Wittgenstein does reject that language can reach into the world of metaphysics. It's part of his philosophy from beginning to end. What he doesn't reject is that we can show what's beyond this world, but that's different from saying.

English philosopher Hilary Lawson makes the point that:

... metaphysical frameworks, such as idealism and panpsychism, which were derided as baseless nonsense by the positivists of the past, are back in new forms. But such claims cannot be taken as a true description of an ultimate reality for there is no credible realist theory of language that would make sense of such claims.

I'm not looking for a defence of realism, I'm more interested in the implications of this matter - do we need a theory of language that explains how any realist claim is possible in order to accept those claims?

If we do not employ a realist account of language (as per postmodern thinkers), what is it we can meaningfully say about this notion of 'reality' we are so fond of describing and seems to be a substitute for god? — Tom Storm

There is no theory of language that will answer your question (this question: "...do we need a theory of language that explains how any realist claim is possible in order to accept those claims?") because the theory itself will fall victim to the same questions. Wittgenstein tried answering this question in the Tractatus through the use of names and objects, it's a kind of mapping of reality, viz., the correspondence of names to objects. We know of his rejection of this theory (much of it that is) and we know of what replaced it (language-games). What W. doesn't reject is the notion that language can reach beyond the world, into the world of metaphysics. He still held onto this notion, although it's a bit modified.

If it's true that the meanings of our words come down to how we use the words, then much of what we believe is a matter of what language-game you believe best describes reality. What do we mean by reality? There is no one answer to this question, there are just answers that fit within the context of a particular language-game. If you're an idealist or realist depends on what language-game you believe best describes reality, or best maps reality. If you're religious, then you accept those views of reality as interpreted by a certain view of metaphysics. If you're not religious you'll latch onto views that have another view of metaphysics. If you hold to a third view, as I do, then you'll hold to another view of metaphysics.

I believe there are answers, I'm not saying there aren't answers. However, you were looking for the implications, the implications are that we have a multitude of beliefs that are very difficult to sort through. As I've always said, language is a very confusing tool, but it's the only tool we have to describe reality. Apart from language, all we have is our subjective consciousness that reaches out to reality through sensory experience.

That's what's wrong with a lot of thinking today, everything is subjective. But if they truly believed that meaning is subjective, then your subjective meanings are just as valuable as theirs. The fact that their arguing that their point is correct, is a point against their argument. Again the argument is self-refuting.

Some people are so set in their beliefs there's almost no point to argue with them. You can spot them by how dogmatic they are.

The quote is self-refuting, i.e., it's expressing a particular philosophical point of view that basically says that philosophy is an exercise in futility. However, since the argument itself is philosophical, I guess we should conclude that it to is an exercise in futility. So, it refutes its own conclusion.

Post 2 continues...

OC begins with the following statement:

“If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest (OC 1).”

Wittgenstein grants that if Moore knows what he claims to know, then Moore’s conclusion follows. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein argues throughout his notes that Moore does not know what he believes he knows. However, I think we are all inclined to agree with Moore. After all, if we do not know this is a hand, then what do we know? This inclination to use the word know as Moore uses it sets in motion Wittgenstein’s response. Is Moore justified in believing his claims are true? The answer to this question directly affects Moore’s proof because he assumes that the propositions he identifies are typical, which they are not.

Wittgenstein asks whether it generally makes sense to doubt that we have hands (OC 2). This question is crucial to Wittgenstein’s argument because it helps identify fundamental, bedrock, or primitive beliefs. Of course, there are situations where doubt about the existence of our hands would make sense, and Wittgenstein points this out (OC 23), but not in the context of Moore exclaiming, “Here is a hand, and here is another hand.” Nor would it make sense as given in a proof.

There are at least two kinds of bedrock beliefs. First, those we observe apart from the use of language. For example, the belief (seen especially in animals and young children) that we have hands and the belief that we are a body separate from other bodies. This is why some philosophers refer to these beliefs as animal beliefs, because of their fundamental or primitive nature. The act of using a hand or moving through space in relation to other objects shows these beliefs. This is not only observed in nonlinguistic children and animals but is apparent in all of us, irrespective of language.

The point of emphasizing the prelinguistic nature of these beliefs is to demonstrate their primitive nature. Bedrock beliefs prescind language. Thus, the ontology of bedrock beliefs gives them a unique standing in relation to our epistemic language. Wittgenstein points out the special status of bedrock beliefs in his opening remarks: does it make sense to doubt them (OC 2)? Again, their status (arational or non-epistemic status) is such that epistemic language would necessarily fail without them.

The second kind of bedrock belief is foundational but not bedrock. If we think of the foundation of a building, it is layered, starting with bedrock. On top of bedrock are other foundational components not as firmly in place as bedrock, but part of the foundation nonetheless. In other words, our prelinguistic beliefs are the bedrock of language. They are the precursor beliefs that allow language and life’s actions to take root. So, although one can refer to certain linguistic beliefs as bedrock (I prefer to separate them from other foundational beliefs), they stand out because they are less susceptible to change. For example, the bedrock belief that I have hands or am a body separate from other bodies will remain fixed for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the rules of chess are foundational to the game, but they are a different kind of foundational belief; that is, they arise within language. The same is true of the rules of grammar, which are necessarily foundational to language use. However, although the rules in these two examples are foundational, they are not bedrock; that is, they are not as primitive or as fixed as there are objects (other people, trees, mountains, etc.) Many foundational beliefs can more easily change over time. For example, the rules of chess have changed over the years, and grammar rules have also changed.

If we return to the example of a building’s foundation, nothing is more fixed than bedrock; it is the foundation’s most fixed point. And if we look at the construction of a building’s foundation above bedrock, some foundational elements are more fixed than others and less susceptible to change. Wittgenstein’s riverbank analogy suggests much the same thing in the following:

“And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away or deposited (OC 99).”
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This ends what will be in the first video.

