What else would it be? — Banno

Yes, we learn what a belief is by what we observe, what we speak, and what is written. There are many observable actions that we correlate with beliefs. We learn the use of the word belief just as we learn the word pain. The outward signs show us what a belief is, just as the outward signs of pain, show us what pain is. The meaning of the words having nothing to do with anything inner, but with the outward sign of the inner process. We learn to associate a moan, a cry, a scream with pain, we use the word in conjunction with others, i.e., as a rule-based linguistic process. We are able to look at an animal and see that it too can show certain behaviors that show signs of pain, not unlike ours. However, the animal can only show us so much. As Wittgenstein pointed out, "A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will come the day after tomorrow?" Some things can only be shown if one has mastered the use of a language.

Part of the problem is trying to simplify things into a neat theory, that's what's problematic. I don't think reducing it to an "explanation" would help, it just begs-the-question, besides it seems quite possible that some reasons or causes have no explanation.

Do his distinction between reason and cause mean the PSR is not an empirical principal? — Cavacava

Good question, and to be honest, I'm not sure. My opinion is that there is something wrong with this principle.

From the SEP:
"A simple formulation of the principle is as follows:

(1) For every fact F, there must be a sufficient reason why F is the case.

The term “fact” in the above formulation is not intended to express any commitment to an ontology of facts. Still, if one wishes to avoid such connotations, the principle can be formulated more schematically:

(2) For every x, there is a y such that y is the sufficient reason for x

(formally: ∀x∃yRyx [where “Rxy” denotes the binary relation of providing a sufficient reason])."

I have a problem with (1), how does it follow that "For every fact F, there must be some reason why F is the case." Some facts have no reasons, they obtain as a result of causes. Why can't there simply be mechanistic causes for many facts? Even factual propositions needn't have reasons to support them, some do some don't. Moreover, again, why can't there be facts that have no cause or reason?

Sorry, https://is.muni.cz/repo/989715/On_the_Idea_of_Analysis_in_the_Late_Wittgenstein.pdf

Whether or not a belief is unfalsifiable depends on the argument for the belief. One cannot simply list certain beliefs and say, these are unfalsifiable. Many religious arguments are unfalsifiable, and many atheistic arguments are unfalsifiable, and I'm here thinking of self-sealing arguments, which are by definition unfalsifiable. Most of these kinds of arguments fall under the heading of being vacuous.

Whether a belief or argument is falsifiable depends on why you believe it's true, not simply that you have a particular belief. Some arguments may be unfalsifiable in one setting, and not in another, it has to do with how the argument is framed.

An interesting short paper worth reading that has some bearing on this in terms of causes vs reasons is the following: https://is.muni.cz/repo/989715/On_the_Idea_of_Analysis_in_the_Late_Wittgenstein.pdf -- read the second section Cause and Reason.

I haven't read the entire thread; but, words derive their meaning by the way they are used, and currently talking about NDE is grounded by convention of science (although, I think Quantum Mechanics and the 'observer' effect is changing minds about the issue) or the 'rules of the game' at play say that the whole thing must necessarily be empirical. So, what I'm saying is that maybe a new paradigm shift is needed to rescue the subjective validity of Near Death Experiences from the dogmatism of the empirical and whatnot to some objective and palpable phenomenon. — Posty McPostface

While it is true that how we use words tells us something about meaning, and you're right to focus on use, it's also important, though, to understand that use and even context can mislead us. For example, if we take Wittgenstein's point about the beetle-in-the-box, the word beetle is used in a particular way, viz., to point at something in the box; however, because it's used in this way, it doesn't mean it's used correctly. So while it's important to understand that use gives us more information about meaning, it can also be misused. This also points out why people shouldn't try to develop theories of meaning based on use, which by the way, was one of the reasons (I believe) that Wittgenstein was against developing a theory of language.

I don't think we need to rescue the subjective validity of NDEs. In fact, if NDEs were based simply on subjective experiences I would reject them. My point has been that there is good objective evidence to suppose that the experiences are real, and by real I mean that they are just as real as any everyday experience. Remember that any experience has a subjective component. However, if an experience is only subjective, then it would be hard to extract any meaning from the experience. What I mean is, it would be similar to Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box. If you're saying that the objective needs to be brought into the experience I agree.

