Again, it's about context. What's veridical is not a fiction, or myth, or a hallucination, etc. Although, within a fictional story one could talk about what's veridical in relation to the story. However, it's still a fiction.

So they do have a referent or they don't? — bongo fury

It depends on the context. If you're talking about a fictional character, the referent is the character in the story. If you're referring to what's veridical, then they have no referent.

Oh, no, I mean the way we use the concept is real, but not all concepts have referents in reality, i.e., they're not veridical. The only referent they might have is a fictional one, their ontology is real, but only as a fiction or myth.

What? What's the brain shiver?

There is an afterlife, i.e., that we as conscious beings do survive the death of the body. For me, it's beyond dispute, as I argued in the following thread.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1980/evidence-of-consciousness-surviving-the-body

So, his approach to meaning and the underlying structure of language is shown to be meaningless and nonsense by his approach. — Richard B

My understanding is the following:

He clearly says in the preface, "[T]he aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather-- not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts..." Also, "If this work has any value, it consists in two things: the first is that thoughts are expressed in it, and on this score the better the thoughts are expressed--the more the nail has been hit on the head--the greater will be its value." And finally, "...the truth [my emphasis] of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive. I believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems."

It seems to me that Wittgenstein wanted us to view the Tractatus as any other work of philosophy (as we proceed through it), viz., that the propositions in it are "true." As one climbs the ladder with Wittgenstein, one comes to realize that the propositions in the Tractatus, as traditionally thought of, are nonsense. Why? Because in drawing a limit to thought (what can be said) we come to see that the propositions of the Tractatus have gone beyond what can be said. It's in this way, that the propositions are nonsense, they have gone into the metaphysical. So, as we take the journey with him (which is the process of showing) we come to realize that the propositions, as traditionally thought, are not true, but nonsense, because there are no facts that correspond to them. He believed, of course, that in taking this journey, we then see the world aright.

Much of philosophy, he believed, transcends the limit of language, and is therefore meaningless in much the same way that the propositions of the Tractatus are meaningless. Even in his later philosophy he believed that such a limit existed, and that much of philosophy, was an attempt to say what cannot be said. Although, his later philosophy is broader in scope, in terms of how the logic of language determines the limits of what can be said.

There are many concepts, especially in fiction and mythology, that have no actual or real existence or referent. The only thing that's real is the concept, or conceptual idea.

I believe that logic was too broad. It seems as though Wittgenstein set up the cart correctly, with logical analysis behind ordinary language — Shawn

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Are you saying that Wittgenstein's restrictive logic in the Tractatus is correct, viz., that the meaning of a word is the object that it denotes. It's this restrictive logic that Wittgenstein rejects in his later philosophy. Moreover, it's clearly incorrect. There's not much dispute about it. The logic in the Tractatus breaks down the proposition into it's smallest part (names), which has a one-to-one correspondence to the smallest part of a fact (objects). It's a picture theory or truth-function theory of meaning.

There are some important ideas in the Tractatus, but Wittgenstein rejects the a priori logic behind the Tractatus in favor of a more broad view of logic. His logic in the T. is much too restrictive in terms of meaning. I'm not familiar with Bergmann. My interpretation of W. mostly came from studying and reading W., that's not to say that we can't learn from others who have studied W., we definitely can, but read broadly.

What kind? What methodology ought one adopt if not an ordinary language one? That's all we can default towards. So, methodological nominalism prevails, yes? — Shawn

If you're asking what kind of confusions, they're everywhere. Pick a subject, and linguistic confusions abound. pointed some out in his quote of Wittgenstein, and the PI is full of examples. Almost any discussion on the nature of truth, knowledge, belief, reality, consciousness, metaphysics, religion, atheism, etc., contain linguistic errors.

I'm not against Wittgenstein's ordinary language methodology, i.e., if one is understanding what he means by ordinary language. It surely doesn't mean that the man on the street is necessarily speaking more precisely, although in many cases he may be. The logic of conceptual use, as seen in Wittgenstein's later philosophy is reflected in our forms of life, which tends to bring out the correct grammar (or logic) behind the use of our words/concepts. Understanding ordinary use in this sense can shed light on the nature of the correct use of words, or again, the logic that follows the history of ordinary usage. This is not as easy as one, two, three, it's extremely complex, and confusing. Note how in many threads/discussions many of the discussion break down over the use of words Even people who think they understand Wittgenstein can't sort out some of the issues (I include myself in this group). This is one of the reasons we shouldn't be so dogmatic about our particular philosophical ideas or theories. We are easily misled down this or that road.

