A correct context would be any context in which it does make sense, that is, any context in which it is actually used. Which is to say, the special or particular circumstances in which it is actually used. — Fooloso4

So that would be in the context of a language-game then? If the word is use in the context of a game, it is a correct use, if it's outside of all games, it would be incorrect. How would one know whether the use is outside of all games, or just outside of the games that the person is familiar with? I couldn't say that a particular use is "incorrect" just because I'm not familiar with the particular game, so how could anyone say that any particular usage is incorrect?

If, actual usage is what determines correctness, then any and all usage is correct, so what's the point in calling it "correct" usage, or "correct context" if usage is inherently correct, and therefore any context of usage is thereby correct context?

So that would be in the context of a language-game then? — Metaphysician Undercover

The context in which it is actually used, as opposed to some metaphysical claim.

If, actual usage is what determines correctness, then any and all usage is correct — Metaphysician Undercover

Just because someone says something that does not mean that is how the word or statement is actually used. Wittgenstein gives several examples that fall outside of actual usage, including "this is here" and "I am here". They make sense in some contexts but not in the circumstances Wittgenstein describes.

I am assuming that when he says "this here" while pointing to the object in front of him he means the object in front of him is here. — Fooloso4

I don't think that you should make that assumption, but thanks for finally admitting that you are making it. You formerly said: "I don't know why you would assume that I have assumed any such thing."

I am not assuming a specific meaning. — Fooloso4

But you just said that you were. Again.

That is not a criticism, it is a statement of fact. You were not making a claim about the object, that is, the map. You were not saying that the map is here. If you were pointing to the map in front of you and saying "this is here" then your example would be the same as Wittgenstein's, and would be just as senseless. — Fooloso4

Then why did you say that my example "replaces the one Wittgenstein rejects"? It does not replace Wittgenstein's example. It is the same sentence and pointing, only with added context (i.e. special circumstances).

I have no assumed meaning of the sentence. — Fooloso4

See the quote at top of this post.

Again, following Wittgenstein, in the circumstances described it makes not sense to say "this is here". That is not because I assume the sentence has a particular meaning, but because in this situation it makes no sense. — Fooloso4

Why does it make no sense in Wittgenstein's example? You formerly said: "It is not a matter of adding context to the example in order to make sense of it."

It is the same in that you are both pointing, but you are pointing to a location on a map and he is pointing to an object, say, the map. In your example 'this' means the location, in Wittgenstein's this means the object in from of him. — Fooloso4

Right, the meaning of "this" (or "this is here") is different in each example, but the pointing is not different. That's why pointing at the object does not make it a circumstance.

But thanks for once again including the pointing. You formerly said: "He is not asking us to consider circumstances in which one points while saying it."

It is frustrating when you act as though your position has remained unchanged all along. It would be nice if you could acknowledge the changes to your views.

I am not going to try to convince you otherwise, but consider this: if I were to ask in what circumstances he said "this is here" the answer would be, while pointing to an object in front of him. — Fooloso4

What does 'This is here' mean in these "circumstances"?

What distinction are you making between doesn't make sense and lacks sense? — Fooloso4

In Wittgenstein's example, "This is here" does not yet have a sense. It's not that it doesn't make sense, but that its sense has yet to be determined. It is not meaningless; it could mean a number of things, but there is currently insufficient information to decide its meaning.

I don't think that you should make that assumption, but thanks for finally admitting that you are making it. You formerly said: "I don't know why you would assume that I have assumed any such thing." — Luke

The thing I make no assumptions about is what he means when he says "this is here". I do not know why he would say that.

I am not assuming a specific meaning.
— Fooloso4

But you just said that you were. Again. — Luke

The specific meaning refers to what he means when he says "this is here". I don't think Wittgenstein intends for us to question what he is pointing to or that what he is saying refers to what he is pointing to. Isn't that the way pointing works?

Then why did you say that my example "replaces the one Wittgenstein rejects"? — Luke

Because that is what Wittgenstein says he should do:

... he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.)

Why someone would point to something in front of him and say it is here makes no sense. Under other circumstances the sentence "This is here" does make sense. Wittgenstein is asking us to consider those case.

It is the same sentence and pointing, only with added context (i.e. special circumstances). — Luke

Right. The circumstances are different. That is why your example makes sense and Wittgenstein's does not.

