I know that you've said the exact opposite to this, that's the point. Wittgenstien, has not yet established the relationship between language and rules, to make the conclusion which you have made. So I suggested the very opposite to your conclusion, as still a possibility from what Wittgenstein has so far exposed. Whether a person needs to understand language to learn a rule, or whether a person needs to understand rules to learn a language has not yet been determined. So as much as you might assert that a person cannot learn language without learning rules, these assertions are irrelevant to the text we're reading. — Metaphysician Undercover

If your only argument is that I'm going beyond what the text is saying at this point, I say, of course I am, and I've said as much.

If it requires that one knows a language in order for that person to learn a rule (I.e. if we can only learn a rule through language) then it is impossible that all language-games are rule following activities. — Metaphysician Undercover

[my emphasis]

Here's where you seem to go wrong. Where did anyone say this? Language would never get anywhere if this was the case. In fact, I've said the opposite, "[t]he rule (known or unknown) is in the bringing of the correct stone in response to the call." Moreover, what do you think learning a rule is all about? When one learns to act in accord with a command, one is learning to follow a rule. It doesn't require that you know a language, or that you know what a rule is. Animals can even participate in rule-governed activities. Think of learning to follow simple commands. The learning of language, and the learning of following rules are things that happen at the same time, viz., if you learn a language, then you are learning to follow rules (implicit or explicit, known or unknown).

Don't confuse the concept of rule-following (or the concept rule), which involves a certain understanding, with learning to follow a rule. The two are quite different. As the animal or primitive man, or even modern man learns to respond to a language, say commands, they are both learning a language and learning to follow rules (it's a simultaneous act). In fact, knowing is not involved at all, one simply acts in accord with, or acts along with others, and as one does, one learns. The learning gets more and more involved until the animal is left behind in its ability to learn or participate in more complicated linguistic forms. However, the human excels at using concepts, until the human learns what the concepts mean, and how to use the concepts in more sophisticated ways.

The only thing that is required beforehand, is that you have the ability to learn a language, whether primitive or not. It's not required that you know anything, in fact, you don't know anything. The language-game of knowing is much more advanced, and requires an advanced understanding of the use of the concepts involved.

I'm not yelling when I use the bold letters, I'm just using it as a very strong emphasis.

This would require the assumption that the game, or "social context" has inherent within it, rules, by the means of which, such a judgement of correct or incorrect could be made. But we have not yet found, in the close-up examination of the details, the existence of any such rules. We haven't even gotten beyond the problem which is that philosophers are commonly opposed to making such a close-up examination. Why do you simply assume that there are rules inherent within "social context"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand how it is that you do not agree with this, namely, that any language-game, which by definition is social, necessarily has rules (implicit and/or explicit). The rules are observed in the actions of those who participate, either correctly or incorrectly. So, if the call is made for a slab, and someone brings the correct stone, they, by definition, are following the correct rule. What is the rule? The rule (known or unknown) is in the bringing of the correct stone in response to the call. If there is no rule, how can we say that they followed the correct action? Keep in mind that even if there is no concept of a rule, as in primitive man, the act of retrieving the correct stone is the act by which we can attribute the concept rule as we know it.

Any language-game by definition is a rule-following activity, if not, then there would be no consistency of actions that would make it work. If there were no rules there would be no agreement in how to proceed, and thus no game of any sort, language or not. What is the rule that dictates that I should go left or right when I see an arrow? There surely isn't something intrinsic to the arrow. It has to be consistency of action within the group as they respond in various contexts to the pointing of the arrow, and that's what the rule consists in, necessarily.

I'm not assuming anything, I'm basing my conclusion on the evidence, as just presented in the previous paragraphs, and as presented by others as they too have interpreted these ideas. I'm not just pulling this out of the air randomly.

Afterthought:
This is not connected to my response to MU.

Kripke's paradox, by the way, is dependent on an interpretation of a rule, which is not what correct rule-following is about (not something in me, as if my understanding determines what's correct or not). It's not my interpretation of some rule that determines what it means to follow a rule correctly, it's in the agreement of the acts within the social group that determines what's correct or not.

I think Kripke has gone wrong in attributing one's interpretation of the rule with correct rule-following. So, the answer to Kripke's paradox is in the dissolving of the problem, which is done when one see's correct rule-following in the right light.

We are in agreement StreetlightX, even where you expanded the point a bit in the first paragraph, and clarified the second paragraph. Excellent work!

