I think we agree. However, you didn't respond to the most important part about referent. What do you think of this point?

I claim that metaphysics is a precise and scientific subject, and that there's no need to use words with vague or unknown meaning. — Michael Ossipoff

Your posts are so long it's difficult to reply to everything. I don't necessarily believe it's a bad thing, because some of my posts are long too. The problem though, as I read through your post, is that just when I think we have a point of agreement, I see that we are very far apart on some of these issues. The only way I see to even begin to clarify some of our disagreements is to take it one step at a time.

First, as you know I spend a lot of time discussing and studying Wittgenstein, so my view of language comes from him, mostly. Therefore, some of my disagreements with you have to do with the way you're using certain words/concepts. For example, we are far apart on the idea that metaphysics is a precise and scientific subject, i.e., I look at it as having some precision, but also having areas of blurred boundaries. And even the word precise falls into the category of being blurred, depending on context/use. For example, I can say, "Stand precisely here," without having an exact spot in mind, i.e., if you come over and stand roughly where I was pointing, that will do. I'm not going to say, "No, your not standing exactly where I pointed," as you get down and point to a piece of gravel. Now of course sometimes we do have an exact spot in mind, but the point is that much of language is very vague, and yet we use these concepts in ways we understand, we do it all the time.

Second, let's consider the statement "God exists." My contention is that we can refer to such a being without having a very precise definition, and still have an idea of what we're talking about, at least generally. To explain this further let's use this example: For the sake of argument let's suppose that we were having an argument about whether Augustus Caesar existed, do we need a precise definition of who we're talking about in order to have a sensible discussion/argument? What kind of definition could one give that someone else couldn't say, that's not very precise? Someone might ask you, "Who or what is Caesar," i.e., give me a definition? Whatever definition you give, surely it isn't going to explain Caesar's exact nature or character, but it's probably going to be close enough for us to have a sensible conversation. My point would be that this is true of the concept God, and it's true of many other concepts we use. Vagueness is built into many of our concepts, and philosophers who think that they can come up with exact definitions to explain things are shooting at the moon. This is part of what Wittgenstein was arguing against in much of his work, and I think it's an important point of understanding. This isn't to say that we shouldn't be precise as possible, but that precision isn't always possible or even warranted.

My disagreement is mainly with the idea that metaphysics is a precise subject, not necessarily with the idea that it's can be scientific.

On my view, it points out a certain kind of belief:One that is clearly existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

I agree that there are beliefs that are existentially dependent upon language, viz., beliefs that are linguistic (statements/propositions). Thus, if I say, "The Earth has one moon," by definition that is a statement of belief. I think we all agree with you on this.

It harks to what is state-able, and works from the long held view that all belief content is propositional. That vein of thought, however, can lead one astray when s/he begins to attempt to put a non-linguistic creatures belief into words/propositions. I mean, clearly an animal who does not speak English cannot have an attitude towards a proposition written in English. If we attempt to claim that the creature has a belief, and belief is a relation between the creature and a proposition, then we are saying that the creature has a relation to something that it doesn't understand. If it doesn't understand the proposition, then the only relation between it and the proposition is one that we draw. That would be meaningful to us, not the creature. It makes no sense to claim that a creature has a belief if that belief is not meaningful to the creature... — creativesoul

I also agree that what's leads us astray is that we are using language to talk about the beliefs on non-linguistic animals, including pre-linguistic man. However, I'm not sure what you mean by "...having a belief that is not meaningful to the creature," i.e., maybe you mean in terms of language, it's not meaningful to the creature?

You seem to be saying what I was saying a while back, i.e., that people seem to be confusing beliefs, the linguistic expression of beliefs, with an act that shows the belief apart from language. There is no way for these creatures to understand the belief as we understand the belief, since the belief as we are expressing them are necessarily linguistic. They have no concept called belief. So part of the problem is that our talk of these beliefs is a necessary function of language, which in turn leads to the assumption that the belief itself, as shown in the animal/human, is a necessary function of language. It is a necessary function of language if we are to express beliefs using language, but that doesn't mean that an act cannot show a belief apart from a linguistic understanding.

