Epistemological justifications require inter-subjective corroboration. — Janus

Explain this statement, I don't follow.

What distinguishes a direct experience from an experience? — fdrake

I suppose a direct experience might be something like the following: Standing in front of my oak tree in my back yard, as opposed to looking at the same oak tree in a picture (direct and indirect). Hearing God speak as he stands in front of you (e.g., Jesus and the disciples), or reading his words in the Bible. Although it's not always clear the way many religious people use these words.

Most basic beliefs wouldn't be doubtable no matter what time in history. Consider the following:

1. This is a tree (as I point to a tree on a clear day).
2. This is my mother or father.
3. This is my hand.
4. I live on the Earth.
5. He is conscious, pointing to someone sawing a piece of wood.
6. He is a person.
7. etc

There are endless basic beliefs that would be silly to doubt. Moreover, because someone doesn't doubt a belief, that in itself doesn't make it basic. It's not a matter of opinion.

There are some basic beliefs that do change over time, but many do not.

Many basic beliefs aren't even linguistic, they are simply part of the background we find ourselves in. I would say that animals, prelinguistic man, infants, and modern man show that they have certain beliefs without saying a word. They show their beliefs by their actions - digging a hole, a dog recognizing its master as he comes home, a baby reaching for a toy, each of these actions requires certain basic beliefs. Most of our daily actions require certain basic beliefs or we wouldn't be able to function.

Outside of language there is no epistemology, therefore it's not a matter of being true, these kinds of beliefs fall outside our epistemological language-games. Not all basic beliefs are of this kind, but many are.

I find the discussion in Platinga's article to bring us to consider the ambiguities involved with the very idea of basic beliefs and discovering what they are through analysing language use — fdrake

I agree with this. Although I find Wittgenstein's analysis of language to be much more sophisticated than Plantinga.

Religions have been around a lot longer than psychology, which is a discipline that hardly seems to know what it is half the time. Surely religious experiences must have a psychological dimension, and surely they may have profound psychological consequences, not always benign, but the 'merely' says something else; 'the science of psychology' speaking from the white lab coat of authority. — Wayfarer

When I speak of psychology in this (context you quoted) context, I'm speaking of mental and emotional contexts that arise from particular beliefs. I'm not speaking of the study of psychology. Thus, in my sense psychology has been around since man first walked the Earth. Moreover, I'm also thinking about meaning, and how meaning has a cultural context apart from our inclination to derive meaning from our subjective experiences or mental experiences.

I find it very difficult to put down in a few paragraphs what I believe about many of the things talked about in this thread. Much of the time it just gets misinterpreted. This isn't a complaint, it happens with all of us.

I disagree with much of what Wittgenstein said in those passages. But I also agree with some of it. For example, I agree that the mystical can be shown in our actions (e.g. prayer). I disagree with the idea that it's beyond language or beyond words. My study of NDEs indicates that mystical experiences can be expressed. I don't believe as Wittgenstein did in the Tractatus that there is a boundary to language, beyond which, is that which is senseless (not nonsense). I also disagree with his ideas about ethics. The explanation would take us far afield of this thread.

I'll use Wittgenstein's examples to partly answer these questions. Wittgenstein argues against Moore's use of the word know in the proposition "I know this is a hand." One of the reasons Wittgenstein gives for this argument is that in Moore's context it would make no sense to doubt that that is Moore's hand. Later, Wittgenstein gives an example in which it would make sense to doubt that that is hand my hand. The example is where someone might wake up after an operation with their hand bandaged, and not know whether their hand had been amputated. In this case it would be perfectly legitimate to doubt whether you have a hand or not.

The criteria here is not arbitrary. The meaning of our words has a lot to do with context, a word might mean one thing in one context, and another in a quite different context. However, it's more than just context, as I pointed out, i.e., the use of the word doubt in a particular context tells us something about the use of the word know in the context also. Moreover, it tells us something about basic beliefs.

There are no absolutes here in terms of basic beliefs, which is why I say that generally it doesn't make sense to doubt that that's your hand. And generally it makes sense to doubt that God exists, or that you're having a direct experience with God. However, I would point out that IF someone did have a direct experience with God, then the belief would be basic for them. Of course what exactly counts as a direct experience? My contention is that what most people count as direct experiences with God are merely psychological. This is not to say that there can't be real experiences with God (if one exists), but only that it would be difficult to discern in most cases.

