"Someone said so" is not in general an adequate justification for an inference or belief. — Cabbage Farmer

Did at any point I make such a claim? You didn't pay close attention to what I said over the course of this thread. You are correct, that "someone saying this or that" is not in itself always sufficient to justify a belief. However, it depends on context, if you're in a class being taught by an expert in biology, that can be a justification for believing what the person is saying. Much of what we believe comes in the form of testimony from trusted people. When you read a book by an expert in a particular field of study, this is a form of testimonial evidence. You certainly aren't involved in the experiments of scientists, so you take their word for it. Obviously not all testimony is worth considering. It's a matter of knowing the difference between kinds of testimonial evidence.

Dividing the world up in accord with our language does not place any limits on what can be addressed. I could for example, by a combination of language, demonstration and practice, teach you the technique of holding the stem of a mugwort so as to twist it over your long finger and pull out the several inches of root without breaking it. Language does not work independently of the world, nor of the body that is speaking or hearing. Cognition is the same. It does not happen in one's mind alone, but in one's hands, in the feel of the root and the soil. Cognition is in the doing, language is a part of that doing. — Banno

Good points @Banno not just this quote, but that post is very well said. It would be interesting, in light of what's being debated about consciousness, to talk of what we mean by consciousness in the light of some of these thoughts. It would seem that our consciousness, and the consciousness of others, shows up in the same way that cognition does, viz., in the doing, language or otherwise. This is one of the reasons I have a problem with others saying that consciousness or the self is an illusion.

You can "say what [ you ] want" but you can not make what you say mean what you "intend". — Antony Nickles

Not sure I follow this statement. I understand that we can say what we want, even if it's just babbling. However, the latter part of that sentence seems confusing. viz., "...you can not make what you say mean what you intend." If my intention is to mean something totally private (as in the PLA), then this makes sense, but if I intend to mean something within the framework of public meaning, then I can intend what I mean, if that intention is a public conveyance. So, I'm transporting, so to speak, my intentionality into the public domain where my intention gets in line with public meaning (is evaluated publicly) and rule-following. So, whether the latter part of this statement is true, depends on the source of the meaning of intend. Unless I completely misunderstood your point.

But I see through Wittgenstein's sham, to see that true principles are derived from the minds of individuals, not from the public judgement of "correct". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm mystified as to why you come in these Wittgenstein threads, especially given that you see through the "sham of Wittgenstein." I'm genuinely curious, are you trying to convince us of your particular interpretation? You seem to be privy to some special knowledge of W. that none of us possess. I know I create these threads because W. really interests me, and sometimes I get new insights into his thinking. Sometimes I even revise my interpretation because my interpretation is just incorrect.

According to what I described above, Wittgenstein's PLA, 253-270, demonstrates very clearly that one can never be certain concerning one's own sensations, if certainty requires justification. Do you not agree, that Wittgenstein has created a model that shows we can doubt being in pain? — Metaphysician Undercover

You are correct to think that Wittgenstein is talking about doubting one's pain in these passages, but there's a huge difference between these examples, and the examples where one cannot doubt that one is in pain. The difference is this: In these examples, Wittgenstein is referring to the PLA, as you correctly pointed out, and the point of the PLA is that one cannot privately create a language that correctly identifies sensations (of course it's more than sensations that goes terribly wrong). Hence, the doubt, but in this contrived situation (viz., the PLA context), which is, it seems to me, logically impossible. Why? Because language dictates a social environment, which is lacking in the PLA. Actually, one would wonder if even the concept doubt would have a foothold in the PLA, because the same argument being made about sensations could be made about doubting.

Now the contrast - the PLA must be seen against, and in the light of how we normally learn a language. So, in our normal everyday language-games about sensations and/or pains, which is not by the way, the PLA, can we doubt we're in pain? Emphatically, No! We can see how far out such doubts are, especially if we compare this with what Wittgenstein is doing in the OC. If we compare Moore's proposition "I know this is a hand," at least Wittgenstein gives a reasonable example of how a doubt can occur here, although one has a difficult time understanding how a doubt could arise in Moore's context. However, in the case of doubting one is in pain, Wittgenstein constructs a contrived example (the PLA), which cannot be done (a totally private language cannot be done), as he rightfully points out. It's only done to point out how language logically works, and how that logic falls apart in the PLA.

