As I see it, faith proper is almost entirely a matter of affect. It consists in feelings: of reverence, of awe, of love, of aspiration, of a sense of the divine, the sublime. Whatever is said as an expression of faith should be taken as metaphor, as allegory.

The existence or non-existence of God cannot be known; first you would need to understand what it could mean to say that God exists. — Janus

Okay, so faith consists of feelings of reverence, of awe, of love, of aspiration, etc. Faith as I see it, involves trust, if I have faith in someone or something, I'm trusting someone or something.

However, let's use reverence as an example, reverence is respect for someone or something, usually when Christians use the term reverence they are talking or referring to someone, viz., God. If they talk about love, it's love for someone, so it's more than a feeling, although it's that too. Even very liberal churches, at least many of them, have tenets of faith, beliefs that they put their faith in. Your idea seems very subjective, viz., faith is whatever I want it to be, a kind of mysticism or metaphor. My argument is with those who put their faith in specific beliefs.

Your way of thinking about it would need to be tackled in a different way. Moreover, the two main religions don't think of it the way you're thinking of faith, at least generally.

The purported truth, in any propositional sense, of what one has faith in is irrelevant, not even coherent, I would say. Faith is not properly held in propositional terms at all; if it is, it is mere irrational belief, some form of fundamentalism. — Janus

I don't follow your thinking. If we're talking about the existence of God, and having faith in a God, what are we talking about if not whether such a being exists, whether it's true or not. If it's not propositional, then what is it? How do you express it? There has to be a belief of some sort, we are not talking in a vacuum of beliefs. I don't know of any religious faith that doesn't hold to some kind of propositional faith or belief. Moreover, if someone asked, what is your faith in, what do you believe, how do you do express it without expressing statements or propositions of some sort. I guess you could chant.

think my analogy is exactly the point i am trying to make - what is your basis for thinking our ability to actually comprehend the true nature of God is in anyway at all better than a 2 year old's ability to understand calculus ? Because we think we can ??? — Rank Amateur

First, a two year old has no conception of what calculus is, that is, they don't understand the concept calculus, or the concepts used in calculus, so they may as well be talking gibberish. We are able to understand the concepts we use about God. For example, does God exist, i.e., is there an instance in reality where it might be metaphysically possible for such a being to exist. We don't need a perfect definition, or even a perfect understanding of the concepts to talk reasonably about the subject, we do it all the time in quantum physics. We do it all the time in fiction too. I don't need a perfect definition or a perfect understanding of my friends to know they exist, so why do I need this when speculating about God. I don't think I can talk about God, I know I can, we're doing it right now.

and ants can communicate their understanding of their world to each other. And their perceptions of their world can be perfectly reasonable to their fellow ants who share the same perception of the world. And it can even be useful - they can tell them follow this trail and food will be there. And to any any other ant this world description is 100% true - but it has nothing at all in common with what our human view of the world is. — Rank Amateur

I'm not sure what your point is here. Nothing is reasonable to an ant, reason plays no part in their world or understanding, and neither does truth. I agree that ants have nothing in common with our human world, well almost nothing. They are biological after all, and there are probably other common elements.

But that's what the argument is about, the validity of the statements, are they true or false. It's not nonsense to talk about the existence of such a being, and your analogy of a 2 year old making statements about your calculus book just doesn't hold any water. It's not the same at all.

P1 - we have no basis at all to believe we can make any statement at all about the nature of God.
P2. - any statement that any human makes that assigns any characteristic at all to the nature of God is by definition anthropomorphic and we have no basis at all to know if it is or is not true.

Conclusion - any argument that contains a premise about the nature of God fails, because there is no way at all establish the truth value of the premise. — Rank Amateur

I've heard this argument before, but I think it's wrong, i.e., I think premise one and two are false. We can and do make statements about the nature of God all the time, and the basis for these statements have to do with the concepts we use. Now one might argue that the concept God has no instance in reality, but I think it's incorrect to say that "...we have no basis at all to believe we can make any statement at all about the nature of God."

