I've been continuing my studies of NDEs, in particular I've been listening to people from other cultures and their experiences. The following is one of those experiences.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yl3OS7aA1gg

As I've said before, testimonial evidence, or if you prefer anecdotal evidence, is generally the weakest form of evidence, but it's not always weak.. So, if someone tells me a story, the strength of that story depends on a number of factors. Can we verify the story, because sometimes we can verify the story. For example, if someone tells me a story about an old women living in a cabin in the woods, there may be a way for me to verify whether this is true or not. And, there are a number of ways for me to do this. I can go into the woods myself to see if the cabin is actually there, or I may be able to talk to others who have had the same encounter. There may also be other ways of checking the reliability of the story. For instance, there may be something written down about the existence of the cabin and the old lady who owns the cabin. Obviously if there is no way to verify a story, then it's indeed very weak, but even here it depends on a number of factors. In our everyday lives we don't need to verify every story told to us in order to believe the story. We generally accept as true many of the stories told to us by family and friends we trust.

Everyday stories are one thing, but what about stories out of the ordinary, stories that go against the accepted science of the time. Well, in such a case we need more than just a few testimonials that can't be verified, we need very strong evidence to counter the prevailing view. This is why I've pointed out over-and-over again that we need not only a strong number of reports (in this case 100's of millions of accounts), consistent accounts, a wide variety of accounts from different cultures, an objective way to verify the accounts, etc., etc. If this can be done, and it has been done, then the evidence becomes very strong. In fact the evidence can be so strong that it becomes unreasonable to reject it.

The argument I've made is based on logic, not opinion. It's based on what makes a good or strong inductive argument. So, it's not just a weak anecdote that cannot be verified.

Also my argument has a strong epistemological point to make, viz., that we can claim to know some things based on strong testimonial evidence.

DNA evidence that Jones's hand was on the knife is good evidence that Jones killed Susan. That Jones has a bit of a shifty look about him is not. — Bartricks

That's just stupid Bartricks. I don't think you would know reasonable if it jumped up and bit you. I've seen many different arguments against NDEs, but nothing as ridiculous as yours. It doesn't seem to me that you know how to evaluate testimonial evidence.

We'll just have to disagree about the interpretation.

I do think that it is possible to enter into heightened states of awareness of without dying too, including out of body experiences. — Jack Cummins

Yes, I agree. One can have similar experiences through meditation, or by taking DMT. There were also studies done years ago on the brain where someone touching a particular area of the brain produced an OBE, or at least a partial OBE.

I had a college tutor once who saw near death experiences as leading to a possible eternity of being in that dimension. At the time, I was swayed towards that idea. However, looking at that way of thinking now, I am inclined to think that that state would not be permanent. Personally, having read 'The Tibetan Book of the Dead,' I wonder if the near death experiences is an entry into the bardo state, and would be a period of time and lead to eventual rebirth. Of course, I realise that this is only a speculation. — Jack Cummins

My view is that we are eternal beings, and that there is some evidence to support this from NDEs and other sources. However, the evidence to support this is not as strong as the evidence to support the conclusion that we do survive bodily death, which is what I'm claiming in this thread.

Think of it this way, there may come a time in our future where we essentially do away with aging, in fact, we are making strides towards this now. It's not hard to imagine that in the future we could download our consciousness into some other kind of body and continue living for long periods of time, barring an accident of some sort. If you can imagine this now, given what we know, imagine beings billions and billions of years ahead of our technology. They might be able to make a copy our consciousness in case there is some kind of accident. All you would have to do is reload it, and bang you're alive again.

There is good evidence that whatever is in the afterlife, it is far beyond anything we can imagine. I would think that life eternal is probably a small problem to solve. Not only is this a good possibility, but the way time passes there may also play an important role in how long we live. It could be that one year here could be an eternity there.

Since you brought up rebirth, I'll say a little about this. There have been thousands of reports by people who have had NDEs that we can choose to come back here in a different body. Now I don't believe in reincarnation as spelled out by some religion, but I do believe that we can choose different lives to live, either in this world or universe or other worlds and universes. I don't think it's forced upon you, but you can choose it. There is also some evidence that what we experience here has been planned out prior to our birth, and that the memories we have of who we really are is suppressed. This can be seen in some NDEs. What happens is that many people who have an NDE all of a sudden remember who they are and why they are here. Some of them are told that they will not be able to remember these memories when they return to their bodies. It's as if remembering too much hinders our life here in some way. There is much more that can be said about this, but it's a bit off topic, not much, but a bit.

We can only get so much information from NDEs. There are many more questions than answers, but there are some answers. We will see our loved ones again, including pets believe it or not. That our true home is there not here. That we are loved and cherished beyond words. Also, that there is no reason to fear death, or some religious idea of hell. Moreover, I don't think any religion quite captures the essence of the afterlife. Is there a God? I don't know, if there is it's probably nothing like the God as presented in any religion.