Finally, it must again be pointed out, that even the doubt in the PLA is not a doubt.

It's difficult to follow what you're saying Isaac, because it's not that clear. On the one hand, you seem to agree about the use of the words sensation and pain, but on the other you deny the existence of sensations and/or pains. Not only do I think you're making it more complicated than it is - you also seem contradictory at points. You seem to be adding to social meaning, i.e., adding a thing that's not needed. Also, I don't think it's likely that you have created a model that shows we can doubt being in pain. Moreover, doubting as you seem to present it, as some physiological model, seems not to line up with how we learn to doubt. I don't doubt based on some inner physiological happenings. Doubting was just fine (at least generally), even without your model. Adding your model confounds the issue, and is especially problematic.

If you are talking about learning new things about physiology, and creating a language-game base on these new discoveries, that's one thing, but you seem to be drawing inappropriate conclusions about what's happening linguistically (based on your model). It's not clear to me, and it seems it's not clear to others, so your idea needs more work.

Well, it's nice to have some company, but as ever I can't really make much sense of what you're saying, you may have to be a bit more explicit for me. — Isaac

@Metaphysician Undercover

It should give you some pause if MU is on your side. Of course it could be that MU is right and everyone else is wrong, it's logically possible. Sorry MU, but it's just so funny how your thinking on this subject is so different. And, by different, I mean that I know of no one who interprets W. the way you do, but I could be wrong. There might be some one somewhere, after all the universe is a huge place.

I'll have to commend you on a couple of things MU, you're consistent, and you're, on the whole, very respectful of others, which is probably more important than being right. I, on the other hand tend to be a bit cranky.

Who is to have authority here, in our new language game? — Banno

Only me Banno, only me. :wink:

Modern science can find no such thing that answers to 'the sensation of being in pain'. That's the problem I'm attempting to address. — Isaac

That's just the old problem of trying to identify some thing that corresponds to the word. Obviously, not all words function like that, and sensation, is just one such word. Are you saying that when someone says, "I feel a weird sensation in my big toe," that that sentence is meaningless? It's correct use is what gives meaning to the word, so it has an ontology based on that use. This reminds of people trying to argue that consciousness is an illusion, or that the self is an illusion, therefore, they don't exist. You say, there's "...no such thing that answers to the 'sensation of being in pain' - but this just isn't true, we answer to it all the time. How? By what we say and do. You seem to be confusing the grammar of "This is a cup" (as you point to it), with the grammar of "This is a pain." One's tendency, and this is what Wittgenstein points out as a mistake in the Tractatus, and what he is fighting against in much of the PI, is to want to find that thing. What exists here is not some kind of object, be it physical or not, that corresponds to the pain, but a family of actions and statements that create its ontology. Where is the thing that corresponds to the word the? Should I say the word is meaningless, or that it doesn't exist because I can't find some thing to point at?

it seems to me that Isaac is really adding a new language-game to the mix based on new information. It could be that the example (not sure at this point) of pain and doubting that one is in pain, is generally senseless, but that there are exceptions.
— Sam26

Yes, that's exactly it. Banno and I have been here before. When we talk about cognition, in the scientific sense, we need a language-game to talk about what we find, but that's often not the folk psychology that gives us many of the terms we use day-to-day. — Isaac

Ya, but when you say things like this,

There's no such thing as 'sensations'. They don't exist. No representation on earth, Non-entities...* — Isaac

then you lose me. Also, you can't look at X, Y, and Z happening in the brain, and say, that's pain. Moreover, if someone isn't feeling pain, then they're not in pain, regardless of what the body is doing.

