Solipsism implies that the self is the only thing that can be known. I would disagree with this idea. However, I do not deny the mysteries of the self, which is probably one of the great mysteries of the universe.

The belief is made up of two distinct things, the private nature of the mind state, coupled with the public acts. The belief is not private, without the public part we would not know that there was a belief. So don't separate the two.

Yes, a belief as reflected in one's actions, apart from any linguistic response. They exist, as any belief does, as a state-of-mind, but the belief presents itself publicly in the actions of those who have the belief.

Thanks Banno, I enjoy it too.

You're going wrong by isolating this statement apart from my other statements, that point to actions that reflect these beliefs.

Whether it's irrelevant depends on many factors. I'm not saying that it's relevant to Wittgenstein's ideas, even though there is overlap. I'm talking prelinguistics, at least partly, and Wittgenstein is staying within language. Relevant in explaining Wittgenstein's ideas in On Certainty, obviously not. However, it's relevant to the explanation of what I mean by prelinguistic beliefs. Moreover, I don't think any of this contradicts or hurts Wittgenstein's thinking.

Banno you are the master when it comes to giving the shortest possible responses to complex questions. roflol

Are you saying that Wittgenstein thought that the mind was somehow empty, that nothing is going on in the mind as we express a belief? And yes he did reject the notion of private objects, I agree. The key here is private. I'm not saying the belief is simply a state-of-mind that is privately held. The only way to know if one has a prelinguistic belief is by observation, thus it's not private, it's public. You seem to be hung up on the idea that it's only a state, but that's not the complete story. It's a state that can be observed by all, in the actions of the person with the belief. The beetle in the box scenario can only be accessed by you, you are the only who can see your particular beetle, i.e., it's not public.

Obviously there is language, and as such they are stateable, but this misses my point.

Wittgenstein never denied that there was something private going on in the mind, he believed that it was much more though, the actions reflect the belief, i.e., that there is something objective going on in the world. He did not deny our states-of-mind. What's primary in terms of belief, is one's actions, i.e., there would be no way to infer that one has a prelinguistic belief other than to point to the actions of the person or animal, but this doesn't take away from the fact these beliefs are mind states. If I were simply pointing to mind states, I would agree that you have a point, but I'm not.

I'll respond to this first. What I mean by unstateable is that there is no linguistic forum to state the belief. It's certainly possible that no language would have ever developed, thus all prelinguistic beliefs would be unstateable. You're projecting linguistics into the argument, whereas, I'm talking about a scenario in which there are no linguistics. Your saying that a belief can be stated, which assumes there are linguistics. How does a belief get stated apart from linguistics?

There's something about beliefs arising non-linguisticaly that resembles beetles in boxes. You rescue yourself later in saying that any belief can be stated. But that leaves hanging the nature of non-linguistic beliefs. Are they more than beliefs that have not been stated? If so, don't they exemplify the sort of private mental furniture Wittgenstein cleared out? — Banno

Even Wittgenstein held to the idea that beliefs can be nonlinguistic, as in my earlier post in which I quoted him. Remember the belief is not dependent simply upon being something in the mind, it has to be shown within the context of life. Also there is no way to objectively verify what's in the box, they're referring to some thing, but that thing could be any X one wants it to be. If prelinguistic man has a belief, the only way to know if he has it, is by observation, what he does that reflects that belief. I'm not simply pointing to something in the mind, although it's that too.

An unstateable belief is nonsense, are you sure about that? Prior to language there were plenty of beliefs that were unstateable. One needs language to state a belief. What about the beliefs of animals?

I also did not say anything about causal knowledge, in fact, I said just the opposite. Knowledge is based on certain causal beliefs. I do not even think there is such a thing as causal knowledge.
— Sam26

That's another quibble so far as I'm concerned. — apokrisis

This is not a quibble. It goes to the heart of what I am saying. And I do hold to the definition of knowledge, that it is justified true belief.

There are two ways of reading this.

In the first, I could read it as setting out in some absolute sense what belief is.

In the second, I could take it as setting out how you intend to make use of the word belief in the discussion.

Given your Wittgensteinian disposition, I'll take the second.

In which case I think it worth pointing out that we could make a distinction between a belief and, say, a disposition. In this account a belief would be a statement that is the subject of a statement of belief, and hence subject to whatever grammatical rules might be deemed appropriate. So in "Banno believes that Moore had two hands", the belief is that Moore had two hands.

And a disposition would be some preceding metal state. — Banno

I do believe, that beliefs acquired by humans and animals are all states-of-mind, and also this is how I intend to make use of the word belief throughout the discussion. However, the expression of beliefs, whether through one's actions, or those expressed linguistically, simply reflect a particular kind of state. So it's not either 1 or 2, but both reading are correct.