Well, that's the case with near death experiences and with dream experiences. There is no serious question that we do have the experiences constitutive of dream experiences, and no question that such experiences have a great deal in common, are attested to by virtually everyone, and, while one is subject to them anyway, can have representative contents as vivid as that contained by any phenomenal experience. And there is no serious question, I think, about near death experiences either - or at least, you won't find me questioning it. But in both cases we are in unusual circumstances - circumstances that operate as undercutters for those experiences. When it comes to sleep, we are unconscious. Our normal sensory modalities are not functioning. And so the more reasonable explanation of these experiences is not that they are accurate and that sleep transports us all to a bizarre other realm in which other laws of nature operate, but that we are hallucinating. And the same is true of near death experiences: those who have them are unconscious at the time and furthermore their body is under extreme stress. The idea that we become 'more' reliably hooked up to reality under those circumstances seems to me to be utterly bizarre and one only someone quite unreasonable would make. — Bartricks

We agreed until we got to the above paragraph. There is no question that both dreams and NDEs are unusual. And, it is true that there are common elements as attested by many who experience dreams and NDEs. It may be the case that while experiencing a dream we believe it to be real or veridical, but most people who awake from a dream do not confuse the dream with reality. They may say that the dream seemed real, but most (99% or higher) don't go on to argue that it was real. Dreams do produce intense feelings that are just as real as what we experience in our waking life, there is no doubt about this. However, there is nevertheless a quality about dreams that is just different from our waking life, which is why most people don't confuse dreams with reality. And, unusual circumstances don't always act as defeaters for a particular argument. They can, but it depends on the combined strength of the argument, and other factors.

Here are some key differences that lead many people to believe that NDEs are real. First, and I mentioned this in another post, people are reporting on real events, and this is corroborated by people who are not having an NDE, but are at the scene where the NDE is taking place. For example, people who are experiencing an NDE in a hospital setting (say in an operating room) are able to describe what is going on in the operating room in detail. Not only do they describe what's happening to them, but they are later able to describe the conversations between the doctors and nurses who are performing the procedures. Some also describe conversations that are going on in other rooms of the hospital. This happens to people even if there heart has stopped, or even when there is no measurable brain activity (including blood being completely drained from the brain). Now you want to tell me that NDEs are like dreams. Our dreams don't overlap with reality in this way. There is an added component to NDEs that dreams normally don't have, viz., the NDE overlaps with what others are experiencing in their waking life. This has been documented thousands and thousands of times, so it's objective evidence that has been corroborated. You just don't get this kind of overlap in our dreams, and if you do, it's very rare, not the norm. This is the norm with NDEs.

You say that it's unreasonable to argue that NDEs are real. I say that the evidence to support NDEs as real experiences (unlike dreams, hallucinations, or delusions) is overwhelming, and to deny it reflects someone who hasn't studied the data, is biased, or is just being unreasonable. I think it's more likely that you haven't studied the data, and your argument reflects this.

It's not my logic, it's logic, period. Because dreams seem real, that's not the same as people claiming they are real. And what about the corroborating evidence, you are not addressing the argument. You are just giving me an opinion.

The question Bartricks raises is that the same inductive argument that I'm making about NDEs could be made about dreams. Is this correct? Let's compare the two arguments. But first let's also reiterate what makes a good inductive argument, and this is just simple logic. The following link gives the criteria of a good inductive argument (this is important): https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/483632

There are five criteria that make a good inductive argument, and these are explained in the link above.

(1) number
(2) variety
(3) scope of the conclusion
(4) truth of the premises
(5) cogency

My argument makes the claim that NDEs are veridical. In other words, not only are they real experiences, but the place that NDEers go to is real. In fact, most if not all NDEers claim that their NDE is more real than our normal everyday experiences, and that their sensory experiences are more expansive. Moreover, their feelings of love, peace, harmony, empathy, go far beyond what we experience here. There are literally hundreds of millions of people who have experienced an NDE, so in terms of numbers the argument fulfills the first criteria.

Bartricks makes the claim that this same argument could be made about our dream states, i.e., that it's a real place with physical laws etc. But, do we actually have large numbers of people making the claim that their dreams are real, i.e., that they are going to a real place? No. His argument comparing the two falls apart right from the start.

It's true that there are large numbers of people claiming to have dreams, and that there are a wide variety (second criteria) of people having dreams (across cultures, age groups, etc), but the key here is what they are claiming about their dreams.

Even if people were claiming that their dreams were taking them to a real place, where is the corroborating evidence? The fourth criteria in the argument I use (truth of the premises) involves corroborating evidence, viz., there are people who were at the scene of the NDE that can confirm the accuracy of the OBEs (accuracy of what people have seen while claiming to be out of their bodies). There are a large number of accounts that can be corroborated. Given that so many can be confirmed we have a way of objectively verifying the accounts. Again, even if people were claiming that dreams are real, we have no objective way to verify it, no corroborating evidence. A good example of this is Pam's NDE out of Atlanta, GA on Youtube. This is an important part of my argument, since you need a way to objectively verify what people are claiming. It can't be purely subjective.