@Isaac @Luke
I haven't been following closely, but it seems to me that Isaac is really adding a new language-game to the mix based on new information. It could be that the example (not sure at this point) of pain and doubting that one is in pain, is generally senseless, but that there are exceptions. It makes me think of Moore's claim, "I know this is a hand," i.e., can Moore doubt in this context? He's holding his hand up in a well lit room before an audience. Doubting in Moore's example, is a doubt that lacks justification. However, as Wittgenstein points out, there are situations where the doubt would be justified (make sense), then he goes on to explain how that can happen. So, the point with Isaac's example is that it could be just such a counter-example, but this really does nothing in terms of Wittgenstein's overall points about language.

Isaac brings up really interesting points.

Sam26, if this is too far off topic I am happy to move it to another thread. Just give the nod. — Banno

You don't have to go to another thread. I don't mind at all.

Is it even worth it to engage with these people?

They're immune to facts and they will not change their minds no matter what happens, which is interesting psychologically. But should we engage for the sake of others who are rational yet "on the fence"?

I struggle with this.

[Edit: I added flat earthers to the original list.] — Xtrix

Why people believe what they do is much more complicated than one might imagine. There is a whole range of things that affect our beliefs (genetics, culture, family, friends, group dynamics, politics, intelligence, etc, etc), it's not always about evidence or reasons. In fact, much of the time it's not about evidence or facts. Moreover, if we think we're immune to these kinds of psychological factors (it's just a matter of degree), then we become part of the problem. You have to keep engaging with people, generally speaking, obviously there are some people who are more difficult to talk to than others, but most people will listen.

I'm currently attending a class at a church on faith and reason, and I'm not at all religious, but I do it to keep engaged. I was straight forward about what I believe with the class, but I was respectful. I challenged their beliefs, but I take my time and allow them to approach me, and I don't try to make them feel stupid. I'll have to admit, I'm more respectful in this class than I am in this forum. Some of the people in this forum are much more respectful when engaging with people in here than I am, but for the most part, I try, but with mixed results. Anyway, this class is going well so far, and they often ask me questions about their epistemological views, and I try to answer their questions gently and with humor. This is disarming, and it allows me to get my point across without trying to tell them that they're being irrational about this or that belief. I believe they enjoy having me there, it's a chance for them to hear other points of view. Now this doesn't always happen, there are some churches that wouldn't take kindly to someone challenging them, especially in this setting (Sunday school class). Years ago I was kicked out of someone's house for my disrespect of Cornelius Van Til, so I'm very familiar with how these situations can go sideways. In this class they always ask me questions, so basically I just wait for them to ask me, and then I simply share what I believe about the topic. Last Sunday I shared why I don't believe in the resurrection, and they listened intently.

The point is that we should stay engaged where possible, don't let it become us against them. Also, you may find that some of your own beliefs aren't as reasonable as you might think.

We got way off topic, but that's fine.

Your belief that the cup is red is not justified by anything. The contention is that it is insufficient to count as knowledge, because doing so fudges the very useful distinction between belief and knowledge.

But further, if "the cup is red" were to count as knowledge by acquaintance, it must be justified by appeal to our common use of those words. — Banno

My view is that another way we justify beliefs is by linguistic training, i.e., we learn how to use words. How do I know that that is a cup and that it's red? First, we learn to use the words in social contexts, so (as I point to a cup) it's what we mean by cup, red, etc. Whether it makes sense to say "I know this is a cup," depends on the context. If someone was learning a language, we could imagine where one might appropriately doubt whether X is a cup or something else. In other words, the doubt is about the use of that particular word, and its referent.

So, I wouldn't claim that the cup example is an example of knowledge by acquaintance, you're making this assumption. This would be an example of justifying a belief based on linguistic training.

Right, we can use knowledge by acquaintance to justify our beliefs, but that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified. That one sees a pink tree - be it illusory or not - is not a belief at the moment experienced. Hence: — javra

Well, I would take issue with "that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified," because if we know it, then by definition it's a belief, viz., one that's true and also justified. And, why wouldn't something be a belief the moment I experience it? If for example someone pulled a gun on me, and surprised me with that gun, my reaction would probably be immediate based on my knowledge (the belief) that they have a gun.

