Explanation' is something that exists prior to philosophy. — csalisbury

I think your correct, but my idea may be a bit different from what you have in mind. I distinguish causes from reasons, i.e., causes for belief vs reasons for belief. Doing philosophy necessarily involves language, and those beliefs derived from language. For instance, because of reason (or propositions) A, B, and C, I choose to conclude X (inductively), so reason generally involves choices. Whereas a cause for a belief is an explanation without choice, I find myself believing as a result of cause A. For example, I may believe snakes are dangerous because I was bitten by one (X causes Y). On the other hand, I may believe snakes are dangerous based on reasons or evidence (a choice based on reasons/evidence).

Prior to philosophical inferences most (if not all) of our beliefs are causal, i.e., we inherit a certain background that forms a narrative. This narrative when seen from a causally formed perspective (causally formed beliefs) provides the foundation from which all linguistic beliefs (philosophy) are derived. Moreover, it prevents the kind of infinite regress you seem to be talking about.

So, there is a kind of bedrock to reality that we find ourselves in, viz, the world around us, it is the background or reality that allows us to have a philosophy.

What comes to mind is that Christian Existentialists want to disregard reason when it comes to faith. I can't make any sense of this idea. As far as I can see, this leads to nonsense. When you take the leap of faith, you may as well jump into the abyss. Throw out reason and you may as well throw out your brains. I'm using reason in the very broad sense, not just reason as it pertains to logic, but reason that is behind language and our experiences.

It seems as though Christian Existentialists want to throw up their hands because they can't answer certain questions. I contend that reason is what is needed to answer the questions, and if we can't get the answers, we keeping working at it, we don't give up (like the Christian Existentialists).

One of the most common criticisms aimed at near death experiences, is that they are hallucinations. Michael Shermer in a 2013 article in the Scientific American postulates that these experiences can be attributed to hallucinations. The question is then, is this likely the case, not is it possible, but is it likely that these cases are hallucinations? Since we cannot get a definitive answer, that is, an answer in absolute terms, our conclusion should give us an answer as to the likelihood of one conclusion over another. So, the question boils down to whether a hallucination is as good or a better explanation of what is happening than the explanation that these are veridical perceptions. Moreover, the question is not, “Are these real experiences?” Why? Because any experience is real, even a hallucination (i.e., the experience of having a hallucination is real, not the hallucination itself). However, we want to ask if the NDE experience is as real or more real than our everyday experiences, which is why we want to know if the experience is veridical.

The question we should ask first, is, what is a hallucination? Hallucinations are sensory perceptions that a person experiences without external stimulus. In other words, the experience is purely subjective and only exists in their mind, as opposed to objectively verified experiences. Hallucinations can occur in any sensory modality (hearing, seeing, taste, tactile, or smell). Hallucinations are not veridical, which is why they are called hallucinations. They are distortions of reality, and they are usually associated with illnesses like schizophrenia or bipolar disorder.

What distinguishes veridical experiences from hallucinations? A veridical experience has an objective component that is shared with others, that is, we generally see (feel, taste, hear, and smell) the same things, we have shared external stimuli, which is what makes a normal sensory experience.

If NDEs are hallucinations, then why are so many people seeing the same things, at least generally? Moreover, if these experiences are not veridical, then why do so many doctors, nurses, family members, and friends verify the accuracy of the experience. In other words, those who are not having the experience corroborate the testimonial accuracy of the ones having the NDE. This is not the case with hallucinations, that is, others, who are at the scene of the hallucination do not report that the hallucination is an account of objective reality. Hallucinations are not corroborated, i.e., they are not veridical.

Many people who have an NDE describe their experience as hyper-real, that is, more real than real. When they compare their normal every day experiences to their NDE, their normal reality seems dreamlike by comparison. They describe their sensory experiences as expanded. For example, the ability to see what is happening in a more expanded field of vision, or seeing colors that they have never seen before. These are not the kind of reports that are associated with hallucinations, nor are they the reports of those whose brains are shutting down, or that lack oxygen, or that are the result of medication.

Why do so many people say that NDEs are hallucinations? There are many reasons. First, they are just giving their opinion. Second, these experiences (NDEs) do not fit their world view. Third, most or many people who have beliefs that are strictly materialistic are biased, and this is true no matter their education. Fourth, they have not studied NDEs, so they are just not sufficiently knowledgeable on the subject, again just giving their opinion based on what they think they know.

So, the objection that NDEs are hallucinations is just not a viable argument. Neither is it a viable argument that NDEs are random firings of a brain that is shutting down. Other criticisms of NDEs are equally lacking in evidence, such as, a lack of oxygen to the brain, delusions, dreams, or some other brain malfunction.

The most likely conclusion based on the evidence, is that these cases are not hallucinations, and that it is more likely than not, that they are veridical experiences.

I don't see why you need hard evidence to back this up, as it is a rather milquetoast claim. Yes, we have conciousness after we die. It's just that, in such a state, there will 1) be no memory, because the bodily function that before facilitated memory has been destroyed, and as such you cannot compare former states with present states, or rationalize and predict latter states due to advanced prediction functions in the brain being annihilated, and 2) there will be no "you" since the idea of you is itself parallel with some bodily function that has been obliterated. — BraydenS

The reason I need a good argument is because of claims like yours, which is just an opinion.