You can read what I said about the consistency of the testimonials in the link above. This, obviously is another important part of the fourth criteria.

Bartricks also says that the argument is unreasonable, but nothing can be further from the truth. The argument is very strong and very reasonable. Granted, testimonial evidence is generally very weak evidence, but what people fail to acknowledge is that it can be extremely strong under the right conditions. And, I have given the conditions under which testimonial evidence can be strong.

I believe that I have given an inductive proof that consciousness extends beyond our biological bodies. The evidence that forms the core of this conclusion is based on good testimonial evidence. I'm not going to reiterate the argument because I've already explained the argument at least three time in this thread (It was last given on page 21 in two posts).

Based on this argument my claim is that I know consciousness survives the death of our bodies. If this is true, it still doesn't get us any closer to understanding what consciousness is, other than to say it's more than the sum of our physical bodies. More specifically, it's more than brain activity.

At a very basic level, consciousness is awareness. Awareness of what? Awareness of ourselves as distinct things in relation to our surroundings. However, it seems obvious that there are different levels of awareness or consciousness. An earthworm's level of awareness is very rudimentary, nonetheless, it seems aware on a very basic level. We know this by the way the worm interacts with its surroundings.

Human consciousness, on the other hand, is more expansive. In other words, human awareness extends to thinking about our awareness, i.e., being aware that we are aware (introspection). Hand-in-hand with human awareness is the ability to communicate our awareness, and to not only think introspectively, but to think about our surroundings in ways that other living things can't.

If consciousness is more fundamental than our brain, what is that composition? I believe that consciousness is at the core of all reality, i.e., that the unifying principle of all reality (everything that exists, seen and unseen) is consciousness, or an intelligent mind or minds. However, what gives something awareness apart from biological matter (or any kind of matter) is a mystery that we are not even close to solving. It's much easier to suppose, or to conclude that consciousness arises from the stuff of the known universe. The composition of consciousness may not be anything physical at all. Moreover, composition implies component parts, but there may be no component parts in the way we think of components. Answering this question would be like trying to figure out alien technology that is billions and billions of years ahead of us.

One might ask, how did consciousness arise or begin? Maybe consciousness is timeless in some sense. It could be the source of all love and knowledge - all that is, will be, and has been. If everything is happening at once the question of a beginning or end lacks sense.

One final comment. I don't think this means that one has to be religious to believe that an intelligent consciousness is fundamental. I find there are too many dogmas in religion, and too many dogmas in atheism.

:ok:

The discussion of pre-linguistic beliefs (with you and others) goes back to my thread on Wittgenstein in the prior forum. I'm wondering if your position has changed much?

Pfhorrest you won't be able to find out much with this kind of poll, it's too vague.

I'm also probably a substance dualist. I believe everything comes from consciousness, i.e., at the bottom of reality, or at the core of reality is consciousness. It's what unifies reality.

:ok:

Sure, but that's not an argument against the position that I and others are taking.

Yes, it also shows that he has knowledge of how to use a hammer, his actions demonstrate the skill (there is knowledge as a belief, and knowledge as a skill). What Wittgenstein would advise, I don't know. Consider what Witt said in OC 284, "...we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not."

No, it has nothing to do with understanding a proposition, it has to do with understanding what the content of a belief is.

Because a belief can be put into linguistic form (a proposition or statement) it doesn't then follow that the content of belief is necessarily linguistic. We observe all kinds of beliefs apart from the use of language. It would be as if we observe someone building a home, handling hammers and nails, picking up lumber, wiring the home, plumbing the home, and digging the foundation, and thinking to ourselves that they have no beliefs about the things they're handling, or the things they're doing. The very acts they're performing show the beliefs they have. It doesn't matter if the belief isn't stated. Moreover, what if a carpenter said he didn't believe in hammers and nails, and yet we see him/her handling hammers and nails almost everyday? Would you say his/her statement overrides the acts that show the opposite. No, you would say that the person is lying or being funny because the actions of the person tell a completely different story, one that contradicts his/her statements. In fact, we often put more stock in one's actions as a picture of what people believe, quite apart from what they say.

Yes, many NDEers mention living past lives, so his research extended into past life memories.

Is it possible to have such experiences during death? I mean, if death was a process, could it be that these people simply did not complete the process? If the process includes lucid memories or imagination... — creativesoul

NDEs occur in a variety of situations, but most occur during the process of dying, viz., when the heart stops beating, when there is no measurable brain function, etc. They definitely don't complete the process, if by completing the process you mean staying dead. If you watched the last video I posted, it's hard to imagine that what they're experiencing is lucid memories or imagination.