Hallucinations tend to be person relative, i.e., how is it a hallucination if people are seeing the same things. What makes something a hallucination is that your seeing what others don't see, or that others rarely see or experience. However, with NDEs millions of people are consistently seeing the same things (deceased relatives, going through a tunnel, having a life review, beings of light, returning memories, etc.) What makes something a normal experience is that others are seeing the same things (shared experiences).

Moreover, there is objective evidence or confirmation that what those having an NDE are seeing, is confirmed by those not having the experience, but in the vicinity. For example, the doctor and nurses working on them while there is no heart beat or brain function, the kind of procedures that are being performed, the conversations of those near the body, etc. These kinds of visual experiences are the same kinds of visual and auditory experiences that people are having in the same vicinity of the body, which by definition isn't hallucinatory.

Ultimately Sam, no matter which way you look at this issue the answer always must be "maybe". While there is much fascinating anecdotal evidence for an afterlife, it's still only anecdotal. — Greta

The word anecdotal carries with it the idea of not being reliable, i.e., a story that may or may not be true. However, can we use the word anecdotal when describing millions of stories of the same experience? The answer would depend, but depend on what? It depends on whether the story is consistent, whether the stories come from a variety of sources (different cultures, age groups, different religions, different world views, occurring under a variety of circumstances, whether the stories can be backed up with primary sources, i.e., people who also were there, etc), this would put a higher premium on the stories. Under these circumstance on could say that we have good testimonial evidence. In fact, under these circumstance one could easily argue that this is exactly what it means to have good testimonial evidence. One shouldn't rule out the evidence simply because it doesn't fit a certain narrative or world view.

Consistency is the most important part of these testimonials, and as I've mentioned before there is enough consistency coupled with enough objective verification to assume that there is something much more than just hallucinations taking place.

Further, we know of no mechanism with which the information that makes you "you" can be preserved outside of a brain (or perhaps one day a quantum computer). Maybe the mechanism exists and we haven't yet discovered it? Again, maybe. — Greta

While it's true that there is much that we don't know about how one's consciousness could exist apart from a body, that in itself doesn't mean that what's happening isn't a veridical experience. It's also true that there is much that we don't know about our everyday consciousness, but that doesn't mean we're not conscious, after all there is a huge amount of data that suggests we are. In the same way, there is a huge amount of testimonial evidence that suggests that consciousness survives death, should I be dissuaded because I don't understand all of the mechanistic underpinnings of such an event. I would say yes I should be dissuaded if there wasn't any evidence to support it, but again, there is a huge amount of evidence.

Also, given the extraordinary changes that occur in us between womb and grave, it's rather difficult to see continuity. Wipe our memories and we effectively become someone else. Where did the original "you" - who is now effectively dead or dormant - go? Where is it during deep sleep? — Greta

Good question, since there is no doubt that our memories play a large part in who we are as persons, and continuity of not only our memories, but also our experiences are extremely important in maintaining the continuity of who we are as individuals.

From my own studies of thousands of these testimonials it is clear that not only do we keep the continuity of our memories, but the stories that people have of encountering their deceased relatives is that the relatives also keep the continuity of their memories and their experiences. In fact, if anything is the case, more of our memories return when having the out-of-body experience.

I don't find any of this speculative at all. I find the argument to be very strong.

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Therefore, every logical fallacy arises due to gaps in knowledge. — Posty McPostface

I can see how you might think this, but it really doesn't tell us anything. In other words, it doesn't get us anywhere. I could say this about any virtually any subject. For example, my errors in mathematics, biology, history, etc, are due to gaps in knowledge.

Thus, the best method at our disposal in discovering objective truths is science. — Posty McPostface

This is one of the biggest mistakes we make when it comes to knowledge, viz., that science is somehow superior to other methods of knowing. It really depends on what we're talking about. Is science superior to my experiential knowledge of say, the claim that yesterday I tasted orange juice and it was sweet. I don't need science to make the claim, and I don't need science to know it was true. However, science maybe superior when it comes to analyzing what it is about orange juice that makes it sweet, i.e., what is its molecular makeup, or some such thing. So whether one area of knowledge is superior depends on a variety of things.

