An interesting DMT trip.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJic9adBquY

Do you, Sam26, find it curious that so many here remain convinced that one does know that this is a picture of N., and rush to provide the justification that appears to be missing? — Banno

It does seem curious doesn't it? However, I'm finding that beliefs have more to do with psychology than good arguments. The psychology of belief is much more powerful than any argument, and this is true no matter what educational level you're dealing with. One can see this especially when we consider religion and politics. People like to follow their particular group, be it a large group or small group, it's comforting to think that others think like you. What we need are more independent thinkers, those who can think outside the box, those who are non-conformists. The other problem is that sometimes you can get to far outside the box. Why people believe what they do is very complicated.

I'm also interested in contrasting the note to the critique of Moore's argument. What are the difference between "Here is a hand" and "that's N."?

The wording is interesting, I think: "Suddenly I had to think of him."(my italics). There is no choice or volition or logical space of any sort between seeing the picture and seeing N.

(unfinished. contrast with knowing how to ride a bike or knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia...) — Banno

I'm not sure what else to say. I guess you could say that one is perceived directly "the hand," and one indirectly by looking at a picture, but generally both are hinge or bedrock beliefs. I would suggest the book Sense and Sensibilia, which is a book that G. J. Warnock's constructs from J. L. Austin's notes.

Where your statements aren't hinges, i.e., where it makes sense to doubt them, then, they can be justified in various ways. One way of justifying them is through linguistic training. In other words, when teaching a child the correct names of things or persons, or when teaching someone a new language. There is no significant difference between showing a child a picture of "N," and pointing them out in a crowd, we learn how to name things using both methods.

When teaching a child to use the word hand there is no issue of doubt. Learning to doubt is a language-game that comes much later. We seem to swallow down certain basic beliefs as part of the reality we live in. Something has to stand fast for us in order to learn anything.

Both of these propositions need a context in order for them mean anything. There is no intrinsic meaning to these sentences apart from some context (not that you suggested otherwise).

The logic behind the use of these sentences seems very similar.

There is knowing as a skill, i.e., learning to ride a bike, or learning to count is a skill. Knowing that bikes have wheels is a belief, and knowing that 1+1=2 is also a belief. As philosophers we are mainly interested in beliefs.

I'm not sure if any of this is what you're looking for, so take it for what its worth.

If to know is to hold a justified true belief, then what is the justification here? I know it is a picture of him because I recognise it as such? But that is to say just that I know it is a picture of him because I know it is a picture of him...

And if there is no justification, then do we not know that it is a picture of him? — Banno

Banno, the answer to your question is similar to the answer given in On Certainty to Moore's propositions. So, I might ask the same question of Moore's proposition, namely, "How do I know this is a hand?" As Wittgenstein pointed out, in Moore's context the use of the word know is senseless. The context in which Moore makes the assertion is before an audience (he holds up his hand and says, "This is one hand.) as a rebuttal against the skeptics about whether there exists an external world. He claims to know this is his hand, or a hand. Wittgenstein immediately points out how unclear the statement is by considering its negation, namely, "I don't know this is a hand." This tells us something about the use of the word know in reference to a doubt, and the logic behind the correct use of these words. It's very similar to following a rule and making a mistake, they are logically linked.

Wittgenstein also points out that there are situations where one could doubt that that is my hand or a hand. For example, waking from an operation with bandages around my hand and not knowing if my hand was amputated or not. So, in one context it may be correct to use know, and in another incorrect. One might ask, "Does it make sense to doubt in a given context?"

So, do I know it's a hand because I know it's a hand, just like the question you asked about the picture. No, it's not a matter of knowing, it's simply the way we act. In another situation we may be presented with two pictures that closely resemble each other, in this situation it makes sense to doubt whether they are one and the same person. In such a context it makes sense to ask what is your justification (the doubt makes sense)? In one context the proposition is hinge or bedrock, in another it is not. The example you gave is an example of a hinge-proposition.

Keep in mind there are many statements/beliefs that fall into this category, namely, they are hinge-propositions, or as I call them bedrock beliefs that fall outside the epistemological language-game.

"Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet when I want to get up from a chair? There is no why. I simply don't. This is how I act (OC 148)."

"Is there a why? Must I not begin to trust somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is part of judging (OC 150)."

"Doubt comes after belief (OC 160)."

"I have a world-picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting. The propositions describing it are not all equally subject to testing (OC 162)."

All of these quotes fit the kind of question your asking. Again, it gets back to certain propositions/beliefs that are so basic that they are outside epistemological questions.

There, I deleted all my posts. Oh, I left a few undeleted, so I must be wrong. Goodbye to all. This was a waste of my time.

I can solve this problem.

]

Well, you got me on that one, I did say "all."

