On Certainty Post 7

"Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand-my own hands, that is (OC 9)?"

The fact that we don't doubt that we have hands, at least in most cases, tells us something important about Moorean propositions. It tells us that they have a grounding that makes them exempt from doubt, at least in the contexts we are describing. This is also true of most of our sensory experiences, viz., those experiences with the world around us. Moreover, it is these experiences that seem to all fit Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions.

On Certainty Post 6

"The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at all except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong. In a law-court, for example, "I am certain" could replace "I know" in every piece of testimony. We might even imagine its being forbidden to say "I know" there. [A passage in Wilhelm Meister, where "You know" or "You knew" is used in the sense "You were certain", the fact being different from what he knew.] (OC, 8)."

This passage seems to be straight forward, i.e., in many instances we can use the two words know and certain interchangeably; and this is probably where some confusion occurs. Except, as Wittgenstein says where it's "...meant to mean: I can't be wrong." - this seems to be a reference to Moore's propositions. Moore seems to be saying that here is a hand, and I can't be wrong about this, or many of the other propositions Moore uses. There seems to be something special about Moore's propositions, and Wittgenstein picks up on this. It's probably why Wittgenstein has some sympathy for Moore's argument.

It seems to be the case that Wittgenstein uses the word certain in both the subjective sense and the objective sense. The latter is akin to knowing, the former is reflective of my inner state of subjectivity.

On Certainty Post 5

"My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on.--I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc, etc. (OC, 7)"

Our lives show that we have certain beliefs, and many of these beliefs are shown by our actions. The very act of sitting at a computer and typing shows my belief that there is a keyboard; that I have hands; that I am controlling my fingers; that what I type is saved to a hard drive, etc, etc. I don't even think about it, i.e., I don't think to myself and say, "Is this really a keyboard?" After all there is no reason to doubt it, and even if I did doubt it, would that doubt really amount to anything? That I am certain of these beliefs is reflected in what I do. We all act in ways that show our certainty of the world around us. Occasionally things do cause us to doubt our surroundings, but usually these things are out of the ordinary. I am referring to our sensory experiences, i.e., generally we can trust our senses even if occasionally we draw the wrong conclusion based on what we see, hear, smell, etc.

The backdrop of reality grounds us, if this wasn't the case, then the skeptic would have an argument. However, the skeptic tends to doubt things that shouldn't be doubted. They doubt that which is outside the language-game of doubting; and they violate the rules of doubting within the language-game of doubting. Similarly, Moore is extending the use of the word know beyond its normal use, beyond the grammar associated with the word.

Both Moore and the skeptics are misusing the words know and doubt respectively.

Sorry, but I'm not going to respond to every post. I'm just going to get the exegesis out, and you can do what you like with the information.

On Certainty Post 4

"Whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends on what I make count as determinants for that proposition (OC, 5)."

This is an interesting point, many of our beliefs are indeed determined by what we make count as evidence. In fact, most arguments are over this very thing. For instance, some religious people believe there is evidence for the existence of God, but others do not believe there is evidence, or at least good evidence. Now, I am not saying that there is or there isn't evidence, only that a proposition is true or false for me or you based on what we allow to count as evidence. In fact, language-games can arise to support any system of belief. However, it's not the language-game itself that decides whether we have knowledge of this or that, otherwise we could create language-games to support any belief.

Language-games can give support for the correct use of certain words; and in the case of On Certainty, we are looking at how we use the word know. So, not all language-games are created equal. We need to look at the original use, and how a word has developed over the years, i.e., the language-game and grammar that surrounded the word's birth and growth.

"Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.--For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed (OC, 6)."

This is where Wittgenstein begins to show that Moore's use of the word "know" is contrary to the word's original home, i.e., contrary to how the word is normally used. There is a kind of logic of use involved in Wittgenstein's method throughout On Certainty.

For the longest time I didn't know exactly what Wittgenstein was referring too, when he made the following statement about Moore's proposition: "...a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed."

However, in a later passage he seems to clarify what he has in mind. In paragraph 42 Wittgenstein speaks of the "mental state of conviction," and that this state of conviction is something that occurs regardless of whether a proposition is true or false. Wittgenstein seems to refer to it as a subjective state of certainty, and we observe this in the way people speak or gesticulate. The way we gesticulate will often show our convictions. Moore's claim to knowledge seems to be more in line with this subjective state of certainty, than with real knowledge claims. This will be developed more as we look at these passages.

Finally, if some of you want to learn how Wittgenstein examines words using the methods in the Philosophical Investigations - I believe On Certainty puts Wittgenstein's methods (the methods of the PI) to use, i.e., we can learn how to apply his methods by a close examination of his notes.

