see how Wittgenstein uses logic to connect the dots. Connecting the dots was an investigation into the structure of the proposition, and the structure of the world, and again, it’s logic that will reveal that structure.

“This order of investigation [in the Notebooks], however, is roughly the reverse of the order of presentation in the finished text [in the Tractatus]. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein starts with the proposition: ‘The world is all that is the case’ (T. 1.0). ‘The world is the totality of facts, not of things (T. 1.1).’ Though these statements stand at the beginning, they are best regarded as conclusions from what follows. The account of the nature of the world is given first because it anticipates and is required by the theory of language which comes later. The meaning of these metaphysical statements cannot be fully appreciated until his account of the nature of language is understood (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Language, by K. T. Fann, pp. 6, 7).”

Post 3

Logic seems fundamental to Wittgenstein’s thinking, however, how logic fits into his thinking in both his early and later thinking is a bit different, but not always. A difference can be seen, for example, in his thinking about propositions. Propositions are a mirror image of the world in the Tractatus. Propositions have a one-to-one correspondence with the world, viz., with facts. One can think of meaning in the Tractatus as a kind of pointing to, i.e., propositions point to facts in the world, names as part of propositions point to objects which are the smallest parts of facts. This logic is much different from the logic that is seen in his later philosophy (Philosophical Investigations). In the Philosophical Investigations he uses the language-game and use (of words, of propositions) within the social context to show the logic behind language. A vague proposition in the Tractatus is no longer vague when fully analyzed. In the PI, a vague proposition is still vague when analyzed, but it has a kind of logical use, a social use, that incorporates its vagueness into its social function.

The logic in the Tractatus contains an exactness that is disposed of in the PI (at least for the most part). It’s this exactness, I believe, that leads Wittgenstein to believe that he has solved all the philosophical problems (in the T.) in one fell swoop. How has he solved all the philosophical problems? Well, if as Wittgenstein supposes one can analyze all propositions via their truth-functions (more on this later), and these line up with facts in the world, then we can determine what’s true and what’s false based on Wittgenstein’s a priori analysis. This is probably why Russell thought that Wittgenstein was creating a logically perfect language.

Post 2

One of the common misunderstandings of Wittgenstein’s later writings is that he rejected the Tractatus. And while it’s true that Wittgenstein did reject some of his earlier premises (e.g., that there was a one-to-one correspondence between names and simple objects in the world – more on what names and simple objects are later), he did not reject the Tractatus in total. This is not to say that he wasn’t a harsh critic of the Tractatus, because he was. It’s only to say that there is a continuity of thought between Wittgenstein’s early and later thinking. That continuity consists in answering the questions of the nature, job, and method of doing philosophy. One can think of Wittgenstein’s early method of doing philosophy, as the traditional method, and in his later works he introduces a new method of analysis (one could look at his early method as an a priori method, and his later method as a posteriori – although this is not written in stone), in both methods he is still thinking about the logic of language, just in different ways.

According to K. T. Fann the basic assumptions behind the Tractatus has to do with the structure of language being revealed by logic, and that the function of language is to describe the world. Wittgenstein deals with two major questions, according to Fann, “(1) What is the nature of logic? And (2) How is language related to the world? (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy, p. 5).”

The Tractatus is divided into seven major parts, the seventh part, though, only consists of one statement. The following is a list of these seven parts:

(1) “The world is all that is the case.”
(2) “What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.”
(3) “A logical picture of facts is a thought.”
(4) “A thought is a proposition with a sense.”
(5) “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)
(6) In six Wittgenstein gives the general form of a truth-function.
(7) “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”


Each of these numbered divisions are numbered to establish a hierarchy. For instance, remark 1.12 is an elaboration on 1.11, which is an elaboration on 1.1, etc., etc. His remarks are put down as if they were unassailable and definitive, with no argument, or very little argument.

Each of these seven divisions can be further broken down into three main topics, logic, language, and the world.

(This isn't going to come fast and furious guys and gals, but I'll try to post at least one post a day.)

I will continue…

I don't want to turn this into a thread on Existentialism, you keep wanting to go there.

Are you saying that the reasons why we are here, are important, yet not understandable? — 3017amen

No, I'm saying that we may not understand all the reasons, but we may understand some of the reasons. That's true of almost everything, we understand some things, but not everything. Christian Existentialists, at least the ones I've read, are more about taking a leap of faith against reason, which is a religious move. I'm not religious, and when I claim to know something, I give reasons or evidence to support it, unless I'm speculating.

Sounds very Existential to me, no? :chin: — 3017amen

We must have very different understandings of what it means to be an existentialist.

Before I go on about what other conclusions follow from the evidence, I want to add a few things that are speculative. However, even this speculation has some merit based on the case studies, but the testimonial evidence isn't very strong.

My guess is that we are eternal beings, and that we can experience anything we want, sometimes for growth, sometimes to help others achieve what they need to achieve, and sometimes just for fun. So, what can you do for all eternity? The answer is, anything you like. If you can imagine it, then you can experience it. Imagine living forever, but also imagine being able to experience any experience. My best guess is that there are an infinite number of universes with an infinite number of possible worlds, and lives to choose. Some of these places are very difficult, and require a lot of courage to experience (for e.g. the life we are currently living). It's your choice, live whatever life you want. You're not forced to do anything. However, it does seem to be the case that we made a kind of agreement before we come here. One of the things in the agreement has to do with the time we are allotted here. Some of us choose to come for a short time, others a little longer, and still others, a life of 90 or 100 years. We come to test ourselves in various ways, we come to help others experience what they want to experience, and we sometimes probably come to fulfill a certain narrative. There are multiple storylines that we can choose. However, the most prevalent storyline is the family.