I think a disposition has a broader reach than simply a belief. A disposition may reflect various kinds of states, whereas, a belief state reflects a particular state, that of being Mary's belief; and if it is reflected in a proposition, of course it would involve the subject of the proposition as put forth by Mary.

I'm not sure of the purpose of pointing this out, maybe you could explain how it differs from what I'm proposing.

"And the concept of knowing is coupled with that of the language-game (OC 560)."

This is something important, and it is something that is crucial to understand in relation to bedrock beliefs (hinge-propositions). Why? Because some bedrock beliefs are formed prior to language, or along side of language; and as such, knowing or knowledge is quite a separate endeavor, which only occurs in language or in language-games. Prelinguistically there are only beliefs, so while beliefs do occur at this level (bedrock) as a state-of-mind, knowledge does not occur at the prelinguistic level. Knowledge is supported by the foundation, as well as a host of other concepts used in language-games.

Not only is, "This is my hand" - "I live on the earth" - "That is a tree" bedrock, but other states like "I am in pain" - "I am happy" - "I am sad," are also bedrock. This is not to say that there cannot be examples of these propositions not being bedrock, and in need of justification - it is only to say that for the most part, and in conjunction with the way Moore is using these propositions, they are bedrock and do not need a justification.

The problem is that when we use language to talk about bedrock beliefs, it makes it difficult to see them as separate and distinct from language. A belief does not need language (the concept belief does) it is merely a state, but knowledge and all it entails (truth and justification in particular) does require a language, and a language-game. We do not need a language to act, but we do need a language to convey thoughts. The way we act apart from language allows us to observe bedrock beliefs.

"People have killed animals since the earliest times, used the fur, bones etc. etc. for various purposes; they have counted definitely on finding similar parts in any similar beast.

"They have always learnt from experience ; and we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not... (OC 284)"

"If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows that he believes that what he is looking for is there (OC 285)."

These passages from On Certainty indicate to me that beliefs are not necessarily rooted in language. In fact, actions tell us more about one's beliefs than mere statements.

Of course it all depends on how you define thinking. As you say, animals can reason in a causal fashion. Brains are evolved for that kind of Bayesian inference. Certain bodily actions will predict certain experienced outcomes. — apokrisis

There is much here to respond to, but I'll only point out some things that I did not say. First, I did not say that animals reason, but of course I'm using reason as something that takes place in language. Also, I'm not going to pretend that I know all of the nuanced things that go on in the brain of a prelinguistic human, because I just don't. The only conclusion that I want to make is that there are prelinguistic beliefs, and that much of our linguistic based epistemological system rests on these beliefs. You're going much further than my conclusions.

I think this makes a big problem for your desire to secure epistemology in bedrock causal knowledge. — apokrisis

I also did not say anything about causal knowledge, in fact, I said just the opposite. Knowledge is based on certain causal beliefs. I do not even think there is such a thing as causal knowledge.

Biology and evolution sorted out the epistemic rules for an animal level of cognition. The epistemic rules for linguistically-structured thought could be another whole ball-game. I would certainly argue that their bedrock seems "mathematico-logical" for a good reason. — apokrisis

I do not understand this. I would not say that evolution sorted out epistemic rules, what does that mean? It sounds like you are giving evolution an intellectual basis. Maybe there are certain causal laws that dictate certain outcomes, but rules imply something else for me.

Thanks for the response Apokrisis, that took time to write out.

I understand that speech is different from the written works of individuals. My point is that it's important to understand what someone is trying to communicate, so to allow any interpretation of a printed work, in some ways destroys what the author may be trying to accomplish. You may add to the work or expand the thinking of the ideas in the work, but for me to allow for any interpretation in some ways destroys the work. It destroys the ideas behind the work, and in some cases we may be the lesser for it.

What's special about philosophy for me is the unlimited potential for thought. It's much broader than any one field because it goes beyond any one field of thought. You can incorporate philosophy into any endeavor you pursue. Even a carpenter's view of his work, his desire for excellence in the things he makes, has a philosophical foundation, an ethical foundation.

If it were up to me I would start teaching philosophy in high school, including basic logic.

Wow, I guess we're much further apart than I realized. To me Tillich's thinking is a muddled mess. However, to be fair, I've not studied him in depth, so I have very generalized view of his thinking. The language Tillich and other existentialists use, especially when it comes to epistemology is just not well thought out.

What about when a speaker is before a large audience? Besides certain written texts are directed at certain people. This is a joke right, this thread is meant to be a joke? Oh, I get it :-$ haha.