Plantinga is talking about belief in God (the Christian God) as properly basic. Just because billions of people believe something, that doesn't make it basic. He wants to argue that people have a kind of built in belief (innate belief) about God, but not just any God. Regardless, all one has to do is ask, "Does it make sense to doubt the existence of God?" Yes, unless I'm having an undoubtable experience, and I'm not doubting that this can happen. It's certainly metaphysically possible.

If I tell someone who is an agnostic that God spoke to me audibly in my bedroom last night as I prayed, it would make perfect sense to doubt such a declaration. That belief (if it really happened) would be basic for you, but surely not for the agnostic. The agnostic would have every right to doubt your experience.

When you see your hand and are prompted to believe that your hand exists, the contents of that belief are an elaboration upon the details of the experience that prompted it. — Pfhorrest

I think I understand what you're saying, although it seems like a strange way to say it (using the word "prompt"). I would say that our sensory experiences can justify a belief, i.e., it's one of the epistemological ways we use to justify a belief. For example, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" "I tasted it." Or, "How do you know that Mary shot Joe?" "I was there the night Mary shot Joe, I saw it."

If we want to understand how it is that we know something, then look at how we use the word in ordinary circumstances. There are several ways we justify a belief. For example, testimony, sensory experience, linguistic training, logic (inductive and deductive reason), etc. My point is that there is a better way to talk about how we arrive at a belief without using the word "prompt." At least that is how I see it.

Ya, he would say something like that. Years ago I went to a couple of conferences and listened to Plantinga give lectures on this topic. I think it was around 1979-80 at Wheaton College.

On the contrary, Plantinga claims that most people DO have direct exprerience - a sense of divinity that produces beliefs about God: — Relativist

I know he claims that, but I'm saying that it's not the same as the kind of experiences we have with one another. The kind of experiences we have with one another are not the kind that can be sensibly doubted, at least not usually. Whereas these supposedly direct experiences with God are easily doubted for good reason.

If they can be doubted, then they are not basic as Plantinga claims. None of the major religions can agree on these experiences. People claim all kinds of things as direct experiences. However, now I'm a bit off topic.

I haven't read everything in this thread, so if duplicate some of what's already been mentioned forgive the laziness.

Plantinga's properly basic beliefs are in some ways similar to how I interpret Wittgenstein's bedrock beliefs. I believe, and have argued this extensively in other places, that Wittgenstein's bedrock beliefs are outside the language-game of epistemology, i.e., they are not based on epistemological justifications. One way to understand this, is to consider doubting these kinds of statements. The classic example is Moore's statement, "I know this is my hand." To see how unclear this statement is (according to Wittgenstein) consider its negation, "I don't know this is my hand (but consider this is Moore's context, before a crowd holding up his hand). For the belief to be bedrock in the Wittgensteinian sense, it must generally (i.e., in most contexts) be the kind of belief that is exempt (again, in most contexts) from doubt. If it is generally not doubted, then it is a statement that is outside of our epistemological language-games in those undoubtable contexts.

If a proposition/statement can be sensibly doubted, then it makes sense that it would need to have a justification to support it, or it would need an epistemological justification to overcome the doubt. Knowing and doubting go hand-in-hand, which is why we need good reasons/evidence, or some other kind of justification. Otherwise, we could infer that one knows, simply by one's claim that one knows. Knowing requires an objective justification.

Plantinga's basic beliefs are similar, in that Plantinga believes that his properly basic beliefs, in this case, belief in God, is direct, immediate, and basic. So, in Plantinga's reformed epistemology, belief in God is so basic that support in terms of an epistemological justification is not needed. Belief in God is foundational or basic as Plantinga says. However, I would argue that Plantinga is wrong about this. Why? We can use the Wittgensteinian test, i.e., does it make sense to doubt that God exists? The obvious answer is, yes. The statement that God exists is not the same as "My hand exists." We don't have direct experiences with God, at least not in the sense that we do with our hands, or even our mothers, fathers, siblings, friends, etc. This would be true even if some people did have direct experiences with God. Why? Because most of us don't have direct experiences with God. Belief in God is not the same as a belief that one has a mother or father. Believing that one has a mother or father is properly basic. If you don't believe it, try doubting it.

My conclusion, is that if you have a belief in God, then it requires a good epistemological justification. It's a cop out to think that such a belief doesn't require such a justification.

Banno?