I hate to get picky, but one use of the word 'all' is to speak generally. So, if I say "all of you are sinners" does that mean the babies in the audience too? Does 'all' always have the force of necessarily each and every?

What!? There's a big difference between propositions being beliefs, and propositions necessarily being beliefs, which is what you seem to suggest I was saying.

"I believe in freedom, justice, and equality." Is that proposition true or false? — Fooloso4

It's true that you believe in those things. Is it not?

I don't believe it, I know it. I know how to calculate and I've done the calculations. Others have done so as well. — Fooloso4

You're saying what Moore is saying, that is, it is on par with his claim to know he has hands. This is what Wittgenstein is arguing against. What would it mean to doubt that 12x12=144? If it does not make sense to doubt it, it does make sense to claim to know it. This is what OC is all about. Hinges are not epistemological.

The state of mind or belief regarding the calculation is unimportant. — Fooloso4

I'm not sure what this has to do with what we're talking about. In terms of meaning this is true, meaning has nothing to do with your state-of-mind.

You are equivocating. Moore does not say: "I have hands", he says, "I know I have hands" which is not the same as saying "I believe I have hands". — Fooloso4

Don't talk to me like I no nothing about the subject, as if I haven't read Moore's papers. He actually says, "Here is one hand." But these are things he claims to know, as he argues with the skeptics.

As I said, there are examples of propositions that aren't beliefs, but in terms of OC we're talking about Moore's propositions, and those are beliefs, Moore's beliefs. I don't disagree with what you're saying, but I don't think I ever said that propositions are necessarily beliefs.

Here is an NDE of a blind person. The only thing I disagree with is the ending, namely, "Jesus is the key." If anything my research on NDEs shows that religion has it wrong. However, religious people love cherry-picking those NDEs that support their views. Anyway, I found this NDE interesting.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3rFW2lc3344

/

Propositions are beliefs, they are statements that are true or false. The only time they wouldn't be beliefs is if you're giving one as an example or something where they're not attached to someone.

]

I have seen some commentators who treat them as such, but I have found nothing in On Certainty or other texts of Wittgenstein's that make that identification. — Fooloso4

The whole book is about Moore's propositions, and the fact that they are hinge propositions. If any commentator said otherwise he would be laughed at. I would challenge you to find someone who said otherwise, especially a philosopher. I've been studying this book for years, and have read papers on the subject from philosophers all over the world, and I have not found one commentator who would make such an assertion.

Moore's propositions are in fact hinge propositions. It is because of Moore's argument with the skeptics that set Wittgenstein notes in motion. "I know this is my hand," is an example, 2+2=4 is also a hinge, that my body is separate from other bodies is also a hinge. There are many many hinges. The rules of chess are hinge to the game of chess. The board and pieces are also hinges. There are too many to list.

In terms of OC 342 Wittgenstein points out that any investigation, including scientific investigations, there are certain things that are not doubted. For example, our sensory perceptions are generally trusted, without which we would not get very far. The deed is at the bottom of this trust.

It would not be possible to doubt without somethings standing fast for us. Doubts are parasitic on that which is not doubted.

Some hinges can change over time, but other hinges stand fast.

I understand.

As I mentioned to Fooloso4, to get a clear picture of what I'm trying to say you have to read the material, not just quote me out of context and give a response. I say this because I don't see the connection between the quote you used, and your responses. Part of the problem is that much of what I'm saying is new, although there are some philosophers working on some of the same ideas.

The following is a link to some similar ideas to mine, although not entirely similar, but close.

https://www.academia.edu/7298912/Hinge_Propositions_and_the_Logical_Exclusion_of_Doubt

A proposition may express a belief but it is not a belief. — Fooloso4

I agree, but I'm talking about propositions in the context of OC, specifically in the context of someone saying or writing out their belief. I should have been clearer.

Are you claiming that there is a picking up a cup of coffee state of mind or the act of brushing your teeth state of mind? — Fooloso4

My claim is that the act of picking up the cup shows that we have beliefs about cups, or beliefs about toothbrushes - not that there is a cup of coffee state-of-mind.

I do not pick up a toothbrush because I believe there is a toothbrush. My belief about the toothbrush is not simply that there is a toothbrush but that it is used to brush teeth and that brushing my teeth is an important part of hygiene. — Fooloso4

I didn't say that you pick up a toothbrush because you believe there is a toothbrush. I said, that the act of picking up a toothbrush shows that I believe there is a toothbrush to pick up. The other reasons you give are linguistic reasons.

Do you think that this is in line with or contrary to Wittgenstein's claim about the spade being turned at bedrock?