Another way to think of this, is when we talk about the Earth having one moon, we can only do this in language, i.e., the concept has an instance in reality. So the concept has a referent (i.e., the object Earth) quite apart from the concept and the linguistic use. In the same way, there is a referent to the word belief, viz., particular actions that an animal expresses in life. We see these same actions (a kind of referent) in us, i.e., in our daily actions. I open the door, shows the belief that a door is there, regardless of any expression of the belief in language. So the action is the referent, granted, it is different from the referent Earth, but it's still part of reality as something that is instantiated. Thus, these acts are referred to in language by the concept belief/s. Just as we use the concept Earth to refer to the object. Maybe this helps, not sure.

Yeah but we're not tenured as 'professors of philosophy'. — Wayfarer

Very true.

Maybe I'll be arrested. :wink:

I haven't read any of that since my college days, which was quite a while ago. Wittgenstein gives me enough of a headache. Leibniz would drive me insane. :gasp:

then an immaterial consciousness poses no problem for physicalism/naturalism (provided that said consciousness is not of a distinct "substance," or anything of the sort). — Arkady

I'd be interested in understanding what you mean by "...provided that said consciousness is not a distinct "substance," or anything of the sort." Do you mean by this that consciousness is not something we can point to and say, "This is consciousness," i.e., it's not like pointing to a tree and saying, "That is a tree."

I agree with much of what you're saying Wayfarer, especially the part that says that Dennett spouts a bunch of learned nonsense. However, it's not unusual, I think many of us do the same thing.

I find that much of the discussion of consciousness is just confusion, and I say this from a Wittgensteinian point of view, i.e., that much of the confusion lies in the way we discuss the issue, and the way we use many of the words/concepts involved. So we create a world view with seemingly clearly defined words, this then shuts out others who have a more expansive use of the word/concept. Now it's not always as simple as this, but this is part of the problem.

Also what's weird about our discussion of what's material or natural, when looking at some of this stuff on the quantum level it seems to morph into the metaphysical. So there is no clear cut boundary when talking about what's metaphysical or not at a certain level of discussion. So the use of words I think on some level confounds us, and this is why I think we need to be careful about being too dogmatic about some of these ideas.

Real” isn’t metaphysically-defined. I have no idea what people at a philosophy forum mean by it. I try to avoid that word. Or, when I mention it, I emphasize that I don’t know what it would mean—as I did in the passage that you quoted. — Michael Ossipoff

Sorry I don't always get back to every response. On some of these ideas we're in agreement, or at least close, but in other areas we seem far apart, but I guess that's natural. One area of disagreement has to do with the use of the word real as it pertains to metaphysical questions. The word real isn't always as clear cut as we would like it to be, but that doesn't mean we can't use the word in reference to metaphysics, i.e., simply because it has no clear cut meaning. The word real is vague by it's very nature, even when used in reference to the physical universe. However, it does get even more problematic when discussing metaphysics, but that doesn't mean we can't know what people mean by real in terms of the metaphysical. You seem to want to limit its use because it's vague, but many words are like this, and yet we understand their use. For example, we often ask, "Is God real?" without any precise definition that applies, and yet we seem to understand the implications of the question.

I haven’t heard of those. I’ve read a few books on NDEs, and haven’t heard of ones that suggested knowledge about past lives. So probably not a high percentage of NDEs report that. — Michael Ossipoff

I've divided NDEs into three categories - category 1 is just a very basic NDE where someone might experience an OBE and observe things taking place around them while their body is unconscious. Category 2 has more information, i.e., they may see deceased relatives, go through a tunnel, experience a life review, etc. And then there are category 3 NDEs, which give us even more information about the experience. An example of a category 3 NDE would be Dr. Eben Alexander's NDE, which gives more detailed information about the experience, but there are many category 3 NDEs that give more information than is generally known. Many of my conclusions about past lives has come from what people have said about their category 3 experience, and yes, this category isn't as pervasive as category 1 and 2 NDEs, but there are still many thousands of them. So there is plenty of evidence, but not enough to be dogmatic about it. All I can say is that it seems to be the case that based on these testimonials that certain conclusions follow. Moreover, there is also testimonial evidence of past lives from people who have experienced DMT, and these experiences are closely related to NDEs, i.e., they have some of the same experiences and more.