When you argue for the possibility of evidence of consciousness surviving the body, what is your understanding of a proper-name? — sime

Roughly, there has to be some consistency of memory and experience to be able to say that that person is Elvis. Memory and one's experiences create a kind of narrative that follows that person throughout his or her life. I'm of the opinion that identity goes beyond the physical body. Others believe that one's identity is necessarily tied to the physical body, or the brain. I would tie a proper name to that which has the memories and/or experiences of the one we call or called Elvis. When we talk about Elvis we're talking about the one who had the experiences associated with a particular life. Whether one's identity goes on after death is the question at hand. I believe the evidence is strong, given my argument, that one's consciousness or identity survives.

This is a video documentary showing the commonality of NDEs. It's over an hour long, but worth watching.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5uDA4RgHolw&t=1996s

In my view there are two senses of justification. First, there's what we mean by justification, viz., having good reasons or good evidence, etc. Second, there's the application of what we mean by being justified. For example, think of it this way, in mathematics we have the formula, and then, we have the application of the formula. The formula is a guide, but we can often or sometimes get it wrong, i.e., we can make an error in the application of the formula. So, I can believe, think, or surmise that I'm correct, but later find out that I was wrong. This is why I say that you have to distinguish between thinking you're justified, as opposed to actually being justified in reality.

I've already mentioned this, but it bears repeating. Built into the application of JTB (not the definition, the application) is the idea of probability. So, when I look at a clock there is a low probability that I'm going to arrive at an incorrect time. This is built into the application of JTB, just as it's built into the application of a mathematical formula, that sometimes we're just incorrect. Knowing this, explains the conflict in the clock example, at least to my satisfaction. The man (again) isn't justified, he merely thinks he is.

Andrew asked me if we could be justified, and yet have a false belief. Yes, in the application we can think we're justified and yet have a false belief. However, in terms of the definition of JTB, if we're really justified, then it necessarily leads to a true belief. This doesn't mean that what we're really saying is that JTB simply amounts to JB, because we're not talking about any belief, we're talking about true beliefs. Again, being justified leads to the truth under the definition of JTB (justification and truth are different concepts), but not necessarily in its application.

Fiveredapples has given an eloquent defense of his position, but my position is much simpler. I'm sticking to JTB as the definition of knowledge. I don't see any good reason to give it up. The clock was broke, therefore the person wasn't justified in their belief that the time was X. If they weren't justified, then they failed to meet the definition of knowledge under JTB. Gettier fails for similar reasons.

As I've said I don't understand the primacy you give to 'belief'. What for example is added to the above phrase by the word 'beliefs'? It seems to me 'bedrock' and 'foundation' would be perfectly clear without them, as metaphors. — mcdoodle

I don't understand this mcdoodle, the whole subject revolves around the idea of beliefs, if we're not talking about foundational or bedrock beliefs, what are we talking about?

It feels like you are shifting away from your Wittgensteinian core, as in my eyes language games are all about knowing-how: skilful use. 'Belief' is relatively unimportant then. As Harry says, to proclaim a belief is to exhibit the skill in making such proclamations; it's the tying the shoelaces that counts. It counts for me, as something the shoelace-tier knows. They may believe they are solving the final problem that makes the universe whole, but to me they are tying shoes, and their beliefs are their own affair. — mcdoodle

You're correct, languge-games do involve skills, Wittgenstein was skillful in showing us the different uses of words in different language-games. However, Wittgenstein not only showed us his skills in doing this kind of philosophy, he also showed us his beliefs about what language-games told us about language as a whole. His beliefs about language are what's important, and that's what I've focused on.

By now everyone should know Russell's stopped clock example as a counter to JTB. Fiveredapples has laid out the problem very well. I'm going to try and put forth my own explanation as a defense of JTB.

The question is: "Do I have the right, i.e., within reason, to believe that I'm justified when looking at clocks to presume that a clock is giving me the correct time? The answer, and I believe most of us agree, is yes. We know based on our experiences with clocks that generally clocks (fiveredapples pointed this out too) give us the correct time. However, we also know based on experience that sometimes clock fail, and thus sometimes (say 3% of the time) they don't give us the correct time. In fact, if you asked the person in Russell's example, "Is it possible you're wrong about the time?" they would probably say yes. So, most of us know that there is a chance that we could be wrong, however small, i.e., the justification is probability based. It's rarely the case that I'm justified with 100% certainty.