I'm moving the revision of the paper on Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance back to this thread, where it belongs.
Post 1

3rd Revision
06/06/2023 by Samuel Naccarato

Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance

(My Philosophic View of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty)


Biographical Sketch:

Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in Vienna, Austria in 1889. He was the youngest of eight children, five boys and three girls. His father, Karl Wittgenstein, was a remarkable man who became a leading industrialist in the iron and steel industry; consequently, the Wittgensteins were very wealthy. In addition, Ludwig’s mother, Leopoldine, had exceptional musical talents and passed her love of music to the children. As a result, all the Wittgenstein children were exceptionally gifted with artistic talent and superior intelligence.

At a young age, Ludwig demonstrated an interest in machinery, which led to his interest in engineering. He was educated at home until the age of 14, then was sent to Linz in northern Austria to further his studies. After his education in Linz, Wittgenstein went to Berlin to study engineering (1906-1908). In 1908 Ludwig enrolled at the University of Manchester in England to study aeronautics. His research eventually led to the design of a jet reaction propeller, which was a mathematical endeavor. The mathematics of his research eventually led him to the philosophy of mathematics. Specifically to the Principles of Mathematics, published in 1903 and written by Bertrand Russell (not to be confused with the Principia Mathematica, published in 1910 and written by Russell and Whitehead). The main goal of thePrinciples of Mathematics was to establish that the propositions of mathematics rest on a few logical principles. Another mathematician from Germany named Gottlob Frege was also working on the same idea. Wittgenstein eventually meets with Frege to discuss some of his thoughts, and consequently, Frege recommends that he go to Cambridge to meet Russell. Russell sees talent in Wittgenstein, which encourages Wittgenstein to pursue philosophy.

If you want a more in-depth biography of Wittgenstein, there are plenty of books to read (e.g., Ludwig Wittgenstein by Ray Monk and Ludwig Wittgenstein by Norman Malcolm).

I will set out an epistemological theory that enunciates a particular set of propositions derived from Wittgenstein’s final notes called On Certainty, published in 1969. These bedrock beliefs (often called hinge propositions) were identified mainly by Wittgenstein in the final years of his life (1949-1951). I am not claiming anything original in my thesis except to point out that bedrock beliefs have an essential epistemological role that advances the subject of epistemology in ways that few philosophers, if any, before the writing of On Certainty, have considered. I am also not claiming that my thoughts necessarily agree with Wittgenstein’s, nor am I claiming that they disagree. Nevertheless, my thinking on this subject would not have gone in the direction it did without Wittgenstein’s keen intellect expressed in the Philosophical Investigations and in his final notes called On Certainty (hereafter referred to as OC).

Wittgenstein begins OC as a response to G.E. Moore’s papers, A Defense of Common Sense (1925) and Proof of an External World (1939), in which Moore lists several propositions that he claims to know with certainty, such as, “Here is one hand” and “There exists at present a living human body, which is my body.” These propositions supposedly provide Moore with proof of the external world, and as such, they seem to form a buttress against the arguments of the radical skeptic, which is why Moore is making the argument.

Moore says, “I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply examples. But did I prove just now that two human hands were then in existence? I do want to insist that I did; that the proof which I gave was a perfectly rigorous one; and that it is perhaps impossible to give a better or more rigorous proof of anything whatever. …(G.E. Moore, Proof of an External World, 1939).”

It is undoubtedly the case that OC goes beyond Moore’s propositions, so it is not just about Moore; it is about knowing, doubting, making mistakes, reality, empirical statements, certainty, acting out beliefs, rule-following, etc., so it covers a range of topics about what we know, and how it fits into our language. It is important to note that not everything in OC should be seen as a response to Moore. However, Moore provides the impetus for Wittgenstein’s final notes and is mentioned throughout OC.

Wittgenstein criticizes Moore’s use of the word know and the skeptic’s use of the word doubt, and he emphasizes the relationship between the use of these words as an essential part of the language-games of everyday epistemology.

Bedrock beliefs provide the grounding for our language-games, which is analogous to how the rules, the board, and the pieces in chess function as the grounding (reality background) for the game of chess. In fact, without these beliefs it is hard to imagine how language would get off the ground. It would be like trying to imagine a game of chess without the rules, the board, and the pieces. For example, there would be no such thing as a bishop move without the rules, the board, and the pieces. Such a move would be nonsense. The same is true of our concepts, namely, knowing, doubting, making mistakes, rule-following, etc.; these would all be nonsense without the grounding of certain primitive or bedrock beliefs. Such beliefs are at the heart of a correct understanding of knowledge, directly affecting phrases like “I know that such and such is the case” and “I doubt that such and such is the case.”

Although Wittgenstein criticizes Moore’s propositions, he is not entirely unsympathetic to Moore’s argument, which would look something like the following:

1) Moore knows that he has two hands.
2) Moore makes the inference from the fact that he has two hands to conclude that an external world exists.
3) Hence, Moore knows that an external world exists.

The following is what Googles AI chat service, called Bard, said about Wittgenstein's On Certainty. I thought is was pretty good.


"Ludwig Wittgenstein's final notes, On Certainty, are a series of reflections on the nature of knowledge and certainty. In these notes, Wittgenstein argues that there are certain propositions that we cannot doubt, even in the face of skeptical challenges. These propositions, which Wittgenstein calls "hinge propositions," are the foundation of our knowledge and understanding of the world.

"Wittgenstein argues that hinge propositions are not justified by evidence or argument. Rather, they are simply taken for granted as a precondition for any meaningful discourse or action. For example, we cannot doubt that we have bodies, that the world is external to our minds, or that the past is real. These propositions are so basic to our understanding of the world that they cannot be doubted without undermining the very possibility of knowledge itself.