I don't discover my pains. I have my pains. Knowledge is something I learn. How would I learn of my pain?

And this knowledge of “being in pain” isn’t JTB or some variant but, instead, one’s direct awareness of oneself being in pain; hence, a variant of knowledge by acquaintance. — javra

I'm familiar with knowledge by acquaintance, and I do believe that it falls under the umbrella of JTB. For me, JTB has a variety of uses, as seen in particular kinds of language-games. My view is that we justify our beliefs in a variety of ways, including sensory experiences, which directly relates to knowledge by acquaintance. For example, you might ask me after I say the orange juice is sweet, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" my justification is, "I tasted it." I think it's clear that we use sensory experience as a justification for many of our beliefs. Similarly, we can justify our knowledge (knowledge by acquaintance) of certain people, because of our direct sensory experiences with them, but justifying the belief that one is in pain seems way out of place. Why? For the various reasons just given in this thread.

You definitely have a unique way of interpreting Wittgenstein.

But that's simply the way language is, it does not consist of rules. Each person decides, based on one's own experience, what to call any different object, or any different feeling — Metaphysician Undercover

Wow, that's some statement. Now I understand how it is that you can make some of the statements you put forth.

I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. If it makes no sense to doubt whether you are having pain (when you are having pain), then it makes no sense to be certain of it, either. — Luke

Agreed, and this is the whole point of this thread.

If we look closely at §258, we see that ‘I remember the connection correctly’ refers to remembering a meaning, namely, the meaning of the sign ‘S’, not to making sure that I infallibly apply ‘S’ only to S’s in the future. — Banno

Ya, I agree, I've mentioned this several times. Maybe I should have emphasized it more in the post Hanover is talking about.

I knew Wittgenstein was nuts.

Edited 12/10/21: Actually Hanover brings up an important point, which I never really addressed.

I'm stuck here. It's hard to imagine a language that doesn't rely on any social conventions. — Wheatley

That's the point, you can't. Unless you think you can imagine it, then it's a matter of understanding what Wittgenstein is trying to tell us about language.

That's funny, but I don't blame you.

Given his thinking about how language develops, viz., that it's not a totally private affair, it's done necessarily with other people
— Sam26
Why does he think it is necessary? — Wheatley

The main problem is rule-following. What does it entail to follow a rule? Imagine a private language, i.e., just one that you're creating. Now try to imagine that you have to remember how to use all the words/concepts involved in your language. Are you remembering the correct use of your words? How would you know if you're making a mistake? Wittgenstein points out that you wouldn't, i.e., what would seem right in the use of your words/concepts, would be right. So, your use of words, in terms of correct and incorrect, would follow any application you deemed correct. Note that this is not how language works, I can't just decide to use the word car to refer to a pencil. Why? Because there is an objective standard (for the most part) that helps us to understand where a mistake has occurred. This, again, is only done with others, in social contexts. This is my take on it, at least partly.

I don't think there are many people who would agree with Gertie's statement ("Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject."), which I used to start this thread. The point that I was trying to make about the statement, is directly connected to much of what Wittgenstein talks about in the PLA. We've been a bit side tracked, but that's okay.

Why does Wittgenstein mention "imagination"? — Wheatley

It's a kind of thought experiment. Given his thinking about how language develops, viz., that it's not a totally private affair, it's done necessarily with other people. And, given that language is necessarily a rule-following endeavor (implicit and explicit rule-following), he then concludes that this process, being that they are both done with others, cannot be done totally in private. It's almost like trying to think of the two-sided triangle. He wants you to think about it, try to imagine it.

I'm against the proposition that philosophers can tell you what you can imagine. How's that? — Wheatley

I would be against any philosopher telling me what I can imagine too. Unless the philosopher is telling me I can't imagine a two-sided triangle, then I would think he has a point.

It's okay Wheatley, argue anyway. We learn by arguing, especially when you have to write out your arguments. We're all learning in here. I'm constantly re-thinking my beliefs. It's the way we advance, hopefully.

