I think maybe I'll keep the book in the first person. I was just looking over a book my philosophy professor wrote many years ago, which is similar to what I'm doing, and it was in the first person.

I'm mainly writing the book as something to accomplish before I pass away. I don't envision selling it or anything like that, it's just something I want to accomplish. It may only be read by a few friends and family members, so I don't think of it much beyond that.

I'm heading in the direction that my thread on "Does Consciousness Survive the Death of the Body" was headed, only I want to show the whole process leading up to the inductive argument.

No, I don't have a chapter breakdown, but I have a pretty clear idea of how I'm going to proceed. I agree that I should have an outline, so before going further I'll do that. I have about 40 pages written so far, which includes much of what will be in the linguistic analysis section; and I also have much of what will be in the epistemology section. I don't want anything long, so I'm going to keep the book length at about 100-120 pages. I figure it will take me about a year to complete the book. Your right about the editing, it's a real pain. Just changing everything written so far will take weeks.

Sorry, but I think some of the comments are still applicable. I'm still trying to decide about first person vs third person. First person is more intimate, but third person is more objective, and maybe more suited for this writing. I would like to be both.

I really appreciate the time spent looking over this material. It gives me some idea of what needs to be worked on, or at least improved upon. I'm hoping to get others to chime in, so I can get more feedback.

What I'm trying to do is show the process that leads up to my final argument, because I'm going to claim to know the conclusion follows; and that others can know too. This starts with understanding some of Wittgenstein's thinking about the meaning of our concepts, and some of the misunderstandings involved in our thinking about how we acquire knowledge. However, I need to be able to explain Wittgenstein so that people can understand it (this is the challenge). Maybe I'm biting off more than I can chew, but I think it can be done. It will just take a lot of work.

My intention is to start with the argument, which is what people are interested in, then if they want more they can go deeper into the book. Next would be epistemology, and finally, linguistic analysis, which is the most difficult part. So, the book will be in reverse order, because if I start with linguistic analysis, they may read a page or two, then give up. I have the outline in my head, i.e., I know how I want to proceed. I should write it down though.

Thanks again.

I understand, no worries. I had to repost the last post because I'm having a hard time with the cutting and pasting, it's leaving names of books out for some reason. Maybe that had something to do with using a unicode text converter.

So, basically, what you're saying is that the writing is mediocre, and it's about as clear as mud. You may be right, and it's especially true if I'm trying to explain this material to people with no background in this area of philosophy. I don't mind the honesty. Let me give the next few paragraphs to see if it helps, with the caveat that none of this is written in stone, obviously.
________________________________

Before we get to the subject of epistemology, we will need some background on how meaning has been traditionally thought of in philosophy. Traditionally, the meaning of a word was thought to be connected with the object it refers to, that is, its referent, or the object it denotes (the object the word points to). The idea that meaning is directly connected to things or objects in reality can be traced back to Augustine (354 A.D. – 430 A.D.). Thinking of meaning in this context culminates in the twentieth century with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (originally published in German, in 1921, then translated and published into English, in 1922).

Again, just as our treatment of epistemology is just meant to be an overview, so is our look at Wittgenstein’s ideas only meant to be a glimpse at some of his ideas. This glimpse is mainly focused on his ideas about meaning; and to briefly contrast his ideas of meaning in terms of his early and later philosophy.

Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was born in Vienna, Austria, and he was the youngest of eight children. He came from a very cultured and very rich industrialist family, where the arts, especially music, played a central role. In fact, Johannes Brahms, who was considered a close friend, would come to the Wittgenstein home and play his music; and Brahms was also known to have given some family members piano lessons.

Ludwig was educated at home until the age of 14, when his parents decided to send the young Wittgenstein to Linz to prepare him in mathematics and the physical sciences. It seems that the young Wittgenstein wanted to study with the physicist Boltzmann, however Boltzmann died in 1906. After being educated in Linz for three years, he then went to Berlin to study mechanical engineering at the Technische Hochscule at Charlottenburg. After two years in Berlin, he went to England where he became a research student of engineering at the University of Manchester. During this time, he engaged in aeronautical research, and went from experimenting with kites, to the construction of a jet reaction propeller for aircraft. The design of the propeller was a mathematical endeavor, which eventually led the young Wittgenstein into pure mathematics, and then, to the foundation of mathematics.