My final speculation is based on no evidence. It's this, if we create these worlds to experience, is it likely that some of the people in these worlds are simply part of a program? Think of it like these giant MMO games, some of the so-called people in the game are simply part of the game, part of the program, not real. It might not be so far fetched as it may seem. Especially if we want to control the game to a degree, or to have a certain kind of experience.

From time-to-time I reiterate some of my earlier points because I know people won't read all that's been posted. What I want to do, is, and this is based on what I believe I know after reading thousands of NDEs, is share what other conclusions we can infer based on the testimonial evidence?

First, though, I would like to add that some of these conclusions are based on the most in-depth of all the NDEs. What I mean is, those NDEs that give us the most information about the afterlife. These are what I call category 3 NDEs. There are thousands and thousands of category 3 NDEs, so these conclusions are not based on just a few testimonials.

Second, I don't want to give the impression that these testimonials give us all the answers, because they don't, but they, at the very least, give us some answers. Third, sometimes you can infer things based not only what is said, but what is not said. In other words, when people describe their conversations with those in the afterlife, sometimes what's left out of the conversation is very important.

In this thread I've argued that one of the strongest conclusions one can reach based on the strength of the argument is that we as individuals survive the death of the body. So, who we are continues after the death of the body, i.e., our memory continuity, and the continuity of our experiences continues. We don't just survive as energy, but we survive as individuals. This can be seen when people describe their sensory experiences, which by the way is very expanded, and it can be seen in the way they interact with deceased relatives and friends. For example, many people report having a life review, and in this review they remember their lives, and how they responded to others in their lives. Some people also remember their choice to become human, suggesting that their life pre-existed coming to Earth. We also know that we survive as individuals based on seeing deceased relatives and friends, i.e., they survived death, so we can infer that we too will survive death as the persons we are. We don't cease to exist. If anything our existence is expanded, i.e., who we are is much greater than who we are as humans. Part of what makes us who we are is the continuity of memory, and that remains intact.

Before I forget, I do want to mention something that I've not mentioned before (I might have mentioned it in passing), viz., that based on some of the discussions people have had in their NDEs with beings in the afterlife, we do have free will, or at least limited free will. This can be seen as people experience their life review, i.e., they know as they review their life (Earthly life) that different choices have better outcomes, suggesting that we're not locked into a fixed outcome, at least in some things. On the other hand, there seem to be things that we are meant to experience, so there maybe some things that are pre-determined. For example, who we will marry, and who our children will be, among other things. However, these things vary from person to person based on what our goals are in coming here.

Another conclusion that seems clear is that our memories are affected by our choice to come here. This can be seen in how many people describe their experiences. They report remembering who they really are, or they remember that their home is not here, but there, in the afterlife. Some actually remember their choice to come here, and who they would come with. Some remember choosing who their parents and siblings would be. Some also remember living out many other lives in other places besides Earth. In fact, it seems that we are able to choose to live out just about any life we can imagine. Another way in which our memories are affected, is that when we make the choice to come here, we forget who we are, what we are, where we're from, and why we've come here. I compare it to entering a dream, in a dream we forget where we're from, and we think that what's happening in the dream is what's real. The dream is real in a sense, i.e., we're really experiencing it, but it's not as real as our waking life. In the same way, when we return to the afterlife, this life seems dreamlike by comparison. Many people describe their NDE as more real than real, and that this life seems dreamlike, not the other way around.

Another important thing to remember in terms of the dream analogy, is this life is important, much more important than our dream life. I say this to point out, that because I use the analogy of dreams, I'm not suggesting that this life is unimportant. It's very important. We've come here for very important reasons, most of which we will not understand until we return to the place we come from. Much of this is hidden from us for very good reasons. One reason might be that if we did remember who and what we are, it would probably affect the goals we have in coming here, or the way in which we live our lives here.

Another conclusion based on very strong testimonial evidence is that our time on Earth is fixed. We see this over and over again, when people have an NDE they're told that it's not their time, they have to go back and accomplish their tasks or goals. Is it fixed in absolute terms? Probably not, but it's generally fixed for all of us. Because of this, I look at death much different from the way I looked at it prior to studying NDEs. No one should be afraid of death, we're just returning home.

One can also conclude that communication is much different from how we experience it in this life. We communicate mind-to-mind, which is a more perfect way of communicating, because we get the full sense of what a person means when they communicate with us.

These are just some of the conclusions that follow from the testimonial evidence.

Assuming you are a believer (perhaps you're a Fundy, not sure), was Jesus' resurrection logical, supernatural or something metaphysical and transcendent? — 3017amen

If you've been reading my posts you should know I'm not religious (and definitely not a Fundy). To answer your questions I would need to start another thread. However, at this time, I'm not up for it, sorry.

Whether a hallucination is veridical is impossible to determine. — Hanover

It's not impossible to determine, what makes something a hallucination, IS, the fact that it's not veridical, which is why some people call NDEs hallucinations. How do you think psychiatrists determine what is, and what is not a hallucination?

Why do you classify a dream as a brain malfunction? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't classify a dream as a brain malfunction. I gave a list of explanations of NDEs, and among them are brain malfunctions. I probably could have worded that better.