That just makes a mash of the meaning of the word. What do you imagine pre-suppose to mean? If I claim justification, then that is exactly not presupposing. See the problem? — tim wood

If I presuppose there are good reasons for believing X, then I'm presupposing there is a justification for X. In this case presuppose means to entail.

On Certainty Post 3

"If for e.g. someone says 'I don't know if there's a hand here' he might be told 'Look closer'.--This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features (OC, 3)."

The language-game of doubt, and what it means in a particular context to overcome the doubt.

"'I know that I am a human being.' In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean 'I know I have the organs of a human'. (E.g. a brain which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as 'I know I have a brain'? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on (OC, 4)."

Here we begin to see the connection between the use of the word know, and the use of the word doubt. The negation of the proposition "I know that I am a human being" illustrates this. Wittgenstein points out what it might mean, but we get a sense of how unclear the former proposition is by its negation. The negation being "I don't know that I am a human being."

What are the grounds for doubt? What are the grounds for knowing? Maybe part of the confusion lies in the fact that we can imagine situations were we can doubt such propositions. However, can we doubt the propositions Moore is using, and can we doubt them in Moore's contexts?

Presupposes as used in this context means there is a justification for believing X, or rather a justification for making the claim that one knows that X is the case.

The word certainty in On Certainty seems to be used in at least two ways. First, a subjective sense, viz., "I feel certain." Or, two, "I know or am certain that such and such is the case." In the second case the word certain could replace the word know, i.e., they essentially mean the same thing.

On Certainty Post #2

"If you do know that here is one hand [G.E. Moore, Proof of an External World], we'll grant you all the rest. When one says that such and such a proposition can't be proved, of course that does not mean that it can't be derived from other propositions; any proposition can be derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself (OC, 1)."

So, Wittgenstein grants that if Moore does indeed know that he has a hand, then Moore's conclusion follows (see post 1). The skeptic says that such a proposition can't be proved. This doesn't mean, according to Wittgenstein, that we can't derive them based on other propositions. However, the derivation may not be any stronger than the proposition we started with. My interpretation is that there is something foundational here, viz., that some propositions are foundational to our claims of knowledge or our claims of doubt. When you reach bedrock no part of the foundational structure is stronger.

"From it seeming to me--or to everyone--to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so. What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it (OC, 2)."

The skeptic may have a point (although it may not be the point he/she is trying to make), that just because people (or Moore) say something is so, it doesn't follow that it is. However, Wittgenstein points out that what we need to ask, is whether the doubt makes sense. Doubting occurs in a language-game, and language-games have rules - later Wittgenstein will point out that a doubt that doubts everything is not a doubt. Some kinds of doubting make no sense, i.e., if you start out doubting everything, then doubting loses all sense.

Knowledge has to be demonstrated - whereas Moore seems to just state his propositions as facts, and this needs to be shown or demonstrated in some way.

Sorry, but I'm through responding, this is going nowhere but around in circles. Thanks for all of the responses.

My cat takes it to be the case that the floor is solid. He does not, for example, tentatively test the floor with his paw to check for solidity before walking on it. He takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, despite his not being able to articulate this in English. — Banno

I don't believe the cat "takes it to be the case that the floor is solid," it acts as if the floor is solid. Maybe it means the same thing to you, but for me it's a strange way to say it. It's probably not even aware that it's acting in such a way. The cat just does what it does.

Also if a dolphin inspects itself in the mirror, the shows the dolphin believes it's seeing a reflection. — Marchesk

I don't think the dolphin believes it's seeing a reflection, reflection involves concepts that the dolphin doesn't have. It believes it's seeing another dolphin, or some such thing.

I might ask you the same question I asked Banno. If they refer to "things" what are these things, for you? Where are they, what do they consist of? How do they come into existence? — Isaac

I don't know how many times I have to answer this question, for the umteenth time, beliefs manifest themselves in our actions (nonlinguistic or linguistic, both are actions). So, if I open the door, then that act shows that I believe there is a door. Or, if I tell you my belief via language, then the act of telling you reveals what I believe. Meaning also is revealed in how we use words in social contexts. These are the "things" I'm referring too.

Hence it might be that at some future time belief comes to refer usually to neural networks. — Banno

I don't see this being the case at all. It is similar to saying that meaning can be associated with neural networks. Beliefs and meaning both refer to things apart from the mind. In fact, they give evidence that we have a mind.

There's much liability for confusion thereabouts. Does showing have a broader reach than saying - are there things that can be shown but not said? — Banno

I think Witt believed that there are things can be shown but not said, because he believed there was or is a limit to language. I disagree with Witt on this point.

Ya, I do believe that showing has a broader reach than saying (at least it seems so), but that doesn't mean that we can't put it into words. Any belief portrayed in our actions, or in the actions of others can be put into words. However, the fact that a belief can be put into words, doesn't take away from the idea that it need not be put into words in order for it to be a belief. I can't make any sense out of the idea that before there was a language there were no beliefs. It's true that the concept belief didn't exist, but that doesn't mean the belief itself didn't exist. Again, the belief is in the showing, or the action apart from language.