I know you're going beyond the text somewhat, but there are some ambiguities with this reading, I think. First, I'm not clear on what it means to say that actions 'determine' what is correct and incorrect: is it not the case that actions are correct or incorrect? (i.e. you seem to introduce a temporal logic - actions > in/correctness - where I'm not sure there is one; But perhaps you don't quite mean this and I'm over-reading). Second, the "it" in the "the characteristic signs of it" seems to refer to 'distinguishing between mistakes and correct play' and not correct and incorrect play itself - the act of distinction, and not the objects of the distinction, as in, not:

(1) "[the] characteristic signs of it [correct and incorrect] in the player's behaviour"; But:
(2) "[the] characteristic signs of it [distinguishing correct and incorrect play] in the player's behaviour";

This insofar as the immidiately preceeding sentence is:

"But how does the observer distinguish in this case between players’ mistakes and correct play? - There are characteristic signs of it in the players’ behaviour": the 'it' seems to refer to the verb - the act of distinguishing in/correct play by players in the game, and not individual correct and incorrect play in themselves. — StreetlightX

What I mean by "...the actions determine what's correct or incorrect" is that the actions within the social context is the means by which we distinguish what's correct or incorrect. No action, as I understand it, is intrinsically correct or incorrect, except as it is seen within the game, or as seen within a social context. No more than an arrow is intrinsically pointing, it points within the context of the actions associated with the arrow.

I do think there is a kind of temporal logic to it, i.e., there is an action, then there is the determination if that action is correct or incorrect. How does one separate the action from the act of distinguishing right and wrong, correct and incorrect? There would be no temporal logic if the act itself was intrinsically right or wrong, correct or incorrect. The acts are only deemed correct or incorrect as the social group determines. When I use the word determine, I'm saying that the social groups decisions to say the bishop moves diagonally is not determined by any move in itself, but is determined within the social context of distinguishing correct and incorrect moves.

As to your last point, I agree that the "it" in the characteristic signs of it refers to the distinguishing between mistakes and correct play. However, the acts of distinction cannot be separated from the objects of distinction. Don't they go hand-in-hand?

I'm not sure I've understood your points, because in the first paragraph you seem to suggest that it's the actions that are correct or incorrect. However, in the last paragraph you do distinguish between the act of distinguishing correct and incorrect, from the acts within the game. However, the acts within the game are what determine correct or incorrect, but only as we determine that they are correct or incorrect. The two seem to be logically connected.

I've repeated myself, but only in an effort to clarify. I've probably misunderstood your points.

§54

For me, the most important aspect of Wittgenstein's rule-following analysis, is not only the idea of the complexity of rule-following within language-games, but the necessary connection of rule-following with actions. Hence, the importance of "[learning] the game by watching how others play." So the rule, for e.g., thats bishops move diagonally, isn't a rule apart from the actions associated with the rule. And of course it's those actions that determine what's correct and incorrect, i.e., "[the] characteristic signs of it [correct and incorrect] in the player's behaviour." And obviously it can't just be any behavior, but the behavior of the social group in relation to the game.

It's also interesting that Wittgenstein points out how that same behavior can be recognized in languages we're not familiar with, which he mentions in connection with a slip of the tongue. It's almost as if there are bedrock behaviors that are associated with all acting, i.e., acting that transcends language in some respect.

§55

The first quote of 55, it seems to me, is referring to his ideas in the Tractatus (not exclusively of course), i.e., his picture theory of language. So true propositions, in the Tractatus, refer to the idea that the proposition (the names - primitive signs) match up with facts (objects - the primitives that make up facts). Hence, the name corresponds to the object, which then gives meaning to the sign.

So part of what Wittgenstein is talking about in terms of the primitive language-game given at the beginning of the PI, is in direct opposition to his thinking in the Tractatus. He demonstrates in the PI using various analogies and examples how the idea of meaning is not, for the most part, connected up with a sign associated with an object. That meaning still has sense even if the object that corresponds to the sign doesn't exist, or is destroyed. Where does that sense reside? It resides in the complexity of the language-game, grammar, rules, and actions (correct and incorrect) within social contexts, all of these work together to establish meaning.

My interpretation is not necessarily exegetical, but seen from a broader perspective.

A good interpretation of the text involves understanding Wittgenstein from the Notebooks (around 1914), which is his early thinking on meaning, all the way through to On Certainty. It doesn't mean you can't understand it without this background, but understanding the background gives you an advantage. Obviously there are going to be different interpretations, but that doesn't mean we can't get the gist of his thinking. It also doesn't mean that any interpretation is a good interpretation.

Even his Austrian background, viz., the culture in which he grew up is important to understanding the way Wittgenstein writes and thinks. Music played an important part in his family life growing up, and this too had an influence on the way he thought. So, the more you know about the man, the more you are able to understand his ideas. Reading letters he wrote to answer questions, looking at his style of architecture, examining his reasoning across a wide variety of his notes, etc, etc. All of these ideas are important to get a good understanding of his thinking.