Why does it make no sense in Wittgenstein's example? — Luke

For one, he says it doesn't. "There it makes sense" In this example it doesn't. What would someone mean by it?

You formerly said: "It is not a matter of adding context to the example in order to make sense of it." — Luke

Right. He is suggesting looking at particular circumstances where it makes sense. One might concoct a story in which his example does make sense, but that is not what he is suggesting. If you think that pointing to something in front of you and saying "This is here" then ask yourself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.

Right, the meaning of "this" (or "this is here") is different in each example, but the pointing is not different. — Luke

Once again, what you are pointing to is not the same. You are not pointing to the object, the map, but to something on the map.

But thanks for once again including the pointing. You formerly said: "He is not asking us to consider circumstances in which one points while saying it." — Luke

Your example is one in which you point. Not all examples of where it makes sense to say "this is here" involve pointing. Here are a few:

We are playing chess and someone bumps the board. I put the knight back where it was and say "this is here".

I am expecting a package and when if comes in the mail someone who knows I am expecting it brings it to me and says "this is here".

I find an novel in the reference section of the library. I pull the book out and show it to the librarian standing with me and say "this is here".

It is frustrating when you act as though your position has remained unchanged all along. — Luke

I am sorry that you are frustrated but my position has remained the same, but for some reason I cannot figure out you have not understood me. And that is frustrating!

In Wittgenstein's example, "This is here" does not yet have a sense. It's not that it doesn't make sense, but that its sense has yet to be determined. It is not meaningless; it could mean a number of things, but there is currently insufficient information to decide its meaning. — Luke

I take the example as given. There is no reason to think that there is information that is being withheld.

As I see it, 117 is a continuation of 116. It is an example of someone mistakenly ascribing metaphysical meaning to the claim "this is here". But that is not how the sentence is actually used, and so, despite what he intends, it is meaningless.

I do not think there is any value in continuing this. Perhaps as we move forward things will become clearer.

The thing I make no assumptions about is what he means when he says "this is here". — Fooloso4

Then why have you said:

I am assuming that when he says "this here" while pointing to the object in front of him he means the object in front of him is here. — Fooloso4

and

If someone points to an object and says "this is here" I assume he means the object he is pointing to is here — Fooloso4

Aren't they assumptions about what he means, just as you say here?

The specific meaning refers to what he means when he says "this is here". — Fooloso4

Exactly. Look at your quotes above. They refer to what he means when he says "this is here".

I don't think Wittgenstein intends for us to question what he is pointing to or that what he is saying refers to what he is pointing to. Isn't that the way pointing works? — Fooloso4

"What he is saying" (i.e. the meaning of "this is here") depends on the use. Remember Wittgenstein's earlier comments about pointing to the shape, colour, etc? We cannot presume that there is an obvious meaning here.

You are not pointing to the object, the map, but to something on the map. — Fooloso4

Am I not pointing to the map in my scenario?

You are trying to make a distinction between pointing to and pointing at, but it is all the same pointing. What differs between my example and what you assume he means in Wittgenstein's example is the meaning of 'This is here'.

Your example is one in which you point. Not all examples of where it makes sense to say "this is here" involve pointing. Here are a few: — Fooloso4

Your claim was that Wittgenstein "is not asking us to consider circumstances in which one points while saying it". The other examples are irrelevant to this claim.

I take the example as given. There is no reason to think that there is information that is being withheld. — Fooloso4

I also take the example as given. The information that is missing are the particular circumstances that will give the sentence a particular meaning.

I do not think there is any value in continuing this. Perhaps as we move forward things will become clearer. — Fooloso4

I agree that it is a minor issue, but I think it is important to get clear on several facts that you have denied, namely that:

• pointing is part of the example given at §117, and therefore should be part of the special circumstances that Wittgenstein motivates the reader to consider;
• it is a matter of adding context to the example to make sense of the sentence;
• there is no obvious meaning of the sentence 'This is here' at §117 and we should not assume there to be one in the absence of the special circumstances which will give it a meaning.

The context in which it is actually used, as opposed to some metaphysical claim. — Fooloso4

But making a metaphysical claim is a context of actual use, just like any other special circumstance of use. You can't say that making a metaphysical claim is not an instance of actual use, that would be untrue.