Do you think it is possible that Witt was making a concerted effort to make sense of Moore's knowledge claim while remaining consistent? — creativesoul

Witt was sympathetic to Moore's propositional claims, but I don't think he was trying to make sense of Moorean propositions. On Certainty shows throughout the book that the grammar of Moore's propositions is just incorrect, so no, I don't think Witt is trying to make sense of Moorean propositions.

Do you agree with my earlier explanation regarding Moore's language use? Was he showing you what he believes or was he showing you what his belief is about? — creativesoul

I don't see how we can show you what we believe without showing you what the belief is about.

I really don't know how to make it any more clear than I already have. Nonlinguistic beliefs are simply those beliefs shown in our actions. This is closely related to Witt's idea of showing vs saying.

You can keep using this thread, I really don't have much more to say.

I may be completely off the mark here but you seem to be surprised by how "foundational" beliefs differ with domain and that some of them are, in your words, "structurally more significant". Could it be, is it possible, that you're under the spell of, in a Wittgensteinian sense bewitched by, language? — TheMadFool

Well, if it is the case, then one would have to show how it is the case. Many things are possible, but that does not give us reason to suppose they are true. If I was to boil all of this down into one fundamental thing, it would have to do with the nature of belief, i.e., what do we mean by belief? How do we normally use the word belief in a variety of contexts, we would have to look at it in terms of its Wittgensteinian grammar.

I do think I am correct about my hypothesis, but of course I could be completely off the rails. I am not the only philosopher who has raised the issue of pre-linguistic beliefs, there are others. However, it is not something that is prevalent. It is good to think outside the box, but often we are wrong; sometimes we get it right, but it takes a while for the idea to catch on.

↪Sam26
I found jamalrob to be quite clear:

A belief just is an attitude to the world (or a mental state if you like) when rendered as a statement.
— jamalrob

Therefore, beliefs are not pre-linguistic or non-linguistic. Unless a belief is something else? — Luke

Ya, that statement is clear.

All he is saying, is that he believes, beliefs are statements. I'm saying, as you know, that beliefs can be reflected in non-linguistic ways. We don't need language to show what we believe, at least in terms of these very basic beliefs. Can you tell me how opening a door doesn't reflect a belief about doors, regardless of any statement. There are millions of things we do that reflect our beliefs apart from language. How does language even start without basic beliefs about the world around us?

I really don't know what else to say, or how to respond to some of your responses. It's as if we're talking past one another. I tried to simplify my position, but some of you didn't even respond; and if you did respond, I didn't understand the connection between what I said, and your response. I don't know what else to say without repeating myself.

Then I'm not sure I understand your objection.

Yeah, then he sets out 286, showing that he was having a bad day. — Banno

Ya, it could have been a bad day. :gasp:

So if you want to avoid this possibility, you'd have to declare it axiomatically, or demonstrate how it cannot be the case by conflict with some other definition. It's not valid to declare that it simply does not have anything to do with pointing to something in the mind, it doesn't follow from what you have specified so far about beliefs. Unless, of course I've missed (or misunderstood) the argument dismissing such a definition. — Isaac

My only point in saying that it has nothing to do with pointing to something in the mind is to address the beetle-in-the-box question, i.e., it's not like the beetle-in-the-box question, because our actions point to beliefs, viz., something happening in the world. So, for example, if I open the door, the action of turning the knob reflects the belief that there is a door. If I sit in a chair, that action reflects the belief that there is a chair.

I'm not saying there isn't something going on in the mind. I'm only saying that we don't point to things in the mind to defend the idea that we have beliefs. No more than we point to something in the mind to define a word. There are things that occur in the world that reflect these things. In particular, certain kinds of actions that give voice to what is happening in the mind.

I'm presuming that from your answer to Banno's earlier questions, you're not referring here to beliefs which cannot form statements or propositions, but rather beliefs which are not statements or propositions? But also, given the above, beliefs which also are not features of the mind (otherwise we very well could point to them in exactly the manner you rule out)?

So what forms are we left with that a belief might take? — Isaac

I am referring to beliefs which are not linguistically formed, not that they can't be, but that they need not be. All beliefs that are reflected in our actions (linguistic or non-linguistic actions) are products of the mind. In fact, that we have a mind is reflected in our actions.

There are three ways beliefs can be demonstrated, (1) simple actions, as in the opening of a door, (2) stating one's belief, and (3) writing out the belief. All are actions of a sort.