If you haven't watched the last video, I suggest watching the first 15 min.

I want to add this video for those of you who are interested in following this thread, and learning more about NDEs. Enjoy.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acN2MQQYGWg

Fair enough then. I wasn't sure if I was arguing against a position you actually held. — fdrake

:ok:

I think that applies definitionally; a use can't be set up/a word can't be defined with respect to only the presence/absence of a mental state. But it seems to me we can use speech acts to describe mental states. The philosophical thought experiment that makes the meaning of the word be the thought that motivated it is blocked, but I don't think that blocks language use in general from thematising mental states or expressing intentional content. Mapping the private with the public is part of the public. — fdrake

I find no disagreement here. You seem to be arguing against something that I also disagree with.

There's a lot of philosophy that says that mental states play no part in what speech acts express, because the connection between a mental state and a word can't be constructed in accordance with a public criterion. Instead, the behavioural states associated with the mental states are treated as the use. In historical context I think this is a reaction against "language of thought" theories from Frege, but the private language section can be read (sensibly) as support for logical behaviourism. As SEP puts it: — fdrake

I find it bizarre that anyone would think that mental states play no part in what speech acts express, as if minds don't exist. However, there has to be agreement publicly in terms of the use of words, it can't be about my own private mental state. One's mental state, say one's interpretation for example, is fit within the use of language that's decided publicly. I can't take just any mental phenomena and fit it into an expression as though I decide how a word or expression is used. So, although we have these private mental states, the act of expressing such states is decided publicly, not privately. One's private mental state does not automatically come mapped to some linguistic expression. Language is a public phenomena that we use to express mental phenomena.

I think those who interpret Wittgenstein as a behaviorist based on meaning as use have it wrong.

To be clear on the significance I think it holds; if intentional content is expressed in a speech act, so are the type of mental/agential states that characterise that intentional content (with some transduction/transformation involved). Overstating it a bit to provide an upshot; the "meaning is use" conception of language has the connection between mental states and speech acts as part of use. To mix metaphors, Wittgenstein's beetles are crawling all over words and eating them from the inside, not inside our heads. — fdrake

I think I agree with the first part of this, but explain your last sentence a bit more.

That sounds right to me. I have the sneaking suspicion that we disagree a lot on some nearby issues, but it's hidden by how you've used the words "separate" and "expression". — fdrake

I'm sure that's true.

To a first approximation, let's imagine what a speech act expresses as a kind of inverse of interpretation. Call the process by which (speech) acts are mapped by people* to interpretations "interpretation". Expression's then the process by which interpretations are mapped by people to speech acts. — fdrake

Are you saying that even our own speech acts are mapped to interpretation? So, that as I write these words I'm mapping my thoughts through the given speech acts? On the other hand, if I'm reading or listening to someone else's speech act/s it seems truistic that I interpret them, or as you say, the speech act is mapped to "interpretation."

Interpretation takes an act and gives it an interpretation. Expression takes an interpretation and puts it in a speech act. — fdrake

Okay, so, an interpretation takes any act (speech or otherwise) and applies the interpretation, or overlays an interpretation onto the act. I take it that not all interpretations are speech acts. I may, for example, interpret an order given to me by going from point A to point B without any speech acts.

As to the latter part of this quote, any expression involving interpretation necessarily (my words) commits itself to a speech act.

In that view, if we look at the assertion "It is raining but I do not believe it is raining", the performative contradiction in it can be explained with: assertions of fact (speech acts) express that their asserters believe what they say is so. The intentional content of belief expressed in "It is raining" is * that it's raining, which is contrary to what is expressed by the latter part of the phrase; another assertion of a fact, that the asserter does not believe it is raining. — fdrake

This seems rather obvious, unless I'm missing some finer point.

"It is raining..."->(the asserter believes that it is raining), the -> is expression/showing. — fdrake

Are you saying that the expression "It is raining." shows or expresses that he/she believes it is raining? If so, it seems obvious, unless they are trying to deceive or mislead.

I'd have it that because speech acts can (and indeed routinely) express intentional content in that manner, they should be considered as part of what speech acts mean. — fdrake

I'm not sure about this, maybe.

And in the context of the bone I picked with Banno, I was trying to expand declarative sentence content (what they express) to include the intentional content of the speech acts which assert them, which I imagine goes against the grain of taking belief's content to be an assertion. Butchering it a bit for clarity: assertion's content is a belief vs belief's content is an assertion. — fdrake

I definitely don't agree that belief content is necessarily an assertion. I've said this time-and-time again. And, I definitely believe that an assertion is a belief, in the main, providing the intention is not to deceive or mislead.

I'm not sure that I've interpreted everything correctly, but I gave it a try.