Just because someone says something that does not mean that is how the word or statement is actually used. — Fooloso4

Yes it is. When someone says something, that is exactly how the statement is used. An instance of someone saying something is a particular instance of actual use, in particular circumstances. What else could special circumstances of actual use ever mean? Each instance of use is particular to the special circumstances of that instance of use. So that instance of someone saying something is exactly how the word or statement is actually used. and another instance would be another instance of how it is used.

How the word or statement is actually used, refers to particular instances of actual use, "special circumstances", as opposed to a generalization such as "this is how the statement is actually used". So for example the statement of 117, "This is here", we might make the generalization that this statement is used in the context of pointing to an object. But that would be incorrect because it really does not indicate how the sentence is actually used. We would have to refer to particular instances of use, in special circumstances, to see how the sentence is actually used. We cannot see how the sentence is actually used through a generalization. because we have to look at actual instances of use.

But making a metaphysical claim is a context of actual use, just like any other special circumstance of use. You can't say that making a metaphysical claim is not an instance of actual use, that would be untrue. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein says:

... one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home?

What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (116)

He contrasts metaphysical use and everyday use. When he says in 117:

... he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.)

he is not referring to any use but everyday use. It is everyday use that he means by actual use. It is only the philosopher who would point to something in front of him and say "This is here". That is not actual use, that is, everyday use. In everyday use it makes sense, its metaphysical use does not.

Yes it is. When someone says something, that is exactly how the statement is used. An instance of someone saying something is a particular instance of actual use, in particular circumstances. What else could special circumstances of actual use ever mean? — Metaphysician Undercover

The special circumstances are particular circumstances. Particular circumstances are not just any circumstances.

Each instance of use is particular to the special circumstances of that instance of use. — Metaphysician Undercover

Both 'special' and 'particular' are translations of the German term Besondere.

So that instance of someone saying something is exactly how the word or statement is actually used. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the answer to the question at 116:

... is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home?

is yes, then what does he mean when he goes on to say:

What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.

?

And what does he mean when at 117 he says:

... he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.)

if the metaphysical use is actual use? If the use in the example is actual use then why would he say that this person should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used?

§118, §119

As per what I said about §116, §118 and §119 are best understood in light of the distinction between the understanding on the one hand, and the empirical on the other. Recalling that the investigation here does not 'uncover new facts', and equally, does not offer any new theories (where theories are understood to be theories of how language 'ought' to function (ideally), apart from how language does function (actually)), Witty's takes the import of the Investigations to be mostly negative in character. They tell us less 'what to do' than they tell us what not to do when investigating language.

So when Witty says, in §119, that "the results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense and the bumps that the understanding has got by running up against the limits of language" (my emphasis), 'the understanding' here must be understood in the quasi-technical sense that Witty has given this term, as that relating to our expectations about language, and not facts or empirical discoveries about it. Similarly, the 'ground-clearing' of §118 refers too to this effort to divest ourselves of idealized notions of what language ought to be, should be, or strive after and aim at, apart from what language 'actually' is.

To anticipate a bit, this is why Witty will say, a little later down, the these investigations thus "leaves everything as it is" (§124); - in terms I used earlier, the Investigations are subtractive, not additive.

He contrasts metaphysical use and everyday use. When he says in 117: — Fooloso4

He's not making a contrast, by bringing the metaphysical use back to everyday use, he is dissolving that contrast. As I explained to Luke, his method of bringing it back is to show that the metaphysical use is a particular instance of use, just like any other particular instance of use (special circumstances).

he is not referring to any use but everyday use. It is everyday use that he means by actual use. It is only the philosopher who would point to something in front of him and say "This is here". That is not actual use, that is, everyday use. In everyday use it makes sense, its metaphysical use does not. — Fooloso4

As I said, you cannot point to an instance of actual use and say that is not actual use. That is pure nonsense. So what you are claiming here is pure nonsense, and not what Wittgenstein is doing. Wittgenstein does not attempt to say that metaphysical use is not actual use, that would be nonsensical.

If there is a distinction between everyday use, and metaphysical use, these are both classes of actual use. Wittgenstein wants to close this separation, and bring metaphysical use into the same fold as everyday use. He does this by showing that any instance of use, is a particular instance of use (use under special circumstances), and so all instances of use, be it metaphysical, or everyday, are classed similarly.