I was talking to a friend the other day about investing. In particular, about options, viz., a put, a strike price, etc, etc, I didn't have a clue, so it happens to all of us.

"Okay," what kind of response is that? :gasp:

Since when did philosophers become experts on limits of human imagination?

I can imagine it. Prove me wrong. — Wheatley

This has nothing to do with limiting human imagination.

All "Prove me wrong" means is that your mind is made up and there is nothing I can say that will change it. Ya, so you're right, I probably can't prove you wrong, the idea of proof here is too subjective.

Okay, give an example of what you're talking about so we can compare (in terms of doubting one's pain). Are you referring to something like phantom limb pains?

Ya, I agree, it's a matter of learning his method of analyzing.

↪Banno If you think I missed something, you should be able to explain what it was you think I missed. — Janus

Ya, answer that in your one sentence reply. :yikes:

↪Sam26 Discussions of the argument usually get stuck - as this one - in explaining it. It'd be interesting to move on to critiquing it. — Banno

Wittgenstein is not easy to understand. In fact, some of what he says, seems, at first glance, to be plainly incorrect. When Russell first read the Tractatus he completely missed the point. Moreover, it's difficult to explain some of these ideas, which is why we get stuck. We end up just repeating ourselves.

But from my point of view it would make no more sense to doubt I was seeing the tree I'm looking at, than it would to doubt that I'm feeling the pain that's throbbing in my toe. — Janus

I agree with this, but note again, that we can imagine a doubting situation with the tree e.g., but not the pain e.g..

Perhaps that artilce can serve to move beyond mere explanation to critique of private language? — Banno

I like figuring it out from the primary source. Some of these philosophers may or may not understand Wittgenstein's points. However, this is also true of me. Too many of these so-called Wittgenstein experts just have it wrong. Although you and I are excluded. :wink:

Are you saying that you just have private sensations, but that you don't know you have them? I don't see the difference between feeling a pain in my foot and seeing a tree in my garden. neither of these experiences require any further justification. — Janus

It's not a matter of knowing you have a pain. Contrast this with it's negation, "I don't know that I have a pain in my toe," it doesn't make sense. If we claim to have knowledge, then this has to be juxtaposed with not having knowledge, which is why it's important to understand the importance of the doubt. What would it mean to doubt you're in pain? Wittgenstein asks the same question of Moore's proposition, viz., "What would it mean to doubt this is your hand in the context Moore's using it?"

You don't see a difference between not being able to doubt you're in pain, as opposed to being able to doubt there is a tree over there. Of course the latter depends on context, it would be easy to imagine someone doubting that your seeing a tree. For example, maybe it's foggy and you can't see clearly. However, try doubting the pain you're having.

Is not feeling pain a kind of sensory experience? I'm finding it difficult to see a cogent difference in kind between "I feel a pain in my toe" and "I see a tree in my backyard".. — Janus

Usually when we refer to sensory experiences we're talking about the five senses, so in this sense feeling a pain is not sensory. We do use the words in similar ways, i.e., the grammar is the same, viz., "I feel the pain" vs "I feel the table." Our sensory experiences generally refer to things in reality. I see the tree, hear the trumpet, touch the table, smell the flowers, etc. However, pain manifests itself as a cry, or the word ouch for example.

Moreover, it makes sense to claim to know based on sensory experiences, but not, to claim to know that I'm having a pain, which has been the main idea of this thread. There's no knowing one is having a private sensation, I just have them.

'll maintain that we are referring to the hand, and expressing the pain. But I think it a moot point. — Banno

No, it's not a moot point, if you mean by moot that it has no relevance, it's very important to understanding W.

Where are you heading with this thread? We've differed as to what is to count as "knowledge" before; is the concern here more about sensation or about private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject. — Banno

I'm trying to show why statements like,

Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject

are meaningless; and, how its being meaningless, is connected with Wittgenstein's PLA.

I thought our other disagreement was over pre-linguistic beliefs, but I'm not sure.