Suppose we applied this idea to our everyday speech. It doesn't matter what you meant, only how I interpret it. This a bit strange to me.

By definition, i.e., that they're separate necessarily means they're experiences are not the exactly the same. Even if it were possible to put you in a replicating machine and produce two biologically identical copies, immediately after such an event the experiences of both would necessarily make them different.

Simply the fact that it exists, along with the commentarial tradition that grew up around it over the centuries. You can be agnostic (as I am) but still not assume that it's all simply historical delusion and myth. Many people put it all in the same category as computer games or fantasy novels; that is one of the manifestations of the cultural nihilism that we're discussing elsewhere. (And a lot of people are unknowingly nihilist.) — Wayfarer

I agree with you in terms of the tradition, and that there are many facts that present themselves as part of that tradition, but, and I assume since you're an agnostic, that you also find the evidence to support a God lacking. This is my point. In many ways, I'm closer to your point of view, and I agree with some of your comments about the materialistic point of view.

As I read through much of what's said in this thread, I find that one of the problems, if not much of the problem has to do with how knowledge is acquired (an obvious observation). I have also been a student of Wittgenstein as some of you know, and I have great respect for Wittgenstein's ideas. In fact, his last work (On Certainty) tells us much about what it means to have knowledge, and if anything, it tells how expansive the use of the word know is. I have very rarely ever disagreed with Wittgenstein, because much of what I wrote on Wittgenstein was an exegesis. Although I did develop my own theory of epistemology based on his ideas.

My disagreement with Wittgenstein is that even he didn't fully appreciate the impact of his work, i.e., Wittgenstein's ideas, I believe, go much further than he even he thought. Although he did not downplay the importance of the mystical, he did not believe that we could have knowledge of the mystical, and this also carried over into his ethical discussions. He limits language, in terms of what we can know, to the world, and this is where I believe Wittgenstein went astray. The mystical is displayed by a showing, not a knowing according to Wittgenstein. This idea remains a part of his thinking from his early philosophy to his later philosophy. His later philosophy is much more accurate and practical than his earlier philosophy, but it still limits our knowing to how we use these words within the world, and within the culture developed around these words. The reasons for this have to do with the Austrian culture he came out of, and also the philosophical culture that molded some of his thinking.

My own view is that our knowledge is quite more expansive than Wittgenstein realized, and it's much more expansive than many materialists acknowledge. I definitely do not think that science has the corner on what it means to have knowledge. Some of you put a much higher premium on scientific thinking, and there are good reasons for this, but I think it is a mistaken notion that limits what we can know. One example comes to mind, and that is the experience of the self, my knowledge of myself, which surely is stronger in many ways than any scientific knowledge (any experimentation). In fact, our self awareness in some ways is bedrock to all that follows, including science.

That is always said with the apparent conviction that none of the religious literature of the Judeo-Christian tradition actually constitutes evidence. I mean, it is simply swept off the table with the gesture of it 'not being empirical science', as though it is thereby settled that nothing in it ever happened, that the whole corpus is simply the superstitious accretions of the pre-scientific mentality. Never mind that it is read out at weddings and funerals, and that billions of people still live by it; there's no 'evidence'. — Wayfarer

The problem for me Wayfarer, as someone who argued for years about the evidence in support of the Judeo-Christian tradition, is that although there is evidence, my contention now is that it's very weak testimonial evidence. The question, at least for me, is what conclusions can one reasonably draw from the available testimonial evidence. The main question is, does the evidence point to the existence of the Judeo-Christian God; and I don't see how one can reasonably conclude based on the available evidence the such a God exists.

When I wrote my thread on NDEs, in terms of consciousness surviving the body, I believe I gave a mountain of testimonial evidence in terms of numbers, variety, consistency, and objective verification of the testimonial evidence, but there is nothing like this in terms of the evidence that supports the God of the Bible. I'm mainly talking about first-hand accounts, not hearsay accounts, which most of the NT accounts, especially for the resurrection, are hearsay. For example, that 500 witnesses saw Christ after his death - pure hearsay.

So when you say evidence, I'm not sure what evidence you're referring too, and what conclusions can be reasonable drawn from this evidence.

There cannot be an infinite regress of existence — The Curiorist

I agree with the other comments, viz., that the above quoted statement is false. There is nothing that precludes the possibility of an infinite regress of existence. It's certainly not contradictory, for example, to say that there could be an infinite number of finite beings extending into the past. There could also be an infinite number of causal links into the past. In terms of modal logic, this is true metaphysically and logically, i.e., it's certainly metaphysically and logically possible. It may not be the case that these things are true, but surely the possibility exists.

