Understood, I wasnt taking offence, just illustrating some distinctions I find useful. I actually am an anti-theist atheist but Im open minded to change either of those positions. I’m not attached much to the positions I hold. Most of them anyway. — DingoJones

Fair enough. Good to have you join the discussion, and I appreciate the probing questions.

Don’t you find that using “god” as a placeholder carries a lot of baggage with it? It just seems easier to call it “existence beyond knowledge”, or “wonder” or “mystery” etc.
Anyway, I would probably call that atheism. You don’t believe in god but call existence beyond knowledge god, a theistic term for something non-theistic. — DingoJones

When I strip that ‘baggage’ of association with any particular religion, it isn’t all that cumbersome. The placeholder is a way of connecting phenomenal experience through language. I suppose my use of ‘God’ fits more clearly with the discussions here. I find your suggested terms are more specific than simply using ‘God’ in inverted commas. When I talk about ‘God’, I don’t just mean ‘wonder’ or ‘mystery’ - these are different ways we can relate. And I don’t think that ‘existence beyond knowledge’ is non-theistic - I think most theists would relate to this as an aspect of their god.

I believe that the phenomenal experience I refer to as ‘God’ and what most people are talking about when they talk about a theistic god all refer to the same relation, they’re just describing a limited perspective of it. That’s not to say my own perspective is not also limited, but I won’t pretend I can accurately describe what I’m relating to. ‘The Tao that we speak of is not the eternal Tao’. It’s like an event horizon.

As to your question about my statement: “I believe that we relate to ‘God’ differently from different levels of awareness.” By levels of awareness, I’m referring to dimensional awareness: our relation to ‘God’ is qualitatively different when we understand ourselves as physical matter (to the act of an eternal Creator), as a living creature (to the concept of an all-powerful Being), as a socio-cultural being (to the ideal of a caring, all-knowing Father) or as a reasoning mind (to the pure relation of goodness, or Love itself). I’ve found that in reading the bible, for instance, it’s possible to follow this progressively developing awareness of ‘self’ in relation to ‘God’, regardless whether or not we believe anything that’s written (it’s all opinion and here-say, after all). It seems obvious to me, then, that the developing Old Testament concept of an all-powerful Being would appear petty and uncaring to a reasoning mind.

So sometimes its not change but lack of change that we have an aversion to, to be specific, lack of desired change. — HardWorker

This demonstrates the way we anticipate any change as pleasant/unpleasant and requiring high/low effort.

Change is part of life, so it isn’t that we have an aversion to change, but that we often don’t feel prepared for it. When we’re prepared for a change that doesn’t happen, the result is as unpleasant as if we were unprepared for a change that we cannot avoid. This is because any pleasantly anticipated ‘change’ is easily integrated into our conceptual reality, and will take time, attention and effort to be extricated from future predictions, with no pay-off.

Agnostics ARE atheists. An agnostic doesnt believe there is a god, thats what defines atheism. The two terms are not even positions on the same thing. Agnosticism isnt a position in whether god exists or not, it is a position on what can be known about god.
Thus one can be an atheists agnostic.
Being against religion or the idea of god is not atheism, it is anti-theism. Many atheists are anti-theists and because of that people think of atheism as anti-theism but its not. — DingoJones

I agree that the two terms are not positions on the same thing, and that some agnostics are atheists, but not all. I also understand that many atheists are not anti-theists, and don’t wished to be tarred with the same brush. If I have made this assumption, then it was not my intention. I think I have referred to ‘atheists who...’ to make this distinction, only because all anti-theists seem to identify simply as ‘atheist’, not as ‘anti-theist’.

As an agnostic, I do believe that ‘God’ is a suitable placeholder for a relational aspect of existence beyond knowledge. I believe this because I want to, because it makes sense in my affected experience. Can I then call myself an atheist?

I believe that we relate to ‘God’ differently from different levels of awareness. But my understanding of this aspect doesn’t fit with the theist position, because I disagree that ‘God’ is a necessary being. Can I then call myself a theist?