The special circumstances are particular circumstances. Particular circumstances are not just any circumstances. — Fooloso4

Every instance of circumstances is unique and peculiar, particular, specific, as "that set of circumstances". Therefore any set of circumstances is "particular circumstances". When you point to a set of circumstances, saying "this, here", you individuate that particular set of circumstances, and no other set of circumstances is that particular set of circumstances. This is the basis for the law of identity. Pointing to an object and saying "this, here" is what identifies the object according to the law of identity. However, you may point to any set of circumstances, and say "this, here". So any set of circumstances is particular circumstances, and may be thus identified, according to the law of identity. A particular is unique.

If the answer to the question at 116:



... is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home?

is yes, then what does he mean when he goes on to say:



What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.
?

And what does he mean when at 117 he says:



... he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.)

if the metaphysical use is actual use? If the use in the example is actual use then why would he say that this person should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used? — Fooloso4

What he means is that when we look at a metaphysical use of the word, it may or may not make sense to us. If one knows the language-game which that particular instance of use is derived from, its home, then it makes sense. This making sense of the word can only be done if one is familiar with that particular language-game (the home game), and in the case of metaphysical use, this might require that the person is educated in metaphysics. That is why I said, the terms of algebra make no sense to me, but it is only because I am not familiar with that place in the language (the language-game) that these terms are used.

That is to treat the metaphysical use exactly as we would treat any other instance of use. Any word may make sense to you, in its particular instance of use, if you are familiar with the language-game which is home to that particular instance of use. But if you are not familiar with the way that the word is used it will not make sense to you. There is a generalization according to a way of using the words (language-game). If you are familiar with this way, the use makes sense. The metaphysical use, is the actual use, and the author is using the words in a way, a metaphysical way. The special circumstances in which the words are actually used like that are the particular instances, just like the algebraic use is a way, and the actual use, the special circumstances, where those words (terms of algebra) are used like that are the particular instances. Each and every instance of use is an instance of using words in special circumstances, but each displays a way of use (a language-game). The particular instances of use are "everyday use", because every day is a new day with new special circumstances. So every instance of use is use according to special circumstances, but the same individual will employ many different language-games each day depending on the special circumstances..

To anticipate a bit, this is why Witty will say, a little later down, the these investigations thus "leaves everything as it is" (§124); - in terms I used earlier, the Investigations are subtractive, not additive. — StreetlightX

You can't subtract and leave everything the way it is, so the Investigations must be neither subtractive nor additive, to fulfill that purpose. Pointing to ideas as wrongful guidance is just as normative as pointing to ideas as rightful guidance.

You can't subtract and leave everything the way it is, — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes you can; it's called cleaning.

Obviously, cleaning is not leaving everything the way it was, or else cleaning would be doing nothing.

No wonder you cannot understand anything. I eat off a clean plate, and afterwards I clean the same plate and next day I eat again off the same clean plate, using the same teeth I have cleaned twice in the meantime. Obviously, literally everything is not literally the way it was, even if one did do literally nothing, because if you literally don't breathe you literally die. So probably don't literally interpret literally every word literally, like a literal idiotic pedant.

If you eat the food off the plate, you are not leaving things the way they were. You are leaving the plate the way it was, but not the food. Therefore you are selective in what you are referring to as "things". It's called "cherry picking", the fallacy of incomplete evidence. This thing stays the same therefore I am leaving things the way they were. Call me a pedant if you like, but it's a matter of fact, and one which is important to this philosophical investigation. If you think that we ought to overlook this fact then you are the one who is an idiot.

Here's the point, after spending a section of the Philosophical Investigations describing an act of striving after an elusive ideal, Wittgenstein insinuates that we ought not strive after that ideal, in the subtractive manner described by StreetlightX. Then at 133 he introduces another ideal, which he says we are striving after. So if he were giving a simple description of language, leaving things the way they are, he'd describe this aspect of language, this striving after an ideal, whether it be this ideal or that ideal, without passing judgement that such and such ideal ought not be striven after, and then proceeding to introduce a different ideal which should be striven after. He says that philosophy ought to be descriptive rather than normative, but this itself is a normative statement. So he has no escape from the fact that philosophy is normative, and if his intent was to produce a true description he would describe it as such, rather than implying that it ought to be other than it is.