I don't think Christian Existentialism fairs much better.

It's very difficult to change people's beliefs, which is why I always say that the psychology of belief is much more powerful than any argument. All you have to do is look at political beliefs, religious beliefs, and atheistic beliefs, it rarely happens that these people give up their beliefs. Logic usually has nothing to do with deeply held beliefs. What you usually find is that dogmatism rules the day; and dogmatism is the enemy of truth.

Based on my research into NDEs, religions (mainly thinking about Christianity, but other religions have it wrong too) have it wrong in terms of needing to be saved (salvation), the idea of sin and punishment, hell, Jesus as God, Satan, etc.

Many Christians either say that NDEs are demonic, or they latch onto those NDEs (cherry picking the evidence) where people claim to have seen Christ, Mary, or other religious figures. However, there is a lot of evidence that suggests, especially when looking at NDEs across cultures, that people interpret their NDE in terms of their cultural predispositions. So, if someone is a Christian, when they experience a loving powerful being, they tend to interpret that being as Christ. Whereas those in the Islamic religion will tend to interpret the being as Muhammad. This doesn't always occur, but when it does, one tends to find cultural influence. This suggests that although they may see a loving powerful being, their interpretation of who or what the being is, is probably not accurate. There tend to many more non-religious interpretations of the being, than religious ones.

There is almost no evidence, or very little evidence that suggests that there is a hell. In fact, in this case one can look at what is not reported, as well as what is reported. You would think that if there was a hell, there would be warnings about it from those who have already passed. In other words, in the conversations people have with deceased relatives they are never warned of the consequences of their sins (i.e., being damned to eternity in hell). You would think that if hell was a possibility, that deceased relatives would warn their loved ones of such a danger. However, in the thousands and thousands of accounts that I've read no such warnings occur.

What I have said about hell can also be applied to the idea of needing salvation (Christian salvation), i.e., if it is so important in terms of an afterlife, then why is it not mentioned in the conversations with deceased relatives. You would think that that would be number one on the list of things that are important, especially if it was true.

There is also very little testimonial evidence that there are such things as devils or demons. These tend to be religious ideas with very little or no evidence to support such beliefs.

The evidence, and I am going beyond the evidence to support the idea that we survive death, suggests that we chose to come here, i.e., to experience a human life with all its frailties. The idea that we chose this life, also answers the problem of evil, at least as Christians and others present it. If we chose to experience this life, then we knew ahead of time what we were getting into. In other words, we knew that we would suffer. It is quite possible that much of our lives were planned ahead of our coming here.

No quarrel there, however, what is the medium? In other words, the means and methods would be intriguing. Otherwise, the book would be restricted to recordation of NDE accounts. As such, aren't there plenty of those? — 3017amen

My book will be much different from many of the books that have been written. I'm presenting a much different kind of argument. No book that I've read has ever laid out the testimonial evidence as I have, i.e., in the way that I have. It's not just a book about testimonial accounts, although there will be some of that.

NDE's entail someone being outside their body and observing some things going on around them. How can things be seen and heard without eyes and ears, and the neural networks that process the inputs? If this physical equipment really isn't necessary, why are there people who are blind and deaf? — Relativist

The question you ask presupposes that sensory experiences are confined to the body (or brain if you prefer). I'm suggesting that there is strong evidence that it is not confined to the body/brain. In fact, some people who have been blind since birth experienced sight in their NDE. The following is an example of a blind person seeing during their NDE.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5qX0zBUYLFs

It is my contention that the mind is much greater than the brain. Also, that our consciousness is not confined to a physical body as we know it. It seems that we still have bodies in the afterlife, but they are greater by an order of magnitude. All of our sensory inputs are magnified once we are free of this body, including the expansion of our knowledge.

Other than that, the last thought is whether you have considered EM field theories of consciousness? The idea there is to theorize consciousness as a direct metaphysical analogy to the NDE, where such phenomena become reality: https://medium.com/@aramis720/is-consciousness-just-a-complex-electromagnetic-field-9d4bf05326f0

You can try to explain metaphysical phenomena that speaks to feelings of Love, euphoria, excitement, intuition, et al. And you can argue that consciousness has not been fully explained by science. — 3017amen

I have read very little about field theories of consciousness. My only goal in the book is to argue that there is strong evidence to suggest that consciousness is not confined to the brain. Moreover, that we do survive the death of the body. Coming up with a theory of consciousness is a different ballgame altogether. Although it is an interesting topic.

However, as a critique, in your subsequent paragraph you mention the nature of truth and reality. The constructs of subjectivity, objectivity, and abstract truth's come to mind here. And you used Einstein as an example. All that said, because we are essentially referring to Metaphysics and Phenomenology in the NDE experience, how have you reconciled those? — 3017amen

I don't have a problem incorporating these ideas into the nature of reality. I define subjectivity and objectivity a bit different from how you define them. A subjective truth, as I see it, is dependent on the subject. For example, "I like orange juice," this subjective truth is dependent on my likes and dislikes (mind-dependent). Whereas, an objective truth, is not dependent on the subject. For instance, the Earth has one moon, is objectively true, which is independent of my thinking, or independent of the subject (mind-independent). There is some overlap of these ideas, but generally this is true.