Premise two states that many of our statements about God are anthropomorphic, but that in itself doesn't make it true or not true, it just means that we have no way to determine if it's true, at least none that I see. After all it's conceivable that there is a God, and that some of the anthropomorphic statements about God are true.

So given these rebuttals the conclusion doesn't follow. Moreover, I would not conclude that there is no way at all to determine if it's true that God exists. All we can say is that given our present knowledge there is no way to determine if there is a God in the religious sense, Christian or otherwise.

I'm an atheist when it comes to a religious God, but agnostic when it comes to whether there is some being that might fit the bill in some sense. I just don't know.

God - a word about which, if it is to be a meaningful word and not a nonsense word - is all about faith. As such, it is not about philosophy, metaphysics. logic, reason, science, quantum mechanics or really anything else. — tim wood

In this quote you say it's all about faith, "...not about philosophy, metaphysics, logic, reason, science, quantum mechanics..." Later you say that if it's brought out of the sphere of faith, then it turns into nonsense. You seem to want to separate the faith from the reason, but faith is about the beliefs, i.e., if it's not about the beliefs, then what is it about? If I have faith that God exists, then I believe God exists. Thus, we want to know what the reasons are for those beliefs. Faith without belief is meaningless.

Faith, as distinct from merely arbitrary belief, or idle entertainment of ideas, has affective power. No one will feel devotion or love for, or be profoundly inspired by, the Spaghetti Monster or Russell's Teapot.

It is not so much that one faith is better than another but that there is real faith and then there is mere belief and then something even less significant than that. — Janus

There is no doubt that faith, which are about beliefs by the way, have power, but that doesn't make them true, and that's what I'm concerned with, not wishful thinking.

Faith without reason is no better than mere belief, that's all it is; and by mere belief, I mean opinion. Now if reason plays a part, as some religious people contend, then we can look at one's faith, one's beliefs, in terms of the evidence or the reasons that support them. Tim seems to want it both ways, at least that's how I read what he's saying.

Finally, people can be inspired by false beliefs, it happens all the time. Beliefs are powerful, and this is true even if the belief is false.

As faith qua faith, none is better, imo - you can believe what you want. But is it that simple? In most faiths there's a component of action. I imagine you would agree with me that some actions are better than others. And there is also the internal logic of any system, which is merely the application of reason - logic - to the system itself without reference to anything outside the system - usual tests being for internal consistency and the presence of contradiction. — tim wood

For me, it's not a matter of believing what I want, I want to have knowledge. What's true is what interests me, not some opinion that may or may not be true.

I do agree that some actions are better than others, and that's based on reason. However, you're going beyond reason, to say that faith is better, but you don't give a reason, you just make a statement, as if the mere statement conveys the truth.

1. If there is a monotheistic God, she is omniscient and omnibenevolent.
2. God can not be both omniscient and omnibenevolent.
3. Therefore, there is no monotheistic God.

For my second premise, I make the argument:
a. Either God had advance knowledge that humans would be sinful (forbidden fruit, world wars, genocides, crocs, etc.) or she did not.
b. If God did not have this knowledge, then she is not omniscient.
c. If God did have this knowledge, and still made humans the way she did, then she is not omnibenevolent.
d. Therefore, God can not be both omniscient and omnibenevolent. — Yajur

Your argument is a good one. What is funny is that people don't seem to understand the argument, based on some of the responses.

Other implications of this argument are as follows: Any being that creates other beings with a free will, knowing that those beings would commit the kind of evils that would send them to hell forever, is an evil being, period. These are not the actions of a benevolent being, by definition. Basically what this says is that the Christian idea of God is either flawed, or that if this being exists, the being is not worthy of worship. In fact, this being should be shunned. I don't believe such a being exists, at least in terms of any religious idea.