Because of my metaphysics I tend towards some of Plato's ideas, but this is a bit off topic. And, because of my metaphysics I believe Wittgenstein was wrong about the limits of language, not that there aren't limits, but where the limit is to be drawn. If, as I suspect, our consciousness extends into the metaphysical, then language use does also.

I like this quote from Wittgenstein in Culture and Value, “People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don’t understand why it has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb ‘to be’ that looks as if it functions in the same way as ‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’, and as long as we still have the adjectives ‘identical’, ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘possible’, as long as we continue to talk of river of time, of an expanse of space, etc. etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what’s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because in so far as people think they can see the “ limits of human understanding”, they believe of course that they can see beyond these.” — Richard B

This is a great quote, as it points to a fundamental problem with language, i.e., that it can twist our conceptual frame of reference into tight little knots of confusion. This is true even if you think you understand Wittgenstein. The best we can hope for is to try to understand Wittgenstein's linguistic methods to untie these knots, but unfortunately, even those who have studied Wittgenstein for years can't seem to untie some of the knots. It could be argued that even Wittgenstein was confused on some level, viz., on the reach of language. I'm speaking here of the metaphysical reach of language.

So, I agree with the above quote, until the last sentence or two. My disagreement, though, takes nothing away from his genius. It is still my opinion that if you don't at least try to understand Wittgenstein's methods, that you are doing a disservice to your own understanding of the concepts used in our philosophical discourse. The point being, you'll be more confused than you should be. Most of the discussions in forums like this reflect these linguistic confusions. In fact, most of the threads are filled with linguistic confusions, you can see it in the type of questions being asked.

Gettier doesn't claim that his characters know. On the contrary, he claims that they have a justified true belief and not knowledge. That's the point. — Ludwig V

I understand that Gettier is saying that they don't know, but those who are having the experience of seeing X, claim they know. Gettier is saying, they don't know, based on his examination of JTB. Again, Gettier is confused. You can't infer from someone's claim that they know, that they do indeed know, and that's what Gettier is doing. He's saying, see, their using JTB and it failed to give knowledge. He's conflating one's claim to knowledge with actually having knowledge. There's nothing difficult about this. That's my point.

What does Wittgenstein mean by grammar? Wittgenstein's basic definition of grammar is, the rules that govern the use or the meaning of words (PG 133). The rules are arbitrary and are not "accountable to any reality." Wittgenstein maintains that the rules of grammar, which guide the use and thus meaning of our words, are similar in function to the rules of chess, which govern the use of the pieces. The rules prescribe and proscribe certain move in language and rule out others. Rules also provide a standard whereby we can adjudicate certain moves as opposed to others. This adjudication allows us to regard certain moves successful and others not. One can also regard the rules as command like. He also refers to the rules as convention (PI 355).

Are language-games synonymous with forms of life? This question is probably driven by statements like, "And to imagine a language-game is to imagine a form of life (PI 19)." It's true that our language-games are intertwined within the fabric of our forms of life, and it's also true that language-games themselves are forms of life. However, it's not true that a language-game is logically connected with a form of life, i.e., we can imagine forms of life without language. "Language-game...[or] the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life (PI 23)." Language-games cannot be imagined without a form of life, but that doesn't mean that forms of life necessarily require language. Again, forms of life can be activities completely devoid of language.

Some thoughts on “forms of life.”

What does Wittgenstein mean by “forms of life?” There seem to be at least four ideas behind Wittgenstein’s idea of forms of life. First, the biology associated with human forms of life, i.e., we share breathing, eating, walking, sleeping in common with all human forms of life. Second, the social cultural forms of life, and the wide variety of social cultural forms of life, such as, language, religious beliefs, political beliefs, games, rule-following, scientific pursuits, etc., etc. Third, that which forms our natural and historical environment, viz., living on Earth, the Earth has one moon, the moon didn’t pop into existence five minutes ago, etc. And, fourth, the forms of life associated with other biological animals. All of these make up our forms of life, and they help condition our grammar, and thus our language-games. Our language-games are embedded within the human forms of life.

Forms of life have developed over time, and as such, have been cultivated from more primitive forms of life (“in the beginning was the deed” -Wittgenstein) including the non-linguistic forms of life.

“Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive kinds of behavior towards other human beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is an extension of primitive behavior (Z 545).”