Apparently, his interest in the foundation of mathematics led him to Russell and Whitehead's work, called, The Principles of Mathematics. The Principles of Mathematics greatly affected the young Wittgenstein, and this interest led him to the works of Frege, who was the founder of modern mathematical logic. So, it was through Russell, Whitehead, and Frege's works that Wittgenstein entered into the study of philosophy.

Wittgenstein’s early work, the Tractatus, is a more traditional philosophical work. It is traditional in the sense of the kind of analysis he is doing. He digs into a proposition as if to find some essence that will logically connect it to the world. It is an a priori analysis of the proposition that shows how propositions picture (or mirror) the world of facts through a one-to-one correspondence between the proposition, and the fact it pictures (it is a picture theory of language). It is through this investigation that Wittgenstein hopes to find an exactness of meaning, or an exactness of expression. He accomplishes this by breaking down the proposition into what he believes are its essential parts, namely, elementary propositions, and even smaller parts, called names. So, according to Wittgenstein, “…propositions must bring us to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination (T. 4.221).” Names, again, being the smallest constituent part of the proposition. And, since Wittgenstein held to the traditional view of language, namely, that the meaning of a word is the object it refers to, or the object it denotes (T. 3.203). He then links the proposition, via a name, with an object, the smallest constituent part of a fact. Facts being broken down into atomic facts, then into objects. There is a direct connection from the name (the smallest component of the proposition) to the object it represents (the smallest component of the fact). In this way we have a direct link between the proposition and the world of facts. This brings us back to the traditional view of meaning, that the meaning of a word is its referent.

Wittgenstein’s analysis is much more complicated than what is presented here. My only point is to show how meaning was thought of in the traditional sense, and how Wittgenstein’s Tractatus continued this historical line of thinking in a much more exacting way. This is probably why Russell mistakenly thought Wittgenstein was trying to construct an ideal language. Because if Wittgenstein was correct in the way he thought of propositions, then you would have more precision based on the nature of the proposition, and how it pictured the world of facts.

Wittgenstein’s later work, in some ways, is continuous, namely, he continues to think of many of the problems of philosophy as misunderstandings of the logic of our language. It would be a mistake to think that his later philosophy completely repudiates his early philosophy. He mainly repudiates his method of analysis. This contrast of methods into the nature of the proposition, is what separates his early philosophy from his later philosophy. If there is a gap between the two periods of his thinking, it is a gap of method. One could say that the difference between these two investigations, is like comparing the a priori (independent of experience) with the a posteriori (dependent on experience).

Wittgenstein’s early philosophy starts when he meets both Bertrand Russell (1911), and Gottlob Frege (1912); and his later philosophy starts roughly around 1929. His later philosophy is most famously expounded in the Philosophical Investigations; and culminates in his final notes on the subject of what it means to know, called On Certainty. His final entry occurs two days before his death in April 1951.

It is important to understand the background of Wittgenstein's works in order to better understand his thinking. I am not going to be able to give those of you who are interested a complete background of what was going on in philosophy at the time, vis-a-vis Bertrand Russell, A. N. Whitehead, and Gottlob Frege. I will only give you bits and pieces in order to show the connection with Wittgenstein’s analysis of what it means to know, and the view of epistemology as presented in these musings.

Does anyone else have an opinion on writing this in the first person? This is meant to be read by the public, so I don't know if that makes a difference. I've read different opinions about first person writing.

Thanks Tom.

That's exactly what I'm looking for. Thanks. I was wondering about the first person part, and I've also been trying to clean up some of the wordiness. There is going to be a complete section on what knowledge is, this part is specifically about linguistic analysis, but your point is well taken.

Thanks for the input. It's appreciated.

Weird, when I pasted this in here, things were left out, so I had to make corrections.

Same slip again. What is true is independent of what is believed. One can assert the truth of a statement that is true. It doesn't matter if that person knows it is true. The way that we (the outside evaluators) know that it is true is based upon our own justifications, not the person that merely believes something is true by luck (or other insufficient warrant). We know it is true, they don't know it, we both assert that it is true. Why is that a problem? — Ennui Elucidator

You seem to be confusing certain concepts. A truth is simply what is asserted, what is independent is the fact that the truth claim is about. If I say, "The Earth has one moon," it's true, why? Because it tells us something that mirrors or reflects reality, generally speaking. Truths are just claims that are expressed as propositions, they don't exist somewhere in the ether. The only things that have this ontology, that you seem to be referring to, are the facts, the states-of-affairs in reality.