There are obviously some spots in the texts that are very difficult to interpret. Even Wittgenstein looking back over some things he wrote wasn't able to always recall his line of thinking, so yes, there are things that are a matter of opinion. But I think as to the main thrust of what he's saying most people who have studied the texts can agree on many things, and other things are open to question.

When I give an interpretation of Wittgenstein I'm bringing in things that are not obvious to the text. For example, Wittgenstein wrote about grammar long before he wrote the PI, so his ideas of grammar are important to the text. It's also worth noting that there is a surface meaning to Wittgenstein, and there is a depth of meaning to Wittgenstein. Compare it to someone enjoying music in a very superficial way, as opposed to someone who has a very in-depth knowledge of music. You just aren't going to see or understand what they see and understand.

Streetlight has done a pretty good job for not having much of a background in Wittgenstein (if I understood his earlier comment correctly), but this is probably due to his philosophical background. If you can bring a wide array of thinking to bear on the subject, that too helps.

Some people just don't have the ability to think abstractly very well, and it's obvious who these people are when reading their posts. That's just the way it is. I'm not going to pretend that I'm good at basketball when I'm not, and if I do pretend, it will be obvious to those who know how to play, that I'm don't know what I'm doing.

Much of this, including §47, is his way of arguing against his old way of thinking, and by extension arguing against how many philosophers knowingly or not think of meaning. As if simple, for example, can be reduced to some irreducible thing, giving us a one-to-one relationship between the word and the object (the referent). This is what Wittgenstein did in the Tractatus with his explanation of the smallest constituent part of a proposition (name), and its direct association with the smallest constituent part of a fact (object). As if sense can be derived from things in the world.

When Wittgenstein is talking about composite he is leading us in the direction of use, as opposed to some referent in the world (although there are times when the referent is obviously important). For example, "'Is what you see composite?' makes good sense if it is already established what kind of complexity-that is, which particular use of the word--is in question [my emphasis]." So, once we understand how we're using the term composite within a particular context of use, then "...we would have a clear sense--a clear use."

Note also when referring to how we might talk about the chessboard as being composite, that is, we might be tempted in some absolute sense to think that the chessboard is composite based on number of squares, colors, wood, etc. Thus, the point is that asking whether the board is simple or composite outside a language-game gets you nowhere. It's not what you have in mind that determines meaning. In other words, because you have in mind a particular association between composite and number of squares, colors, or bits of wood, that is not what gives meaning to the word composite. But if in a social context that's what we mean (which is based on use or grammar), then that use gives sense to the concept composite.

Streetlight you are correct to point out the relationship between all of this and epistemology. I think grammar should be seen as having the role of governing the moves within language-games, as opposed to the actual moves. An actual move may or may not conform to the rules of grammar. It follows from this that a correct move is in conformity with the grammatical rules. If we extend this analogy to epistemology, epistemology is simply a move in a language-game governed by the grammar in social contexts.

I tend to agree with Conant/Diamond here insofar as I take it that this is what Witty understands therapy to consist in and why the notion is so central to his meta-philosophy. You can't shout Terrapin into understanding this point, as you seem to be doing in your post. Nor can you force him to engage in the sort of philosophical therapy he needs to understand it so long as he refuses to work with L.W. qua therapist in order to fully realize the point through a sort of anerkennen (i.e. if he reads Wittgenstein as his buddy rather than as a philosophical diagnostician who needs to be allowed some pathos of distance in order to show the reader what he wants him to see). — John Doe

I think Conant and Diamond are incorrect in the way they interpret parts of Wittgenstein, but that's a subject for a different thread.

I don't know why you would characterize my reply to Terrapin as shouting, maybe because of the force of the comment, I'm not sure. In fact, I tried to inject a bit of humor into the comment. When I write I'm not only writing as a reply to a specific post, but I'm writing to those who might be following along, so I think it's a good idea to reply to certain posts, even if it seems to be not worth the effort as Banno suggested.

Okay. — Luke

I didn't think you would let him off the hook so easily Luke. Now I'm am forced, in my own inimitable way, to say that not only is Terrapin incorrect, but what he's saying is logically impossible, or at the very least linguistically impossible. Moreover, no argument you give will save you from this error. What error? This error, Terrapin says, "I don't believe that meaning is public. It's not at all possible to make meaning public..." This is akin to saying, "I don't believe triangles have three sides." It's the nature of rule-following to be public, just as it's the nature of triangles to have three sides. Period! And no response you can give will change that. If you can't see this, then your ability to think through this stuff is called into question. In other words, what I'm saying is that you can't be more confused than this when reading the PI. In fact, I wonder what you will get out of reading the PI if you don't understand this central point.