Do I see the duck-rabbit one way or another because something causes me to see it one way or the other? Can the cause of seeing one way be the same as seeing it the other? — Fooloso4

I'm not trying to be in line with or against Wittgenstein's ideas, I'm developing a theory of epistemology based on some of his ideas, and my interpretation of where some of his ideas lead.

I don't understand what the duck rabbit idea has to do with what I'm saying.

Your questions don't reflect a clear understanding of what I'm trying to say, which maybe a fault of mine, I'm not sure at this point.

[

I know you haven't read this thread because it's a lot to read, but I don't want to re-write the thread to answer your questions. One thing to keep in mind, not all of my conclusions are based on what Wittgenstein said in OC - some are some aren't.

l

I've answered this question already in the posts, and even in the paper I wrote on Hinge-propositions. The paper is on page 9 - 'Hinge Propositions and Their Epistemic Importance.'

.

However, there are language/mathematical/logical communities that DO special things. For example, the conventional math-languages used in the sciences and engineering DO solve problems of a much more complex nature than the problems that other language games solve. It creates predictive models for which other language games do not have the ability to predict. How can this language game be so useful compared with others, in mining complexity in natural phenomena and in secondarily creating synthetic technologies from those original mined complexities? — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein's methods of dissolving philosophical problems in the PI is meant to solve particular kinds of philosophical conundrums. This does not mean that every philosophical problem is solvable using these methods. If I understand you correctly, you seem to think that all philosophical problems can be solved using the language-game model. Wittgenstein is showing us how a certain kind of thinking is a misuse of language, and when it is such, then Wittgenstein's methods can be employed, otherwise never-mind.

PI 132
"We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language:..."

Think of order in terms of an arrangement or method, not the order or the method, as if there is one way of seeing or looking at a word's use, but "...one out of many possible orders or methods. Why? Because of the complexity of language-games, and the logic of use behind each language-game. In order to see this clearly one compares language-games (similarities and dissimilarities). Think of comparing the use of the word time in one language-game (e.g. science), as opposed to the use of the word time as a poet might use it (compare and make note). As we do this we accumulate "...knowledge in the use of language," and we begin to see the distinctions within each of these language-games that are easily overlooked.

Clarity is also not a kind of generalized clarity, but a clarity that comes from understanding various uses of words within a particular language-game. It's not the clarity Wittgenstein was seeking in the TLP. Clarity for Wittgenstein in the PI is piecemeal, and each case is a reminder used for a particular purpose.

The question that arises is, "Are all philosophical problems solved using Wittgensteinian methods?" The answer, has to be an unequivocal, no! Wittgenstein's methods don't clear up everything. However, they do clear up many philosophical puzzles. In fact, as I've stated before, many, or probably most of the philosophical problems in these forums are simply misunderstandings of the sort that Wittgenstein is dealing with. Moreover, understanding Wittgenstein's methods will help you not to go down roads that lead nowhere.

Understanding Wittgenstein is not enough, one must be practiced at using his methods.

I'm starting a forum on just Wittgenstein. I'm trying to get all my writing together in one spot. It would be good to have you and a few others as posters from time-to-time.

https://philosophicalthinking.createaforum.com/index.php

There's no evidence whatsoever that consciousness can do anything — Unseen

Consciousness can manifest itself in a variety of ways, one way is through a body of some kind. Moreover, there are different levels of consciousness, and at some levels very little can be done, at other levels things can be done that are beyond your imagination. Essentially when we refer to consciousness we're talking about a mind or minds.

So, why are we conscious? — Unseen

Why? Because consciousness is the source of everything, and it's what unifies everything. There, I just gave you what will someday be one of the greatest discoveries of all time. :gasp:

There are many situations which apparently require me to make assumptions instead of actually knowing what is true and what is not. Is there any way to get rid of this constant uncertainty? I feel like I become really uncertain about many things if I don't constantly check them or if I'm unable to do so. — AnonThinker25

I'm not sure I'm clear on what you mean by "knowing?" Part of the problem may just be that you think knowing X means that you have complete certainty or absolute certainty. Much of what we claim to know is probabilistic, that is, we know with a degree of certainty. I know the sun will rise tomorrow with a very high degree of certainty (here I'm talking about objective certainty - based on good reasons or good evidence). I know my car will start with a high degree of certainty. I don't know with absolute certainty, but that doesn't mean there is good reason to doubt that my brand new car will not start. What you need to ask yourself is, "Are there good reasons to doubt?" Just because you could be wrong, that doesn't mean you should be skeptical. In many cases there are good reasons to doubt the doubt, we shouldn't doubt willy-nilly.