That's it for me, I'm in the middle of writing a book. Good Luck.

Or on the triune analysis of JTB, can't you have TB without the J such that you can say, "X is true and I believe X is true, but I lack justification such that I don't know X is true?" Consider the old "Child believes his father has his wallet because he gave it to him moments before, but as it turns out, the Child is wrong about who his father is because he was kidnapped at birth by FakeFather, FakeFather doesn't have his wallet because someone just pickpocketed him, and the pickpocket is Realfather!" — Ennui Elucidator

I thought my explanation was very clear, but apparently not. I'll just respond to this. Can you have a true belief, without the justification? Obviously you can, in at least three ways. First, I can have a belief that's true, i.e., I don't know it's true, I just believe it's true without the justification. In this case, it's akin to a lucky guess, since there is no justification. Second, I can hold to a belief that's based on some or little evidence, but it's not enough to, again, justify believing it's true. You still don't know if it's true. So, still, in these two cases, you can't make a definitive claim that it's true. A claim to truth doesn't equate to truth. Third, and finally, you can have a truth claim that's justified, you have good reasons or good evidence to back up the claim, if this is the case, then you not only have a truth claim, but a truth claim that's amounts to knowledge.

In your example, which seems to allude to the Gettier examples, is that the child believes something that's not true, so what's the point? Presumable the point is that the child thinks their justified, when their not, so their belief is false. Again, the difference between believing a claim is true, and it actually being true. These are totally different things. All of the Gettier examples fall short of actually being justified, or actually being true, as opposed to thinking or believing one is justified. The same with your example.

But do we ever say, "I don't know that it's true (i.e., I'm affirming the truth, not doubting the truth), that Paris is the capital of France." So, it's true, but I don't know it. What!?
— Sam26

Do you mind elaborating a bit on this?

A: Has sufficient epistemic warrant to know X.

B: Was told by A that X is true, but lacks sufficient epistemic warrant to know X because "B said so" is inadequate. Has never had cause to doubt A's claims of truth and believes that if A says it is true, it is true. If "X" was "It is true that this bridge is safe for you to walk across" and B said it to A, B would unhaltingly walk across the bridge.

B says, "I don't know that X is true." — Ennui Elucidator

This gets back to the statement, "X is an unknown truth." First, I hold to the view that generally speaking, the definition of knowledge is justified true belief, i.e., for many of our uses of the concept know, this definition works perfectly well.

Second, if someone makes a claim that X is true, it's just a claim, not known to be true. For a claim to be true, it needs a justification, otherwise it's just a claim and nothing more. What's being stated here, is that we have a truth, categorically, not a claim that maybe true, but a truth. But, how can we make such a claim, unless that truth is known to be true, and if it's known, then it's by definition, knowledge. It follows necessarily then, that the statement, "X is an unknown truth," is contradictory. There are unknown claims (beliefs or opinions), that is, we don't know if their true or false. There are unknown facts, yet to be discovered, but there is no such thing as an unknown truth. It's like saying there are unknown knowns. Keep in mind, again, to say that something is definitively true, then supposedly you have good reasons or good evidence to support the truth of the claim. Otherwise, again, to repeat myself for clarity, you don't have a truth, you have a proposition that maybe true, or maybe false.

Your example seems to make a similar mistake. Let's say, for example, "Joe tells me that the bridge is safe to cross," and let's suppose that I know Joe, and have interacted with Joe on innumerable occasions, and moreover, I know Joe is honest and levelheaded. Would I have sufficient warrant to believe Joe? Yes. We justify many of our beliefs in this way. In fact, most of our beliefs are justified based on the testimony of others, unless there are mitigating circumstances that give us reason to suppose otherwise. So, you do have sufficient warrant to believe Joe. And, if you don't believe what Joe said is true, then supposedly you have reason to doubt what Joe said. In this case you don't have a justification for the truth of what Joe said, so it's not a truth, it's simply a claim, a simple proposition.

Yes, you want to read his original works, but read this first it will give you a lot of background information, then read his works.

One of the best books to read starting out is, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, by K. T. Fann. You can get it used for just a few dollars.

That's understandable, you're not alone. It's difficult material. I still find large parts difficult to follow, and I started reading his notes in 1979. Good hunting Agent Smith.

Yes, we feel at home in the bottle.

There is just so much of this in philosophy, and in our general thinking, it's difficult to unravel it all. And, even those of us, including myself, who think we understand Wittgenstein, makes these same errors, over and over again.