God - a word about which, if it is to be a meaningful word and not a nonsense word - is all about faith. As such, it is not about philosophy, metaphysics. logic, reason, science, quantum mechanics or really anything else. These other things, to be sure, as tools can be applied to theology for the benefit of theology. But no application of them brings theology out of its own proper sphere of faith without turning it into nonsense. — tim wood

The idea that God is just about faith is an idea that I think most people understand, but if it's just a belief based on faith, what makes one faith better than another. It's funny because when I ask this question to religious people they start using reason to defend their faith, but the claim is that reason has nothing to do with faith. So which is it, I ask, faith or reason? If it's purely faith, without reason, then I suppose I could have faith in anything I please. One faith is no better than another.

"Being" is our shuttlecock of the moment. If we cannot simply affirm that, what can we affirm? And lacking that affirmation, what else can reason arise from? — tim wood

I edited out that comment about arguments for the existence of God because I didn't want to get into that can or worms right now.

Reason arises out of the language of reason, we reason from one proposition to another, that's what we do in logic. However, as I've already stated, there are beliefs that have nothing to do with the language of reason. These beliefs are shown in our actions, they have nothing to do with the logic of reason. We show these beliefs everyday in our actions. I open a door, I sit in a chair, I pick things up, all of these actions show certain fundamental beliefs. I don't justify them, no more than I need to justify my belief that I'm sitting at my computer typing, again, they are part of the background of our reality. I believe that being or the thing that is fundamental to reality itself, I refer to as consciousness, is such a foundational or fundamental thing.

For me, I am comforted by the chance that there is an afterlife—an opportunity to keep on existing—but for those that believe in physicalism, there would be nothing after death. Isn't it scarier to believe in nothing than something? — Play-doh

There is something comforting in a belief in an afterlife, especially if you believe that you're part of that group. God loves you, God saved you, etc,. this is a comfort for people, and it does drive belief. These are simply psychological causes for belief, not reasons. One shouldn't base a belief on the fear of being damned, one should base a belief on the evidence, or on the reason that support the belief. Nor should one base a belief on the chance that they could be wrong.

Don't you mean exactly in terms of epistemology? It may be that it's difficult to say what being is, but that is no relief from a duty to try to say what it means. I'm willing to take the lazy way and accept it as fundamental - foundational, as you say - but that would be precisely in epistemology. — tim wood

No, I think that there are things that are so foundational that they support all that comes after. Especially when it comes to epistemological constructs, which are based on the language of knowing. For example, "I don't know that I have hands," I just have them, it's a belief that is fundamental to our reality. It's like the pieces and the board of the game of chess, one might say the pieces and the board are foundational to the game. One cannot have the game without the board and the pieces. One cannot have epistemological language-games without there being first something foundational, and I believe that our background reality gives us such a foundation.

The nature of being, as you seem to propose, is that it falls under the construct of epistemology, as, for example, a first principle of knowledge. My thinking is that there is something so fundamental that it defies our epistemological constructs, it's not a matter of knowing, but a matter of what's fundamental, foundational, or bedrock to all that is, including what it means to have knowledge.

First, the ontological argument doesn't work for a variety of reasons. One is that you can't infer the existence of something based on a concept or concepts. If that was true you could infer the existence of all kinds of things. There is no good argument for the existence of God.

Second, granting that there is a religious God, it's possible that abstract objects like number are just part of the mind of God, as Devans suggested. They along with a myriad of other abstract ideas, objects, and properties could just be part of what God knows. In other words, they would not be within the realm of the creatables. Think of it this way, if God is omniscient, or even if there is a being that possessed omniscience, that would mean that that being knows all that can be known (simple definition), as such it would know, presumably, the number system. However, if numbers are creatable things, then what you're saying is that an omniscient being, prior to the existence of the number 2, didn't know there was such a number. It doesn't make sense.

The other problem that Devans alluded to is that religious people, at least some, think that if numbers and other abstract ideas don't fall under God's power, then somehow this takes away from God's omnipotence. However, that's just a problem of understanding what omnipotence entails or means.

So if the picture basically describes the make up of an object, then would it have existed before the object? Is it necessary for the object to exist before the picture is created?