"Wittgenstein's view of certainty has been influential in a number of different fields, including philosophy, psychology, and the philosophy of language. His work has been praised for its insights into the nature of knowledge and the limits of skepticism. However, it has also been criticized for being too vague and unconvincing. Nevertheless, On Certainty remains an important work of philosophy that continues to be studied and debated today.

"Here are some of the key points of Wittgenstein's argument in On Certainty:

"There are certain propositions that we cannot doubt, even in the face of skeptical challenges. These propositions are called "hinge propositions."

"Hinge propositions are not justified by evidence or argument. Rather, they are simply taken for granted as a precondition for any meaningful discourse or action.

"Hinge propositions are the foundation of our knowledge and understanding of the world. Without them, we would be unable to make sense of anything.

"Wittgenstein's view of certainty has been influential in a number of different fields, including philosophy, psychology, and the philosophy of language."

I find it strange to say a basic belief is “I have two hands”. Not only is absurd to say “I doubt I have two hands”, but also “I believe I have two hands” or “I am convince I have two hands”, when, in fact, I have two hands. — Richard B

Of course, but I'm not saying that the statement, "I believe I have hands," is any better. The beliefs Wittgenstein is referring to in many cases, are the beliefs that are shown in our actions. When I sit in a chair, open a door, pick up a pencil, etc., all of these actions reflect beliefs. This is why some philosophers refer to them as animal beliefs, and why I sometimes refer to these bedrock beliefs as pre-linguistic. Not all bedrock beliefs are pre-linguistic, but many are.

I think I will make OC my first video. Making videos going from the Tractatus to OC is something I'd like to do, and I will continue to work on it, but I'm going to concentrate on OC. Besides there are many videos that cover the T. and the PI, but not as many on OC.

But we justify orange juice is sweet by our taste? You seem to be inconsistent here. — Richard B

Yes, it does seem that way, but here it's important to note the relationship between knowing and doubting (very important), which Wittgenstein points out. So, when trying to separate those beliefs (they are arational beliefs) which are bedrock, and not part of any epistemological justification, it's crucial to ask oneself, "Does it make sense to generally doubt this belief?

In the case of Moore's propositions there are very few contexts that we doubt, for e.g., that we have hands. It's something we have, it's part of the inherited background of being human (at least for most), and we sure don't doubt that we are human, unless you're a skeptical idealist. Again, similar to the inherited background of chess, viz., the rules, pieces, and the board. How can we doubt the inherited background our lives?

If we take my e.g., "The orange juice is sweet," we do come to know this in various ways, by tasting it is the most common (sensory experience), but asking someone is another way of knowing (justification through testimony). Does it make sense to doubt that the orange juice is sweet? Yes, we may be asking ourselves or others if it's ripe, or if it's sweet enough and not sour. So, this proposition is not the same as Moore's propositions, viz. called variously, hinge, bedrock, foundational, or basic propositions (I don't believe they are propositions in the normal sense, which is why they have a special name attached to them. It has to do with how they function in our epistemological language-games, viz, as the very building blocks of our epistemological language.).

Moore is demonstrating his knowledge of his hands, and it's this knowledge, demonstrated by proof, that is supposed to rebut the skeptic. Wittgenstein, of course, argues against this. Wittgenstein points out that much of our certainty (I call this certainty subjective certainty, as opposed to objective certainty, the latter is knowledge) is arrived at in the course of our lives, as we act within this reality. I don't in many cases arrive at some of these beliefs through some logical process, which is the point. It's through our interaction with the world that this subjective certainty comes out. Wittgenstein doesn't make this distinction, at least not clearly, but I do. We act in the world with a certain conviction that things are the way they are, and it's not a matter of justification as W. points out in PI 325. And, it's through these actions that these very basic beliefs (other philosophers refer to them animalistic beliefs) are seen.

By the way I added more to my previous response.

No, we don't justify that we have hands through sensory experience. Is that how you came to believe you have hands. Again, it's just part of the inherited background. The statement that "I know I have hands" is just epistemologically wrong, since when do we need to justify that we have hands, unless it's in a very special context, like waking up from an operation. What would it mean to doubt that you have hands in Moore's context?

So what is a “statement of knowledge”? Can you provide an example? — Richard B

A statement of knowledge is a statement that's justified in some way, and there are various kinds of knowledge statement based on different language-games. We justify our knowledge using logic (inductive and deductive arguments). I'm assuming you know many e.g.'s of these. We justify knowledge claims based on sensory experiences. For example, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" - because I tasted it. There is knowledge based on testimonial evidence, and this is wide spread, given in books by experts, lectures, testimony in courts of law, etc. So, there are many e.g.s.

The Earth has one moon is a statement of knowledge. The Earth is the third planet from the Sun, on and on. I'm not going to list them, but they're all over the place. Why would you ask this?

A conviction on the other hand is just one's strong belief, which is expressed as a strong subjective feeling, that's not justified or it's based on very little evidence. You here this from many religious people. For e.g., "I know X is true." How do you know? - "I just know it," it's a matter of faith. It's just a expression of one's religious conviction. It's not an epistemological statement.

OK, a distinction is being made here, a “conviction” vs “a statement of knowledge”? — Richard B

Yes, Wittgenstein is pointing out that Moore's propositions seem to be more like statements of conviction, rather than epistemological assertions.

Declaring “I have two hands” falls under the category of “conviction” But Wittgenstein finds this odd to say this in front of a bunch of philosophers rather than saying it after, say, a car crash. — Richard B

Declaring "I have two hands," may or may not fall under the category of conviction, i.e., there are contexts where it might be appropriate. Yes, he does find it odd to say it in front of philosophers, especially as an epistemological statement as Moore does.

Should it even be called a “conviction” when our concepts have been removed from its common use? — Richard B

Well, there is a use of "I know..." that is not an epistemological use, and you hear it all the time. It's used to emphasize one's subjective certainty (their strong conviction) about their belief. It's often confused with objective certainty, which can often be used as a replacement for the epistemological use of "I know..."