Now the problem is the following: How can you not have knowledge (JTB) if you've followed the correct reasoning process in this example? After all, reason dictated that your conclusion (you had the correct time) was justified. So, in one sense you believe you have JTB based on your experiences with clocks. However, later you find out the clock is broken, and so you weren't justified after all. This seems to be contradictory, but is it really? Does it really show that JTB fails? No. Why?

Because no definition, at least few definitions, are absolute. An example of an absolute definition would be, "All triangles have three sides," an example of a definition that's not absolute, is the definition of a game. Those of you who have read Wittgenstein know that there is no definition of the word game that covers every possible use of the word. The point is, do we say that the definition is incomplete or doesn't work because we find some exception. Again, no. The definition is a guide, it's not some absolute that works in every possible use of the word. The same is true of the definition of knowledge as JTB. It's not some absolute that will work in every possible use, but, I believe it's the best definition as a general rule or guide.

Much more could be said about this, but it would take about 15 or 20 pages of writing.

No, intuitively he's not justified. Come one now, that just is the lesson to draw from our intuitions about knowledge. Yes, he is justified on the JTB definition, but the scenarios are meant to highlight how JTB fails as a definition. (I think Sam26 wants to argue that JTB doesn't fail as a definition, but that seems wrong -- unless we want to accept that knowledge is defeasible, which nobody wants to accept.) So, in both scenarios, there is something amiss with the justification. In other words, he's not justified. This is why people have moved from JTB to WTB (warranted true belief, where the "warrant" guarantees us that neither of the knowledge claims you described count as knowledge). — fiveredapples

You're right I do want to argue that JTB doesn't fail as a definition. I want to separate the definition from it's actual application, i.e., the definition works, but it's application is fallible. The application of the definition, due to a number of human fallibility factors, is never infallible. We are always updating and changing what we think we know. So, built into the application of the definition (we could in a sense call it a kind of formula) is the understanding that for various reasons/causes it could turn out that my justification wasn't correct, thereby nullifying my reasons for thinking I was justified. If we later find out that the clock was broke, then we weren't justified - period. Just because you thought you were justified, doesn't mean you are or were justified. This is why often our justifications need testing, because we are often wrong. Fallibility always includes the possibility of being wrong, even if it's a very low probability.

False premises can and do lead to true conclusions, as was shown in the argument. The real question is about justification.

This idea that Gettier somehow showed that JTB is flawed is just not the case. It's as if Gettier performed a slight of hand and people think it refutes JTB. When examined closely the cases are not really justified. All Gettier pointed out is the difference between a claim to knowledge (for e.g., thinking one is justifed when you're not), as opposed to actual knowledge. So, if I make a claim, and that claim appears to be JTB, but in the end it lacks proper justification, then it's simply not knowledge. There is nothing difficult here. No amount of thinking something is JTB, amounts to something actually being JTB.

I believe Five that a form of your argument can be used against Gettier. Gettier's examples fail to either be properly justified, or not true. I've always believed that Gettier's examples fail to undermine JTB.

Nice to hear from you again fiveredapples.

I'm not really writing to debate with people on this subject. Although I'll entertain a challenge or two. I'm just writing to explain what I've gleaned from my study of On Certainty. People will either see the points or they won't. I do appreciate the input though.

We just disagree when it comes to knowledge as a skill. I have to move on, I don't want to get stuck on that particular disagreement.

Let me say a few more things about basic or bedrock beliefs, and I'm mainly thinking of prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs. First, Moore's claim that he knows he has a hand, is one such belief, i.e., we know that Moore is incorrect to say that he knows such a belief for many of the reasons Wittgenstein points out. The reason Moore is making such a claim is to attack the skeptic (extreme skepticism), who claims that one can't know such a thing. One cannot know, for example, that there are physical objects. Thus, Moore starts out by making a claim that most everyone seems to agree with, viz., "Here is one hand," and "Here is another," and I know it. After all who would deny such a claim.

Second, how do we know that Moore's beliefs are not knowledge? We know for various reasons. As I pointed out above we know this belief is formed without justification, it's part of our inherited background. I find myself believing that I have hands as I interact with them in the world around me. These beliefs are causally formed through sensory experience. It has nothing to do with knowledge as a belief, especially since knowledge as a belief requires language.