Then, what method is the most appropriate at discovering the truth and validity of ethical claims, which philosophy is best known for? — Posty McPostface

There is no one method that works in every situation, i.e., there is no one description or method at arriving at truth that works in every context.

Supposing a Christian, Bob, associates some ineffable inner experience with the Holy Spirit, is perfectly happy, and never complains of experiencing confusion. Why would Wittgenstein, the philosophical therapist who hated substantial philosophical theses, think Bob is nevertheless making a mistake? what should be the criterion of correctness here? the opinions of the priesthood? or Bob's happiness? — sime

While happiness may be important in our overall well-being, it has nothing to do with whether Bob is making sense when he associates the Holy Spirit with some inner experience. Your question, "What should be the criterion of correctness here?" is important, and that is the issue. There are lot's of people who are perfectly happy while making statements that are senseless, but this is not the issue.

I will try to answer the question of criteria later in the post.

Supposing Bob compares his religious experiences with fellow Christian Alice, who also says that she identifies the Holy Spirit with her ineffable private sensations. — sime

Yes, this example is what actually goes on in many churches, often Christians associate an ineffable experience with that of the Holy Spirit, and herein lies the problem of senselessness. This is not only true of Christians, but it happens in many other areas of life.

Given that Neither Bob nor Alice can point to anything public playing the role of the "holy spirit", can Bob and Alice be said to be in agreement here about their ineffable experiences? or is there at most merely a delusion of agreement? — sime

I don't think they can be in agreement, since there is no way to know if my experience is the same as yours, or Bob's is the same as Alice's. How could we know that the experience is the same? This is why I believe it's the same as the beetle-in-the-box, because there is no way to confirm that what we're looking at is the same thing. Sure we're using the same words, either Holy Spirit in the Christians case, or Beetle in Wittgenstein's example.

I probably wouldn't use the word deluded, I would just say that the words have no meaning. It's like comparing "patent nonsense with disguised nonsense," as Wittgenstein noted. The confusion lies in thinking that because the grammar of the sentence is the same, i.e., the grammar is similar to, "I'm experiencing pain." So we think that the same sentence "I'm experiencing the Holy Spirit," is also referencing my inner experience in the same way. However, the difference is that pain has something that is crucial to learning how to use the word, viz., pain behavior. Imagine trying to teach a child how to use the word pain without the outward signs of pain (crying, moaning, complaining, etc.). We don't teach a child pain behavior by pointing to some inner experience apart from the outward signs. The outward signs are crucial to learning how the word is used, without which there would be no correct or incorrect use of the word.

We could ask ourselves what would be the incorrect use of the statement "I'm experiencing the Holy Spirit," especially if there were no outward signs that we could associate with correct usage, or incorrect usage. In other words, whatever you think is an experience of the Holy Spirit would be an experience of the Holy Spirit.

Well from each of their perspectives, experiential agreement might mean "The other appears to perform similar rituals to me and expresses similar sentiments as I do, and that is my criteria for them having the same ineffable experiences of the Holy-Spirit as I do". — sime

Yes, they might suppose that, but the question is, is that correct? For example, suppose that a group of people believed that their inner experiences were from aliens. They all had similar rituals and sentiments, and they all talked in similar ways, pointing to their inner experiences as a way of confirming that aliens talk to them. We could also imagine these people developing complex beliefs regarding their beliefs just as Christians do. Wouldn't we think something was amiss in these kinds of beliefs?

Even I feel I understand what Bob is saying, and I'm an atheist who never practices religion. So am I under a delusion of understanding Bob? According to Alice's opinion and her criteria, the answer is probably yes. Relative to my own criteria? no. — sime

Yes, I think many people feel they understand what Bob is saying. The reason that you feel you understand is that we all have inner experiences, and we experience private experiences, at least we think we do. But even the words inner experience wouldn't make sense apart from shared outward signs. If it was true that nothing outward was required, then we could suppose that rocks have inner experiences too. There has to be some outward manifestation that connects up with language and the use of words that are associated with such behavior in particular contexts. In other words, language has to have a social context where rules of use are observed, and where right and wrong can be delineated.