If we see forms of life within this wide context, we can begin to understand why Wittgenstein would say, “If a lion could speak, we could not understand him (PI).” Even human language-games, embedded in certain cultural beliefs, can leave us wondering what they mean by the use of their words. If you extend this to lions, one can see why this would be problematic.

What people seem to forget is that Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, is giving us a method of doing philosophy that is more of an art than a science. He is not presenting theories that put forth dogmatic ideas; in fact, one could argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is fighting against dogmatism, and deemphasizing general theories of meaning.

It is the uniform nature of our words that lends itself to theorizing about the general use of meaning. This can be seen clearly in the study of epistemology, namely, what it means to know is not some clearly defined idea without shades of gray. What we get are a variety of uses that do not give us the clarity we are striving for, especially as philosophers. For the most part language hinders our desire for exactness, and our desire for absolute meaning. Instead what we see are words that have a variety of meanings, largely dependent on how they are used in a variety of social activities or "forms of life." The tendency, is to draw arbitrary lines of meaning in order to provide clarity. Where we draw these lines depends on how we view a particular use or definition, that is, what we are stressing. As we stress a particular view of meaning we naturally form an arbitrary boundary that causes more confusion. We tend to get tunnel vision when looking for exactness.

The logic of use that Wittgenstein fosters is one in which the logic is elastic, not given to mathematical precision; and this is seen in the contrast between the exactness of the Tractatus, versus the more elastic view of meaning shown in his later philosophy. His later view is not saying there is no precision, only that we tend to want precision where none can be found. Meaning is not always clearly delineated, but spans a wide variety of uses given in a host of language-games and social activities.

However, there is still another problem, and it is seen by those who think they understand Wittgenstein (including yours truly). The problem is in the application of use as meaning, that is, we find ourselves over emphasizing a particular use that is not in the spirit of Wittgenstein’s enterprise. We tend to push a particular use that is too restrictive, that is, a use that does not allow for the expansive nature of "our forms of life." Thus, we fool ourselves into thinking we are doing what Wittgenstein suggests, but in the final analysis we are using a distorted view of use to perpetuate the very thing Wittgenstein is trying to steer us away from.

The Gettier problems conflate two things, viz., the difference between a claim to know, and the definition of knowledge. Because one believes that they know X, it doesn't follow that they do know it. It must be demonstrated that they do indeed know. All Gettier problems are mistaken knowledge claims. Why do you think the phrase "I thought I knew (Wittgenstein)," has a use? It's because we are often mistaken. The problem isn't with the definition of knowledge as JTB, it's with the claims people make. It's as if Gettier in saying that my claim, based on what I believe is JTB, is the same as being JTB. It's not. I find it strange that so many philosophers think that the Gettier's examples actually tell us something important about the failure of JTB.

I think many or most subjects end up being like this - elusive. What does it mean to be strong? What is reality? What is the purpose of living? I can't think of many subjects that don't end up in the zone of contradictions and confusions, so why should gender be any different? — Tom Storm

I agree with you.

Some people want to discard certain concepts because they don't fit precisely within their view of reality, then they want to impose their conceptual view on the rest of us. Guess what, many of our concepts are like this, that's just the way language is.

Hume's The Problem of Induction means that the so-called laws of nature aren't immutable. They could change at any moment as doing so doesn't entail a contradiction i.e. they're contingent truths, not necessary ones. — Agent Smith

I wouldn't disagree with that.

Inductive reasoning doesn't entail that X follows necessarily.

I was trying to do something that very few have done (if any), viz., bring the argument into the arena of what can be known (in an inductive sense).

I haven't been posting much, but I'm always lurking. :smile:

Probably! I remained unconvinced, but it took decent effort for me to feel like I'd unravelled things. Worth engaging with I feel regardless. At the very worst, you engage with a sophisticated reasoner (@Sam26) who's thought a lot about why what they're saying is good evidence. It would be nice if other supernatural claims were that well fleshed out. — fdrake

I also remain unconvinced. You gave it a good effort compared to the other responses, but the argument's conclusion follows with a high degree of objective certainty. It's probably one of the strongest inductive arguments you could construct based on testimonial evidence.

and concepts are so different, be able to acquire the ability to speak English. Personally, I don't believe a lion's thoughts would be so different to our own. I think human exceptionalism is way overblown. — Janus

I guess it depends how you define human exceptionalism. It seems to me that all you have to do is look at what we accomplish, in areas of science, or in other areas of study, as compared to what other animals accomplish. The way we interact with the world is generally far more complex. This isn't to say that animals aren't more advanced in some areas, but if you look at the overall picture, humans generally will outperform an animal in terms of what we can accomplish.