Also, as part of the nature of reality, we have abstract truths. Examples, include mathematical truths or principles, and the truths and/or principles of logic. These are contrasted with a posteriori statements, as opposed to a priori statements.

I'm trying to keep this book as basic as possible, so although I'll probably include some of this in the book, I don't want to get to esoteric. There have been many books written on the nature of reality, and I'm sure that whatever I put in the book, people will think I should have included this or that.

This is a continuation of some of what I'm writing in my book entitled "Does Consciousness Survive Death?" A couple of things to remember. First, this is written for the man on the street, so in many ways it's very basic. Second, these pages are not completely edited.

Post #2

The second part of the argument is based on testimonial evidence, that is, what makes testimonial evidence strong. This is an important part of the argument, because generally testimonial evidence is looked at rather suspiciously, and rightly so. We will examine the criteria that makes testimonial evidence strong. The criteria that makes testimonial reports strong overlaps with the criteria that makes good inductive arguments. For example, a good inductive argument is based on the following criteria.

(1) number
(2) variety
(3) scope of the conclusion
(4) truth of the premises
(5) cogency

The number of cases cited to support the argument, directly supports its strength. Compare, one person testifying to seeing Joe shoot Mary, as opposed to ten people seeing Joe shoot Mary. It’s obvious that the more people you have that witness an event, the stronger the evidence to support the conclusion.
There are literally millions of accounts of NDEs in the United States and around the world. Hence, in terms of numbers the argument is well positioned, but numbers are not enough, which brings us to the next yardstick used to measure good or strong testimonial evidence, variety.

Variety has to do with the cases cited, the greater the variety, the stronger the evidence, and thus, the stronger the conclusion. If we again consider a murder case (Joe shooting Mary). If we have an eyewitness account, or even multiple witness accounts, the evidence is stronger if it is from a variety of sources. For example, not only eyewitness accounts from different sources and positions, but fingerprints, DNA samples, the victim’s blood found on the accused’s clothing, etc., this variety of supporting evidence gives strength to the argument that Joe is guilty of murder.

In NDE cases, unlike the murder case above, we do not have physical evidence, so we will be relying on a variety of other factors. For example, NDEs occurring from the points of view of those in car crashes, operations, heart attacks, cancer patients, suicide, etc. Variety also includes NDEs from different age groups, different cultures, different times in history, and although rare, people sharing the same NDE. The variety in the accounts of those who testify to their NDE is another point of strength.

The third criterion is the scope of the conclusion. The broader the scope of your conclusion, the more difficult it is to prove. The narrower the scope of the conclusion, the easier it is to prove. In other words, the more you claim in your conclusion, the more evidence you will need to support the claim/s. Therefore, a conclusion that is narrower in scope, and more conservative, is easier to defend.

The fourth criterion is the truth of the premises. In other words, the truth of the statements used to support your argument. Obviously if your supporting statements are false, then the conclusion may be false, at least it is more likely that the conclusion is (inductively speaking) false.

Finally, cogency, which means the statements used to support the argument (premises), are known to be true. This is often overlooked in arguments. It seems obvious that if the person or persons to whom the argument is given do not know the premises are true, then no matter how good your argument, it will ultimately fail.

So, we will be using the three methods described earlier (sensory experience, testimony, and logic) to infer that consciousness survives death. Which brings us to the value of inference, namely, the value of drawing a conclusion based on our evidence. Moreover, in terms of epistemology, if you can infer or prove (inductively prove) that your conclusion follows, then you know your conclusion follows. In this case, we are trying to inductively prove that consciousness survives death. What does it mean to inductively prove your conclusion? It means that the inductive argument is strong. How strong depends on the criteria given earlier. Again, it should be stressed that the criteria must be taken as a whole, not isolated from each other. In isolation the criteria diminish the strength of the argument.

As stated earlier, the definition for knowledge used in this book is justified true belief. We have already spoken about the ways in which we justify a belief (linguistic training, sensory experience, testimony, logic, etc), but now we want to say something about the nature of truth. The general definition for truth used in this book is the following: A statement is generally true if it corresponds with reality. Thus, if I make the statement that the Earth has one moon, the statement either matches reality or it does not. If it does not, then obviously the statement is false, if it does match reality, then the statement is true. Einstein claimed that space was curved or warped, and that this could be demonstrated as starlight passed by the sun. Thus, Einstein made a prediction about what could be seen by observation, namely, what is happening in reality as starlight passed by the gravitation pull of the Sun. Einstein’s prediction was confirmed in 1919 by Sir Arthur Eddington’s experiments. The point is that Einstein’s claim turned out to be true based on what was happening in reality, so Einstein’s statements corresponded with reality (our definition of truth).

Please note that the moral oughts I find morally relevant are the wishes/desires of people; they are simply recommendations concerning moral thought/speech/behavior and not the other kind of moral ought we see cropping up in moral theories. They are sourced from moral intuitions rather than from full rational analysis of morality and are rough guidlines to serve most moral issues and are not the laws that moral theories are so fond of. — TheMadFool

You didn't address my argument which disputes your premises. All you did was repeat yourself. Your proofs are irrelevant if the premises are false, which I believe is the case.

