That's exactly the same as saying "but, assuming that the future mimics the past, I cannot imagine the existence of zombies". — Magnus Anderson
Can I doubt that "2" means what I think it does? Surely not, since I have decided what "2" means. What about this can I doubt then? — PossibleAaran
Sure. The issue is whether or not certainty as a propositional attitude is justified. If there's a 10% chance that something will happen, is it reasonable to be certain that it will happen? What if it's 99%? What if it's 100%? The claim MU and others are making is that if something isn't certain to be true then it is reasonable to be uncertain (doubt). Of course that's not to say that it's reasonable to believe that it's false, which is where I think there's been a misunderstanding between you and them.
I can strongly believe that something is the case and still have doubt. The skeptic can still believe all the same things you do; that this is a hand and that there's a cat on the mat. — Michael
Whether one can strongly believe X, and still reasonably express one's attitude of doubt, depends on what we're talking about. My earlier example of someone doubting the expert chess player as they teach chess, is just such an example. The point isn't that you can't find reason to doubt the chess expert in some situations. We can always create a scenario in which it would be reasonable to doubt the chess expert. Most people, especially if we have good reasons to believe that the person is a chess expert, wouldn't doubt that the chess expert knows the basic rules of chess. Thus, to doubt the expert's explanation that bishop's move diagonally, and that bishops always remain on the same color in any given game, is an unreasonable doubt.
There are some propositions, in some contexts, that are not only immune to doubt, but also immune to knowledge claims. Such propositions, as Wittgenstein pointed out, are bedrock, i.e., they provide a backdrop which enables us to talk about knowledge and doubt. They are in a way, required, if we are to have meaningful discussions on epistemology, and by extension, meaningful discussions of what it means to doubt. — Sam26
So take the sentence either way:
If something is possibly (modal) false then it is reasonable to lack a full conviction that it is true.
If something has a non-zero probability of being false then it is reasonable to lack a full conviction that it is true. — Michael
The mistake is to think that the world is the ultimate arbiter. Out there, the actual truth of the matter lies. — apokrisis
One thing that I worth doubting is any theory that claims to provide an ultimate answer. — Banno
Perhaps that is one mistake. Another would be to suppose that there is an ultimate arbiter. The world is complex. — Banno
There's something odd about thinking that one epistemological approach, perhaps one that looks good for science, will work in geometry; and organisational management; and ethics. — Banno
The argument is, roughly, that in a given language game (and it is all language games), there are certain things that cannot sensibly be doubted. So in geometry the three angles of a triangle add to a straight angle and in Chess the bishop moves only diagonally.
However, language games themselves are subject to change. So in some geometries the angles of a triangle add to more than a straight angle, in others to less; once the pawn could only move one square, but to speed the game this was changed to two squares for its initial move.
In such cases it is very important to understand which game is being played. — Banno
I'm not sure if you're using the term "doubt" the same way that MU and others are. What they mean by it is "not certain". Are you saying that "you can't find reason to [not be certain of] the chess expert in some situations"? I don't think that's right. If it is possible that what they're telling you isn't true then there is a reason to not be certain that what they're telling you is true (even if you nonetheless strongly believe them). Being certain of something that isn't certain seems unreasonable. — Michael
I could be wrong but I think the central point of this thread is Wittgenstein's claim that Moore's propositions such as "Here is a hand" are neither true nor false. — Magnus Anderson
One way to interpret it is as an analytic proposition where "Here is a hand" simply means "let this [the experience of a hand] be one of the things the word 'hand' symbolizes". It appears to me this is how Wittgenstein interprets it. — Magnus Anderson
So far as hands and chairs and capitals of France go, it doesn't do too bad a job. — Banno
Yes. That's rather the point. — Banno
I can imagine that "4", in my language, means this many distinct units: — PossibleAaran
Thus, there is a sense in which I couldn't really doubt that 2+2=4. — PossibleAaran
Am I right to understand that what makes 2+2=4 dubitable is that although I might decide the meanings of "2" and "4" such that it is indubitable, its still possible that any time I entertain 2+2=4 I am misremembering my own meanings of "2" and "4"? — PossibleAaran
We can understand our world in simple terms like the bishop that moves on the diagonal simply because that is a convention of a language game. — apokrisis
Again I answer these questions in my other thread on OC. — Sam26
↪Michael ↪Sam26
Keep in mind how Wittgenstein defined certainty in On Certainty, as logically excluding the possibility of mistake. At this point it is implied that this is what is required to render doubt unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you go down that path all discourse becomes meaningless. How could we discusses anything, or make sense of anything, if we radically doubted the veracity of our memories? — Janus
This is not correct. "4" must necessarily refer to one unit. Each of the numerals, "2", "3", etc., refer to individual units. If "4" referred to four distinct units we would not be able to carry out the mathematical proceedings which we do. For instance, 4x1 would be 1x1x1x1x1 if "4" referred to four distinct units. Instead, "4" must refer to one unity, a unity with the value of four individuals. — Metaphysician Undercover
There must be some kind of strange process going on behind the scenes. I am not following what is popular, apparently. Certainly not Wittgenstein's train of thought. — Magnus Anderson
Wittgenstein, as far as I know, never defined certainty as logically excluding the possibility of a mistake. In OC 194 Wittgenstein asks, "But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?" The answer to this question is seen in the way Wittgenstein deals with these questions throughout OC. — Sam26
The answer to this question is seen in the way Wittgenstein deals with these questions throughout OC. There are propositions, bedrock propositions, and they are grounded in a way of acting, they are not grounded in some epistemic or psychological certainty (objective or subjective certainty). So when he is talking about a mistake being logically excluded, it's not in reference to knowledge or certainty, but in reference to his hinge-propositions, which are outside any epistemic considerations. In fact, doubt is something that is part and parcel to knowledge, which is why Moore's propositions aren't the kind one can know, and it follows that they're not the kind that one can doubt. The answer to his question is in the negative, and that is seen in the overall picture of what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish. — Sam26
There is an interesting insight in OC 402 where Wittgenstein seems to reject that Moorean propositions are empirical propositions. — Sam26
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