I thought I would quote something from K. T. Fann's book, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy.

"Wittgenstein himself wished to publish the Tractatus and the Investigations together because, as he puts it, '...the latter could only be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking. For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again..., I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in the first book' (P.I. p. x).

"The relation between the Tractatus and the Investigations is a matter of controversy. On the one hand the passage just quoted has been interpreted to mean that 'Wittgenstein himself viewed...[the Investigations] as a development or deepening of [the Tractatus], and in fact, ... both the one and the other only makes sense when they are seen as complementary.' On the other hand, the majority of commentators seem to agree with Hartnack in maintaining that 'No unbroken line leads from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations; there is no logical sequence between the two books, but rather a logical gap. The thought of the later work is a negation of the thought of the earlier.'

"One asserts that the Investigations, as a whole, is a 'development' of the Tractatus while the other claims that they are 'negations' of each other. Both interpretations are radically mistaken. Wittgenstein himself used to say that the Tractatus was not all wrong: it was not like a bag of junk professing to be a clock, but like a clock that did not tell you the right time. It is important to distinguish clearly the part of the Tractatus which was repudiated from the part which was not. Wittgenstein merely advises us to contrast his later work with his old way of thinking - i.e. his old method of philosophizing. It is quite true that his new and old ways of thinking are poles apart. The Tractatus follows the methods of traditional theoretical construction (even though to construct only a 'ladder' to be abandoned at the end) while the Investigations employs what can best be described as the method of dialectic. However, there is an important continuity in Wittgenstein's conception of the nature and tasks of philosophy. The views arrived at in the Tractatus (that philosophical problems arise from our misunderstanding of the logic of our language, that philosophy is no science but an activity of elucidation and clarification, etc.) continued to serve as the leading thread in Wittgenstein's later works. Thus, Wittgenstein's later conception of the nature and tasks of philosophy can best be seen as a 'development' of his earlier views, while his later method should be regarded as the 'negation' of his earlier method. This, I think [K. T. Fann], is the key to a clear understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole (Preface p. xii, xiii)."

I think this is important.

In the Tractatus, he is under the mistaken assumption that every proposition must have a definite sense. That a statement must have a fixed sense is reflected in his analysis, that is, the one-to-one correspondence between a name and an object. He inherited this thinking from Frege, as per Frege's idea that a vague concept is not a concept at all, just as a vague boundary is not a boundary at all. However, in the PI Wittgenstein demonstrates that because a proposition is not clear, that does not mean that it has no function (PI, 71). Sometimes being unclear or inexact (in terms of a statement) is precisely what is needed. The method of analysis, as presented in the Tractatus, forces a view of language that is just mistaken, and Wittgenstein begins to realize this in the very early 1930s.

So, philosophers have a tendency, as did the philosopher of the Tractatus, to analyze language as if one is doing mathematics. This method of analysis rears its head all the time. In fact, when interpreting the PI, as is done in this thread, and in my thread on OC, we are making the same mistake. We are looking for that precise exegesis, which leads to a discovery of Wittgenstein's meaning. It does not mean that the work is all bad, it means that sometimes we are searching for the very thing Wittgenstein is criticizing. We think we eliminate misunderstandings by making our analysis more exact. When what we need is a general idea of his method, the PI method. Wittgenstein criticizes philosophers often for looking for the real artichoke beneath the leaves or layers (BB, p. 125). This criticism only goes so far though, because much of the time we are re-wording his writings to look at it from a different angle.

This is a great paper that deals with Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein, and just so happens to also comment on §117 in a way that might help w/r/t the discussions that were going on before:

"“The meaning of an expression” is not something which an expression possesses already on its own and which is subsequently imported into a context of use ... What we are tempted to call “the meaning of the sentence” is not a property the sentence already has in abstraction from any possibility of use and which it carries with it—like an atmosphere accompanying it— into each specific occasion of use. It is, as Wittgenstein keeps saying, in the circumstances in which it is “actually used” that the sentence has sense. This is why Wittgenstein says in the previous passage from On Certainty: the words “I am here” have a meaning only in certain contexts— that is, it is a mistake to think that the words themselves intrinsically possess some sort of meaning apart from their capacity to express a meaningful thought when called upon in a context of use. The problem with the pseudo-employment of “I am here” under consideration in the passage above is that the meaning of the words “is not determined by the situation”; that is to say, it is not clear, when these words are called upon in this context, what is being said—if anything.