1. Moral oughts are simply wishes/desires for something better and can't be obligations for freedom is essential to morality

2. Any moral theory that attempts to make the good obligatory and the bad prohibitory, like all moral theories so far, is self-refuting because, as I said, freedom is an essential ingredient for moral responsibility — TheMadFool

I can't make any sense out of either of these premises. I understand what your point is, I just don't believe either (1) or (2) is true. It may be true that some people believe "oughts" are derived from "wishes/desires," but that would make them arbitrary and capricious. What you might consider moral and obligatory might conflict with what I consider moral and obligatory. How would we arrive at any consensus if there weren't good (objective) reasons to suppose that generally love is better than hate, or that murder (as opposed to justifiable killing) is always wrong.

One contention we might be consider is that oughts are derived from that which we value. We value love much more than hate, because we see the outcomes of love over hate. We also value truth-telling generally over lying, because we see the outcome in relationships (business, friends, and family relationships).

Finally, it's correct to assume that freedom is an essential ingredient of morality. However, freedom must be seen in the correct context, that is, it's the power to do otherwise. To say that one should generally keep one's promises doesn't take away one's freedom to not keep one's promises. The freedom to do otherwise is still present, it's just that it's not generally the best course of action - the best moral action. Why? Because we see that in our daily lives keeping promises promotes the good in a variety of ways.

Imagine you are born as adult, fully intelligent, in a completely empty universe. What does it even mean to be intelligent without having no any information about anything? Or do we get born with some kind of basic information with which we could then derive some basic concepts and eventually geometry and math? By the way, what are the minimum necessary concepts to derive the concept of colors? — Zelebg

First, what would it mean to be "fully intelligent" without information of some kind? Intelligence has to be measurable in some way. Second, the universe couldn't be completely empty if you're in it. Third, if you're in the universe, then there is information, namely, you, your hands and feet, and the rest of your body. Your fingers alone could give you some basic information about math. Although one would wonder if you could have a language in such a situation, probably not. If language couldn't exist in such a situation (because of its social nature), then there would be no concepts. However, this doesn't mean that there wouldn't be colors, it just means that there would be no concepts for the colors.

In terms of logic, if you were in the universe, then there would have to be some logic to your existence apart from you understanding that logic.

If the answer is "yes" then I'd be pleasantly surprised and would like to request you to tell us what that is that's worth hellfire? Love? Immortality? — TheMadFool

I reject the idea that there is a hell, so the question is moot. I see no evidence that hell exists. It's based on very weak testimonial evidence, to say the least. If there was strong evidence that hell existed, then maybe your question might have merit.

By doubting your existence, you show your existence. I agree, how would such a doubt be rationally presented?

Here is part of the beginning of my book. It hasn't been completely edited, but you get the general idea.

Does Consciousness Survive Death?
(Do We Survive Death?)


The primary goal of this book is to establish whether we can have knowledge of the question at hand, as opposed to an opinion, speculation, or a faith based religious belief. The two subjects of this book include the subject of epistemology and the subject of near death experiences (NDEs). The subject of epistemology, or the subject of knowledge, has been a subject that mankind has grappled with for millennia, at least as far back as Plato. Not only can epistemology be traced back to Plato, but one of the oldest accounts of an NDE can also be traced back to Plato. It is the account of Er, which is about a soldier who awoke on his funeral pyre, and his account of the afterlife. The point is that the subject matter we are investigating is nothing new. What is new, is the amount of data we have on NDEs, that is, we have access to millions of firsthand NDE testimonials. A 1992 Gallup poll found that 5% of Americans have had an NDE, that is roughly 16 million people in the United States. This does not include the millions of people from around the world, which would make the numbers in the hundreds of millions. Having access to so many testimonials can help us determine if the testimonials have any merit, namely, it will help us determine if the testimonial evidence is strong or weak. We are not striving for knowledge in absolute terms, no more than we need to strive for absolute certainty in most of our knowledge claims. Most of what we claim to know, is known with a high degree of probability; as such, we will strive for the same kind of certainty as we examine the testimonial evidence of NDEs.

Given that the two primary subjects of this paper are epistemology and NDEs, and since epistemology plays such a foundational role in what this book will claim, it will be examined first. For many of you the subject of epistemology will be something new, or something you heard of in some philosophical discussion that seemed far removed from anything practical or useful. In fact, this thinking is probably how most people feel about philosophy in general, that is, people discussing esoteric subjects that have no practical application, and in many cases this is true. However, in this book we will endeavor to show just how practical the subject of epistemology can be in terms of what we can claim to know.

So, the first question is, what does it mean to have knowledge? We will be using one of the oldest definitions of knowledge, namely, justified true belief. This definition is used in a variety of ways, or in a variety of contexts. First, we can come to know that something is the case through sensory experience. For example, I know the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it, or I know there is a palm tree in my backyard because I see it. Second, knowledge is acquired through linguistic training. For example, I know that the object on my desk is a cup, because that is what we mean by cup in English. So, within any language there are correct and incorrect uses of words. Third, much of what we learn and claim to know, is based on testimony. People who are experts in their field tell us that such-and-such is the case. For example, this happens through books, the classroom, multimedia applications, etc. The fourth way of gaining knowledge is through the use of logic, that is, deductive and inductive reasoning. A deductive argument is one in which the conclusion follows with absolute necessity. They are commonly referred to as deductive proofs. In such an argument, if the premises are true, then the conclusion follows necessarily. The second type of logical argument is an inductive argument, an inductive argument is one in which the conclusion follows with a degree of probability, which is why inductive arguments are often referred to as either strong or weak. These are just some of the ways in which we come to have knowledge.