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Actually a tautology is true due to it's logical structure, so it would be something like, "Either George Washington was the first president of the U. S., or he was not the first president of the U. S.," i.e., "X or not X." So my first premise in the argument is not a tautology, and the example I gave in the deductive argument is not a tautology. I think we both were wrong.

Premise (1) seems rather tautological, wouldn't you say? Given that humans are intelligent, all of their contrivances are the result of "intelligent design." Thus, it is just a circuitous means of saying that "objects designed by intelligent agents are intelligently designed."

Thus, you are here attempting to infer substantive conclusions about the world from a tautology, which seems logically suspect to me. Not that arguments from analogy can never work, of course, just that this particular one seems problematic. — Arkady

Ya, I would say it's tautological, but I don't see how that makes it logically suspect. For example, if I say,

1) All men are mortal.
2) Socrates is a man.
3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Would this deductive argument be suspect in the same way? After all "All men are mortal" is a tautology too. I don't see how it being a tautology takes away from the conclusion. The conclusion either follows or it doesn't. In this argument we are also inferring a substantive conclusion about the world.

To be honest the older I get the harder it is to post in these forums. Whether rightly or wrongly, I read some of this, and it makes me want to pull my hair out. It's not personal, I just don't have the patience.

What I'm probably going to do is confine my posts to a blog.

This thread is not specifically a discussion of Wittgenstein. All I have asked is why you think the term 'belief' is more useful in the context of this discussion than 'expectation', and why you believe that using the same term in both linguistic and non-linguistic contexts does not do more to obscure the differences between animal and human, and between human propositional and non-propositional dispositions to action, by making it more difficult to see the very distinctions that might lead to greater understanding and clarity. — Janus

I know it's not a discussion of Wittgenstein, but Wittgenstein has some important ideas that are relevant. The term belief is what the thread is about, is it not? Not expectations. The uses of these words are just different. I don't think "mental correlation is helpful either. To unravel some of the confusion would take a while.

That's fine, but I would rather stick with Wittgenstein's analysis on much of this.

Are there any other criteria that can be used to establish whether something is or is not a belief, beyond whether or not calling it a belief is consistent and coherent with common usage of the term 'belief'? — Janus

Yes, there are other criteria, and I've been talking about it all along. It's our actions that show our beliefs quite apart from language. The simple act of opening a door shows your belief that there is a door there, and there are many actions like this that we do on a daily basis that show or demonstrate what we believe.

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...we have just embarked on Descartes' project — Cuthbert

There is very little to compare between Wittgenstein and Descartes. Wittgenstein's ability to do philosophy compared to Descartes is like comparing a high school runner to an Olympic athlete. Moreover, Wittgenstein looks at doubt from the view of what can be known, which is the correct place to start.

And one good way of defending the undoubtableness of these statements is to show, for example, that we know we have hands — Cuthbert

The whole point of Wittgenstein's criticism of Moore is that we can't know we have hands, especially in the context of Moore's proposal.

But I think W is inviting us to put the Cartesian project out of our minds altogether, because he holds that such a project is fundamentally incoherent and that there is no such thing as 'entertaining doubts' in such cases and therefore no such thing as 'knowing' either. — Cuthbert

Yes, this is true, but Wittgenstein isn't looking at this from the Cartesian perspective. The important point to understand is that sometimes what can be coherently doubted in one setting, cannot be doubted in another setting. Thus, statements often times only make sense within the confines of a particular use. For example, doubting that one has hands in rare situations can be coherently understood, this is why one cannot easily fit these statements into a set of statements that cannot be doubted. However, there are some statements that cannot be coherently doubted in any possible world.

there is no such thing as 'entertaining doubts' in such cases and therefore no such thing as 'knowing' either. — Cuthbert

I would reverse this, i.e., "...there is no such thing as knowing in such cases, and therefore no such thing as entertaining doubts either." Doubting follows necessarily from knowing, and epistemology rests on bedrock beliefs, which allows the whole system of knowing and doubting to function.