Now, you can come back and tell me how wrong I am, but any response you give will dig the hole much deeper.

Ya, that makes sense. I figured it was just a point of clarification.

What do you think of Terrapin Station's reply to me?

That is: ostensive act (pointing) + utterance of words. If this coupling is not kept in mind, the discussion here will be unintelligible. — StreetlightX

I'll definitely agree with this, if you uncouple these two things you'll definitely be lost.

But how is the person to whom the explanation is being given supposed to differentiate when you are pointing at one feature instead of another, if the only change in the "pointing" is your (private, mental) concentration of attention. — Luke

This is also an extremely important point to keep in mind when thinking about what Wittgenstein is trying to say in the long run. The meaning of a word/concept can never be the result of one's private mental happenings. There is nothing within you that gives meaning to a word. I was reading a book on epistemology by a philosopher who was trying to give meaning to the word knowledge by associating the word with something going on privately, as though you could give meaning to the word by some internal mechanism apart from social context. It's difficult to catch their mistake when it's coupled with language that's correctly used.

On my reading, Wittgenstein indicates that understanding an (ostensive) definition is not something which happens only in the mind of the listener or student, and neither is it something which is only tied to a specific set of accompanying behaviours; rather, it depends on the wider circumstances surrounding the language game. — Luke

I agree with the first part of this, but the last half raises questions. What could understanding what it means to play chess, be, other than specific behaviors associated within the social context of the game? Are you talking about private behavior? I agree that it depends on the wider social context, but aren't these wider social contexts or surroundings "accompanying behaviors?"

Read carefully 34-36. Notice at 35 he describes how there is no bodily action which has a necessary relation with "I mean the shape", or the colour. No necessary relation means that there cannot be a rule. This is why he claims a separation between what the speaker intends and what the hearer interprets at 34, because there is no necessary relation (like cause and effect) between the two activities, allowing them to be associated. There is nothing to signify to the hearer in any necessary way, what is intended by the speaker. There is no rule which the hearer can refer to, such as "this bodily action means colour", or "that bodily action means shape". Even if there are characteristic actions which occur often, they do not always occur, [so this excludes the possibility of a rule]. He even repeats this at 35:

To repeat: in certain cases, especially when one points 'to the shape' or 'to the number' there are characteristic experiences and ways of pointing—'characteristic' because they recur often (not always) when shape or number are 'meant'.

Wittgenstein is describing this type of learning as one which does not involve rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Part of the point of Wittgenstein talking about the ostensive definition model or deriving meaning from this medium is that there are no rules in this medium unless it's connected up with other people and actions. If I point to an object and say pencil, how would you know what I'm referring too? Do I mean it's color, its length, that it has an eraser, etc? There is no way for the word pencil to connect up with the object, no social rule. This example is not even a language-game, it doesn't have the requisite social settings. However, if you compare this with the language-game at the beginning of the PI there is a big difference. So, in Wittgenstein's example, he says pillar, or points to the object and says pillar, and there must be the corresponding action that tells the builder that the assistant understands what's required, i.e., that the assistant understands the rules of the game. He must bring the correct object. If the assistant doesn't do the required action, then the builder will correct him by showing him the correct action, until finally the assistant understands the rule.

Often when we teach children this method (ostensive pointing and learning) there is a period of time where they don't understand. When they finally do get it, it's not because they've grasped some mental process on our part, but because they learn what is required through trial and error (correct and incorrect) - they have grasped the logic behind the use of the word (the grammar). Their actions have matched the rule-governed activity of the social group. Just pointing at something and uttering a sound isn't enough in itself, it must be coupled with other things within a social context.

We've jumped a bit ahead, because in this early part of the book he's trying to show us something about the ostensive model, and how it sometimes lacks what is needed for someone to learn what is meant by a word or concept. He's pointing out the deficiencies of this view of language. He's pointing out the deficiencies of his previous view. He's also doing much more, but to explain I would have to write a lot more.

I don't think this will help you MU, i.e., I'm pessimistic, but it will help others, hopefully.