Note that private experiences that are described using language, that have no way of determining whether one is using the words (Holy Spirit or Beetle) correctly, is the same as trying to devise your own private language. The problem of course, is that there is no way to know if you are following your own rules correctly. As Wittgenstein pointed out, whatever will seem right to you, will be right. Rules of usage don't happen privately. They happen as language develops within social settings where rules of use can be observed.

Wittgenstein's private language metaphors seem to provoke their own misunderstanding, namely that to understand a language is to have absolute criteria of correctness. — sime

Wittgenstein would never say that there is some absolute criteria of correctness. In fact, just the opposite. Consider his example of the use of the word game, there is no absolute criteria of correctness, there are just a variety of uses in a variety of contexts. There is nothing absolute about it.

Assertions must only be judged relative to independent criteria if they are to be interpreted as conveying truth-by-correspondence. That is all. And in my opinion, this is all Wittgenstein was pointing out. — sime

Actually this is closer to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and is not something that Wittgenstein would have said in his later analysis of language.

I would suggest reading PI 243-326.

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Many Christians fall into the mistake of associating meaning with private sensation or private experiences. For example, many will often associate some inner experience with that of the Holy Spirit, or the idea of the soul as something private to each of us. Each of these examples are very similar to the beetle-in-the-box.

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I think the best way to understand much of what's been said in this thread, and in other threads is to have a good understanding of Wittgenstein's PI. The only way to do this is to start a thread on the PI, but the problem is, it takes a lot of work. Then once you have a clear understanding of the PI, whether you agree or not, it will put you in a better position to understand these kinds of linguistic arguments. The PI doesn't solve everything, obviously, but it does make things a bit clearer.

I'm assuming when I say certain things that you understand some of the Philosophical Investigations, but maybe I shouldn't assume that.

I think that's it's less a misunderstanding on my part of your position than it is a knowing rejection of it. That is to say, I could argue your side if I wanted to, meaning I get it, I just reject it. — Hanover

That's fine, but I think this idea of meaning that you have has been thoroughly debunked by Wittgenstein. It's not even close Hanover.

That is to say, we have 3 options:

1. Phenomenal state --> Behavior ---> Language
2. Behavior --> Language
3. Phenomenal state --> Language/behavior

I take it that you accept #2, where behavior alone is what yields language (begging the question of what yielded the behavior). — Hanover

No, I'm not saying that behavior alone is what yields language. In fact, I don't accept any of these conditions as necessary for meaning. I'm saying that certain words/concepts, not all, get their meaning based on certain behaviors. In particular, the concept pain gets its meaning from pain behavior, otherwise there would be nothing for the word pain to latch on to, in terms of sharing what we mean by pain. How would we know if someone was using the word correctly?

It seems to me that you're saying that our internal states, however you might want to describe them, are a necessary condition for meaning. After all, you might say, how can we mean anything without this internal thing expressing itself (rhetorical)? This is the way I see the confusion. There is the internal me, the subjective me and my experiences, I don't deny this, and neither does Wittgenstein. What is denied is that meaning is dependent upon this internal self, and since one cannot have a private language, one cannot have private meaning.

If you want to say that language is dependent upon minds, then of course that follows, but you're saying that meaning is dependent upon minds, which is much different. Meaning is developed amongst people, i.e., two or more people working together to share concepts. It's an agreement to go on in a certain way, to proceed based on rules of use. This doesn't deny our subjective experiences, it denies how the internal mind is expressed via language, and to our point, how meaning is derived.

This is just wrong. The noumenal realm is unknowable period. I cannot speak of the rock outside of my experience of the rock because it is incoherent to reference a rock with none of the subjectively imposed properties of a rock. No matter how I look at the rock, it will be from my perspective, and since there is no such thing as a perspectiveless perspective (the noumenal realm), I can't know the rock.