The philosopher, Wittgenstein says, tends to think that he understands “the meaning of a sentence” apart from and prior to any concrete occasion of use ... The philosopher takes there to be something which is the thought which the sentence itself expresses. He takes himself already to know what it means: what it means is a function of what these words combined mean. To consider the use of the sentence for such a philosopher, is to consider an additional dimension of meaning. An investigation of “use,” for such a philosopher, is an investigation into the relationship between “the meaning of the sentence”—which we are able to grasp independently of its contexts of use—and the sorts of things this sentence can express or imply (over and above what it means taken by itself) when brought into conjunction with the various contexts of use into which it can be intelligibly imported. Questions can be raised about why what is said is said and what the point of saying it on a particular occasion of use is.

But the very possibility of asking such questions presupposes that it is already reasonably clear what thought is expressed, and thus what it would be for the truth to have been spoken on this occasion of speaking. Cavell’s Wittgenstein is concerned to contest such a conception of the relation between meaning and use. What your words say depends upon what they are doing—how they are at work—in a context of use".

§120

§120 largely trades on the distinction between the ideal (what language 'ought' to be) and the actual (what language 'is') that Witty has previously set up in a few places (§101, §105, §107). The general gist of it is: you're going to have to use actual language (in all its messy coarseness) to set-up your ideal language, so exactly how are you meant to set it up as ideal to begin with? Once again it's worth noting that when Witty says: "And your scruples are misunderstandings" - the sense of 'understanding' here is once again the quasi-technical sense of it: as relating to the understanding - that is, not facts, but to our expectations of language (of what it 'should' be).

This theme, of shedding expectation and ideality in order to deal with actuality ('alone'), helps explain the critique that closes §120: a critique of the distinction between word and meaning. For the distinction only 'works' if one posits an ideal of how language 'should be', as distinct from how language is actually used: only if you have this distinction in place, can one subsequently distinguish between a word and its meaning. But abolish or disactivate the former distinction, and so too is the latter distinction abolished or rendered inoperative as well.

This insofar as, if only actual use matters, then a word is a word only insofar as it has meaning - only insofar as it is used in a language-game (without which, one might say, it's just a scribble on a page). This also helps explain (again) §117, where Witty also critiques the idea that meaning were distinct from a word ("As if the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it").

This is a great paper that deals with Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein — StreetlightX

Does Conant agree with Cavell's reading?

I think so. At least, he spends alot of the paper comparing Cavell with other readers and seems to 'side' with Cavell against them. It's more expository than argumentative. The tone seems to imply agreement though.

In fact, when interpreting the PI, as is done in this thread, and in my thread on OC, we are making the same mistake. We are looking for that precise exegesis, which leads to a discovery of Wittgenstein's meaning. — Sam26

Why would you assume this, that we are looking for a precise meaning? Have you not attended philosophy seminars? The goal is to discuss the variety of interpretations, in an attempt to understand the various perspectives of understanding, brought to the table by the different backgrounds of the different participants. Sometimes we may be influenced to alter our understanding based on the perspective of another.

The way (method) of the author of philosophy is often the way of poetry, and that is the way of ambiguity. The intent of the poet is to say something which will be received as significant by a very wide audience. If you and I come from completely different backgrounds, then different sayings will be significant to me, from what will be significant to you. But if the author uses words with sufficient ambiguity, the same phrase may be significant to both you and I, but significant in differing ways. This means that we may each derive meaning, but different meaning. The poet (also sometimes the philosopher) uses ambiguity as a tool, to say something which appears to be significant to the very different members of a very wide ranging audience. When the commentators and critics discuss the poetry, they will rarely agree on the meaning. But such discussions are a very useful exercise to help one understand the variations in understanding, and this aids us in understanding being human.

What your words say depends upon what they are doing—how they are at work—in a context of use". — StreetlightX

When we, as poets and philosophers, use ambiguity (as described above), what we are doing takes a completely different form from "the thought which the sentence itself expresses", because it is assumed already, within that mode of usage that there is no such thing as the thought being expressed.

That was my impression as well, but I wondered about him saying "Cavell's Wittgenstein", "according to Cavell", Cavell's reading", and so on. In the opening paragraph he says:

... if Cavell is right about who Wittgenstein is—Wittgenstein’s point.