I take it you weren't exposed to much Continental philosophy in your curriculum ;) — SophistiCat

I see what you mean. :-O

Ya, you really have to be challenged if you're to progress. There are a few people, a handful, in here that can challenge you, unless your so intellectually superior no one comes close. :D Other than that you'll have to be at a university with other intellectuals to be at the top of the game. Besides forget about being in here, all conversations with people tend to be less than what we (or I) expect, at least some of the time.

Ya, I think philosophy, when it's taught well, is valuable whatever field one chooses.

You mean there are really people who think this is not the case? I find that amazing.

I'm glad you explained what objective means, otherwise, I may have not understood. Of course objective means mind-independent, and of course anyone can state that X is an essential property of Y without it being the case. If someone does make such a statement, all it takes is one counter-example to refute it. So give me an example of an immoral act that doesn't cause harm? There maybe examples that are more difficult than others in determining the harm, but even in those examples one could make a strong case that one's character is harmed. I'm not saying the harm is always clear cut, but in those cases in which it is clear cut, it does seem to be the essential component or the essential property of immorality. Thus, I'm inferring from those immoral acts where the harm is clear cut, to those immoral acts where it's not so clear cut, that that property is probably just as essential. Furthermore, if harm isn't the one property that makes something immoral, what would make it immoral? Don't say "justice," because what makes something an injustice, is in fact, the harm done. Otherwise how could you say it's not just?

My own view is that there is an essential property to a moral act, and that property is the conventional view of justice. All moral acts are those that act for justice. If there is no justice, there is no morality. When I say this I'm not saying that every justice act is an morally good one, only that all good or moral acts are for justice. — SonJnana

I'm not so sure that justice is an essential property of [all] moral acts. Moreover, I would disagree that justice is a matter of convention (conventionality connotes subjectivity for me), that is, there seems to be an objective component to what's just. That said, I would agree that justice is an important part of being moral, but it doesn't seem to be an essential component. I haven't read all of your posts, but it's important here to define, at least generally, what you mean by being just. Justice seems to me to be something that's meted out in terms of compensation. Let's say that I help an elderly women cross the street, most people would consider this a moral action, the right thing to do. Furthermore, I may just act in accord with what I consider my duty as another human being, so my action doesn't proceed from the idea of justice, but it's based on a duty, a rule, or a principle. Justice may never enter the picture for most, most would just act from the motivation of kindness.

The second component is that morality is objective, that is, it's not subjective, or a matter of opinion, or a matter of consensus. For example, if I kill someone's wife because he killed mine, there are several factors that make this a moral act, and moreover, make it an objective moral act. First, it's objectively true that the arm has been cut off, we can see it on the ground. Second, we can objectively observe the fact that my wife was dead originally and now I have killed his. These two reactions show the objective nature of the justice done. No opinion or consensus will or can change the objective nature of these observations." — SonJnana

Maybe you mistyped, I'm not sure, but this act is not an example, of a "justice done," but is an immoral act based on the harm done. What makes all immoral acts evil, is the harm done to oneself or to others or to both. If a justice is done in terms of the act as you presented, then the person cutting the arm off would have to suffer the consequences of their actions based on relevant criteria. Justice would be something meted out after the fact, after the harm has been done. I suppose you could say an injustice has been done, but this begs-the-question, because what makes it unjust other than the harm itself? Harm is foundational for all immoral actions, as far as I can tell - no harm, no immorality.

Did you read the second paragraph? It explains why it's objective, and gives examples.

I explained that in the post.

I make an argument about objective morality in this thread starting on p. 2
(https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2297/if-objective-morality-exists-then-its-knowledge-must-be-innate/p2). I have several posts in this thread, so it's not just one post. So for what it's worth here is my argument.

So if I understand you correctly, there are no objective inherent reasons why murder is always immoral, other than what a society dictates?

Yes, I believe it is the backbone of philosophy, but knowledge can be gained apart from using just logic. I say argument is the backbone because one of the key features of philosophy is analyzing beliefs that are put forward as arguments. The goal is truth, and yes the wisdom you gain from discovery, but you have to do it well to gain wisdom. One doesn't gain wisdom apart from gaining knowledge.

I didn't say that was all there was to philosophy, but that it's a very important part of philosophy.

It seems to be a core feature of being self-conscious that one is aware or illuminated, so to speak, but that doesn't mean there aren't negative aspects of being self-conscious. My belief is that being human is only one reality where self-consciousness presents itself, and that it probably expands in other ways. This seems to be what people who have experienced NDEs testify to.