If the first then facts are independent of the mind. If the second, it would seem that the world needs us to exist. — Sir2u

Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning is not pictures of the objects. In fact, it's not even clear what an object is. It is though, a picture of a fact, which is composed of atomic facts, and atomic facts are composed of objects.

A proposition, for Wittgenstein, is a picture. So, if we say the Earth has one moon, that proposition is a picture of the relationship between the Earth and the Moon. The words of a proposition stand in a certain relationship, just as a fact in reality mirrors a certain relationship. It mirrors reality, and many propositions are like this. However, in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, he demonstrates that propositions do more than picture facts.

If a picture is a picture of a fact, then the fact has to exist first, i.e., if it is true. If the proposition is false, then it's a negative fact, i.e., one that has not obtained (it reflects a possible picture of reality), but one that is possible nonetheless. But strictly speaking pictures are only possible given certain facts. For example, if there were no people, then there would be no propositions, and without propositions there would be no pictures of facts. So pictures of facts (positive or negative facts) are dependent on the propositions and the people who express them. In this sense pictures are secondary and dependent or contingent.

You seem to be worried about the metaphysical implications of what Wittgenstein is saying. As if the picture implies some intelligence in back of reality, but you're stretching his ideas way beyond what they mean. Wittgenstein does believe in the mystical, but not in terms of propositions. Propositions for Wittgenstein are confined to the world, not the mystical, which is beyond the world. The mystical can only be shown, not expressed in terms of propositions. How is the mystical shown? One can show the mystical by certain actions (prayer, meditation, chants, etc).

I struggle with making friends. Almost all my intellectualizations are safely put in through this forum and I'm a really intellectual person. — Posty McPostface

One of the best things in life are friends, so I would put that top on your list of things to do, i.e., making friends. I've always had two or three really good friends, but it's never been easy for me to make friends either. Hopefully you'll find a friend of like mind. Good luck Posty.

So if the picture is basically describes how to make an object, then the the picture must have existed before the object. So where did the picture come from? — Sir2u

A picture describes how to make an object? What? Where did you get this from? What do you think objects are?

No, I'm not leading in any direction. But if one had to explain where the picture came from, creationism would be an easy answer I think. That sucks. — Sir2u

You're chasing the boogie man.

His ontological views would take some explaining. I'm currently trying to write a book, but not on Wittgenstein's ideas.

What about your thoughts on Tractarian ontology? I can't shake the suspicion that Wittgenstein was some monist in the Tractatus. — Posty McPostface

There is a very definite undertone of metaphysics to what Wittgenstein is saying, and as such, it does have ontological implications.

As far as him being a monist, I don't believe this to be the case. Why would you think so?

Here's something I posted on Quora. This was written to answer the following question:

What did Ludwig Wittgenstein mean by "the limits of my language are the limits of my world"?

To answer this question one needs to have a good understanding of the *Tractatus* and what Wittgenstein was trying to accomplish. There are three main ideas in the *Tractatus*, and these three ideas will help answer your question.

First, though, one must understand what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein’s goal is to investigate the essence of language, that is, how it functions, and how it is structured. Second, he assumes that the function of language is to describe the world, and he assumes that the structure of language is revealed by logic. Why did Wittgenstein think that logic would reveal the structure of language, and reveal how language is connected to the world? We have hints here and there, but it seems that not only did he believe that logic lay at the bottom of all science, but he also believed that there was something universal about logic (his idea of logic has ontological implications), a peculiar depth (PI 89). In fact, logic is one of the three main ideas behind his work in the *Tractatus*, the other two are language and the world.

Wittgenstein starts his investigation in the *Tractatus* with the world. The beginning statements of the *Tractatus* can be thought of as conclusions, which are required by his theory of language. There are two components of Wittgenstein’s theory of language, *the picture theory* and *the truth-function theory*. Wittgenstein believed that if we can talk about the world, then propositions must be logically connected with the world. In this way, the truth of a proposition is not connected with other propositions, but connected with the world. He called propositions that are directly connected with the world, *elementary propositions*. So you have propositions (complex propositions), which are made up of simpler propositions called elementary propositions that are directly connected to the world. Two questions that naturally arise, how are elementary propositions related to complex propositions, and how are elementary propositions logically connected to the world?