We seem to be going in circles, so let me see if I can boil this discussion down to its essence. Can a belief (a state-of-mind as I define it) have form apart from language? This has nothing to do with pointing to something in the mind, but everything to do with our actions. So, the further question is, do our non-linguistic actions reflect beliefs apart from statements or propositions? My answer to both of these question is yes. If I'm wrong about this, then my conclusion is false. This is where the argument should start.

Our looking for something shows that we believe that something is there to be found. Here, Witt offers a candidate that is statable, for it is a belief that has propositional content. He gets kudos from me for attempting to remain consistent. — creativesoul

Forget the idea that we can state the belief, we can see or observe the belief without the stating. I don't think he is offering a candidate that is statable, just the opposite. As far as I can see, there is nothing inconsistent here. It's just a different kind of belief, i.e., a state-of-mind reflected in our actions.

Perhaps Sam. That would seem to be incommensurate with his talk of hinge propositions... wouldn't it? — creativesoul

Wittgenstein's hinge-propositions aren't propositions in the normal sense. In fact, one could argue they aren't propositions at all. They look like propositions, but don't function as propositions. Moore, of course, would argue that they are functioning propositions, but W. is saying that they are something very different.

As mentioned earlier, Witt was a proponent of JTB, and as such also held that all belief content is propositional. — creativesoul

I don't think this is true. I pointed out where in OC 284 and 285 where Wittgenstein seems to hold to the notion that some beliefs aren't propositional at all, i.e., they are reflected in our actions. But of course this isn't the thrust of OC.

I can't think of any beliefs that are un-statable. What prompted this question?

The structure would look something like the following:

(1) The World
(2) Minds
a) Beliefs (prelinguistic and/or nonlinguistic)
b) Beliefs (linguistic and nonlinguistic)

While it is true that Wittgenstein doesn't delineate the idea that there are prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs, this doesn't mean that the idea is not present within the scope of his writings. For example, as I have pointed out on numerous occasions, OC 284 clearly states that actions clearly point to beliefs apart from saying or expressing such beliefs. Moreover, the idea of showing a belief also contains this idea, i.e., one shows what one believes by doing, or by acting in a certain way. For instance, the act of praying shows that one has certain mystical or religious beliefs. Or, as Wittgenstein pointed out in OC 285, "If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows [my emphasis] that he believes that what he is looking for is there."

I'll have to find that book.

It was a very good article. I'm glad Luke pointed it out to me.

The point of me saying, "keep in mind that I'm not necessarily trying to keep my thoughts in line with Wittgenstein," is that they are my thoughts, not necessarily Wittgenstein's. It doesn't concern me if Wittgenstein had an interest in prelinguistic beliefs or not. I'm exploring the idea because I find it interesting in terms of what is bedrock.

The only point I'm trying to make about prelinguistic beliefs, is that they are the starting points of all beliefs. They are the most basic of all beliefs. The structure of all beliefs rests on prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs.

At least part of the reason for my posting this was because I tend to agree with what others have said re: your comments on beliefs not being in line with Wittgenstein's philosophy; or a "shifting away from your Wittgensteinian core", as mcdoodle put it. — Luke

You'll have to explain this a bit more. Keep in mind that I'm not necessarily trying to keep my thoughts in line with Wittgenstein. I disagree with some of Wittgenstein's ideas, and I'm trying to go my own way on some of his thinking, for better or worse.

I read almost all of that article (Wittgenstein's grammar: through thick and thin, by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock), and find it fascinating, thanks. I see it as another thread linking his early philosophy with his later philosophy. It would be interesting to explore this further. My understanding of the Tractatus is very general, and I'll have to admit I haven't seen this aspect before, i.e., the grammar of the Tractatus. I do see the connection, albeit rather vaguely, with what this thread is about. So, if I understand that article, Moore's propositions lack sense in that they don't properly reflect the rules of grammar, i.e., in Wittgenstein's broad use of the term.

It's a difficult thing to see, viz., that grammar goes beyond the proper use of, say, the verbs was and were, and extends into the arena of sense itself. The logic of sense is a grammar in and of itself. One can see this in his later works, especially in On Certainty.

I like this because it expands my thinking a bit more.

I read the Tractatus to be motivated by hyper-pschologizing philosophy, which are forms of scientism. But as I mention, I do not foundationally believe that's true. — boethius

You've now switched back to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, which really has nothing to do, or very little to do with his last work called On Certainty. Moreover, the Tractatus is not motivated by "hyper-psychologizing philosophy." I have a thread that summarizes the Tractatus, that should give you some idea of what the Tractatus is about.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8056/a-summary-of-the-tractatus-logico-philosophicus/p1

I'm not disagreeing with this.

We know what we believe in the sense that we know it because we believe it. We do not know it in the sense that we have carried out some chain of reasoning. — boethius

You seem to be contradicting yourself, to know is to give a justification in some form. I'm saying and I believe Wittgenstein is saying that we don't know it period, i.e., in any form of knowing.