An example might be that a doctor's trained eye can look for abnormalities in an x-ray scan, the intentional state is abnormality seeking, Asserting "This is an abnormality" would be derivative of finding an abnormality. What I'm trying to highlight is that the content * of the abnormality finding state is expressed somehow in "This is an abnormality", it would also be expressed in whatever description of the abnormality occurred. — fdrake

Do you see this as different from what I've expressed in other threads about beliefs states, say the act of opening a door, shows your beliefs about doors, expressed or not?

Someone else might express "This is an abnormality," as you exhibit the "abnormality finding state." Or, someone else might say he believes X, by observing some intentional act or another. This it seems to me (your e.g. as well as mine) shows that the belief is quite separate from the expression.

I think we're close then. I didn't want to say language in general was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content; I think there are good reasons to suspect that language use informs what we believe and how we believe it; but that declarative sentence content was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content. — fdrake

I think we're close too. I only want to say that there are certain base or foundational beliefs that arise quite apart from language content. However, there is no doubt that language plays an important role in how and what we believe. We use language to expand our beliefs, so I don't want to say that language in general is separate and distinct from all beliefs. I'm not sure about your last sentence. For example, what about declarative sentences that arise as we expand our beliefs using language?

Would you agree that it shows that whatever the intentional content of belief is, because it is expressed (perhaps with some transformation/mutilation) through assertions it forms part of the content of assertions? But remains distinct from the content of the assertions? — fdrake

Yes, which is why, if I understand your point, I believe that although language expresses one's belief, it's not a necessary component of that belief.

Ya, I think we agree.

Eg, I grasp the cup; my body and mind are directed towards the cup in a specific way, to grasp it, to reach for its handle, to lift to to my mouth etc. This state is directed towards the cup. The content will include the location of its handle, the type of liquid in the cup, that the cup is to be grasped for drinking and so on. SEP characterises intentionality as: — fdrake

One's intention is shown in one's acts. This I believe is partly the point of Wittgenstein's remarks about how beliefs are also shown in one's actions. For example, the act of picking up the cup or opening a door shows that we have particular beliefs about cups and doors. Moreover, these actions are quite apart from propositions or statements. Language came later, as something we attached to our mental states.

Mental content or mental states is necessarily reflected in one's actions. If there were never any corresponding acts, it would be difficult, if not impossible to ascribe a mental state to a person. This is true of beliefs, intentions, anger, love, etc. We don't ascribe mental states to trees, because trees don't exhibit the corresponding actions.

I can see what you mean that my experience was more of an unusual experience than an actual near death experience, but perhaps what you are saying about my experience is true of near death experiences too, because the individuals did not die in the permanent sense. — Jack Cummins

You don't have to die in the permanent sense to know that there is life after death. There are millions of accounts of people seeing their dead relatives while having an NDE. This testimonial evidence alone tells us that those who have died in the permanent sense are still around. Sure we can't answer many questions about the afterlife, but that doesn't mean we can't answer some questions, viz., that we survive the death of the body.

The evidence for the argument I give in this thread is overwhelming. Only those people committed to a materialist world view, or those who seem unable to understand how testimonial evidence can be very strong, reject the argument.

The Inductive Argument:

The following argument is based on the testimonials at the following site:

https://iands.org/ndes/nde-stories.html

The following argument is based on the testimonial evidence of those who have experienced an NDE, and the conclusion follows with a high degree of probability. As such, one can claim to know the conclusion is true. This argument makes such a claim.

Each of the aforementioned criteria (in the above post) serve to strengthen the testimonial evidence. All of the criteria in the previous post works hand-in-hand to strengthen the conclusion, and these criteria serve to strengthen any claim to knowledge. If we have a large enough pool of evidence based on the criteria above, then we can say with confidence that we know that consciousness survives the death of the body. In other words, we can say what is probably the case, and that is all that is needed.

Again, if there is a high degree of probability that these testimonials reflect an objective reality, then we can also say with confidence, that we know consciousness survives the death of the body. Thus, our knowledge is based on objective criteria, not on purely subjective claims.

We will now look at the testimonial evidence in terms of the five stated criteria, and how these testimonials support the conclusion.

First, what is the number of people who claim to have had an NDE? According to a 1992 Gallop poll about 5% of the population has experienced an NDE; and even if this poll is off by a little we are still talking about hundreds of millions of people. Thus, the number of accounts of NDEs is very high, much higher than what we would normally need to decide the veracity or accuracy of the testimonials, and much higher that what is normally needed to draw a proper conclusion.

Also, as was mentioned in the previous post, numbers in themselves are not enough, which is why the other criteria must be coupled with numbers. It's not numbers alone.