First, complex propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Thus, if a complex proposition is broken down into elementary propositions, then the truth-value of the proposition is determined by the truth-value of its component parts (seen in truth-tables), namely, the elementary propositions that make up the proposition. Second, elementary propositions connect with the world in that they are pictures of atomic facts, which are the smallest constituent parts of facts.

Wittgenstein believed that his process of analysis, in terms of the structure of a proposition, must come to an end, but “…what will the end be?” (Nb p. 46). Once we have completely analyzed the proposition, that analysis will have the same complexity as its referent (Nb p. 46). The referent being facts in the world.

However, we are not done with propositions. Elementary propositions, according to Wittgenstein, have more basic parts, namely, a nexus of *names *(T 4.22). Do not think of names like pencil, cup, chair, etc, these kinds of names are not what Wittgenstein had in mind. For Wittgenstein a *name* is a primitive sign, and he uses the symbols x, y, and z to refer to them. These names cannot be dissected any further. They are, in one sense, the end result of the analysis, in terms of the elementary proposition.

So how do propositions correspond to facts in the world? Keep in mind that in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy he holds to the traditional view of language, that is, a name’s meaning is directly associated with the object it denotes (T 3.203). Thus, this is carried over into his thinking in the *Tractatus.*

The totality of facts* *are what make up the world (T 1.1). Facts are divided into atomic facts, just as complex propositions are divided into elementary propositions. There is a direct picturing correlation between an elementary proposition and an atomic fact. The elementary proposition, which is made up of *names*, has its counterpart in the world of facts, because the smallest constituent part of a fact is an *object *(do not think of objects in the normal sense), objects for Wittgenstein are simple, just as names are simple.

The elementary proposition is in touch with the world via *names*, which are in direct contact with the world via *objects*. The arrangement of names in the elementary proposition must have the same logical structure as the arrangement of objects within the atomic fact. If it has the same arrangement, then it’s true, if not, it’s false.

Propositions show their sense by their logical structure, and if that sense is correct or true, then it matches the facts in reality, or it mirrors reality. Think of a picture, a picture has a sense, the sense is given by the arrangement of things in the picture, but that sense need not match reality (the way things are), the same is true of a proposition according to Wittgenstein’s early philosophy.

So how does all of this answer your question? Well, for early Wittgenstein language is completely descriptive, that is, it attempts to describe the world, either truly or falsely. The limits of language, or what can be said, is the limit of our world. Things that have sense happen only within the limits of language. Senseless propositions attempt to say something about the limit of language; and attempts to go beyond the limits of what can be said, result in nonsense. It follows from all of this that the limit of language is the limit of our world.

The logical positivists misunderstood Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* in that they thought his work was anti-metaphysical, on the contrary, he thought that philosophical propositions that try to go beyond the world were attempts to say what cannot be said. They are attempts to transcend language, and thus the world. And although Wittgenstein tried to set out what can and cannot be said (in terms of propositions), he did think that that which transcends our world was important; and although that which transcends the world cannot be stated, as Wittgenstein tried to show, the mystical could be shown.

Hope this helps.

So early Wittgenstein actually thought reality consisted of atomic facts and not things like apples, trees, people, etc? — Marchesk

Language ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- World
| |
Proposition ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fact
| |
Elementary Proposition --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Atomic Fact
| |
Name -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Object

Think of this as a mirror image. Moreover, don't think of names or objects like you normally think of these words, or you'll get confused. The smallest constituent part of a proposition is a name, and the smallest constituent part of a fact is an object. There is a one-to-one correspondence between an object in the world and a name in a proposition. Names form elementary propositions, which then form propositions. Objects make up atomic facts, which then form the facts of the world. Wittgenstein believed that there had to be this relationship between language and the world, so he constructed a logical (a priori) relationship.

Wittgenstein wasn't saying there aren't things like apples, trees, people, etc., how these are arranged would be the facts, but facts are broken down even further, into smaller parts (objects). You can think of objects as occupying a place in space.