Another reason that these beliefs are not what Moore thinks they are is that they cannot be doubted sensibly, which is why Wittgenstein points out the negation of Moore's propositions - "I don't know this is a hand." Remember we are talking about normal circumstances. Wittgenstein points out that there are instances where it would make sense to doubt such a claim, but Moore's context is not such a context. What would a doubt or mistake look like in Moore's context. Moore is giving a lecture before an audience and holding up his hands.

If you know something such as Moore is suggesting, then you are able to justify how it is that you know it, but what would such a justification look like? Do I observe the hand from different angles to make sure it's my own? Do I feel it or pinch it to make sure I know it's my hand? No, none of this happens. We find that we believe such things and many others as part of the world around us, outside the language-games of epistemology. These are some of the reasons why they are referred to as bedrock beliefs or foundational beliefs.

The reason I brought this subject up, is that not only are there beliefs that are non-linguistic, there is also knowledge that's nonlinguistic (knowledge as a skill). How do we know this is the case, we can observe it in the actions of others. This is how we know there are other minds, we observe the actions of others, which are the same or similar to our own actions.

That's my point - knowledge as a skill is different from knowledge as a belief - as you point out.

It seems to me that people can display knowledge without saying so — Harry Hindu

There is knowledge as a belief, and there is knowledge as a skill. We can observe knowledge as a skill, for example, tying your shoes, but there are many other examples. Riding a bike and counting to ten are skills. Knowing that bikes have wheels and that 2+2=4 are beliefs.

There have been times in the past where I stated that prelinguistic man doesn't have knowledge, but I was mainly thinking of the language of knowledge in terms of propositions/statements. It's clear though, if you want to be precise, that prelinguistic man and even young children display certain kinds of skills, which is another aspect of knowledge. You don't necessarily need language to demonstrate a skill, but you do need a language to demonstrate knowledge as a belief. Knowledge as a belief is necessarily linguistic.

So, I agree that you can show that you have knowledge (knowledge as a skill) without the use of language. Your example of tying your shoe is just that.

Beliefs are much more basic than knowledge, so the act of tying your shoe or skinning an animal shows that you have certain beliefs about the shoe and the animal. In both these cases we see very basic (bedrock) beliefs and knowledge as a skill.

For myself I think 'prelinguistic' is a red herring, though I know many are wedded to it. Instead I feel that it's a mistake to distinguish the linguistic from action. To use or interpret language is to act, it's not an alternative to action. — mcdoodle

Hello Mcdoodle.

Prelinguistic is just a way of talking about particular kinds of beliefs "wedded" to actions apart from linguistic actions. I agree that to use language is an act, but I also believe that all beliefs are actions of a sort. If someone walks into the woods with an axe, walks up to a particular tree and start chopping it down, it would be weird to say that the person doesn't believe there is a tree in front of them, or that they don't have an axe in their hand. Our actions, linguistic or not, show that we believe certain things apart from the linguistic act of saying (verbal or nonverbal) "I believe..." There are all kinds of things we do on a daily basis (opening doors, starting our cars, brushing our teeth, etc) that reveal that we believe certain thiings, all of which are acts of a kind.

I'll continue tomorrow.

If belief is prior to language, than it exists in it's entirety before our awareness of it. — creativesoul

That's probably the case. However, others become aware of these kinds of prelinguistic beliefs by observation, but only if they have the concept of belief. In other words, it's backward looking, it only happens, that I can say there are prelinguistic beliefs, from the perspective of language. It's only in language that we can talk about such beliefs. This causes confusion.

It seems to me that a more fundamental belief in the kind that Sam26 is trying to get at would be the belief that there is an external world. You need that as the foundation before you can build a structural understanding of what language even is. The idea of language is built on the idea that there is an external world with other minds, and that my mind is a representation of that world including how human being communicate. Language would have no foundation to stand on if there wasn't the foundational idea of an external world, for what purpose would language serve to a solipsist? How would the idea even come about in a solipsist mind? — Harry Hindu

Actually Harry this is a pretty good summary of some of my thoughts. I've been trying to work on a theory of epistemology based on some of these ideas.

Some of this is going to be difficult to understand, especially if you have not studied Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, or especially if you haven't studied On Certainty. Although much of what I'm writing is an extrapolation of what I believe follows from Wittgenstein's On Certainty. These are my own thoughts, which I believe follow from some of Wittgenstein's remarks.