There is still a problem with using brackets, I tried using brackets in Cuthbert's quote to show where I inserted a word or words, but it left the words out, so I just italicized the words.

Statements which cannot coherently be doubted in one world view can come to be doubted in another. There is no absolute 'beyond doubt' set of statements. — Cuthbert

What about the statement "I cannot doubt my existence," doubting my existence shows my existence. This statement cannot be coherently doubted in any world view. Can I doubt that my words are not changing of their own accord? Can I doubt, in any world view, that objects disappear when I'm not looking at them?

The first example I gave cannot be doubted in any world view, nor can it be doubted in any possible universe in which there are rational humans. Thus it's necessarily the case that if there are rational humans, then they cannot coherently doubt their existence. The second example doesn't seem to be logically possible either, viz., that words could change of their own accord.

In the third example, it's certainly logically and metaphysically possible that objects could disappear when I'm not looking at them, so this would be an example of a statement that would fit into your set of parameters. Now this depends not only on a changing world view, but it also depends on the laws of physics within a particular universe.

There are beliefs and/or statements that cannot be doubted in any possible universe where there are rational humans.

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They are beliefs, they can be prelinguistic, which are shown in a form of life, viz., one's actions. Here I'm not just talking about prelinguistic man, i.e., they can have this prelinguistic form in us before they are stated. How? We open doors, we pick up objects, we put on clothes, we take showers, we do experiments, we do all sorts of things that show we believe certain things without ever stating the belief. However, when these basic beliefs are stated, in the Moorean sense, they play a different role than most beliefs, and that role is borne out in Wittgenstein's analysis of Moore's claims.

I don't know enough about Heidegger's philosophy to comment intelligently on what he was saying. Maybe one can say that these beliefs reflect a kind of understanding of the world, but I think, at least for me, they are better understood as bedrock, basic, or foundational. You're correct, "...it is simply our way of being in the world." These beliefs are like the chess board and pieces, the chess game is played with the board and pieces, which show our foundational beliefs about the game, viz., that we believe there is a board and pieces. We don't have to state our beliefs about the board and pieces, but our actions show our beliefs without ever taking on the form of a statement.

Note though, how weird it would be if we were playing a game of chess and I stated "This is a bishop," as if there could be a doubt in such a context. We don't doubt these kinds of beliefs generally because of their fundamental nature, and if we don't doubt them, then they are not pieces of knowledge. Doubt plays an important role within the language-game of knowing.

These beliefs do reflect our subjective certainty about the world though, but this certainty is not epistemological certainty.

Why call them "beliefs" then, when the word 'belief' is usually understood to have a propositional sense, when beliefs are generally truth apt, and thus right or wrong? It seems all the more odd in that you have stated a few times that you don't like Wittgenstein's term "hinge proposition" for this very reason.

Why not call these "hinge propositions" or "bedrock beliefs" 'hinge understandings' or 'bedrock understandings'. I anticipate you might say that understandings can be wrong too; but I think generally it is more the case that they are adequate or inadequate, rather than right or wrong. The understanding that I have hands seems to be eminently useful and not at all inadequate. — Janus

It's true that we philosophers talk about beliefs in terms of language, and in terms of being either true or false. However, Wittgenstein's hinge-propositions are not propositions in the normal sense, he seems to be speaking of these kinds of propositions (basic beliefs) as outside our epistemological constructs. And he talks about these beliefs as being separate from language, which I think is important to the understanding of what they are. The reason I do not like Wittgenstein's term hinge-proposition, is that this term still carries with it the idea of being true or false (because proposition is still part of the name).

He has talked about these Moorean statements in many different ways. He is searching for a way to talk about them, which is why he talked about them as being bedrock, foundational, hinge, etc. Also I would not characterize them as understandings, for me at least, this does not capture Wittgenstein's intent.