The second criteria of good testimonial evidence is variety, i.e., do we have evidence from a variety of sources? The answer to this question is in the affirmative. NDEs have been reported in every culture from around the world, which by definition means that we are getting reports from different religious views, and different world views. NDEs also span every age group, from young children, to the middle-aged, and finally to the aged. The testimonial reports come from doctors, nurses, scientists, atheists, agnostics, literally from every imaginable educational level and background. NDEs occur in a variety of settings, including drowning, electrocution, while awake, while on the operating table, after a heart attack, etc. People have also reported having shared an NDE with someone else, although rarely. They have happened when there is no heartbeat, with the blood drained from the brain, and with no measurable brain activity. They have been reported to happen with a minimal amount of stress, i.e., without being near death. Finally, there have been many thousands more reporting these and similar events happening to those who have taken DMT (N,N-Dimethyltryptamine), which is an illegal schedule 1 drug. These DMT reports are also reports that are happening without being near death.

The third criteria is scope of the conclusion, and the scope of this conclusion is limited to consciousness surviving the body. The conclusion claims that we can know that consciousness survives bodily death.

The fourth criteria is truth of the premises. To know if the premises are true we need corroboration of the testimonial evidence, a high degree of consistency, and firsthand testimony. In all or most of these cases, it seems clear that we have all three. We have millions of accounts that can be corroborated by family members, friends, doctors, nurses, and hospice workers. Corroboration is important in establishing some objectivity to what is a very subjective experience. It lends credence to the accounts. One example of corroboration is given in Pam's NDE out of Atlanta, GA, which can be seen on Youtube.

Consistency is also important to the establishment of the truth of the premises. We have a high degree of consistency across a wide variety of reports. What are these consistent reports?

1) Seeing one's body from a third person perspective, i.e., from outside one's body, and hearing and seeing what's happening around their bodies.
2) Having intense feelings of being loved, and also intense feeling of peace.
3) Seeing a light or tunnel in the distance and feeling that one is being drawn to the light, or moving through the tunnel towards the light.
4) Seeing deceased loved ones.
5) Seeing beings of light that one may interpret as Jesus, Mary, Muhammad, an angel, or just a loving being that one may feel connected to.
6) Heightened sensory experiences, viz., feeling that one is having an ultra real experience, as opposed to a dream or a hallucination.
7) Communication that happens mind-to-mind, not verbally.
8) Seeing beautiful landscapes.
9) Seeing people who are getting ready or waiting to be born.
10) Having a life-review by a loving being who is not judgmental in any way, but simply showing you how important it is to love, and the importance of your actions on those you come in contact with.
11) Feeling as though one has returned home. This is also confirmed by people who were told they chose to come to Earth.
12) A feeling of oneness with everything, as though consciousness is at the bottom of everything.
13) Memories of who they really are return, as though they temporarily forgot who they were, and where they came from.
14) There are also reports of knowledge returning, and many questions being answered.
15) Understanding that ultimately we cannot be harmed.
16) That we are eternal beings simply entering into one of many realities.

These are just some of the reports from those who experienced an NDE, and some of these reports are confirmed by those who have taken DMT.

Another aid in establishing the truth of the testimonial evidence are firsthand accounts, as opposed to hearsay. There are literally thousands of firsthand accounts being reported by the International Association of Near Death Studies. And according to polling, there are hundreds of millions of firsthand accounts of NDEs.

The fifth criteria is cogency of the premises. Whether the argument is cogent for you depends on many factors, but many people have heard of near death experiences, so the concept is not an unfamiliar one. It is not going to be cogent for everyone, but with a little study and reading it can be cogent. It is not difficult to understand the concept. Although it is probably going to be difficult to understand how it is metaphysically possible. This argument is claiming that it is highly probable that consciousness survives the death of the body, and that the conclusion is very strong based on what makes for strong inductive arguments.

The further claim of this argument is that I know that I know the conclusion is true. Is it possible the conclusion is wrong? Of course it is possible, but we do not want to base a belief on what is possible, but on what is likely the case. All kinds of things are possible, but that does not mean we should believe them.

I'm re-posting this from page 14 with minor changes. The original post was in response to a question.

There are two ways to use the word proof, one is in reference to an inductive argument, i.e., I have sufficient evidence to conclude that X follows from the evidence. Inductive arguments are either strong or weak based on the evidence. They follow with a low, medium, or high degree of probability. You've proved your inductive argument if the evidence used to support the conclusion follows with a high degree of probability.

The second way we use the term proof in philosophy is when referring to deductive arguments, i.e., the conclusion follows with absolute necessity if the argument is sound (it's valid and the premises are true).

Although I can use both arguments, the deductive argument is less convincing, so I mainly use an inductive argument.

My claim is that there is sufficient testimonial evidence to reasonably conclude that consciousness survives the death of the body. In other words, I'm making the claim that I know the conclusion is true. And although I believe that I could make other claims based on the evidence, i.e., claims of knowledge, I'm limiting the scope of the conclusion. By limited, I mean I'm not trying to give evidence of a god, heaven, that we are eternal beings, or any other spiritual or religious idea; nor am I trying to give evidence of many of the other claims people are making while having such an experience. Although I do believe there is strong evidence to support other conclusions, and these conclusions have varying degrees of certainty, just as many of our everyday rational conclusions have varying degrees of certainty.