You sound more like a troll than someone who is interested in good arguments.

The lion is an eater of flesh as many of us are. The lion is active sometimes and rests at others. The lion sleeps and perhaps even dreams. The lion seems to enjoy playing sometimes and cares for the young. The lion copulates. In all its vital features of life the lion does not seem so different to us. — Janus

Ya, I could have worded that better. There are things that are incommensurate, but things that are also commensurate. So, both of these concepts apply.

I never understood that saying of Wittgenstein's, that we would not understand the lion if it could speak, to make any sense. If it did not speak English or a language we are familiar enough with, then of course we would not understand it, just as we don't understand anything spoken in an unfamiliar language. If the lion spoke in a familiar language, then why would we not understand it? — Janus

The assumption is that the world of a lion is different enough, i.e., it's ability to think and use concepts would be so different from our own, that understanding the lion would be a great challenge, if we could understand at all. That's my take.

:up:

I could same about you, but where does that get us? We have different ideas about what's reasonable. I'm not even sure what you believe. I've been analyzing these arguments for about 47 years, so I quite familiar with the arguments. Moreover, I've a good background in logic, so don't talk to me about reasonably backing up my arguments. I find that most Christians, if you are one, aren't good at defending their beliefs.

Can you give an example of a "truth being relative to you personally"? Do you have in mind a preference for vanilla? — Banno

Yes, my preference for vanilla is a truth relative to me.

I'm also bothered by "facts separate from our forms of life". I'm not sure wha they might be. — Banno

Well, the concept fact is relative to our forms of life, but what the facts sometimes refer to are things separate from our forms of life. For example, the Earth having one moon is not dependent on our forms of life.

And "Some forms of life (other than our own) exclude the use of concepts" - is this the observation that some forms of life exclude concepts found in others, or something else? — Banno

It includes the forms of life that exclude certain concepts, but it also includes forms of life that exclude language, at least language that is as complex as our own.

So do we agree that at least some truths are not relative to a from of life? — Banno

I think we agree, but I'm not entirely sure.

This of course raises the question of relativism in Wittgenstein. Some suppose that the truth of any proposition is dependent on the form of life against which the proposition is set. But if, as argued above, in order to recognise a form of life as such we mist recognise some aspects of that form of life, then it follows that there are propositions that are true for both forms of life. To say that forms of life are recognisable as such is to say that they are commensurable, that they share common truths.

Hence, truth cannot be entirely relative to form of life. — Banno

There is a difference between truth being relative to you personally, as opposed to truth being relative to a language. Truth can be relative to a form of life, for e.g. bishops move diagonally, but it can also be dependent on facts separate from our forms of life. Some forms of life (other than our own) exclude the use of concepts, so there would be no common truths, but probably common beliefs.

You seemed to be making it private, that's why I responded the way I did a couple of posts back. Okay, now I think I see what you're getting at.

If one supposes that there are various, discreet forms of life, then one might be tempted to suppose them to be incommensurate. Something like that seems to sit with the lion comment.

But if forms of life were incommensurate, would we recognise them to be forms of life? It seems that in order to recognise certain behaviours as a form of life, we have to recognise the parallels with our own form of life. The language, practices and values of a form of life must be recognised as such in order for us to recognise a form of life.

So it seems that forms of life cannot the totally incommensurate, one to the other.

The interesting question then arrises as to the extent to which forms of life might differ, yet remain recognisable as forms of life. — Banno

With the clarification, I believe I agree with this. It seems that we would recognize the forms of life of animals, right? There has to be something in common?

That's not quite the argument. Rather, one could only recognise another form of life from within ones own, and by seeing that some aspects of the other form of life matched one's own. — Banno

When you say, "...one could only recognize another form of life from within one's own," are you using the phrase "from within one's own," as a private matter, or something broader, to include our forms of life generally as persons?

If one supposes that there are various, discreet forms of life, then one might be tempted to suppose them to be incommensurate. Something like that seems to sit with the lion comment. — Banno

I don't see our "forms of life" as being incommensurate, but as having a family resemblance. Although, with the lion example, I do see it as being incommensurate. We don't share much in common with a lion's form of life, which is why we wouldn't understand a lion if it could talk.