I've talked before about the idea of these beliefs being prelinguistic, and Wittgenstein hints at this when says that they tend to be animalistic in their function (paraphrasing), which I take to be basic, and it is why my tendency is to think they are causally formed quite apart from reason or linguistics. They seem to be subsumed or absorbed as part of the functioning of our minds, i.e., in many cases we do not even think about it, we just find ourselves with the belief when the need arises. This comes out in my example of walking into a room and noticing pens, paper, clothing, etc., we do not even think about much of what we see, but our sensory impressions simply imprint (for lack of a better word) the information upon the mind. There seems to be a causal relationship between the world and the mind, which is linked by our sensory inputs. It is almost like a video camera which picks up information and then stores it on a disk or other device.

Wittgenstein characterized the use of "I know..." in terms of Moore's statements as "...[a] comfortable certainty, not the certainty that is still struggling (OC 357)." And still further he states, "Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified [outside epistemology]; as it were, as something animal (OC 358, 359)"

You have to listen more carefully, because that's exactly what he's singing.

All Moore is doing is stating one of many bedrock beliefs. Similar to someone announcing that this is a bishop in a room full of chess players.

It isn't.

Yes, argument, inference, and proof is one of the ways we justify a belief, but keep in mind that there are other language-games that justify beliefs. This is where many people go astray with regard to knowledge claims, i.e., they limit the language-games, but the language-games of justification are much broader in scope than simply argument, inference, and proof (inductive and deductive arguments).

Just because one claims that what they believe is a piece of knowledge, that surely isn't the end of the matter. And of course the claim that you know X, doesn't mean that you indeed do know X. We often make claims to knowledge that later turn out to be false (to your point). This is why there is a connection between saying that one knows X, and the doubt, the two are linked at the hip. Moreover, this is why Wittgenstein not only attacks Moore, but also attacks the skeptic, both are making the same linguistic mistake.

Yes, to say that one knows X, is to be justified in believing X, and as such, one can claim it as a piece of knowledge, but the claim doesn't necessarily mean it is knowledge; which goes back to my point about the difference between a claim to knowledge, which isn't necessarily knowledge, as opposed to the definition of knowledge.

To be justified in believing X is varied, i.e., there are various language-games in which it is appropriate to to state that we are justified in believing X. We can be justified in various ways, viz., argument, inference, and proof; by the testimony of others; by linguistic training; and by sensory experience; to name a few.

And yes given the context of Moore's statement, it is not a piece of knowledge, which is Wittgenstein's point.

And If I have@Sam26 correct, we can be certain but since this entails there being no doubt, and hence no need for a justification, we do not know what it is we are certain of. — Banno

That's not quite what I'm saying Banno. :wink:

The problem with this is that one is confusing the definition of knowledge as JTB, with a claim to knowledge that may or may not be true. They are two different things.

To call it a belief suggests that it could somehow be wrong — Janus

I would say not, i.e., these beliefs can't be wrong in the epistemological sense. In what sense could Moore be wrong about having hands, especially in the context of the statement? If one makes a genuine knowledge claim, doubt plays a role against such knowledge claims. Otherwise we could infer the truth of a knowledge claim simply by making the statement. But with Moore's propositions, note that it doesn't make sense to doubt the statement "Here is a hand." This lack of sensible doubt tells us something about that particular belief, viz., that it has a special role in our belief system, outside, apart, and quite separate from our epistemological language-games.

The temptation is to think it's a piece of knowledge, but it's not. In fact, it's the same mistake that Moore makes, and that Wittgenstein criticizes. One does have a subjective certainty about these bedrock beliefs though, and Wittgenstein points this out. However, one's subjective certainty is not knowledge, but it's a very powerful intuition that causes us to react with certainty, which makes us want to claim it's knowledge.