Omniscience is a logical impossibility if interaction is involved, for interacting with that what the knowledge is about will destroy the knowledge you had before interacting. Hoisting the interaction aboard of the knowledge already there doesn't change the outcome. If the process of knowing becomes part of the process the knowing is about then the knowing itself becomes a hindrance to knowledge of it all.

Only the evolution of neatly isolated material arrangements, given well defined initial conditions, can be related to omniscience. The science being about the material insofar it satisfies the criterion of being valid knowledge. If the arrangement is started and we let it evolve freely, without us intervening, the evolution can be known completely. The moment we intervene, the knowledge is frustrated. If the molded matter behaves not as expected the knowledge has to be adjusted. Which potentially involves changing the theory, or changing the mold and conditions. — Raymond

This is just too convoluted Raymond.

Why shouldn't there be referents for these? Time refers to a clock, free will refers to the will, the refers to nouns, etc refers to a not mentioned part. Only nothing refers to nothing. All words have referents or meaning. Unless you use the words like words only, like can be done in poetry. — Raymond

There are plenty of threads in this forum that discuss this, so I'm not going to explain it again. I find it funny that you think 'time' refers to a clock. So, if we didn't have clocks there would be no time? What if there was nothing used to measure time, would there be no time, and what would be its referent then?

1. Can have meaning in the usual sense (as referents). Which meanings of this strain makes omniscience coherent? — Agent Smith

The idea that meaning is generally derived from referents has been debunked. There are exceptions, but meaning should be seen, primarily, as a function of use. There are no referents for words like, time, nothing, the, free will, etc. Freeing yourself from this idea is very helpful in philosophy.

I gave you an example of a coherent use of omniscience. Read my other post to you above. Remember you can always create examples where a particular concept doesn't make sense, or is incoherent. The problem is that people want to give some precise definition to the word, and there may not be one. I like the general definition of omniscience as, knowing all that's possible to be known. There maybe things that are impossible to know, for anyone, including a god. And, because people don't like the concept, because it has religious overtones, they go a bit overboard in their analysis.

But can we buy the proposition that there are true propositions that cannot be known? And can we know that proposition to be true? — Cuthbert

My view, is that it's largely a misunderstanding of the concepts involved. You also see this in the Gettier problem. But to answer your question, and I think you're leaning this way too, is that there is a serious problem with the phrase, "unknown truths." One can say "unknown facts," facts being states of affairs, but "unknown truths" is a misunderstanding. Again, it seems this phrase, as has been pointed out, is saying "unknown knowns." If we have an X that is true, then how can we say it's true, if it's not known to be true? Otherwise you just have a proposition that's either true or false, a claim that's not known to be true, an opinion.

As to your second question, what proposition? There is no proposition that corresponds to this supposed "true proposition." It's an illusion. Language again confounds us. Can we call an imaginary claim true or false?

Someone give me an unknown truth! Saying we don't know X, Y, or Z, is one thing, it makes sense. And, saying there are unknowns, makes sense, but the rest of this is senseless to me. There are states of affairs that are unknown, viz., facts that we haven't discovered. There are claims that are potential truths, but they are potentially false too. A claim is about propositions, and the only way to know if a proposition is true, is if we can justify it in some way. However, if we justify it, it then becomes knowledge. This, I believe is just a confused way of talking. Where am I going wrong?

Also, we apply the word truth to actual claims, not some invisible claim existing in the ether.

We can say "I don't know algebra," or "I don't know if I remembered his name correctly." But do we ever say, "I don't know that it's true (i.e., I'm affirming the truth, not doubting the truth), that Paris is the capital of France." So, it's true, but I don't know it. What!?This is essentially what you're doing by affirming an unknown truth. I can say, "I don't know if Paris is the capital of France," which expresses a doubt about one's knowledge.

Again, linguistic knots.

Notice that "p is an unknown truth" uses a proper name - p - for the unknown truth. It is quite different to the everyday "there are things we do not know". — Banno

I find the phrase "unknown truth" to be problematic, to say the least. If X is known to be true, which is what this statement seems to imply, then how can it be unknown? It's like saying, "I both know, and don't know, that X is true, which is contradictory. If truth in this statement is just a claim without justification, then you can't say it's true, you can believe it's true, but that's not the same as being true. Claims don't equate to truth, so I'm not sure the statement "P is an unknown truth" even makes sense. This reminds me of the Gettier problems, they say things that seem to make sense, but in reality don't make sense. People tie themselves up in linguistic nonsense.