Again, what circumstances would this become knowledge? — Richard B

One's conviction, viz., one's subjective certainty can become knowledge when one has the appropriate justification for one's belief or claim. Moore's use of "I know I have hands," would never become a piece of knowledge. It's not a matter of knowing, which means I have the proper grounds. Moore of course beliefs he has a proof, but Wittgenstein is challenging this use of know. Justifying these kinds of Moorean beliefs would be akin to justifying the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces. They are just there as part of the background allowing chess to be played. In the same way, our background, the reality we find ourselves in, is the background that allows for epistemological language-games, and other kinds of language-games. In fact, language arises out of this background, i.e., our conceptual framework is dependent, in many ways, on this background.

I have a job that requires someone to have two hands to operate a piece of machinery; so on the job application I declare “I have two hands.” Is this not providing my knowledge of my biological state to someone who can confirm my assertion? — Richard B

No, and this Wittgenstein's point, i.e., it's not a matter of epistemology, generally speaking.

Post 1 above of Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance has been edited and clarified. Hopefully this paper will clarify my position on OC. My position is not supposed to be some exegetical defense of Wittgenstein notes. It's supposed to be my thoughts on where some of Wittgenstein's thinking seemingly leads.

Any thoughts on where I might need clarification, whether you agree or not, are appreciated.

I recently bought a book called An Essay In Aid of a Grammar Assent by John Henry Newman. If you remember, Wittgenstein references Newman in OC 1. I was interested in finding out what influence this book had on W.'s thinking. I haven't read it yet, but it's calling to me.

I know this thread was mostly supposed to be about the Tractatus, but it seems I've shifted gears a bit.

Although I quote Wittgenstein quite a bit, I'm trying to give an account of where I believe his thoughts lead. There is no way to know where Wittgenstein would have gone with OC, and no way to know which passages would have been left in or out in some final version of OC. All we can do is work out where they might take us, and try to fit his mostly original thinking into our epistemology ideas.
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Continuing with...

Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance
(Post 3)

One of the problems with Moore enumerating what he knows, is that it seems to amount to more of a conviction of what he believes, than a statement of what he knows. How does this happen? It happens because the beliefs Moore is claiming to know are not normally part of the language-game of knowing, that is, what he is retailing as part of what we know does not normally fit the role of what we justify. Moore’s use fits the role of someone expressing one’s conviction, and this seems to be the mental state that Wittgenstein is pointing out in OC 6. We often see the use of the word know as an expression of someone’s conviction, but this is not an epistemological use of the word. It expresses more of a subjective certainty, a feeling of being correct, an intuition, or a mere belief. Moore did not intend that his use of know be an expression of a conviction, but that is what his use amounts to. The evidence that this is so is seen in the relationship between the expression of what we claim to know, and the question, “How do you know?” - which is the expression of a doubt or a challenge to justify your claim.

“When Moore says he knows such and such, he is enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar role in the system of our empirical propositions.

“Even if the most trustworthy of men assure me that he knows things are thus and so, this by itself cannot satisfy me that he does know. Only that he believes he knows. That is why Moore’s assurance that he knows…does not interest us. The propositions, however, which Moore retails as examples of such known truths are indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, but because they all have a similar role in the system of our empirical judgments.

“We don’t, for example, arrive at any of them as a result of investigation (OC 136-138).”

The main thrust of Wittgenstein's argument is that these Moorean propositions (my claim is that they are not propositions, but expressions of belief shown mostly in our actions) have a "peculiar role," as Wittgenstein says, in our language-games.

This peculiar standing that Moore's beliefs have, is that they function as foundational or bedrock supports (not all foundational supports are bedrock), which is similar to how the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces give life to the game of chess. Moore’s beliefs have a similar role in the language-games of epistemology (although their function is probably much broader). In Moore’s context such beliefs are in no need of justification, that is, there is no need to justify Moore’s claim that he has hands, no more than a rule of chess needs a justification that stipulates bishops move diagonally. It just is the case, as part of the contingent background of reality, that Moore has hands, or that bishops move diagonally. It is not a matter of knowing, namely, justifying a claim, but a matter of contingent bedrock beliefs that support many of our language-games of knowing, justifying, and making truth claims, which is the whole of epistemology. Hence, their peculiar role.

This is not the final edited form of this paper.

continuing with...

Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance
(Post 2)

Moore’s proof is supposed to show that the conclusion follows necessarily, and if it does, then the skeptic’s doubts are rebutted. The proof would look something like the following:

1) Moore knows that he has two hands.
2) Moore makes the inference from the fact that he has two hands, to the conclusion that there exists an external world.
3) Hence, Moore knows that an external world exists.

Wittgenstein challenges the first premise, namely, that Moore knows that he has two hands. How does Moore know that he has two hands, that is, what is his justification? And do we justify these very basic beliefs? This is at the core of Wittgenstein’s criticism. Do I know that I have hands because I check to see if they are there every morning? Do I make a study of my hands, and thereby conclude that I do indeed have hands? I know chemistry, physics, history, epistemology, and other subjects, and there are ways to confirm my knowledge. However, in our everyday lives do we need to confirm that we have hands? Do we normally doubt these kinds of statements?

Consider the following:

“I know that I am a human being.” In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean “I know I have the organs of a human”. (E.g. a brain which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as “I know I have a brain”? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on (OC 4).”

Even the sense of these kinds of propositions (I do not think they are propositions. I refer to them as very basic foundational beliefs.) is unclear according to Wittgenstein. This is not to say that we cannot imagine a situation in which they have a clear sense, or that there are contexts in which it is reasonable to doubt such statements. It just means that these statements have a unique place in our language of knowing and doubting. The uniqueness of Moorean statements seems to be what Wittgenstein is pointing at in the following quote.

“Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand—my own hand, that is (OC 9)?”