I agree that it may be difficult to imagine someone knowing how to play chess without having learnt the rules of chess, but consider that children learn how to speak before they learn any rules of language, by mimicking the behaviours of others. Also, bear in mind that Wittgenstein is attacking certain prevalent philosophical assumptions of his time, including those of his Tractatus, that language is exclusively a private, mental phenomenon. He is trying to remind us that language is instead (or also?) a shared, public, cultural and behavioural phenomenon. — Luke

I generally agree with Luke, but want to add something about rules which will be coming up in the PI. As you know grammar for Wittgenstein is much more than what we usually mean by grammar, i.e., it's much more than what we might learn in an English class covering nouns, adjectives, and verbs for example. His use of grammar extends to the logic of use, which governs linguistic practices as a whole, including how we use words in social settings, and the physical actions associated with the use of the words.

So, if you're learning to play a game by watching others, then by definition you're actions conform to certain rules. If a child learns how to speak using words, then the child actions comport or conform to the rules. Moreover, the child is learning how to follow a rule without knowing he/she is following a rule. If the child has learned to use a word correctly, then using the word correctly is, again, following the rules.

One can probably only go so far without learning some of the explicit rules of language, or without learning some of the written rules of chess. In other words, some games, including language-games, and even mathematics can be learned up to a point by watching, but at some point you will have to learn the rules.

Note carefully what Wittgenstein said in PI 31, "[o]ne can imagine someone's having learnt the game without ever learning or formulating rules," he's not saying you can learn a language without participating in rule-following. He's not saying you can learn a game without following rules, but without having learned or formulated rules, that's much different from saying, you can learn a game without the actions you're learning conforming to the rules. Just as a child needn't learn or formulate rules to learn how to use the word cup, and yet the child's actions do conform to rules. There is a subtle difference here.

However, rule-following at this stage of the PI is closely associated with what he's talking about in terms of ostensive definitions, and it's closely related, as Luke rightly pointed out, with his former view of language.

Anyway, I don't want to derail the conversation but I do want to push back a tad on the notion that Sellars inherits or continues Wittgenstein's legacy in any significant way. *push* — John Doe

I will definitely agree with this.

Ah, the "myth of the given," Fafner and I argued over this about 3 years ago in the other forum.

We agree, damn miracles will never cease, there is a God. :wink:

Streetlight is doing a good job of staying on the topic at hand. My comments were meant as generalizations, but what Streetlight is doing is what should be done, especially if you want to follow the steps in Wittgenstein's thinking.

Rule-following is an activity, and it's one of the activities that takes place in a game. It doesn't necessarily mean that you have learned rules or that rules have been stipulated in some way prior to the learning of the game. The same is true when you teach a child what the word cup means, the child doesn't need to know anything about a rule in order to learn how to use the word. The child observes, and probably already has some background of what it means to associate a word with an object. This is similar to the person in Wittgenstein's example (PI 31), where there is no learning of the rules explicitly or implicitly. Note though that the person has a background with learning other games, and as a result it makes it easier for them to figure out how the game is played.

This does not mean that once the person or child has learned to use pieces in a game, or has learned how to use the word cup, that they are not performing a social activity in accord with rules. Dogs can even learn to play simple games, and obviously a dog has no concept of rule-following or understanding of rules. However, the actions of a dog, in say a competition, is in accord with rules. The dog, child, or adult doesn't need to understand what the rules are in order to learn a rule-governed activity.

It's important to note that the person who is learning the game is already familiar with the kind of activity associated with rule-following. This is true without them understanding what a rule is, or being shown the rules, or learning rules.

This is part of what Wittgenstein, I believe, is saying in this passage.

Everyone has a world view whether they recognize it or not, so in that sense everyone has a philosophy of life. If this is true, and it is, then maybe all beliefs are bullshit, even the belief that beliefs are bullshit.

Since I'm currently working on a theory of knowledge involving Wittgenstein's thinking, I thought it appropriate to include some of these ideas as they apply to language-games and rule-following. This is central to understanding the implications of the PI.

It's very important to juxtapose private rule-following with language-games, because one or more people can participate in a language-game, that has as its basis for meaning a privately held meaning. This of course goes against Wittgenstein's notion that it's logically impossible to have such a meaning, i.e., it has no foothold in terms of what it means to be correct or incorrect. This is also Wittgenstein's stance in On Certainty as he responds to Moore's propositions, viz., "I know this is a hand." The point is that people can establish language-games that reflect a lack of understanding in terms of what gives meaning to words. It follows from this that not all language-games reflect the correct use of words. So if you think that all uses in terms of language-games, are correct uses, then you would be wrong. The correct notion of rule-following must be linked to the language-game, or you will miss an important part of what Wittgenstein is telling you.