Agnostic are mute because they're too intellectually lazy to push back against dogmatic religious "beliefs" or "practices", deluding themselves that they inhabit some "neutral ground" between demonstrably true claims & demonstrably untrue claims. — 180 Proof

Oh, we push. The thing is that when you see us push, you imagine us as fellow atheists. And when we argue against your commitment to rationalised doubt, you imagine us as theists.

The irony is that believing any of your actions are based on a justification schema of certainty is completely irrational. — Kenosha Kid

Agreed.

Yes, and I would also challenge anyone who vocally expressed such affected beliefs. But I do think some people still believe something must be ‘wrong’ with homosexuality, for instance, without such harmful attitudes toward homosexuals, and I think you can gradually influence such a belief by increasing positively-affected awareness, connection and collaboration.

Beliefs and doubt are highly susceptible to affect. An affected belief or doubt can lead to ignoring or excluding contradictory information, and can block opportunities to increase awareness. But I think it’s an affected or blind commitment to belief in literalist readings of holy books, etc - the kind that motivates people to declare these statements of belief without entertaining any doubt, and then actively ignore, isolate or exclude information which disputes them - that can be more damaging than just belief alone.

I do recognise that most of us don’t feel the need to make this distinction, and define a belief as one stated or evident. I have a number of beliefs I’m not committed to due to insufficient reason, but nor am I prepared to exclude phenomena that supports them. For the most part, these beliefs are impotent in the light of reason, but I’m aware that they can show up in thoughtless or affected words and behaviour. I often mention these beliefs in discussions here to entertain doubts and contradictory information, and I’m not committed when I say ‘I believe’ or ‘I think’. This is how we continue to challenge our own thoughts and beliefs - by introspecting the role of affect.

I get that atheists prefer to simply exclude any beliefs that cannot be supported by sufficient reason. My issue is with atheists who attack agnostics for a lack of blind (or blinkered) commitment either to rationalised doubt or to unsupported beliefs. It suggests a niggling awareness of potential/value in phenomena or aesthetics they ignore or exclude on rational grounds - not that they might be ‘wrong’, just missing something. An agnostic position does not prevent speaking of or acting on either belief or doubt - but is also aware that phenomena and affect play their part in this. An atheist’s commitment to rationalised doubt is not as damaging as a theist’s commitment to affected beliefs, but they both increase ignorance, isolation and exclusion in their own way.

You can be an agnostic about the existence of God while also believing that, if God exists, it isn't Yahweh or Allah. — darthbarracuda

:up:

Yep. This is a key point. Agnosticism is not necessarily a neutral position - it can be just as combative and critical of religion and god beliefs, not to mention atheism. And atheists are far from harmonious with each other. — Tom Storm

I would say that agnostics can be just as combative towards and critical of claims to logical justification, objective truth or certainty one way or the other. But I don’t find them so critical of beliefs as such - or lack of belief. Ignorance, actions and attitudes maybe, but not beliefs. I think this is an important distinction to make for agnostics. It can be easy to get lost in the binary form of a debate, though. Just because I’m critical of your perspective, doesn’t mean I’m diametrically opposed to it. It’s hard to recognise this when you feel so certain. And it’s equally difficult to concede this when someone claims such certainty.

I think most things should remain in doubt. I feel 99.999999999999% confident that no intelligent deity created mankind or the universe (but 100% confident that the previous percentage I wrote was just made up). This is good enough for action. Action is predicated on certainty: confidence is sufficient. — Kenosha Kid

Justifiable action is predicated on certainty. Affected belief is sufficient for action. Some of us just hold ourselves (and/or others) to a more rational standard.

Agnosticism? It's lazy, even stupid.

Theist: "I suck on a cosmic lollipop."

Atheist: "I don't suck on a cosmic lollipop (maybe because cosmic lollipops are imaginary)."