The idea here is clear, we do not as a matter of course, make “…sure [we] know that here is a hand—[our] hand…,” and this applies to many, if not all, of the Moorean statements; and although there are exceptions, which Wittgenstein concedes (OC 23), these exceptions are irrelevant in Moore’s context. The point is to answer the skeptic in relation to what can sensibly be doubted.

“Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.—For otherwise the expression “I know” gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed (OC 6).”

The disputes with Moore’s propositions are not only problematic, but they are also very subtle disputes, which means that they are difficult to flesh out. One of the problems is that we sometimes fail to see the connection between the use of the word know, and the use of the word doubt, and the logic behind that use. The connection between knowing and doubting, that is, the logical connection, is a crucial point. It is the kind of logical link that is also seen between rule-following and making a mistake - one is logically dependent on the other, that is, they are necessarily logically intertwined.

I mean to get back to a close analysis of Danièle Moyal-Sharrock's book. — Banno

Let me know what you think because her views are very similar to my own.

Ya, there is no way to know what passages would have been eliminated if he had edited those notes.

As I said in page 7 of this thread I'm trying to complete a series of videos starting with a summary of the Tractatus, a summary of his transitional period (starting around 1930), a summary of the PI, and ultimately ending with an in depth look at OC. I'm not sure I'll finish it, but I'm giving it a go.

What follows is the beginning of my work on OC, it's a revision of a paper I wrote some years back. I'll post at least some of it here.

edited on 5/15/23
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Post 1

Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance

In what follows, I will try to set out an epistemological theory that enunciates a particular set of propositions, which are derived from Wittgenstein’s final notes called On Certainty (OC published in 1969). These bedrock propositions (often called hinge propositions) were identified mainly by Wittgenstein in the final years of his life (1949-1951). I am not claiming anything original in my thesis except to point out that these statements or bedrock beliefs (as I refer to them) have an important epistemological role that will advance the subject of epistemology in ways that few philosophers, if any, before the writing of OC, have considered.

Bedrock beliefs form the substructure of our epistemic language. In other words, they provide the bedrock to create sophisticated epistemological language constructs or language-games. For example, our understanding of knowledge and how we use phrases like “I know that such and such is the case” and “I doubt that such and such is the case” in certain social linguistic contexts and not in others; and how not understanding the proper use of words like know and doubt can cause conceptual or linguistic confusion. The underpinnings of these beliefs are crucial to understanding what it means to know and where justification ends with our epistemology. Answering such questions helps clarify the limits of reasoning (the infinite regress problem), and it also solves the problem of circularity.

As pointed out, many of the ideas presented here, are derived from OC, which begins as a response to Moore’s papers, A Defense of Common Sense (1925), and Proof of an External World (1939) in which Moore lists several propositions that he claims to know with certainty. Propositions such as the following: “Here is one hand” and “There exists at present a living human body, which is my body.” These propositions supposedly provide Moore a proof of the external world, and as such, they seem to form a buttress against the radical skeptic. Moore says, “I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply examples. But did I prove just now that two human hands were then in existence? I do want to insist that I did; that the proof which I gave was a perfectly rigorous one; and that it is perhaps impossible to give a better or more rigorous proof of anything whatever. …(G.E. Moore, Proof of an External World, 1939).”

It is undoubtedly the case that OC goes beyond Moore’s propositions, so it is not just about Moore; it is about knowing, doubting, making mistakes, reality, empirical statements, certainty, acting out beliefs, rule-following, etc., so it covers a range of topics in relations to what we know, and how it fits into our language. So, it is essential to note that not everything in OC should be seen as a response to Moore.

It is not only Moore’s claim to knowledge that Wittgenstein criticizes but his use of the word know. Wittgenstein also spends much of his time critiquing the radical skeptics, specifically, their use of the word doubt. Wittgenstein emphasizes an essential relationship between the word know and the use of the word doubt as part of the language games of everyday epistemology.

Even though Wittgenstein levels his attack against Moore’s argument, he is not entirely unsympathetic. However, he argues that Moore’s propositions do not accomplish what Moore thinks they do, namely, to provide proof of the external world, which in turn is supposed to undermine the doubts of the radical skeptic.

OC begins with the following statement:

“If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest (OC 1).”

Wittgenstein grants that if Moore knows what he claims to know, then Moore’s conclusion follows. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein argues throughout his notes that Moore does not know what he thinks he knows. However, we are all inclined to agree with Moore; at least our intuition seems to lean in Moore’s direction. After all, if we do not know this is a hand, then what do we know? This inclination to use the word know, as Moore uses it, causes Wittgenstein to question Moore’s argument. Is Moore justified in believing his claims are true? It certainly seems so, but Wittgenstein has other ideas.

“From it seeming to me—or to everyone –to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so.

“What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it (OC 2).”

We begin with Wittgenstein’s juxtaposition of the word know against the word doubt, that is, if knowing does not make sense in Moore’s context, then does doubting make sense as a rebuttal against Moorean propositions.

If there never arose a doubt in connection with a knowledge claim, would it be a knowledge claim? What would be the purpose of a justification if a doubt never arose, or if the question “How do you know?” never raised its head?

“We just do not see how very specialized the use of “I know” is.

“—For “I know” seems [my emphasis] to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression “I thought I knew”.

“For it is not as though the proposition “It is so” could be inferred from someone else’s utterance: “I know it is so”. …[F]rom his utterance “I know…” it does not follow that he does know it
“That he does know takes some shewing (OC 11-14).”

It is certainly the case that one’s knowledge does not follow from the mere assertion that one knows. As if the truth of a statement follows from merely uttering “It is so.” It is this tendency to emphasize one’s conviction with the phrase “I know…” as if it guarantees that our statement is a piece of knowledge. However, as Wittgenstein points out, “That [we] do know takes some [showing] (OC 14).”