Well, it seems to me that if I make the claim that I'm omniscient, most people would say the claim is false. However, how could you say it's false if it was incoherent? How are you able to have this discussion if the word was incoherent? Are you saying that the concept omniscience is the same as "xfisdia?" And, what are you saying when you say it's incoherent?

If I say that I know everything, i.e., there are no facts hidden from me, is this incoherent? I don't see how it's incoherent. So, it depends on how you are using the concept. You might argue that no one has access to all the facts. Okay, if no one has access to all the facts, then no one is omniscient, which would make my claim to be omniscient, false. But, again, I don't see where the conversation about omniscience is incoherent.

Whether the concept is coherent depends on how it is used. Just like any concept it can be misused, and as a consequent it can be incoherent.

My turn. Sime, you're wrong about the arrow example." How an arrow is understood is not private; the arrow has a use only because we (not "I") agree as to which end of the arrow is which. The example leads in exactly the other direction to the oen you suppose. — Banno

I agree.

Also, @Sime think of how playing a game of chess would go if the rules for chess were determined privately - no one would understand what in the world you were doing. It wouldn't correspond with the moves the rest of us were making. Of course, it's even worse than this, at least people in the chess example could point out how the correct moves are made; but in your private language, one where there is no interaction with others, it would be even more problematic.

And Sam26 says my interpretations of Wittgenstein are "so far from the norm". What Sam refuses to accept, is that when we are talking "private language", there is not such thing as the norm. How can one even discuss the possibility of private language if one insists that language use must be normative? — Metaphysician Undercover

Geez MU, who in the world ever said there was a norm of use with regard to a private language? Norms of use, as discussed by Wittgenstein, have to do with language-games as part of a social use. It's our social uses of concepts that give us a norm of use. Moreover, there is not one norm of use, but many norms of use, depending on the context, and the language-game associated with that concept and context.

We are only able to talk about the false assumption of having a private language, in light of the social nature of meaning, namely, it's a necessary feature of a concept that its meaning happens socially within forms of life, both linguistically and non-linguistically.

I found an excellent article that is worth reading, by Stefan Majetschak, entitled

"A misleading parallel”: Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts. It's definitely worth reading.

Just search, "A misleading parallel”: Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts by Stefan Majetschak, and download pdf.

This article is from the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy Volume 9, Number 4.

The observation here is quite specific: hell is immoral. The simple answer is that assuming god is good, then there is no hell, and various popular forms of christianity and other religions are simply wrong.
— @Banno

That's like saying that the police and the justice system are immoral, and that if they were good, there would be no arrests, no judicial processes, and no prisons. — baker

Forgive me, but this is just a stupid comparison, and needs to be called out. We are talking about a God, according to some Christians, obviously not all, who sends people to eternal damnation for not believing or accepting certain beliefs. We are also talking about a God, who created humans knowing full well that many would reject these beliefs, given their free will. So, God would have known that creating this or that person, at the very least, would result in, or at least there would be a good chance, that that person would go to hell. If such a God existed, I would do all that I could to oppose that being. Moreover, such a view makes this God responsible for the resulting evils that occur given God's knowledge. It would be like me creating a robot, giving it free will to do whatever, knowing that it's probably going to result in a certain amount of evil, sometimes even great amounts of evil. I would be responsible for the evil that ensued as a result of such a creation, and I should be held responsible for that evil and punished.

Furthermore, eternal punishment or damnation, is excessive by definition, even if you don't think of it as torture. Most people go through their lives without committing the most egregious of sins, yet because their not within the fold of Christian beliefs, they are damned, forever (according to many Christians, Protestant and Catholic). This is not just, and should be rejected as part of any Christian belief, and many Christians do reject it.

Finally, to compare this belief with what we do in our legal system, is just ridiculous, to say the least. Even we recognize that sending someone to prison forever for minor crimes is not just, period. Yet this is what the God, as defined by some Christians, does! We at least try, although not always successful, to be just in our deliberations about punishment. We can recognize, generally, what's just and not just, given the crime. But the concept of God as defined by these particular beliefs (I don't believe such a God exists), is outright immoral. So, on the one hand you have no justice, or very little justice, and on the other hand you have an attempt to be just.