But if forms of life were incommensurate, would we recognise them to be forms of life? It seems that in order to recognise certain behaviours as a form of life, we have to recognise the parallels with our own form of life. The language, practices and values of a form of life must be recognised as such in order for us to recognise a form of life. — Banno

I'm not sure if we would have to recognize our own form of life in order to understand an account of forms of life in general. Wouldn't that be the same as saying, in order to understand a concept, I'd have to understand my own account of concept? We seem to understand what a form of life is, only after understanding forms of life in general, as is what happens with concepts.

So it seems that forms of life cannot [be] totally incommensurate, one to the other. — Banno

I agree. There are some aspects of our forms of life that may not be commensurate, just as there are some aspects of games that aren't commensurate. However, there must be something in common, like the commensurability of the concept game. They share incommensurability and commensurability, both can be true at the same time, but not in the same way.

I don't know, is that as clear as mud?

It seems to me to be like supposing that a form of life could be private. — Banno

I agree. If forms of life could be private, then so could language. To say that language can't be private, is to say that forms of life can't be private.

Oh, no wonder you didn't reply to my question, "What link?" Sorry, I was thinking of a link to a web site. :gasp: It's so easy to misunderstand. You were clear, but my brain had other ideas.

What do you think of the link, if any, to Davidson's rejection of conceptual schema? Davidson's strategy seems to me to be showing that conceptual schema, if they exist, must be private; but that leads to their being incoherent, unintelligible. Hence, he rejects the notion. — Banno

Well, if you believe that Wittgenstein's point about a private language is well-founded, then it would follow that Davidson is correct to reject the notion of a private conceptual schema. It would be incoherent and unintelligible.

Well, we just disagree. I'll leave it at that.

Actually you wrote "IF" He claimed it. Not "IF" He said it. — ThinkOfOne

Obviously if Jesus claimed that he was God, then he said it, or at least implied it.

The point you seemed to miss is that even "probably said" cannot be reasonably determined from the available evidence. — ThinkOfOne

That's my point. We can't reasonably conclude that Jesus said X, Y, or Z based on the testimonial evidence. It's just too weak. Geez, I don't know how I can make it any clearer.

If someone claimed to be God, he may not be a lunatic, he may just be delusional (you could argue that being delusional is a mental illness), or a good liar. — Sam26

Ya, "IF" he said it, but I have no strong evidence/reasons to conclude that he did say it, other than very weak testimonial evidence.

While we don't know that Jesus necessarily said what was attributed to Him, there's no compelling reason to believe that He necessarily did not. I've always found that argument really weak. The argument seems to be, "If we don't know that He necessarily said it, then there's no point in discussing anything that was attributed to Him". If that's an acceptable argument, then that argument could be used for many a historical figure. — ThinkOfOne

Why are you framing the argument in such absolute terms? I sure didn't frame it that way. Even if there was strong testimonial evidence to support that Jesus said X, Y, or Z, that doesn't support the idea that Jesus said it necessarily. The argument is an inductive argument. Inductive arguments don't give us conclusions that follow necessarily, only deductive arguments do that. So, again, it's not about what Jesus said necessarily. It's about what he probably said, or didn't say. If it was true that that is what I was implying, then I would agree, but it's not what I was implying.

Since you responded as if you believe that Jesus claimed to be God, can you address the following which I posted earlier? — ThinkOfOne

How did you come to that conclusion? I said, we don't know what Jesus actually said, because the testimonial evidence is too weak.

I'll refrain from expressing my attitudes or feelings about Christianity, but I don't always succeed. I came from a Christian background, and considered myself a Christian for about 40 years. Moreover, at that time, I considered myself a Christian apologist, so I'm quite familiar with the arguments for God's existence, and C.S. Lewis's arguments.

The problem with setting the trilemma up as the only choices, is that all of the testimonial evidence, as to what Jesus actually said, is second-hand or hearsay, so it's very weak by definition. We actually don't know what Jesus said, because we don't know how reliable the second-hand testimony is. Of course if you believe that the words of the Bible are inspired by God, then your beliefs about the claims of Jesus, as given by the writers of the NT, will be governed by those beliefs. The trilemma only works if you believe the testimonial evidence is accurate.

If someone claimed to be God, he may not be a lunatic, he may just be delusional (you could argue that being delusional is a mental illness), or a good liar. Of course many Christians would respond that these options are not appropriate given that he performed miracles (supposedly), and rose from the dead (supposedly). The problem, again, is that the testimonial evidence is too weak, and the counter-evidence is enormous, i.e., our experiences run counter to people coming back to life after three days in a grave. You would need an enormous amount of testimonial evidence from a variety of sources, including extra-Biblical sources, to support such a belief, and we just don't have that kind of evidence.