Wittgenstein puts Moore’s statements into the category of an expression of conviction because it seems obvious to Moore that we know these propositions (I will often go back and forth between saying these propositions are propositions, as opposed to what I believe they are, viz. basic beliefs), even though Moore offers a kind of proof. It is often the case that we claim to know that something is the case, but later find out that we were wrong. Hence, Wittgenstein’s pointing out the phrase “I thought I knew (OC 12).” Understanding this points to how a doubt can enter our claims of knowledge, but the doubt must be justifiable. It cannot be used in the same way that Moore is using the word know, that is, as an expression that can stand alone without demonstrating how it is that one knows. In other words, “I know that something is the case,” should be justifiable, just as doubting should be justifiable, it is just how the language-games of knowing and doubting work, at least as a function of how Moore is presenting his argument, and also as a function of the criticisms of Moore’s argument, that is, the radical skeptics criticism.

In a video asking the question What is Philosophy Good For, philosopher Hans-Georg Moeller gives an answer: questioning religion. He even suggests that it’s part of a good definition of philosophy, but at the very least he’s saying that questioning religion is historically one of the things that philosophy has done well, and is one of the most valuable things it does. — Jamal

I would disagree that "questioning religion" should be part of a good definition of philosophy, no more than questioning atheism should be part of a good definition of philosophy. Philosophy questions everything, and nothing should be off the table. In fact, there should be more questioning of much of the academic thinking in our culture, and the cultures around the world.

I agree that metaphysics has taken up much of philosophy, especially when it comes to religious beliefs, but that's because it's so pervasive. The questioning of metaphysical beliefs is a good thing, and the questioning of physicalism or materialism is also a good thing, both play an important role in trying to sort out what's factual. It's true that any belief that is as pervasive as religious belief will take up a large portion of philosophical thinking, but that doesn't mean that part of the definition should include "questioning religion." Part of the definition of philosophy is a critical analysis any belief.

Philosophy, for me, is any critical analysis, using philosophical principles (reason, epistemology, etc), that analyzes any belief or system of beliefs. My definition is much broader in scope than academic philosophy, and it includes the man on the street questioning his neighbors beliefs. Obviously most people are not trained in philosophy, but we're all philosophers to one degree or another. There are just not many that are very good at it.

Answers

(Answers to Life’s Most Perplexing Questions)

That’s right, I’m going to give you the answers to many of the questions that are asked about life and this reality. I know it seems rather arrogant to think that I have some of the answers, but it comes from much of the evidence that I’ve given in this thread, and much more evidence that I haven’t given. Much of what I answer goes against the standard model of reality, including many of the models of consciousness, and who we are as individuals.

These questions and answers are in no particular order, and some of these answers are only partially answered. No one has the complete answers to all these questions.

I’m writing the answers as they come to mind.

1) What is this reality?
We are in a kind of holographic simulation.

2) Who created this reality?
We participated in creating this reality.

3) Is there a God?
There is no God as most religions think of God, but there probably is something akin to the concept. To say that God is love is probably closest to the truth. However, most religions distort this picture with other beliefs.

4) What is at the base of reality?
Consciousness or mind is at the base of reality. We are all part of that consciousness, and yet we also maintain our individuality.

5) Where is our origin?
Our home is definitely not here in this simulation, it’s in the base reality and the immediate surrounding reality or realities that are not part of any simulation, of which there are many (many simulations).

6) Do we choose to come here?
Yes! We chose to come here. In fact, we plan much of our lives. Moreover, we choose our parents, we choose the kind of body we’ll have, and we choose many of the hardships we’ll experience. By the way, this is why there is no problem of evil, because we know what we are getting into before we come. Evil is a construct of this reality, and probably other created realities, but it’s not part of the base reality.

7) Why did we come here?
There is no one answer to this question, but there are several very general answers to this question. We come here to have human experiences and to learn from these experiences. We come not only for what we will learn from the experiences, but what we will help others to learn from the experiences. Much of this is still a mystery. We definitely don’t come here to have fun. The idea that the goal of life is to be happy is misguided. Life is meant to be a struggle. It’s meant, at least for most, to be difficult and challenging. The struggle is mostly with yourself. There is much more that can be said about this, but I’m trying to keep the answers short.

8) Who are we?
One thing seems certain: we are far greater beings than we realize. We are beings with great knowledge and power, not gods, but much greater than this human version of ourselves.

9) Is death anything to fear?
Definitely not, you are simply returning to your home or your original form.

10) Why don’t I remember who I am?
Probably because it would interfere with your learning experience here, and with the learning experience of others.

11) Do we choose when we will die, that is, is there a set time to die?
Yes. Although it’s not set in stone, it’s somewhat flexible for some. For others, when your time is up, it’s up, it’s agreed upon before you come here.

12) Can prayer alter someone’s death time?
In some cases, yes, in most cases, no.

13) Can prayer alter your life?
Yes, but as in the case of praying to save someone’s life, it just depends on what agreements were made before coming here. Also, you may only have access to a certain number of interventions in this life through prayer. On the other hand, no amount of prayer will change some things.

14) Will AI become conscious?
No. Consciousness is not composed of the material of this simulated reality. The only way something in this reality can become conscious is if consciousness enters it. In the same way we enter this body.

15) Can we access other realities?
Yes. There are several ways, including NDEs, DMT, mushrooms, meditation, the other side communicating to us, and deathbed visions.

16) Do animals have an afterlife?
Yes.

17) Do we sometimes see our dead loved ones?
Yes. In fact, this is probably why the disciples thought Jesus rose from the dead. They had visions after his death.

18) Do our loved ones know what’s happening here?
Yes, they are always with you. Remember we are all part of the same consciousness, so they have access to everything that’s going on. We don’t have the same access because we are a dumbed-down version of ourselves with very limited knowledge.

19) Are there children in the afterlife?
No. We only experience being a child in this simulated reality, or some other simulated reality.

20) Have we experienced other lives?
Yes. Some of us have experienced many lives in this reality and in other realities.

