I'm not disagreeing with this.
We know what we believe in the sense that we know it because we believe it. We do not know it in the sense that we have carried out some chain of reasoning. — boethius
You seem to be contradicting yourself, to know is to give a justification in some form. — Sam26
I read the Tractatus to be motivated by hyper-pschologizing philosophy, which are forms of scientism. But as I mention, I do not foundationally believe that's true. — boethius
You've now switched back to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, which really has nothing to do, or very little to do with his last work called On Certainty. — Sam26
I have a thread that summarizes the Tractatus, that should give you some idea of what the Tractatus is about. — Sam26
Having developed this analysis of world-thought-language, and relying on the one general form of the proposition, Wittgenstein can now assert that all meaningful propositions are of equal value. Subsequently, he ends the journey with the admonition concerning what can (or cannot) and what should (or should not) be said (7), leaving outside the realm of the sayable propositions of ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Freud in his analysis provides explanations which many people are inclined to accept. He emphasizes that people are dis-inclined to accept them. But if the explanation is one which people are disinclined to accept, it is highly probable that it is also one which they are inclined to accept. And this is what Freud had actually brought out. Take Freud’s view that anxiety is always a repetition in some way of the anxiety we felt at birth. [...] It is an idea which has a marked attraction. It has the attraction which mythological explanations have, explanations which say that this is all a repetition of something that has happened before. And when people do accept or adopt this, then certain things seem much clearer and easier for them. — Wittgenstein 1966, p. 43
Freud has not given a scientific explanation of the ancient myth—what he has done is to propound a new myth.” — Wittgenstein (1966, p. 47)
You've now switched back to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, which really has nothing to do, or very little to do with his last work called On Certainty. — Sam26
The later Wittgenstein will extend the list of the sayable to include non-truth-conditional uses of language (e.g., spontaneous utterances, questions, imperatives), but he will never give up the idea that some things cannot be said in the sphere of language – that is, 'in the flow of the language-game'; or the idea that some things cannot be put into words at all but can only show themselves through words (and, he will add, through deeds). In fact, he will add certainties to the list of the ineffable – the grammatical ineffable. Like regulative nonsense, certainties cannot be said because they constitute the scaffolding of sense, not its object. Basic certainties (e.g., ‘There exist people other than myself’, ‘I have a body’, ‘Human beings need nourishment’) are 'removed from the traffic' (OC 210); they cannot meaningfully be said in the flow of the language-game as if they were open for discussion because they are bounds of sense (rules of grammar), not objects of sense.
In fact, the Tractatus sets the stage for what Wittgenstein will later call 'grammar': grammar is that which enables or regulates sense (and so is itself nonsensical) and cannot meaningfully be said in the flow of the language-game but only heuristically articulated. — Daniele Moyal-Sharrock
I do see the connection, albeit rather vaguely, with what this thread is about. — Sam26
So, if I understand that article, Moore's propositions lack sense in that they don't properly reflect the rules of grammar — Sam26
I like this because it expands my thinking a bit more. — Sam26
At least part of the reason for my posting this was because I tend to agree with what others have said re: your comments on beliefs not being in line with Wittgenstein's philosophy; or a "shifting away from your Wittgensteinian core", as mcdoodle put it. — Luke
You'll have to explain this a bit more. — Sam26
The point of me saying, "keep in mind that I'm not necessarily trying to keep my thoughts in line with Wittgenstein," is that they are my thoughts, not necessarily Wittgenstein's. It doesn't concern me if Wittgenstein had an interest in prelinguistic beliefs or not. I'm exploring the idea because I find it interesting in terms of what is bedrock.
The only point I'm trying to make about prelinguistic beliefs, is that they are the starting points of all beliefs. They are the most basic of all beliefs. The structure of all beliefs rests on prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs. — Sam26
Are you suggesting that there are beliefs which cannot be stated? — Banno
How would such ineffable beliefs differ from beetles in boxes? — Banno
Are you suggesting that there are beliefs which cannot be stated?
That is, not just beliefs which have not been stated, but beliefs which are un-statable?
How would such ineffable beliefs differ from beetles in boxes? — Banno
As mentioned earlier, Witt was a proponent of JTB, and as such also held that all belief content is propositional. — creativesoul
I don't think this is true. I pointed out where in OC 284 and 285 where Wittgenstein seems to hold to the notion that some beliefs aren't propositional at all, i.e., they are reflected in our actions. But of course this isn't the thrust of OC. — Sam26
How would such ineffable beliefs differ from beetles in boxes?
— Banno
To followup on creativesoul's comment, other animals can't state their beliefs in language. — Marchesk
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