The first question is, what makes a strong inductive argument? As some of you know, the criteria for a good inductive argument is much different from the criteria of a good deductive argument. The criteria of a good inductive argument are as follows:

(1) number
(2) variety
(3) scope of the conclusion
(4) truth of the premises
(5) cogency

First, number. It seems rather obvious that if you have a greater number of testimonials that say X happened, then the stronger the argument. This does not mean that the conclusion relies solely on numbers, because numbers in themselves are not sufficient.

Second, variety. The greater the variety of cases cited the stronger the conclusion. Remember that when examining the conclusion of an inductive argument, the conclusion is either strong or weak, which is much different from a good deductive argument, where the conclusion follows with absolute necessity. The difference being what is probably or likely the case (inductive arguments), verses what necessarily follows (deductive arguments).

Third, scope of the conclusion. This has already been covered briefly in the opening paragraph. It means that the less the conclusion claims the stronger the argument. In other words, conclusions that are broad in scope are much harder to defend. A conclusion that is limited in scope is easier to defend.

Fourth, truth of the premises. Clearly this means that the premises must be true, which by the way, is the same criteria that makes a good deductive argument, i.e., a good deductive argument must be sound (soundness has to do with whether the deductive argument is valid, plus the premises must be true).

(a) Also, since we are dealing with testimonial evidence, in order to know if the testimonial evidence is true we need corroboration, i.e., we need an objective way to verify some of the testimonial evidence. This helps to establish the truth of the testimonial evidence, and since the evidence is testimonial evidence, it helps to establish the fourth criteria of a good inductive argument, viz., the truth of the premises.

(b) Another important factor in determining the truth of testimonial evidence is firsthand testimony, as opposed to hearsay or secondhand testimony. Firsthand testimony is stronger than hearsay or second-hand testimony, all things being equal.

(c) Consistency of the reports is another important criterion in terms of getting to the truth. However, testimonial evidence does not have to be perfectly consistent to be credible. When dealing with a large number of reports you will inevitably find some inconsistency. So, inconsistency itself is not enough to rule out the reports unless the inconsistency is widespread, and of such a number that it affects the quality and number of consistent reports. So although consistency is important, it must be looked at in terms of the overall picture.

Fifth is cogency. You rarely here this criteria, but it's very important in terms of effectiveness. Any argument's (deductive or inductive) effectiveness is going to be based on whether the person to whom the argument is given, knows the premises are true. For example, if I give the following argument:

The base of a souffle is a roux.
This salmon dish is a souffle.
Hence, the base of this salmon dish is a roux.

If you do not know what a souffle or a roux is, then you do not know if the premises are true, so how would you know if the conclusion is true. You may know that the argument is valid based on its form, but you would not know if the premises are true. Thus, you would not know if it is sound. For any argument to be effective, you have to know if the premises are true; and since knowledge varies from person to person, an arguments effectiveness is going to vary from person to person.

The next post will give the actual argument. This post simply tells us what makes a good inductive argument.

I read it, but it doesn't sound like an NDE. I'm not saying the experience wasn't real, only that it doesn't seem to fit into the experiences of NDEers. For example, if I want to know if person x,y and z went into my bedroom, I would compare what each of them saw, generally there is some overlap. They might not all see the exact same things, but some of what they saw would have to be the same, at least generally.

Some of what I posted is speculation (and I've stated it as such), i.e., it's based on no testimonial evidence or very little testimonial evidence. However, the thrust of my argument, which I've given a couple of times in this thread, is based on thousands and thousands of first hand NDEs, and these experiences are evidence. Keep in mind that there are millions of people who claim to have had an NDE. Now some people write these off as hallucinations, but I think there is to much similarity between them to say they're hallucinations. What distinguishes a hallucination from a veridical experience is that many others are experiencing that same thing, i.e., we generally agree that we are having the same or relatively the same experience.

And yes, I do think there is a strong case for an afterlife, but I don't agree with the Christian perspective or an afterlife. In fact, I don't agree with any religious idea of an afterlife. Although it could be that religion arose from these experiences.

After a long break from any discussions, I thought I might come back to add more information to this thread. Although at 70 I don't always have the patience to deal with many of the topics and/or questions in this forum.

In this thread I tried to steer clear of religious beliefs, although there is some overlap because we're talking about an afterlife. I've tried to use evidence that's not based on religious ideology, and I think I've succeeded. The testimonial evidence is from a wide range of cultural perspectives and beliefs, which gives a better picture of the NDE experience. The picture that I've formed is based on examining many thousands of these experiences. I don't believe you can conclude much by watching a few testimonials, other than to dismiss or agree with them based on your particular world view.