There are at least two kinds of certainty going on in Wittgenstein's notes, a subjective certainty reflected in the way we emphasize or gesticulate; and there is the certainty that is used as a synonym for knowledge. We tend to confuse these two uses of the word certainty. The confusions lies in equating our feelings about pens, pillows, clothes, with having knowledge. Knowledge is JTB, so does one justify to oneself that one is seeing pens, pillows, etc? Of course not, it's a basic belief that is part of the background information, like the chess board and chess pieces are the background to the game of chess.

Another problem with trying to explain this, is that some of you have a strange view of what knowledge is. I'm sticking with the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. It's a good working definition that I find invaluable. I find no good reasons to give up this definition.

I agree Baden.

I understand. Thanks.

I hope this last post clarifies some of the problems.

Banno the belief is not justified, nor is there a choice involved. I don't make some kind of justification for these kinds of beliefs, that's Wittgenstein's point. Moore justifies "here is a hand" through a proof, an argument (look at my last posts in A Wittgenstein Commentary where I quote Moore), but Wittgenstein refutes this idea. There would be a justification involved if you asked me how I know that there are pens, paper, clothing, etc. in the room, and I replied with, "I saw them." Note that now this is taking place within language, which is where justification takes place. Justification is linguistic.

Think about it this way: You walk in the room and see the objects, as a result of seeing the objects you have the belief, there is no choice, and there is no justification needed. Do you justify the belief to yourself? No. The only time a justification would be needed is if a discourse takes place between you and someone else, i.e., you are asked, "How do you know...?" Also note that this e.g. is different (in terms of justification) from Moore's e.g., in that everyone sees Moore's hand, Moore holds up his hand to the audience and says, "Here is a hand." "Here is a hand" is bedrock, there is no need to justify this belief to the audience. Wittgenstein's point is that these statements are bedrock, they are the hinge on which justification occurs. The epistemological door wouldn't swing without these beliefs.

There is also something that is the same in my e.g. and Moore's example. Everyone in the room with Moore is having the same sensory experience that you have when you walk into the room (my e.g.) and see the objects I mentioned in my e.g. Where Moore goes wrong is that he is using a justification where no justification is needed, just as in my room e.g. Do all the people in the room need a justification that that is a hand? No. Do you need a justification when walking into a room that has x, y, and z objects? No.

You need a justification where a doubt might arise. So if I'm not in the room, where either e.g. is taking place, I might ask, "How do you know?" This is perfectly legitimate, and it's within your epistemic rights to ask "How do you know?" Then, of course you can give your justification, "I saw..." The justification is a sensory justification, which is one of the ways we justify some of our beliefs. Thus it would be a piece of knowledge.

There is a further point however that seems to be confusing, viz., that there are two kinds of bedrock beliefs. First, there are those that take place within language, as in Moore's statements. Second, there are bedrock beliefs, which I'm identifying, and which Wittgenstein alludes to in On Certainty, that occur quite apart from language. These bedrock beliefs are the ones I've given when talking about pre-linguistic man, but also note that they do occur in my e.g. above, viz., if Banno walks into a room and sees x,y, and z objects, then you have these beliefs; and although Banno can state the belief (something pre-linguistic man cannot do), they are not stated until they are stated. They are not stated in your mind, you have them quite apart from any statement, a statement is not required in order to have these beliefs. If you want to share the belief, or justify the belief, you can, but that's not a necessary ingredient to having the belief. This is why pre-linguistic man can also have the belief quite apart from language. He could walk into the room and see the same objects you see, and as a result have the same beliefs you have. The only difference is that he cannot share the belief, he doesn't have the linguistic ability, the same is true of an animal.

That's the question: is it legitimate to cal something a belief if it is caused - if there is no choice involved? — Banno

While it's true that some beliefs are a matter of choice, it's also true that some beliefs have nothing to do with choice. For example, let's suppose that I walk into a room and observe certain objects in the room, do I make a choice to believe there are pens, paper, clothing, pillows, etc, or do I just believe it without a choice being made at all. In fact, this may support the idea that the belief is causally formed quite apart from any decision. My sensory observations about what's in the room have become part of what I believe, quite apart from a choice to believe.

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