Agnostic: "I don't know whether I suck or I don't suck on a (real? imaginary?) cosmic lollipop." — 180 Proof

The agnostic acknowledges what you’ve alluded to by adding ‘maybe’ to the atheist position: that you cannot know whether ‘cosmic lollipops’ are imaginary or real. The atheist is adamantly refusing to suck on any ‘cosmic lollipop’, real or imaginary. The theist has chosen to happily suck on what they believe is the closest thing to what a ‘cosmic lollipop’ might be. The agnostic thinks you’re both a little loopy, carrying on about ‘cosmic lollipops’ as if ‘to suck or not to suck’ on something that may or may not even be real is an important, life-altering decision, and would rather just get back to it.

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But one can consistently believe (ii) and (iv), since they would, by the same process, imply that one could
vi. not believe (god exists and god does not exist)
that is, believe a tautology. This gives us a third mode of belief,

c) an agnostic will accept both ii and iv

We are left with three possible forms of considered belief:
Committing to a belief that god exists
Committing to a belief that god does not exist
Not committing to either belief

Agnosticism is, therefore, a valid form of belief. — Banno

In my view, ‘God’ refers to a qualitative relation. I believe that the possibility of ‘God’ exists, and yet I won’t commit to a belief in the existence of a necessary being, let alone one that is omniscient, omnipresent and omni-benevolent. The way I see it, there is a difference between believing that infinity exists and believing it exists as a quantity.

I think there is philosophical usefulness in imagining the existence of a relational absolute such as ‘God’, without necessarily conceptualising it beyond a formless quality or idea, a paradox. That I can entertain or dismiss such an unjustifiable belief points to a relational or qualitative aspect of experience from which the limits of logic or reason may be understood. But about this (true to Wittgenstein) I cannot speak - not in any way considered reasonable. It’s like Kantian aesthetics without an object.

So, while I have no argument against those who feel they can commit to a belief either way, I disagree with those who insist that only one can be true, or who form arguments either way on logical grounds. It’s a pointless exercise, in ignorance of their affected position - the arbitrary commitment (of attention and effort) they have made in relation to a paradox.

the matter we embody is bound by limitations that the mind we embody is straining against. But this body was never supposed to mark the limits of our mind’s capacity
— Possibility

How did this come about? What do you think is the resolution, if any? — skyblack

I think the reduction of Darwin’s evolutionary theory to ‘survival value’ ignores an underlying ‘creative’ impetus of limited structural variability in all physical systems, not just in living organisms. Life individually is about limited resources of effort and attention over a duration. More broadly, though, it’s about developing and refining systems of variability, testing and adjustment across time. We’ve evolved not just to survive, but to maximise these limited systems of structural variability. Life is just one aspect of this.

Mind/consciousness enables us to increase awareness, connection and collaboration beyond the limits of observation/measurement across time, and with imagination beyond the limits of perceived significance/value in potential. But it is our flesh, organs and systems that enable us to continually navigate an intimate, qualitative understanding of all physical systems: something a cyborg cannot replicate. This is what enables us to vary, test and adjust the efficiency and effectiveness of system structures, from the most complex to the simplest, as new information comes to light.

Yet we focus on consolidating our position/identity as a dominant mind (destructive as we must be to sustain this), in some apparently necessary relation to a surviving body (temporary as it is), because it’s what we can be most certain of. In doing so, we strive to ignore, isolate and exclude these ‘useless and impractical systems’ that sustain us, and then complain that we are held back by them.

While we remain enamoured by dualism, I think we will continue to both need our bodies and begrudge them.

I’m always fascinated by threads like this - there’s a point in our self-awareness where we ask ourselves: why am I doing this? And we find the answer unsatisfactory. That we can imagine a ‘disembodied’ existence - thanks to Descartes and perpetuated by computer science - presents a preferable option we’re unable to actualise. And the frustration as individuals is acute.

This is an issue for dualism: the matter we embody is bound by limitations that the mind we embody is straining against. But this body was never supposed to mark the limits of our mind’s capacity. It is constructed to interact - to increase awareness, connection and collaboration - not to contain.