In this book we will be concerned with three of the above four ways of attaining knowledge, namely, sensory experience, testimony, and logic. All NDEs are experienced through subjective sensory experiences; and, if others are seeing the same things, then this lends credence and objectivity to the experience. This is also the case in our everyday experiences, that is, we share the same general sensory experiences; and we conclude, at least generally, that something is veridical if others are seeing or experiencing the same things.

So, how do sensory experience, testimony, and logic play a role in determining whether we can claim to have knowledge about whether consciousness survives the death of the body? The claim of this book, is that in the same way these three ways of justifying a belief inform our everyday knowledge claims, they can also be used to justify other kinds of claims, more specifically, the claims of NDEers.

People who have NDEs claim that what they are experiencing is veridical, that is, what they see, feel, hear, etc., is just as real, in fact, more real, than their everyday experiences. This is the first part of the argument, people’s subjective experiences, which by itself is generally not enough for us to conclude anything, especially that consciousness survives death. One must keep in mind (and this is crucial) that this argument, which is supposed to give us knowledge, combines three ways of justifying a belief (sensory experiences, testimony, and logic). These three combined, form the foundation of the argument, and we will claim in the end that they give us a good justification to conclude that consciousness survives death.

Part of the argument that relies on sensory experiences is dependent on the fact that generally we can trust our sensory experiences. If this was not the case, the argument would fail to support the conclusion. In fact, much of what we believe about our everyday lives would also fall apart, including science, which relies heavily on our sensory experiences, and draw conclusions based on sensory observations.

I'm specifically referring to the trustworthiness and reliability of the verbal reports of experimental subjects in psychological experiments where they are tasked with giving self-reports, possibly including explanations for their own behaviour. A testimony of a subject taken at face value can be terribly misleading when it comes to understanding the actual underlying proximal and distal causes of the subject's verbal behaviour, for there is no reliable mapping between a person's use of sentences and their psychological state, and people don't possess introspective access to the causes of their own behaviour. — sime

I agree with this, but my argument doesn't rely solely on these kinds of reports, if it did I would say the argument is very weak. Note that the inductive argument as I've put forth has a variety of criteria that make the testimonial evidence strong. I think people forget that not only can testimonial evidence be very weak, it can also be very strong.

I've been wanting to write a book, but medical issues have been a problem. I want to write something that an everyday person would be able to easily follow. I will post some of the beginning of the book and would appreciate comments about clarity, not necessarily what you think about the argument, although that would always be welcome.

I don't even trust personal testimonies when it comes to deciding the veracity of the humdrum theories of behavioural psychology, let alone for deciding the veracity of pseudo-scientific mystical hypotheses. — sime

Most everything you believe has come from the testimony of others, if you doubted most of it you would be reduced to silence. Professors, books, language, science was given to you by others, you probably had little to do with creating the information yourself.

The argument is logical (inductive argument), don't give your opinions, give reasons why the argument fails.

Consciousness Without Brain Activity: Near Death Experiences - Dr. Bruce Greyson

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J_qBIw7qyHU&t=773s

Logic may be defined as the branch of philosophy that reflects upon the nature of thinking, or more specifically reasoning, itself. — Harry Hindu

Logic is concerned with the nature of reasoning, i.e., correct reasoning as opposed to incorrect reasoning. The nature of thinking is much broader in scope than logic.

In this sense, religion and politics are bad philosophy. Science would be good philosophy. — Harry Hindu

There can be good and bad reasoning within any subject, including science. You can't just say that science equals good philosophy. It depends on the subject matter, and the arguments put forth.

If something is believed to be impossible, what sort of evidence would be needed to undercut that belief?Certainly not testimonial evidence. — Relativist

Believing something is impossible, and something really being impossible, are two different things. I'm sure that at one time people believed it impossible for man to fly, and how did that turn out? I'd be careful about claiming things are impossible, there are things that fall into this category, but most of the time when people say something is impossible, all that is really meant is that it's improbable. Moreover, there are different degrees of possibility.

I'm not interested in turning this thread into an argument about whether aliens can travel great distances, but scientists have been talking about the possibility of bending space, which would allow us to travel great distances. It's difficult to say what a civilization thousands of years ahead of us could do. You probably couldn't even imagine the technological advances such a civilization would have.

Testimonial evidence certainly could overturn something that people believe to be impossible. However, it would have to be strong testimonial evidence, based on the outline I gave above.

There is a great deal of testimonial evidence of alien encounters. All that have been investigated have been discovered false, none verified as true. More significantly, the probability of an advanced, intelligent civilization within a navigable distance, who were motivated to make the long journey, is extremely low. Conclusions:
1.there have been zero alien encounters
2. Testimonial evidence is not a reliable means of establishing that an anomolous type of event can occur. — Relativist

It's true that there is a great deal of testimonial evidence regarding alien encounters and UFOs, but if you read my argument above it's not just based on numbers, there are other criteria that go into making a good inductive argument based on testimonial evidence. However, the best testimonial evidence about a UFO is from Fmr. Commander Dave Fravor, take a look at it, it's interesting. I don't know what it means, but it is interesting.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GS2ZKw3G9-w&t=2s

where are you with the mind-body/materialist problem? — 3017amen

I'm definitely in the camp with those who believe that the mind is independent of the body. I believe the argument I gave above is strong, given all the data, and taken as a whole. I too believe the brain acts as a receptor, but I also believe we exist as persons apart from our bodies.