Does he intend to leave this "if" an open question, as though interpretation is never settled? He does, however, reject certain interpretations.

People say: it’s not the word that counts, but its meaning, thinking of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, even though different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow one can buy with it. (On the other hand, however: money, and what can be done with it.) — PI, 120

What are we to make of the parenthetical remark? He rejects the idea that meaning is a thing of the same kind as the word; I do not, however, think he is rejecting the distinction between a word and its meaning. Buying a cow is not the only thing one can do with money. What can be done with words is like what can be done with money, but we can do more with money than just buy cows.

The question of money and what can be done with it is analogous to the question:

Yes, that is a sentence. An English sentence. And what is it supposed to be doing? — On Certainty 352

When at PI 117 he says:

As if the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it and retains in every kind of use.

we need to pay attention not only to the image of an aura but to the notion of an aura that is retained in every kind of use. "In every kind of use" would be the equivalent of money being used only to buy cows. Words may have an aura (e.g.,"loaded words"), but that aura is not inherent in the words themselves, and it is not retained in whatever circumstances the word is used.

Why would you assume this, that we are looking for a precise meaning? Have you not attended philosophy seminars? The goal is to discuss the variety of interpretations, in an attempt to understand the various perspectives of understanding, brought to the table by the different backgrounds of the different participants. Sometimes we may be influenced to alter our understanding based on the perspective of another. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm saying that it's easy to get so involved in what Wittgenstein is saying that you forget that he's putting forth a method, so it's the method, and not so much what he's saying in this passage or that, although it's that too. Sometimes it's about the right balance between what he's saying here or there and the overarching picture of his method of linguistic analysis.

Sometimes it's about the right balance between what he's saying here or there and the overarching picture of his method of linguistic analysis. — Sam26

There's actually two "methods" which we have to keep an eye on here. One is what you call his method of analysis, the other is his method of writing (the way he uses words). There is really no such thing as "what Wittgenstein is saying". But if we were to look for "what he is saying", wouldn't that just be the theory he puts forward, "his method of linguistic analysis"?

Or would you say that there are three distinct things here, his method of analysis, his way of using words (i.e. his philosophy), and what he is saying? We cannot dismiss "the way he uses words", as a method in itself, and this refers to things like, he speaks clearly or ambiguously, he speaks honestly or deceptively, etc.. These, and similar judgements, are judgements we make concerning the way that people use words, which is a reflection of their personal philosophy.

There is really no such thing as "what Wittgenstein is saying". But if we were to look for "what he is saying", wouldn't that just be the theory he puts forward, "his method of linguistic analysis"? — Metaphysician Undercover

To me, it doesn't make sense to say, "There is really no such thing as 'what Wittgenstein is saying.' I think it's plainly contradictory, at least in terms of how we normally use the word say. Also, Wittgenstein is not putting forth a theory, that seems clear also. As usual MU we are far apart on Wittgenstein, but you seem to thrive on living in your private world. Whatever floats your boat.

what happened to your idea of a group reading the PI? I would be interested. Did you mean a face to face group, or you want posts on this forum?

Whatever floats your boat. — Sam26

Finally, someone else said it. It's really a great saying IMO. Somewhere up there with a rising tide lifts all boats, and there's no free lunch. And maybe even topping, you can't have a cake and eat it too.

Finally, someone else said it. It's really a great saying IMO. Somewhere up there with a rising tide lifts all boats, and there's no free lunch. And maybe even topping, you can't have a cake and eat it too. — Wallows

I just ate my cake. Chocolate, with a think layer of chocolate frosting.

I just ate my cake. — Sam26

Oh, did you. Do you think it is possible that Wittgenstein would have thought highly of these insightful sayings? I find them irresistibly concise and worthy of admiration to say something like "there is no free lunch". Something about them strikes a person as a bedrock and unshakable "truth or belief".

I really do wonder what impressed Keynes so greatly that he exclaimed that God [Wittgenstein] stepped out of the train [at some time].

I really do wonder what impressed Keynes so greatly that he exclaimed that God [Wittgenstein] stepped out of the train [at some time]. — Wallows

He was just much smarter than your average bear. The whole family was a bunch of geniuses, mostly in music though.