I guess it depends on how far you want to take it. I talk to people about this stuff all the time, but I'm measured, I'm not always measured in this forum, but when talking with friends, etc. I even went to a church and sat in on a class on faith and reason. I was very careful about what I said, and mostly, offered answers only when asked. However, the person leading the class didn't like that I was there, at least that was my impression. I find that some progress can be made, but I had to watch my attitude. And, I had to be careful not to come across as a know it all. I find that many atheists and agnostics have a very condescending way of talking. I include myself in this mix. My metaphysics, although not religious, is a bit spiritual, so I do have some sympathy for those who appeal to something beyond.

Many Christians need to be challenged on some of these beliefs. I remember arguing with one Christian many years ago who believed that if you didn't "accept Christ" as savior, then you're doomed to hell. So, I asked him, "What about babies who die in infancy? They never accept Christ." His response, is that they too go to hell. Now obviously not everyone who calls themselves a Christian would believe such a thing, but there are many who do.

I also find it reprehensible that there are many people who think communism is a good thing. Especially if you consider how many people have been murdered under this ideology in the 20th century, too many to count. People fall victim to all kinds of crazy beliefs. This is why I continuously point out that most beliefs have nothing to do with logical arguments, it's more about how people were raised, what their friends believe, what their family believes, group think, etc., etc.

Ok, but what other uses? That is what I'm asking. Strange that you can't even provide any examples of what it is that you are trying to say. — Harry Hindu

I haven't given any examples because I've assumed that most people know, that any use of a word in a sentence, is an example of how it's used. So, if I'm talking about epistemology for example, and I say, "I know John is guilty of murder," then the sense of the word know, (namely, how it's used in this sentence), is that I'm justified in some appropriate way. Another use or sense of the word know that is common, is to use it as a kind of emphasis. The emphasis on know would reflect a conviction, i.e., how one feels about the belief their expressing. Wittgenstein pointed this out in OC, where he says this kind of use can express itself in tone of voice. These are two specific examples of different uses of the same word. An epistemological use, and a use that expresses my subjective conviction. However, don't confuse a use that expresses the subjective, as a use that gives the word meaning.

So you've never heard of mass delusions, or ideas that propagate within a group that are just wrong - like the Earth being flat? — Harry Hindu

First, I don't think that because people believe in something that's false, that that necessarily means that they are deluded; and I don't believe this is an argument against my point. And, even if you're under the spell of a mass delusion, it doesn't follow that your words have lost their sense. It just means that you're convinced of something that's false, among other things.

The idea that it's you (emphasis on the subjective) that's convinced, gives people the false idea that it's you that gives meaning to the word. Again, the difference between understanding an expression of the subjective, and understanding how meaning comes about within a social context.

If words have meaning apart from the subjective and is necessarily the case, then how did you misconstrue my intent as being funny when that wasn't my intent? — Harry Hindu

I was being facetious Harry.

Used for what? To accomplish what goal? To win the game? Or to communicate? How does one communicate without the understanding of representation -that something (scribbles and sounds) can mean something else (that isn't scribbles and sounds, like apples and trees)? Unless Witt is saying that individuals don't exist, then it would logically follow that individuals will have varying experiences with the rules of any language which will lead to varying degrees of understanding the rules of some language, which is to say that they have a subjective view of any language. — Harry Hindu

Oh, I get it Harry, you're joking, right? You're trying to be funny, because I can't make any sense of this apart from a joke. If I say a word has a use, then I'm saying that it has a use within a particular language-game or a particular social context. There may be many uses of a word, so your question, "Used for what?" isn't taking into account that there may not be any one use, but many uses. And yes, we do use words/concepts, and sentences to communicate. However, the sense of a word is never the result of your subjective view. We can use words to communicate a subjective view, but we learn to use the words, and the meanings of words, in social contexts apart from the subjective. Not only is this the case, but as far as I can tell, it's necessarily the case.

Any interpretation of a social convention is subjective. Wittgenstein was especially clear about this (e.g how can I know the intended direction of an arrow? how I am supposed to interpret a look-up table? ) . So there is no escape from purely private meaning, at least for Wittgenstein, even if such meaning cannot be linguistically translated. — sime

Sime, you're wrong about the arrow example, and about a "look up table." Let's see if I can make this clear. Wittgenstein asks in (PI 454), "How does it come about that this arrow -----------> points?" Any sign, be it a word or an arrow, only has an application, a use, that we together as a people, i.e., in socially given situations, give to it. "This pointing is not a hocus pocus which can be performed only by the soul [the soul, as used here, should be understood as the inner thing, the subjective]. So, it seems to me, and not only me, but many other interpreters, that Wittgenstein is saying the exact opposite of your point. This is clear throughout the PI, starting at the beginning when he talks about language-games.