As has already been mentioned earlier in this thread, my view is that consciousness survives the death of the body. To say it another way, I believe we survive as persons, i.e., whatever it is that makes us who we are is not dependent upon the body/brain. For me, the testimonial evidence is overwhelming, which is why I took an epistemological approach to answering the question of consciousness surviving death. My main argument was inductive, and based on the rules of good inductive arguments I concluded that consciousness survives death. Do I know it with absolute certainty, of course not, but I do claim to know it with a high degree of certainty, and that's all that's needed. That's all that's needed in our everyday lives, and that's all that is needed in science, because much of what we claim to know is based on what is probably the case.

Is there racism in the U.S., yes, but is there "systematic racism," absolutely not. Did that police officer murder that man? Yes. That said, I don't want to have anything to do with this forum after reading some of the most disgusting posts by those who run this forum. Please delete my account.

On Certainty Post 8

"I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am looking attentively into his face.-So I don't know, then, that there is a sick man lying here? Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense. Any more than the assertion "I am here", which I might yet use at any moment, if suitable occasion presented itself.---Then is 2 x 2 = 4" nonsense in the same way, and not a proposition of arithmetic, apart from particular occasions? "2 x 2 = 4" is a true proposition of arithmetic-not "on particular occasions" nor "always"--but the spoken or written sentence "2 x 2 = 4" in Chinese might have a different meaning or be out and out nonsense, and from this is seen that it is only in use that the proposition has its sense. And "I know that there's a sick man lying here", used in an unsuitable situation, seems not to be nonsense but rather seems matter-of-course, only because one can fairly easily imagine a situation to fit it, and one thinks that the words "I know that..." are always in place where there is doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would be unintelligible (OC 10)."

Consider the following: We are sitting together visiting a friend in the hospital. We are in a well lit room, and we are not under the influence of drugs or anything that would alter our perceptions, so there is no reason to doubt that we are looking at a sick friend. I say, "There's a sick man lying here. In fact, I know there is a sick man lying here. It's our friend Bob." You respond, "What's your point? Obviously there is a sick man lying here. Did you have any doubts?" Notice how out of place the proposition sounds. It is important to realize that if there was a reason to doubt the statement, then it would not be out of place. For example, if we were standing outside Bob's room, and it was not well lit, and you asked, "Is that Bob in there?" And I replied, "Yes, it's Bob." You ask, "Are you sure (the doubt), it's hard to see in here?" I respond, "I know that's Bob, because a few minutes before you arrived, I was in there talking with him." In this last example note how the use of "I know..." fits together with the doubt, and the resolving of the doubt. In the former example, where a doubt does not arise, the use of "I know..." seems like nonsense or silliness.

The problem it seems, is that because we can imagine a situation that fits Moore's propositions, then it follows from that Moore's propositions are good examples of what we know. But the problem may be that some of these propositions will work within the language-game, and some will not. One needs to understand the context. Therefore, is it proper to say, as Moore did, "I know I have hands." One cannot answer the doubts of the skeptic by simply using the word know, as if the utterance of the word conveys that you really do know. In fact, the statement that one knows is no more intelligible in this situation, than the statement that one doubts that one has hands. Both people are making the same mistake, viz., using the words out of the language-game that make them intelligible.

Wittgenstein seems to be making the same point about the mathematical proposition 2 + 2 = 4, i.e., when it is used outside of its normal range of use (outside the language-game in which it resides), it too, is out of place.

Consider how we use the word know in our everyday lives. We take a course in algebra, history, ethics, or physics, and the teacher wants to know if you know the subject. Is it enough to say to the teacher "I know algebra." Is that enough to alleviate the doubts of your teacher? Obviously not, we have to demonstrate our knowledge? We take quizzes, we take tests, and we answer questions in class, this is what convinces others that we have knowledge. Once the doubts are eliminated, then the question of knowing does not generally arise. If we say in a court of law that so-and-so is guilty of murder, then hopefully the evidence will convince us, so that very little doubt, or even no doubt remains. A claim to knowledge is a special kind of claim that requires an objective standard, so that we generally have no doubts that we have such knowledge. Moreover, the claim to knowledge is not a claim of absolute certainty. We do not need absolute certainty to say that we know that a proposition is true or false, but we do need a high degree of certainty. This is often seen in courts of law when the jury is told to disregard doubts that are not reasonable.

What possible doubt could there be in the examples above? Doubting has to have a context beyond the expression of the word doubt. Just as knowledge must have a context beyond simply expressing the word know. Just because someone is able to use the words know and doubt in a proposition, that does not mean that the proposition has sense.

Using the word know as Moore used it, is senseless, in fact, it creates bogus philosophical problems. Many so-called philosophical problems are just as senseless. The way we talk about free will and determinism, time, knowledge, and a whole panoply of other philosophical ideas, propositions, and words are also just as problematic. Once you come to understand what Wittgenstein is saying, or trying to do via his method, then many of the problems of philosophy simply vanish as pseudo-problems - many, but not all.

Descartes' very bad idea. — Banno

Ya, I think it is poor philosophy.