If you have the time, this video interview of Dr. Bruce Greyson talking and answering questions about NDEs is worth listening to.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-QYBhzi67NY

The best summary is from Dr. Greyson himself.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-QYBhzi67NY

What happens after the confusions are dispelled? Does that speak to the veracity of the cleared ground, or is it simply a case of being better off to do whatever else is required than before? I'm always wary of leaving the implicit accounts our use of language has as the final word, when their analysis is intended only to be the first. — fdrake

It depends on what the confusions reveal. For example, if we're referring to Moore's argument against the skeptics, the argument fails. If we're referring to the skeptic's argument against Moore, their argument fails. Both arguments fail because of the misuse of the words know and doubt respectively. In both cases it clears the ground, so that future mistakes of the same kind are not made. Does it speak to the truth of the arguments? Yes. If both arguments fail, then their conclusions are not true. Is it the final word on the matter, of course not. One might need to revise the arguments in light of the new information. It depends on one's goals. Moreover, understanding the points made in Wittgenstein's analysis clears the way in many other similar arguments.

It's seems you're implying that not much is accomplished after the air clears. It depends on what the clarity achieves. It might be a minor point of clarity, or a major point of clarity. Wittgenstein's analysis of what it means to know in OC is a major point of clarity. It affects the way we use the word know across a wide domain of uses.

Most of us have talked in generalities, although you have brought up specific examples from Austin. There are many words that philosophers use (and others) that could do with some Wittgensteinian analysis (as per the PI or OC). For instance...

Truth
Knowledge
Illusion
Delusion
Soul
Hallucination
Reality
Unconscious
Subconscious
Belief
Time
Thought
Experience
Infinity
Subjective
Objective

The list goes on and on with words that cause linguistic confusion. Austin tackles a few of these in his book Sense and Sensibilia.

Then there is Wittgenstein's analysis of how we derive meaning. How that many of our words aren't associated with objects (mental or otherwise) that give meaning to a word. It's the problem of thinking that meaning is associated with something internal to me (some mental phenomena) that I associate with the word as I use it.

Obviously, as we have already agreed, linguistic analysis in the tradition of Wittgenstein and Austin isn't the be-all and end-all of understanding, but it is an important study, helping us to understand many confusions that arise philosophically.

Here's a link for you.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1980/evidence-of-consciousness-surviving-the-body/p1

Some of you may enjoy this spoken essay based on J. L. Austin's notes.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIB6rUa9fJQ

I think it illustrates the kind of linguistic analysis we're talking about.

As an example, Austin's analysis of the argument from illusion (for perceptual anti-realism, specifically used to argue for sense-datum theories). The original argument goes like: we see a stick half submerged in water, it appears bent. The stick has not really bent as immersion in the water does not bend it. The bending of the stick in the water is equivalent, insofar as it generates a perception, to seeing a stick really bent in that manner. Since a perception of the stick appearing to bend in water is sensorially equivalent to a perception of the stick bending outside water in precisely the same way, we do not see reality as it is; we see appearances, construable as sense data.

Austin intervenes in the argument by, among other things, pointing out that it is fully consistent to say "Yes, we see a stick which appears bent", undermining the equivocation of appearance and perception used to establish the equivalence of the "really bent stick" perception from the "bent stick in water" appearance (there's more to the argument of course).

The internal tension highlighted is the elision of perception and appearance through a shifting of vocabulary, which when criticised dispels the force of the argument by revealing unstated, implausible premises. — fdrake

I really enjoyed reading Austin's analysis when I was in college, and would recommend Sense and Sensibilia to anyone interested in the issues being discussed in this and other threads like this.

The internal tension highlighted is the elision of perception and appearance through a shifting of vocabulary, which when criticised dispels the force of the argument by revealing unstated, implausible premises. — fdrake

Austin's analysis is a good example of how such arguments can shed light on linguistic confusions. You're right to point these out.

In the context of this thread, Linguistic analysis should not be isolated from the confusions of meaning that often occur when stating one's ideas. Moreover, the analysis should not be separated from the world in which we live and breathe, where language gets its life.

We've had a brief discussion about it being useful for clarity; and we've conducted the discussion in pragmatic terms in general. It's a truism that clarity is certainly desirable when writing on a topic, but it does not seem a sufficient reason to render linguistic analysis necessary for discussing that topic; even if such a topic would benefit from it, that does not establish that it is required to discuss the topic at all. — fdrake

It's certainly the case that it's a truism to say that we need to be clear when we write, especially writing from a philosophical perspective; and generally it's the case when writing about anything. However, there's something unique about Wittgenstein's (and Austin for the matter) later philosophy that lends itself to the clarification of meaning that we've rarely seen before. And, it's in this sense that clarity for me takes on a whole new study. These kinds of discussions are needed because it's easy to overblow the significance of any advancement. Wittgenstein's later works are an advancement in philosophical thinking, viz., clarity of meaning.

We both seem to agree that in order for people to have discussions, at least on an everyday level, this kind of analysis is not necessarily needed for us to communicate. People communicate all the time without ever hearing of Wittgenstein or Austin, or without ever understanding some of their methods of linguistic analysis.