For example, some people use the word know in a way that reflects some private access, which then allows them to assert that X is true, or that X is justified. People do this all the time, even philosophers do it based on particular theories of knowledge. To further illustrate the point, I'll use a religious example. If I say that "I know X," and you ask, "What is your justification for knowing X," and I reply, "The Holy Spirit revealed it to me," then you would be falling prey to the private notion of meaning. However, if Wittgenstein is correct, and it seems obvious (at least to me and others) that he is, then this way of giving meaning to a word, be it knowledge or some other concept, is faulty, to say the least. Why? First, because there is no way of resolving what would count as being incorrect about such knowledge. Second, and this is closely related to the first point, rules cannot be privately established, i.e., totally isolated from social contexts. It's just not possible. Every notion of correct or incorrect, knowing and not knowing is part of a social construct, viz., a linguistic construct. There is no meaning to be had privately. Again, because it's logically impossible.

Finally, Kripke's skeptical argument about rule-following, which in some ways reminds me of the Gettier dilemma. Basically it's the idea that there is no way to know if Mary understands addition beyond a certain point, i.e., there is no way to know if she understand the rules as they are acted upon in public over time. Let' say that Mary has been doing addition as we understand addition up to 1000, but that after 1000 Mary does something much different, viz., she randomly adds 5 to every answer above 1000. It would seem to follow from this that there is no way for us to know that anyone is following any rule correctly, because at some point their actions may reveal something very different than what we normally mean by a word/concept.

So the skeptical rejoinder is that we can never be sure that anyone is following a rule correctly, since at a given point in the future, a person's actions may reveal that what they understand as addition, doesn't conform to what we publicly understand as addition. Thus, the notion of rule-following collapses as an essential part of our understanding of concepts. Why? Again, because there is no way to know if someone really understand a rule or not.

But, there is something very wrong with Kripke's skeptical argument, i.e., it assumes the very thing it's arguing against. It's circular. Here's the crux of the problem. In order for Kripke's argument to work, he has to be able to compare Mary's understanding of addition up to 1000, with that of Mary's understanding of addition after 1000. However, if there is no way to know, according to Kripke's skeptical argument that we are following a rule in terms of any concept (addition in the e.g.), then there is no way for Kripke to know if he is following the rules of sameness correctly. When he compares what Mary did at point X, with what Mary did at point Y along the time line, how does he know that he is applying the rule of sameness in the correct way? If what his argument is claiming is true, then it would apply to all concepts, even the very words used to express his argument. This is what Wittgenstein meant when he said that a doubt that doubts everything, is not a doubt, which is what Kripke's argument boils down to.

Why was Kripke's argument circular, because it assumes an understanding over time of the concept sameness. So it assumes the very thing he is arguing against. However, it's more than circular, it's contradictory.

Some general remarks:

Another important part of Wittgenstein's analysis in the PI that is not carried forward from the Tractatus, is the idea of a final analysis. I spoke earlier of the continuity of his thinking, but there are clearly ideas from the Tractatus that he rejects. And it's the idea of some final analysis, as if we can boil down philosophical ideas (generally speaking) to their constituent parts, which will reveal in very precise terms what we mean. This is seen in his example of the broom, as if seeing the parts of the broom will give us more insight into what a broom is (PI 47). The broom example is similar to what Wittgenstein was doing in the Tractatus as he analyzed language. He was trying to give a final analysis that explained how language worked in very absolute terms, and thus solve all philosophical problems. He did this in the Tractatus by giving us a method of seeing language in terms of what has sense, what is senseless, and what is nonsense. He supposedly gave us a way of seeing proposition is very absolute terms, with very specific boundaries.

However, the PI turns this analysis on it head, by showing us that much of what philosophers do in terms of an analysis is just the chasing after shadows. Shadows isn't the correct word, because shadows exist, a better phrase is, chasing after ghosts.

I do think we can take Wittgenstein's methods too far, as if clarity isn't possible, but clarity should be seen in a context. What's clear in one context, isn't clear in another. How we use the word reality in our everyday lives will not do in physics. Neither context of how the word reality is used, is THE correct use, both have their uses, and both can be correct given specific language-games. There is no final analysis of reality that give us perfectly clarity on every use of that word.

Many people, scientists included, do this with what we mean by knowledge, i.e., as if scientific knowledge is superior to every other kind of knowledge. It may be in many instances, but what it means to know is much broader than scientific knowledge. This misunderstanding tends to put science up as some kind of god when it comes to having knowledge. Don't get me wrong I think scientific knowledge has a rigor that we don't use in many other areas, but even this rigor is subject to sensory experience, as is much of our knowledge.

Given what Wittgenstein is doing in the PI, it cannot be fit into the kind of analysis that is seen in the Tractatus, and thus Wittgenstein cannot be seen as an analytic philosopher (in his later years) in the traditional sense. Wittgenstein is not giving some final analysis in the PI, or some dogmatic theory, but giving us a way of looking at language from a multitude of perspectives and contexts. He opens our minds wide, as opposed to looking at things from a very narrow perspective.