It's much more complex than this, but what I'm trying to get across to you is that objects and names are not what you would think they are.

Wittgenstein would tell you that you would be better off learning something like carpentry. I would say that most philosophers do not contribute much. Why? Because much of what passes for good philosophy is mostly confusion. This might be a bitter pill, but it is the truth.

Good luck Posty.

Damn, Fdrake you ended the thread in one post. :gasp:

Yes, it is misleading but it does have a point, though, which is to warn against the naturalistic fallacy. — Pierre-Normand

Agreed.

Okay, I'll give another.

Banno is as smart as me. :gasp:

Wittgenstein said, if I remember correctly from so long ago something about the world being described properly only when it is described down to its atomic components. So surely the whole of the world would be included. But I have not read him for a long time so I might be wrong. — Sir2u

Atomic facts are reflections of elementary propositions. Atomic facts can combine to form facts of any complexity, and as such, describe the world. So yes the whole of the world would be included.

How about this one.

You can't derive an ought from an is.

:razz:

So objects are independent of their properties but the properties are dependent on the objects. — Sir2u

I'm not sure I see the connection between what you're saying, and what I said. Are you talking about Wittgensteinian objects, i.e., the objects of the Tractatus? You seem to be talking about objects like apples, trees, persons, etc. Your question may still be valid, but I'm trying to get clear on what you mean by objects.

So which came first, the picture or the thing that is made up in the arrangement described in the picture? — Sir2u

Pictures, in this model, are of facts, or the possibility of facts. It would seem that you have to have the facts, or the possibility of those facts in order to create the picture. What is in the picture is a possible form, that form either matches reality or it doesn't. You can't have the picture unless there is something to picture, so the picture isn't first.

:wink:

I can't keep up with all your threads. lol

"Since being is the first principle of all human knowledge, it is a fortiori the first principle of metaphysics (313). — tim wood

I'm not so sure this first principle is true. Being may be foundational, but not in terms of epistemology. One might say, it just IS. In a sense it defies epistemological questions.

It is a persuasive thought no? — Posty McPostface

If you're referring to bipolarity, my inclination is to say that it's not persuasive.

/

Atomic facts are constituted by objects that make up the substance in the world (or logical space if you prefer the original terminology). — Posty McPostface

Keep in mind that objects, for Wittgenstein, aren't the same as things. Objects are simple, they are the simplest constituent part of a fact that occupy space, but nowhere does Wittgenstein give an example of an object. They are simply requirements of his logical analysis. They are not things like, apples, trees, cars, mountains, numbers, properties, etc.

What are your thoughts on the Principle of Bipolarity and Wittgenstein? — Posty McPostface

I think it's a bit more complicated. Are there issues of bipolarity in Wittgenstein? Yes. I would say that ascribing a particular view of philosophy to Wittgenstein is a bit dangerous in terms of correctly understanding him. Also, when reading Wittgenstein it's best to not start with a particular interpretation in mind, look at him from many different views. If you look at him from a particular point of view, it's like looking at Mars through one telescope aimed at one particular area of Mars. It will give you some information, but not a complete or correct picture of Mars.

For some reason we love categorizing things, but especially people. He's this, or she's that, life is just much more complicated and diverse. I say generally resist this, in many of it's forms, especially when it comes to people.

One could make a good argument against bipolarity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.

Wittgenstein was heavily influenced by Russell and Frege, especially in terms of the Tractatus. There is some influence of Schopenhauer and Kant, but, at least from my studies, it's not a heavy influence. Early in Wittgenstein's life (very early, probably as a teen) he accepted Schopenhauer's idealism, but later (probably early to late 20's) in his life he rejects it.

The world isn't made up of things. The world is made up of a particular arrangement of things. Things don't tell us anything. So facts are the arrangement of things in a particular way. The world is the world because things are the way they are in a particular way - they form a picture, a particular picture. Propositions, according to the Tratatus, are pictures of these arrangements. The picture either correctly describes the world, or it doesn't.