Moreover, much of the point of the PI is to escape from the idea of a purely private meaning. I don't understand where you're getting this interpretation from, but I'd run from it. It can't be further from the truth. Anyway, that's my take.

Sometimes the obvious does need to be stated, so than you for stating it. — Banno

I have a knack for stating the obvious. :grin: I do it often. It helps keep us grounded.

I just listened to the podcast that you provided about Lewis and his thinking. I think it's reasonable to ask the questions Lewis asked, I've asked these questions myself. However, I think it's more complicated than just seeing God as evil, and then wondering about all the people who worship this God - i.e., what does it say about the character of these people? I've been around Christians from many denominations and their moral characters vary just as widely as do the moral characters of any group. I don't think you can make the generalization that the people who worship the Christian God, for example, have a diminished character. No more than you can generalize about the moral characters of people who believe in communism, or any other ism. Moreover, many of these people have thought through some of these issues, and do provide a rationale of sorts to themselves and others. One rationale, which I do not in any way find convincing, is that what is meant by just or unjust, good and evil, is based on God himself. We don't determine the sense of these words, God does. It's goes to the divine command theory or something close to it. Moreover, you can always escape some of these questions by saying that God has good reasons which are unknown to us, or some interpret the Bible in a way that helps them deal with these questions.

There have been other types of answers that go to God's infinite nature, how are we even capable of judging whether God is just or unjust, etc, given our limited view of the infinite. Other Christians argue that hell is not forever, that it's for a given period of time, and their are levels of punishment that fit the offense, so it's not as straight forward as one might suppose. And, to answer such a questions requires much more of a study of the psychology of belief, the logic used in thinking about such beliefs, and the conceptual framework these people work within. I don't think it's a simple thing to answer, and we have to be careful about making such sweeping generalizations.

Cheers.

In what follows I've tried to condense some of what's been said in this thread and elsewhere.

Wittgenstein has an important point, namely, that the meaning of our words or concepts is primarily a function of a norm of use within a given language-game. These norms are mostly governed by the rules of the language-game (the logic of the language-game), which take place socially as a cultural practice, in what Wittgenstein calls the activity of a “form of life (e.g., PI 23).” And, it is in this social activity (non-linguistic and linguistic activity woven together) that words or concepts get their sense. Just as the pieces in chess get their sense from how they are used in a chess game, which is also a form of life. Outside the social practice of playing a game of chess, the pieces lose their sense. In other words, how would we talk about chess pieces without referencing their place of origin, that place where chess pieces get their life? The same would be true if we wanted to talk of cellular function apart from the language-game of biology. The word cell, as a biological concept, would lose its sense apart from biology. This is why we say words have a home in which they reside, that is, they have a function, and get their life within their respective language-games.

The meaning of our words or concepts is established necessarily within a social construct, and it necessarily follows that meaning is not a function of an individual’s privately derived sense of meaning; assuming that a privately derived sense of meaning is even linguistically possible, as Wittgenstein’s private language comments seem to suggest.

Further, I have invited you to read something with more care and attention that perhaps you're accustomed to and to do even a little on-line looking about a claim you made. And you're not interested. Where I come from, such dismissive non-interest disqualifies you from conversation. Not least because you have fired off all of your ammunition. "It means what I say it means!" And were that the case, what need the rest of us for any other authority, or even opinion. — tim wood

You have no idea as to how much care I put into studying the Bible, or theology for that matter, that's pure speculation! I was interested enough to study the Bible for years, including going to a Bible college and some master level classes, so I think I have a right to be dismissive of some of these ideas. And, I never said anything close to "it means what I say it means." I was giving you the view of many Christians. I've associated with these people for years (mainly Protestants, but also many Catholics).

No doubt about it. The Old Testament supports slavery, genocide and rape and depicts a monstrous and evil creature who insists on being worshipped. This is not a creature that deserves anything but scorn. — Tom Storm

I'm not saying there is no God, I don't know, and neither does anyone else. I don't believe there is such a being as presented in the Bible, or any other religion. Now some people use the concept God in a very general way, that's fine, but to think the Bible is some divinely inspired book just seems a bit out there. People had all kinds of strange beliefs 2000+ years ago.