Not everything Wittgenstein said is correct, but this isn't the point. The point is the method, which is seen in OC as culmination of his methods in the PI, viz., a sustained treatment of what it means to know.

I'll leave it at that Terrapin.

Some conventions are correct or incorrect.
— Sam26

No, they are not.

One cannot simply use a word any way one likes, i.e., if you want to be understood.
— Sam26

Sure, it will be more difficult to understand someone if they're very unconventional. I mention that in the post you're responding to.

So there is a sense where we can say you are using the word cup incorrectly even though the word cup is a matter of convention.
— Sam26

Yeah, in the sense where you endorse argumentum ad populums, conformity, etc, and you mistake your opinion for a fact. — Terrapin Station

So let's see if I understand you correctly. The rules of chess are a matter of convention, i.e., they could have been otherwise. But according to you it's not incorrect for me to move the bishop like a queen. The problem is that your use of incorrect and correct is out of the norm, as such, one has a difficult time understanding what you're saying, because by implication even in the use of these words (correct and incorrect) has no correct or incorrect use. If that's true why are you arguing that I'm incorrect? Your argument, if you follow it to its conclusion leads to an absurdity.

The rules are simply conventions. Conventions aren't correct or incorrect. It's not incorrect to be unconventional. If you're too unconventional in this case, people will have a difficult time understanding you, at least initially. What makes something count as a particular language or not is simply the conceptual boundaries that individuals have in mind for that language. In other words, simply "what they'll assent to call 'English' (or whatever language)" — Terrapin Station

Some conventions are correct or incorrect. One cannot simply use a word any way one likes, i.e., if you want to be understood. So there is a sense where we can say you are using the word cup incorrectly even though the word cup is a matter of convention.

Yes, I agree. There are both implicit rules and explicit rules, as in comparing some children's games where the rules are not spelled out, and some board games where the rules are spelled out. Both kinds of rules can change over time, and both are developed over time.

The central idea throughout the PI is the idea of the language-game, and under this rubric is the idea of rules of use (or logic of use), and also Wittgenstein's idea of grammar which falls under the role of the rules. Although the role of rules is probably more expansive than just the rules of grammar.

Whether we are referring to Wittgenstein's grammatical rules (which are important), or the more general idea of rule-following, as seen in the application of rules across a wider swath of language usage, rule-following is central.

Grammar is what makes the moves in language possible, just like the rules of chess make the game of chess possible. And just as the rules of chess permit some moves and disallow others, so also does grammar permit and disallow certain linguistic moves. This should be seen under the logic of use, but again keep in mind that the logic of use is broader than just grammar. It includes the various acts that occur in a language-game. For instance, the act of bringing the slab in Wittgenstein's primitive language-game, is also seen as part of the logic of use. Just as the rules of chess bring about the various moves in chess as part of the logic within the game.

It's also part of the nature of the rules of grammar to adjudicate certain moves as correct or incorrect. Again the parallel with chess rules. One can think of the rules of grammar and the rules of chess as more akin to commands to follow in order to play the game correctly. The rules are conventions, but they necessitate certain moves, i.e., if you want to play the game correctly within the social structure.

I will just make general remarks here and there.

Hopefully I didn't distract your thread too much. I'll stop by from time-to-time to make a comment or two. Good luck with your discussion.

:ok:

Another key element to the continuity of his early philosophy and his later philosophy is how we come to mean something by our words. What constitutes meaning? In the T. he does it through the picture theory of meaning. In the PI meaning is seen through the eyes of the language-game and use, i.e., meaning happens in linguistic rule-governed social settings. Your private experiences have nothing to do with meaning.

Looking at the Routledge edition there is nothing much there that does more than the text itself. It is NOT a complex text at the start. Anything I have said is to reference the text and expand a little on what W says. For example I like the term “ostensive” as something to apply to non-verbal thought (I haven’t said this because it is irrelevant. — I like sushi

I'm not familiar with the Routledge edition.

Actually, the way Wittgenstein is using "ostensive," as in "ostensive teaching of words (PI 6)," is not in connection with non-verbal thought, but in connection with how words are taught, and he thinks this view is very primitive, viz., it doesn't account for how we learn many words. For example, I may point to a cup while saying the word cup as I teach a child how to use the word. However, there is nothing to point to when using the words nothing or the, we learn how to use these words in other ways.

Think of the "ostensive teaching of words" in reference to the primitive language-game at the beginning of the PI.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein believes that the structure of language is revealed by logic, and that the main function of language is to describe the world. The three main issues of the T. are - logic, language, and the world. His investigation in the T. is purely a priori.