Given that, what seems a more interesting discussion topic is are three related issues:

(B1) What circumstances necessitate adopting linguistic analysis as a philosophical methodology? — fdrake

Books could be written trying to answer these three questions. Nevertheless, they are good questions.

First, one needs a good understanding of the methods employed by Wittgenstein and Austin in order to be able to recognize when to apply them; just as a scientist recognizes when to employ the scientific method. Second, one needs to recognize the context (philosophical discussions, and the depth of those discussions) that might permit such a discussion. On the other hand, sometimes when talking about meaning, one can interject some of these methods into simple discussions. Depends on how adept you are, and how well you understand the methodology.

(B2) What does it mean that linguistic analysis is necessary for analysing a topic?

As I understand it, in this context, it would mean that a clarification of meaning is required that would help resolve an argument, or at least clarify a philosophical problem. These kinds of issues arise all the time, especially in a philosophical forum. Rarely are there threads where such clarifications would not benefit the discussion.

(B3) Does the necessity of linguistic analysis for a topic say anything about the topic's nature?

Yes, from Wittgenstein's early philosophy to his later philosophy, he has concentrated on how it is that we mean something by this or that word, or by this or that statement/proposition. Thus, if one could sum up Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole, its been one devoted to understanding meaning.

Seeing as you reacted to the question "were the banker bailouts in 2008 (morally) right?" strongly, affirming that it is a classic example for linguistic analysis, what was it about the question that made you believe it was necessary (if you believed it was necessary) to approach it through that lens?

And moreover, to what extent are these features generalisable? Can you use them more abstractly as indicators that linguistic analysis is necessary (or profitable) in a circumstance? And moreover, if that is true, how can you transfer those indicators to philosophical discussion more generally? — fdrake

I can see why you might want me to react to the moral question, but since my main work has been in the area of epistemology, I think it would be appropriate to answer the question in terms of my epistemological background, as meager as it might be.

In just about every subject the question of knowing arises. What does it mean to know (I use JTB as a generalizable definition), and how has Wittgenstein's methods helped to clarify what it means to know? This, it seems to me, is paramount if we want to claim that we know anything. If we look at use in terms of knowing we see that there is at least five ways of justifying a belief (remember we are applying Wittgenstein's methods, we are looking at use).

1) Linguistic training, which is a very basic justification of the use of words, i.e., it agrees with correct public usage. It's a matter of learning how to use words within a particular language. A child learns that's Mom or Dad because they were taught that's Mom or Dad. Later they will learn to use words like cup, water, dog, cat, etc. How does a child know that's a dog? Because it was taught that's a dog. How do we know they know? We observe how they use the words. They surely don't give us a definition.

2) Pure reason, pure logic, so a proposition is true due to its logical structure. It's called a tautology. For example, "Either Abraham Lincoln was the 16th president of the U.S., or he wasn't the 16th president of the U.S." This statement is true due to its logical structure. The logical structure of the statement is "X or not X." Any proposition of this form is always true.

3) The third way of justifying a belief is through sensory experience. You can know the car is blue by looking at it, that the apple is sweet by tasting it, that someone is playing a trumpet by hearing it, that the table top is smooth by feeling it, etc.

4) The fourth way of justifying a belief is through inference, argument, or proof. A belief is inferred from other propositions (e.g. inductive and deductive reasoning) or evidence.

5) The fifth way of justifying a belief is through testimony. We very often learn things from those who are in a position to know. Much of what we know comes from the testimony of others. In fact, there is a massive amount of information that comes to us through testimony. Can we doubt most of this information? No. Why? Because the very tools for understanding the world around us, our words and concepts, come from others. If we doubted most of it, we would be reduced to silence. Our culture and other cultures succeed because of the truthfulness of most of what is conveyed to us. This is not to say that we should trust everything we read or hear, because sometimes there are good reasons to doubt what is said or written.

I think it's clear how these uses are generalizable, and I think it's clear how each of these can be used to further explain what it means to know. As you can see, knowing is not restricted to any one subject (e.g. science). Moreover, most of what we know is not known with absolute certainty. Very often people classify knowledge as knowing with absolute certainty. If this was the case there wouldn't be much that we could claim to know. You couldn't even claim to know algebra if you got less than perfect scores on all your tests. As it is, we can get a B, or even a C, and claim to know algebra. Thus, knowledge extends to what is probable or likely the case.

I think I've answered some of your questions.

I bring these up because questions in fields can provide philosophical insights or impinge upon philosophical questions; "do special and general relativity impact the A-theory of time?", "were the banker bailouts in 2008 (morally) right?". Questions in metaphysics and political economy do not seem to require linguistic analysis to play a central role in order to pose them or attempt to answer them.

But this is hardly the "home turf" of linguistic analysis. — fdrake

There is much here to agree with, but on the other hand, there are philosophies that grow out of some of the analyses done that need (I believe), in order to be more precise, a Wittgensteinian analysis. For instance, your example, "were the banker bailouts in 2008 (morally) right?" This, it seems, is a classic example of where a linguistic analysis might be needed. What does it mean to be morally right? What theories of moral right and wrong are we talking about (utilitarian, deontological, or relativistic theories, to name a few)? This would bring up the different uses we have for these words in our culture. That said, much of the time when using these words, we take it for granted that people are referring to the same things, until you press them on the specifics.