21) Are we eternal beings?
Yes. We probably will always exist.

22) Does evil exist?
Yes and no. In this reality evil surely exists as a concept describing certain actions, but in ultimate reality there is no evil, no sin, no damnation, no devil, and no demons. No harm can ultimately come to you. Sure, you can experience pain and harm here, but it’s just temporary, a function of this reality; and much of what you experience in terms of pain and harm is something you knew about before coming.

23) Is what people see in an NDE the afterlife?
Yes and no. In other words, what people see in their NDE is sort of an in between, viz., where we go after we immediately die. It’s like going to the train station, you’re between destinations. It’s a place you can return from, i.e., you can still be connected to your body while being there. There is a further boundary, where if you cross that boundary, you can’t return, it’s often encountered in NDES. It’s the place where you are completely disconnected from your body. People often see a silver cord connecting them to their bodies. Once the cord is broken, then you are probably severed from this simulation. It’s like being unplugged. If you’re still plugged in, there’s time to return to the body and continue living.

24) Do miraculous healings occur?
Yes. Some healings are seen in the recovery of people who have had serious illnesses that led to their NDE. In fact, sometimes doctors are guided by beings on the other side to help in their recovery.

25) Are the people in my life, viz., family, friends, enemies, and acquaintances part of who I’m supposed to interact with while I’m here?
Yes. Many, if not all of them, were part of the plan before coming here. We all play a kind of role with each other, but it’s an important role. Even those whom you detest are playing a role, for you, and for them.

26) What about suicide?
If you take your life, you are interrupting the agreement you made before coming here. Moreover, you may have to come back and live your life all over again with many of the same problems, possibly worse problems. So, suicide is not an answer to escaping the problems of life.

27) What is the most important part of life?
Love, it’s at the heart of reality. It’s not like the religious love you hear about, viz., I love you, but if you reject me, you’re going to hell forever.

28) Do we have free will?
Yes, but limited free will. There are also those things that are deterministic, i.e., those things that are determined before you come into this life.

29) Does time pass differently in the afterlife?
Yes. What may be only a few minutes or a few seconds here, maybe much longer there. Time passes, seemingly, at a faster rate there, or at the very least it passes in a non-linear way. The only way there would be no time is if we’re experiencing everything at once, including being everywhere at once. I’m not sure if that’s possible.

30) Does coming here help us in some way?
This question is related to the question, “Why do we choose to come here?” It helps us to advance in experiential learning or knowledge in ways we won’t understand until we return home. My speculation is that we also add to the experiential knowledge of the core consciousness, and that experiential knowledge can be accessed by all of us. There is no end to what we can experience. If the core mind can imagine it, it can create it, and then, we can experience it.

31) Are all realities as difficult as this reality?
No. Some realities are probably fun, and some realities are probably even more difficult to experience than this reality. If you wanted to experience hell you could probably do that. However, whether you do is up to you. Some people are warned about coming here. They’re told that it’s very difficult. It’s not for the faint of heart.

32) Last question is speculative, but very possible. Is everyone you see in this reality real? In other words, are some human bodies just NPCs?
If this reality is an advanced holographic program of sorts, then it’s very possible that not everyone you see is real or conscious. Maybe there are billions of NPCs. If this is true, and it may be, then it’s very possible to create AI that appears conscious in almost every way, but in fact is not really conscious. Maybe the only way to know would be to look at reality from outside the program.

33) Do we survive death? Yes, but this human self ends when this body dies. In other words, this body is like an avatar, and when the avatar is destroyed, we return to our base self. There is continuity of memory, experiences, and experiential knowledge, but the base self is a much higher being (more knowledgeable, higher sensory awareness, more powerful, much more loving, etc, etc.).

I'll use an argument formed from Anselm's text to show the argument isn't sound. It's taken from the English text of the Proslogion chapter 2. I think this is a better version of the argument, but it still doesn't work.

Premise (1) The fool hears and understands "a being than which none greater can be thought."

Premise (2) If the fool hears and understands, then it exists in his understanding.

Intermediate Conclusion: (3) The being than which none greater can be thought exists in the fool's understanding. Follows from (1) and (2) Modus Ponens

Premise (4) The being than which none greater can be thought exists in the understanding alone. (This would be the atheist's position according to Anselm.)

Premise (5) A being of which none greater can be thought can exist in reality.

Premise (6) A being that exists in reality is greater than a being existing in the understanding alone.

Intermediate Conclusion: (7) The being of which none greater can be thought existing in reality would be greater than the same being existing in the understanding alone. Follows from (5) and (6)

Final Conclusion: (8) A being than which none greater can be thought existing in reality would be greater than the same being existing in the mind/thought. Follows from (4) and (7)]

This presumably shows that the atheist position is contradictory, and therefore false. Why? Because the atheist's position is that a being than which none greater can be thought exists in the understanding alone. However, this cannot be so, because one could add a further attribute that would make it greater, viz., existing in reality. Thus, it can't exist in the understanding alone. It would be similar to saying that 10 is the greatest number. However, someone replies, no, I can add 1 to the number 10 and get 11, so 11 is the greatest number.

Since this argument is deductive it is valid. However, it must also be sound, i.e., the premises must be true, to be a good argument. The first premise with a problem is (2). How can a being exist in the understanding? Only a concept can exist in the understanding. We have the concept unicorn, but that doesn't mean unicorns are running around in my mind. Moreover, if you change the premise to only the concept existing in the understanding, then the argument is no longer valid. Why? Because if you add to the concept existing in reality you would still just have a concept existing in reality, not the being itself.

Finally, many find the argument dubious for other reasons, viz., trying to prove the existence of something from the concept alone, which others have pointed out in this thread, is very problematic to say the least.

This is another good video of an MD (she was an atheist) having an NDE. Much of what she experiences confirms my own conclusions on this subject. As for God and religion, although I don't believe any religion has it correct, there is something that people experience while having an NDE that could fit the bill of God (or source, or consciousness, or mind). However, it's much different than our human understanding of God, especially any religious understanding of God.