In the PI he still believes that the logic of language is important, but the investigation of that logic is different, it's more of an a posteriori investigation. The logic in the PI is seen in the language-game, and the grammar and rules that make up the language-game. It's also seen in how we use words in social contexts. These social contexts (language-games) reveal the logic behind the use of the words or propositions. Our actions as seen in a form of life also reveal the logic within the language-game.

There is definitely a continuous narrative between the two works. He didn't completely disavow everything in the Tractatus. One of the continuities, is that there is a logic behind the use of words. Although the way he applies that logic is different.

The professor I studied under studied under Cora Diamond who is one of the proponents of the resolute reading. I'm definitely not a fan of the resolute reading, and that article explains part of the reason.

http://wab.uib.no/agora/tools/alws/collection-7-issue-1-article-21.annotate

The best book I've read that sums up Wittgenstein is K. T. Fann's, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy. You can get it used for just a few dollars. It's sums up his philosophy from the Tractatus to the PI.

The best book on Wittgenstein's life is Monk's Ludwig Wittgenstein.

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07922L4HW?tag=opr-mkt-opr-us-20&ascsubtag=1ba00-01000-ubp00-win10-other-nomod-us000-pcomp-feature-scomp-wm-5&ref=aa_scomp#customerReviews

Believe me Wallows, I would loathe leading this thread. One of the reasons is that like other forums, people think their opinions have the same force, without studying, as those who have studied the material. Studying it doesn't make you right, but it sure gives you a leg up on those who haven't studied the material. Besides I'm working on my book, along with a theory of epistemology related to OC.

This thread is like the blind leading the blind. There are so many misunderstandings going on that it pains me to read this. If you listen to MU you'll all be screwed in the head. He doesn't have a clue. He sounds like he knows what he's talking about to someone who doesn't know the material, but he is lost in a fog.

First, I think you people are going to fast. Some of this material takes a lot of thought, and if you don't think it takes a lot of thought, then you definitely don't understand it. You really need someone who knows the material well to guide you through it. Otherwise, you'll end up with a bunch of cliches that will distort Wittgenstein's thinking. I've spent years studying the 90 pages of OC, and only then can I say I have a decent understanding of Wittgenstein's thinking in terms of knowing. I only say this because I've compared my thoughts to what other philosophers have written on the subject, and it lines up well.

If you don't have a philosophical background, and you start with Wittgenstein, that's like trying to learn calculus without learning the math leading up to the study of calculus. Wittgenstein's works are some of the most difficult to understand in all of philosophy. Even people who have a good background in philosophy get confused about his ideas. In fact, many of them are confused.

My summary of the PI in my thread on Wittgenstein is very simplistic. It doesn't come close to doing justice to his writings in the PI. My comments on OC are much better, but still need work.

Anyway, those are my thoughts for what they're worth.

I don't disagree with that Terrapin.

Some, sure. But it makes little sense to say philosophy belongs, or ought to belong to that subclass. The rules of chess are more or less utterly contingent and utterly arbitrary after all (constrained only by the - already contingent - choice of an 8x8 grid, our physionomy, and our intelligence and history). Insofar as philosophy asks after how things in reality hang together in the broad sense, the constraints which govern its discourse ought to be far more significant that than those which govern a frivolity like chess. — StreetlightX

Of course the discourse of philosophy has broader ramifications than a chess game, but the analogy, as far as it goes, still holds. How we talk about facts, truth, real, exist, etc, is not only contingent on how the world is, but the concepts of language hang together based on how we use the concepts to describe the world.

It's true that there is a kind of arbitrariness to our concepts, but that arbitrariness is only in the choice of the letters and words used (among other things) within language. We could choose what we want to mean by the words car or book, just as we could choose whatever rule we want when setting up the game of chess, or a game of baseball. However, once the rules are set, then we follow them to play the game, or to talk about philosophy. This is what Wittgenstein meant by the logic of use, at least partially. We can see the logic behind the use of words by observing how we use the words in social settings. For example, did the person properly respond to the word slab as given in Wittgenstein's language-game.

Once the rules, say, of syntax are arbitrarily decided, then whether we use such rules correctly or not can be seen objectively. You either followed the rules or not. In baseball, the rules are arbitrary, but whether you follow the rules correctly is not arbitrary. We can observe whether the hit was a home run or not, it's objective. It's not always clear whether someone correctly followed a rule, but generally we know. This is true of our concepts, if it wasn't we wouldn't be able to communicate, which is somewhat what happened at the beginning of this thread.