Are you really going to say that looking at your watch isn't sufficient justification for knowing the time? — dePonySum

I would say that it is a sufficient condition, i.e., that generally we can trust our watches and our senses. However, we also know that whether we are justified or not is probabilistic, namely, watches sometimes fail to give the correct time because of various mechanical or battery failures. So, given that justification is only probabilistic (in the watch case) we shouldn't, and in fact are not, surprised when sometimes justification fails us. Therefore, we can't say with absolute certainty that we are justified in such cases.

It doesn't follow from this (as some people think) that because justification is only probabilistic that we can't make the claim that "We know X." For example, I claim to know algebra, but that doesn't mean that I had to get every problem correct on every test to make the claim. You can still make the claim that you know algebra, even though you only got 80% correct. I only bring this up because sometimes people conclude that you can't claim to know if your claim is only probabilistic. However, this is an error, since the correct use of the word know often involves what's only probable.

It also follows, that while our definition of knowledge as JTB is absolute, our claims are not. This is an important point.

On page one starting with post #2 I talk about the Tractatus. In the Tractatus the theory of truth is the correspondence theory, or the picture theory.

There is no theory of truth in the PI.

Keep in mind that I'm constantly re-writing these posts.

By the way, I'm starting my own forum. The forum will be mostly on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. I just started it today.

https://philosophicalthinking.createaforum.com/general-discussion/

Do you think Wittgenstein's goal in OC was at some foundationalist attempt, despite there being a lot of controversy about logical foundationalism in the TLP, and contextualism or correspondence in the Investigations? — Wallows

No, that wasn't his goal, although some might think so based on some of the things he said. I don't agree with your characterization of the TLP or the Investigations.

I hope things are well with you Wallows.

It is true that some bedrock propositions change over time, but not all. For example, Moore's propositions, for the most part will not change, unless in the future we evolve into beings that have no need for hands, but then, other bedrock beliefs will fill the gap. It is true that bedrock propositions/beliefs are contingent, so I guess given enough time most or all of them might change. Although it's difficult to think how being a person separate from other persons would ever change.

Let me just say again that I'm expanding on what Wittgenstein is saying in his notes, I'm not claiming that Wittgenstein would agree with me, or that this is where he was leading.

I started working on intuitions. To see what a philosophical intuition is (or rather, what one type of philosophical intuition is), consider the following:

You might think knowledge is justified and true belief. But suppose I look at my watch and it says the time is 12:37. On this surely reasonable and justified basis I believe that the time is 12:37, and indeed the time is 12:37. However, unbeknownst to me my clock is stopped. It just so happened to stop on 12:37, and by coincidence this happens to be the time now.

Many people have the intuition that in such a case you do not know that the time is 12:37, but you are justified in believing it, your belief is true, and you certainly do believe it. Thus, they argue, having a justified true belief does not guarantee knowledge. If this is true, it overturns what was the almost universally accepted view of what knowledge almost two and a half millennia- that knowledge is justified true belief, often shortened to JTB. This sense of wrongness about the idea that the person in the example knows that it is 12:37 is a paradigm case- perhaps the defining example- of a philosophical intuition. A philosophical intuition is typically (and these are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions!) a sense of rightness or wrongness about the application of a predicate- for example “Knowledge” in a hypothetical case. This sense of rightness or wrongness does not seem to rely on anything external to itself for its own justification, rather it just sort of seems self-evident. — dePonySum

This is just Gettier warmed over. There is nothing wrong with the definition of knowledge as JTB. The problem is that believing that one is justified, is not the same as being justified. There is nothing new here. The example, as in all Gettier problems, is that you fail to meet all of the criteria. As you look back on your justification, i.e., later you find out that your watch stopped, this in itself demonstrates that you did not meet the criteria. Thinking one is justified, call it intuition or not, is not the same as being justified, even if you lucked out in drawing the correct conclusion.

This seems like more like rhetorical bluster than anything of conceptual import, much like his grumbling about 'depth' and 'surface' in §111: an effort to change our metaphors, our attitudes. — StreetlightX

PI 129
I think this paragraph is much more important than just rhetorical bluster. It goes to the heart of much of what he's saying. We often miss the obvious in spite of it being "always before our eyes." It's as if we have to be reminded over and over again in order to see the obvious. This is partly what Wittgenstein does with the language-games by comparing and contrasting similarities and dissimilarities.

And what you call grumbling about 'depth' and 'surface' grammar is partly what we miss, i.e., we are fooled by propositions that have the same surface grammar. For example, "All rods have length," and "All roses have thorns," have the same surface grammar (the same sentence structure) - we can imagine roses without thorns, but not rods without length (depth grammar that goes beyond sentence structure). You can also see this with sentences about time. Compare the river flows with time flows.

Another good book to read on language is "Sense and Sensibilia," which is reconstructed from the manuscript notes of J. L. Austin.

Maybe we can keep this thread alive.