There are some that think that Sam's getting old and he wants to latch onto these beliefs as a way of having hope, nothing could be further from the truth. I've believed in these experiences for over 45 years, so it has very little to do with getting older. It's just that I've been studying these experiences more since I've been retired, but they have always interested me.

If you have even a slight interest in these experiences this is a good video to listen to.

The first proposition (T 1) is a kind of metaphysical basis for truth. Any proposition that doesn't fit the world of facts is metaphysical.

The tractatus is showing us how things are, not saying how things are. — Banno

That's an important point often overlooked. W. is doing both in the T., viz., showing using metaphysical propositions (which is why we throw the ladder away at the end of the book), and also telling us that the limit of what can be said amounts to the whole of natural science. The showing part is all the metaphysical language used in the T. Once you take the journey with him, then you can toss all the metaphysical propositions away in terms of what can be said. He treats the metaphysical propositions as normal at first, but once you understand him (T 6.54) you can discard them.

So, I should have said that if a proposition is to be correctly counted as a fact, it must be true. — Janus

But propositions are not facts, they either mirror a fact, or they mirror or picture a possible fact. It sounds like you're conflating true propositions with facts. Do you agree that propositions and facts are two separate things? Propositions, as I see it, are claims about facts.

Facts, considered as true propositions are necessarily true. If a propositons or description is false it is not a fact. Facts considered as actualties are not true or false, they simply obtain. — Janus

I agree with everything, except, I'm not sure what you mean by the first sentence. Are you saying true propositions are necessarily true?

I may have at some point in the past. Why do you ask?

But hence TLP 6.5... "to say nothing except what can be said". — Banno

We can talk about anything that exists, including the metaphysical, as long as we have access to it, so I disagree with W. on this.

Not quite. At issue is realism against antirealism. Things can be true and yet unsaid; there are unstated facts. — Banno

Ya, we're very far apart on this. If truth is a property of certain kinds of statements, viz., propositions, then truth is not something unsaid. I can see how you arrived at this though, at least I think I do. It seems to come from your idea of potential propositions. If you believe proposition have form prior to their use, then I can see where you get the idea that truths can be unsaid. Facts, on the other hand, have an ontology that is separate from statements/propositions.

Seems to me that if something is the case, then it is in a form that can be put into a proposition - whether it has been or not. IF you prefer, the world is proposition-ready... — Banno

We agree that it can be put into a proposition. Where we disagree is that it has propositional form before being used as a proposition. Propositional form is nothing more than a particular kind of statement, and it doesn't exist prior to becoming a statement (to repeat myself) Because something has the potential to become X, it doesn't follow that it is X before its potential is realized.

It seems to me that if something can be put into a proposition, then by that very fact, it has a propositional form — Banno

How can it have propositional form without being a proposition, without being used as a proposition? Are you saying that animals are communicating via propositions? I think we've argued about this before.

Truth is a property of propositions, and given that propositions, as used between people, are always used in a context, then truth is context dependent. I don't think you can separate truth from a context. Facts, on the other hand, are quite a different story, facts can stand alone, even without language.

Not sure who you're responding to, maybe both of us. All I'm doing is trying to show that logic is not only part of W's thinking in his early philosophy, but it's also part of his later philosophy as well. seems to want to deny this, or dimmish it. There is ample evidence that logic is important to W's later thinking. First and foremost W. is a logician and a mathematician.

As for your comment that rudimentary communication can be put into a proposition, it's true of course, but the point is that it's not a proposition until it's used as a proposition.

What he being said when the baby cries? It it communicating but is it trying to communicate and what is it saying? — Fooloso4

You're leaving out an important part of what I said, viz., "...the logic is seen in both forms of communication..." the primitive forms that you site, and the propositional forms that I'm emphasizing. One doesn't have to communicate via propositions, that's a given, but even in these primitive forms of communication the logic is seen in the activities associated with them. OC 402 does nothing to diminish my point. Obviously the deed is first. We wouldn't get to language without the deed being first.

I would argue that the logic of our most primitive forms of life lies foremost in the activity, what is done, rather than what is said. — Fooloso4

It's both, the logic is seen in both forms of communication, i.e., in very primitive forms of life or communication and more sophisticated forms of communication (e.g. propositions). You can't separate what is said (propositions) from what is done, which is why language-games are connected with our forms of life (activities). For communication or language-games to have sense they must be connected with other activities, this includes primitive communication.

What do logics basically consist in, if not intelligible regularities? — Janus

Logic, viz., propositional logic, is an act of inference using propositions. Not all of our actions are of this type, which I'm sure you know, and not all regularities are of this type. My thinking was that there is a kind of logic, not propositional logic (formal logic), behind reality, this was the thinking of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Logic in the T. is the starting point, and this W. inherited from Russell and Frege.


My original point, is that logic still plays a significant role in W's later thinking, is, I believe, an important continuation for W. In W's. later thinking logic is "...everything descriptive of a language-game... (OC 56)." My contention, and the contention of others, is that logic still plays a central role in W's later thinking, and it's the chief method of investigation, not only in the T., but also in the PI and beyond (especially in OC). So, in the PI and beyond, logic is seen in the various uses of the proposition in our forms of life. Logic, then, is still about the proposition, but it's internal to the various uses we give to the proposition. Logic, is intrinsic to how we use propositions in various settings, and it's what gives propositions their sense.

If you or some other animal were to try doing this it would not be because you or they are acting illogically but that there is something neurologically wrong. — Fooloso4

That certainly is true, there could be something neurologically wrong. However, my point, and maybe I'm pushing logic a bit to far here, is that apart from some neurological problem, there seems to be a kind of logic built into the world around us and how we interact with that world. I maybe looking at logic as something transcendental, this maybe a mistake, not sure. I have to think more about it.