The structure as I see it, consists of the world, minds, and language; and the relationship between these three. The world is the backdrop, and we find ourselves existing in it. Our mind helps us to interpret the world (it's in the relationship between our minds and the world that bedrock or basic beliefs form); so in a sense our mind is the center between the world and language. However, before we get to the language of beliefs, I want to say a few things about prelinguistic beliefs.

Without language we have the most basic of all beliefs. These beliefs are formed (I believe) causally between the mind (sensory experiences) and the world. More importantly these most basic of beliefs (states-of-mind) are not revealed linguistically, but are revealed in our actions (remember I'm talking prelinguistic beliefs). They are mostly seen in animals and children (and prehistoric man - OC 284). This is not to say that you don't see these kinds of beliefs in the language of modern man, it's only to say that they are most clearly seen in the actions of animals and very young children.

What is the relationship between my mind and the world? The initial relationship seems to be between our sensory experiences and the world. We come into direct contact with the world through sensory experience. We observe this initial contact (between the world and sensory experience) in animals and in young children. However, I'm not saying that adults don't exhibit these kinds of beliefs, only that they're most clearly seen in the actions of animals and young children who only have a rudimentary language.

One of the problems in seeing prelinguistic beliefs is language itself. It's difficult to look past the beliefs we express in language in order to see the beliefs I'm referring to. The key to doing this is in our actions. Actions express beliefs. In some ways actions tell us more about what we believe than statements (written or verbal).

Try to keep your responses limited to two or three paragraphs, or about the length of this post. It's difficult to read anything longer.

Guys and gals, I'm a little slow with my typing due to 'essential tremors,' so please don't take offense if I don't answer all of the questions/comments. Sorry my age is slowing me down. :yikes:

Hello fdrake. My next post is going to talk more about the structure, and what the structure is. It's not unique, in fact, it's quite familiar to us. The problem, as usual, is how we talk about it, and therein lies the problem that's difficult to explain.

As to your second question or comment, the problem is epistemological, and as you say philosophical, and since philosophy has something important to tell us across all subjects, it even has something to say about phantom limb pain. Especially Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, which I believe is important to understand.

If you were familiar with Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions in his notes called On Certainty, you would know that I'm not asking the question that you are answering. This is not a linguistics class, at least not a typical linguistics class.

I don't have a particularly good attitude towards Christianity either, but Wittgenstein would never make such remark. Moreover, he would never say that the soul is an illusion, and neither would I. The word soul isn't necessarily a religious word, although it's associated with many religions, especially Christianity.

During Wittgenstein's lifetime he published the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a children's dictionary, and a lecture on ethics. However, the Philosophical Investigations along with a long list of other notes was publisihed posthumously. Here's a link to a list.

https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/efts/WITT/WITT.bib.html

There are obvious limitations to logic. First, not every premise within an argument can be proven, or shown by inference to be true. Knowledge using logic comes to an end, and the premises must be shown to be true by some other means such as linguistic training, testimony, or experience. Logic (inference or proof) is parasitic, it requires knowledge by other means which it can then use to extend what we already know.

Second, logic is person relative in two important ways. Any proof or inference is limited to what a person already knows. Thus, logic (inductive or deductive reasoning) is limited by a person's current fund of knowledge. A proof, in order for it to be effective, must start with what a person already knows. Also, a proof is limited to what a person can follow in a proof. In other words, it's more than knowing the premises are true, but understanding the moves of a proof. How does the inference flow from the premises; and knowing the difference between an inductive argument verses a deductive argument.

Third, and in many ways one of the most powerful things to influence an argument, is psychology. Because a person may not like you they may be unwilling to listen to the argument, or refuse to draw the proper conclusion.

Finally, even though all of this may be true, logic is still a very valuable tool.

I do, I wasn't being sarcastic. I didn't read all the posts. I just read a couple of posts.

Okay, fair enough.

In other words it isn't possible in the context of logical thought which is the basis of reason to know what is the case without knowing why it is the case, — Janus

There are many things that we know are the case without knowing why it's the case. We know for example that quantum entanglement is a fact (it is the case that quantum entanglement occurs), but we don't know the whys of quantum entanglement. I can also know that so-and-so murdered Mary, but not know why so-and-so murdered Mary. In some cases we know why, but in other cases we don't. Just because we have good evidence or good reasons (logic) to support a conclusion that doesn't mean we know for example the causes behind the conclusion, or even all the reasons behind the conclusion.