I would disagree that "[q]uestions in metaphysics and political economy do not seem to require a linguistic analysis." Especially when discussing the philosophical theories that arise from different belief methodologies. There is a sense, though, where both of us are correct depending on what we are emphasizing. If we are talking about a statistical analysis of income brackets, as you pointed out above, then you're probably right about not needing a linguistic analysis (as per Wittgenstein). It depends on what we're trying to accomplish. However, if we're developing a philosophy as a result of a statistical analysis, we might need a linguistic analysis for precision's sake.

When it comes to epistemology, in many of these subject areas I find a lack of understanding from scientists and lay people alike as to what it means to have knowledge, or what it means to know. They fail to understand the many ways in which we can claim to have knowledge. This can be seen from Wittgenstein's unfinished notes called On Certainty. Epistemological considerations come up in almost all of the subjects you exampled above.

If there is something above that you think I failed to address, please press the point.

Something that makes me deeply suspicious of this whole endeavour of subordinating conceptual analysis to the analysis of word use is that an idea can be posited and motivated by use and insulated from its problems by claiming that the idea itself is sound — fdrake

If analyzing concepts isn't a matter of linguistic analysis, then what is it? Concepts by definition are linguistic, and definitions arise through use. Even when someone discovers something new, and thereby discovers a new concept, it's through use that it becomes a norm of language. It's in a culture of language that correct and incorrect uses become manifest. Furthermore, use isn't the be all and end all of the answer, simply because it takes a huge amount of effort sometimes to untangle correct use from incorrect use. This is clearly seen in Wittgenstein's Investigations, and it's clearly seen in On Certainty, which, I believe, is the actual application of Wittgenstein's thoughts in the PI.

Because something is motivated by use, it doesn't mean the idea is sound (so I agree). We often fail to understand just how complex some of these problems are, even those who think they have a good grasp of Wittgenstein's ideas (and I include myself in this class) often fail (more often than not) in their attempts to explain some of these ideas or concepts.

This is not to say behavioural indicators regarding a concept are worthless for examining how it works, it's just to say that it's not the whole story - simply because the use of words does not exhaust the domain of analysable phenomena. — fdrake

Of course the analysable data goes far beyond just a linguistic analysis. There is a danger in thinking that a linguistic analysis always answers a particular philosophical problem. I tend to use it for two reasons, first, it's where my interests lie, and second, language is the medium used to talk about these problems, especially philosophical problems.

that nonlinguistic belief are not under consideration in the paper, nor have they been throughout the history of epistemology. — creativesoul

Correct, Plantinga never discusses basic beliefs in terms of nonlinguistic beliefs. Nonlinguistic beliefs wouldn't fall under the category of epistemology.

Hey Creative, how's it going?

I'm curious as to what happened. Do you no longer hear the sounds which you had attributed to God whispering, or do you still hear the sounds but now believe that they are caused by something other than God? — Metaphysician Undercover

This discussion would take us far away from the thrust of this thread. Suffice it to say that I don't believe, because I don't think there is sufficient evidence to support many of the Christian beliefs.

By the way, I never heard sounds, it was more like a feeling or intuition.

I don't know that there is an everyday use of words that maps neatly onto the distinction between direct and indirect experiences. — fdrake

I agree with this, i.e., there is no neat way of mapping this. It's like trying to map out what pornography is, like the Supreme Court said, I know it when I see it (Justice Stewart). I know that seeing that tree in my back yard is about as basic as you can get. The problem is setting out some definition that will fit each case. I don't think that can be done. It's like trying to come up with a definition of game that will fit every use of the word. It can't be done. This is why I say that each use needs looked at on its own merits. Even the words direct and indirect have problems as you pointed out.

This is why in most of my discussions I use the phrase "generally it's the case that." So, there are some general things we can say about basic beliefs. I do think there are nonlinguistic basic beliefs along with linguistic basic beliefs, but this covers a lot of ground.

Would you agree that the distinction between a direct experience of X and an experience of X differ only insofar as direct experience of X is not mediated, whereas experience of X in general is mediated? — fdrake

I would agree, but would compare direct with indirect experiences. The best way to examine these kinds of experiences is to examine context driven experiences, or how we use the words in specific cases.

I think when someone reads the bible and hears God speaking to them through it, the experience they have is not of the character of God announcing their presence through the interpretation of words; a mediated relationship; it's a borderline aesthetic sense of identity, a tacit "this is divine" that comes from immersion in the words, like a calling or a whisper of purpose. The people who have experienced this readily distinguish it from ordinary functioning of their senses, even if the divinity expresses itself in a usual sensory modality (so no necessary divine sense to have it). It's direct in the sense of finding oneself in an intimate connection with the divine while reading, not by inferring something is divine or being caused to believe that something is divine as a result of what is read. — fdrake

I generally agree that some people, maybe most view it like you've described. I considered myself a Christian for many years until recently, and believed that many subjective experiences I had were from God. For example, that quiet whisper of God speaking - a kind of divine sense, that some would argue all of us have. I now have many problems with this kind of thinking. I don't outright dismiss it, but I'm very skeptical of most of it, even though I still have a strong spiritual belief system (e.g., my beliefs associated with NDEs).