On the other hand, my phenomenal state of the rock is knowable to me. I can speak of it. You can't. You can't speak of it because you can't see inside my head and see and feel my thoughts. The noumenal perspective is God's perspective, which no one can have. The phenomenal view is my personal view, which only I can have.

I can see my own beetle. You can't. No one can see the beetle as what it is as the thing in itself. — Hanover

For me Hanover this is where so many people go wrong. I see this error being made in a variety of contexts, especially religious contexts. It also arises in talk about consciousness, so I don't want to make it seem that it's just a religious error.

Much of this has to do with how it is that we mean something by a word or statement, i.e., how does meaning arise in language. I've talked about this before, but it's very important if we are to get clear on some of these problems.

If it's true that language derives it's meaning in social contexts, then it follows that meaning is not a private endeavor. If I make it a private endeavor, then it loses its sense. This of course gets back to Wittgenstein's example of the beetle in a box. If we use the term beetle to describe something that only I can experience, then it necessarily follows that what each of us means by beetle is senseless. The thing in the box has no way of gaining a foothold in an objective reality, i.e., there is no way for anyone to objectively know what each of us are referring to. Note how this compares to our use of the word pain in reference to our pain. The concept pain has something to latch onto, viz., pain behavior. It's the pain behavior that gives meaning to the word pain, it's not my particular pain, it's not my subjective experience. This is not to deny that there are subjective experiences, but it denies that subjective experiences give meaning to words or concepts.

You said, "...it is incoherent to reference a rock with none of the subjectively imposed properties of a rock." Actually this is backwards, i.e., it's incoherent to talk about a rock in strictly subjective terms. You seem to think that your private experiences govern meaning, but that's impossible given how language forms. Language is governed by rules, and rules only make sense in social contexts. Social contexts not only show us when we are following a rule, but also show us when we are making a mistake. There is no such thing as having a completely private rule, because there would be no way to tell when you're making a mistake.

You also said, "my phenomenal state of the rock is knowable to me," but this is also an incorrect use of what it means to know. Knowing is not a completely private matter. It would not make sense to answer the question of how you know, by pointing to some internal state, or noumenal experience. The term or concept know would lose all its meaning, again it would be senseless. One can see this is so by looking at what follows from such a statement. Anything that I deem as knowledge, would be by definition knowledge. It's as if I have some privileged point of view.

I find it quite problematic to look at every conception of the term belief as a means for 'understanding the concept'(scare-quoted intentionally). It's almost as if you're planting the seeds of equivocation. Sure, all the different uses need to be looked at in order to understand all the different accepted usages(sensible conceptions; language games; linguistic constructs; conceptual schemes). — creativesoul

All I'm saying is that the concept belief should be looked at in terms of how it's used in language, which include language-games, and in turn gives us a clearer picture of where we might be going wrong in our analysis of the word belief. In terms of equivocation, one could also say that of Wittgenstein's many examples of how words are used in various contexts. Some words are even used in contradictory ways, i.e., in one context they mean one thing, and in another context something quite the opposite.

Some words are used to refer to objects, but not all words, and since many words refer to objects, the tendency is for us to look for something that corresponds to all words. For many words (exists, two, nothing, time, consciousness, etc) there are no corresponding objects. To get clear on these words one must look at the many ways they are used. The same is true of the word belief, if we want to understand the concept belief, we must look at it in the many contexts of use. However, we must be careful not to conclude that context drives meaning, it's only part of what drives meaning.

Where does the distinction between what can be shared and what cannot be shared come from? Is there any way to tell if a thing can be shared other than sharing it? — fdrake

From my perspective, unraveling the confusion, my own as well, has to do with understanding the Philosophical Investigations. The problem is that sometimes what we share, say, communicate is senseless. What confuses us is the grammar of what's said, i.e., the grammar is similar to statements that do make sense. So I say, for example, "I understand what pain is, based on my own pain," i.e., by looking at something internal, or focusing on something internal, and we think we've said something meaningful. In terms of this thread, we might be tempted to think that to understand what a belief is, we need to examine the internal mechanism of belief, i.e., what's going on in the mind when we say, "I believe..."

These same issues arise in reference to consciousness, soul, time, thinking, etc. To get clear on these problems one needs to have a good understanding of how language works, i.e., how we learn language. There are many examples that Wittgenstein gives to try to clear up some of the muddle. First, it's important to understand some of his ideas in reference to having a private language. Second, Wittgenstein uses the beetle in the box to show how nonsensical it is to talk about meaning in reference to something private. Third, and this is connected to the idea of private language, viz., the logical connection of rule-following and making mistakes in a social linguistic context, as opposed to something private.

That's definitely an in depth article on the nature of a proposition. Most of my time is devoted to reading and trying to understand Wittgenstein. I have a few threads going already. Why don't you read the article and study it, and start the thread up yourself. I'm sure you'll get plenty of responses.

Sure Frank I can always use help.

We run into this kind of thing on the internet all the time. People who tell you are wrong, when they know little about the subject matter. It would be like me sitting down with a biologist and arguing with them, when I clearly know very little about biology. It's the height of arrogance.

Now if you want to translate my confidence as arrogance, that's your choice. I stop talking to people when I can't make headway, or I'll take a break from the subject matter, or from them for a while. There are people on this forum that I've argued with for years. Some of them I can't even make sense of what they're saying. Moreover, they would never admit they're wrong.

I've made plenty of mistakes, with typos, and also I've misunderstood facts. Hell, even the greatest of philosophers have done that, and considering the fact that I'm not near their level, I should also expect to make mistakes, even grave ones.

How's that for moaning. :groan:

I would just rather you wouldn't moan about how uninformed people are on this forum and how sometimes you just have to abandon trying to explain anything to them. — frank

Oh no, definitely not, and you're one of those who definitely fits that description. I'll continue moaning about people who think they know something, and act as though they do, when they clearly are ignorant. Especially if they want to press the point.

I've got plenty written on epistemology, all you have to do is look it up.

I'm not going to play your silly game. If you don't want to read what I write that's your prerogative.

Let me think Janus, I'm not sure.

So Frank, you think I don't know what I'm talking about, because you find some error in wording. If that was the case none of us could make a claim to knowledge.

Propositions are statements that can be true or false.

Why, should I fight harder. :lol:

No, my wording was wrong, I know what propositions are.

No, it wasn't a questioning. I corrected him. — Sapientia

Congratulations, you want a star. :razz: If you look, I'm sure you can find others, I've been known to make others too.

None of this would be a concern to me if it weren't for your history of raising the smug quotient on this forum. Just say it. You were wrong. — frank

Yes, yes, the wording was wrong. I often make mistakes. I've made plenty of them, believe me. Besides I love raising the smug quotient it's fun, and just for you I'll continue.

Yes, it's a sentence but not a statement/proposition. I should have said these are sentences, but not propositions.

A statement can be defined as a declarative sentence, or part of a sentence, that is capable of having a truth-value, — IEP on propositional logic

Yes, that's another way to word it.

The this portion is a proposition. A proposition contains that special verb to be. — frank

Ya, this seemed inaccurate to me.

The following gets to the point I'm making Banno...

"'But you surely cannot deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place.' - What gives the impression that we want to deny anything [important point]? When one says 'Still, an inner process does take place here' - one want to go on: 'After all, you see it.' And it is this inner process that one means by the word 'remembering'. - The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the 'inner process'. What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word "to remember". We say that this picture with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is (PI 305).'"

So the point again is not that there is no inner process, is that the use of words are not objects in the mind. As Banno likes to say, "They're not mental furniture."

Also keep in mind the Tractatus, which associated words with things or objects, and here Wittgenstein is showing us that it's not the case, especially in reference to the mental.

The use of the word statement is much broader in scope than the use of the word proposition. A statement can be a proposition, for example, "The earth has one moon," is a statement, but it's also a proposition, in that the statement/proposition can be said to be true or false. However, statements also include the following, which are not propositions.

A command: Stand there!
A question: What is that?

These are statements, but not propositions.

Just a note: Questions aren't statements or propositions. This was an error.