Protection from illness and disease, warmth, water, food, hygiene, sex, child-rearing - none of these are ideally a solo act. The more we rely on others, the more efficiently and effectively we achieve them - whether we’re willing to admit it or not. Anyone who believes they are juggling alone is either not paying attention to where the ball goes when it leaves their hands, or not prepared to let go of the ball for long enough.

Somebody, somewhere along the line, taught us to strive for autonomy. But the closer we come to creating this illusion, the more burdensome our life appears. No man is a solo act. The more we are connected and collaborating, the more we recognise we’re not expected to juggle alone, and the more satisfying this juggling act can be. When we stop seeing it as so many balls I must keep juggling, and start to look at it as so many jugglers working together, then this mental capacity we envisage beyond our bodily limitations makes more sense. It’s not what I must achieve as a lower limit for survival, but about what we can achieve as an upper limit of collaboration.

That’s the way I see it, anyway.

You don't love a person because you love his body; you only start to love his body after you start to love his person. — Kaveski

I agree that you don’t love a person because you love their body - but I do think you can start to love a person after you start to love their body. Physical attraction is not the only path to love, but it is one way to start. Love is quite different to desire, however.

2. IF the universe has symmetry THEN for every thing there must be an anti-thing (the opposite). — TheMadFool

I think there is a fundamental flaw here - but forgive me if my explanation of this is not clear. I’ll try a different approach.

If the universe has symmetry, then it does NOT follow that every property or quality of the universe is symmetrical at every level of awareness. Gravity is qualitatively different from matter, which is qualitatively different from particles, etc. So it does NOT follow that ‘for every thing there must be an anti-thing’. 2 does not necessarily follow from 1.

The gravity/anti-gravity relation has potential symmetry with five-dimensional awareness, but not four - only one or the other can be observed/measured as an event, and neither can be rendered in only three dimensions (let alone two).

The matter/anti-matter relation has actual symmetry with four-dimensional awareness, but not three - only one or the other can exist as an object, and neither can be rendered in two dimensions.

Proton/electron (or atomic structure) has predictable symmetry in three dimensions, but not two - only one can be predicted as a wavefunction, and neither can be rendered as a linear structure.

Particle spin (positive/negative) has symmetry in two dimensions, but not one. One cannot exist without the other.

The yin-yang symbol is a rendering of this positive/negative symmetry at the base of all existence - but it can only be interpreted as such in five-dimensional awareness.

6. Since there's a being that's powerless, ignorant, and bad (me :sad:), there has to be an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good being (God proven). — TheMadFool

As for our perceived impotence, ignorance and evil in relation to ‘God’, the symmetry of this relation is beyond even five-dimensional awareness. To predict our own potential to act, to know or to do good either breaks symmetry here, or disproves ‘God’. A universe in which our relation to ‘God’ has symmetry must be at least six-dimensional.

.

No, it won’t automatically constitute a duet - the ‘anti third party’ is the duality with which it interacts
— Possibility

What are you saying? It would/it wouldn't. — TheMadFool

It wouldn’t - not automatically. I will concede that we have a tendency to consolidate towards dualism, but as a symmetry this is ignorant and ultimately self-destructive.

But let me see if I can understand where you’re coming from...

If a universal symmetry of only two equal and distinct aspects existed as such, then it would immediately dissolve (as 180 states). The fact that our universe doesn’t, suggests that either:
1. The relational structure is not equal (dualistic);
2. The relational structure is not differentiated (monistic); or
3. The relation structure is not dual (triadic).

The first option I imagine is yours, and consists of an upper and lower limitation/extreme. It is most accurately rendered as a radial symmetry, a circle, like we perceive electrons in an atomic structure. Another example of this is geocentrism. This is what you’re referring to when you talk about matter/anti-matter, gravity/anti-gravity, determinism/randomness, ignorant/all-knowing, etc.

It’s important to note that an efficient rendering of any symmetry relation is always missing one aspect, which is the reference point to be assumed in relation to it. A circle shows only one point, equidistant from a reference point which is assumed from the structure. This dualistic symmetry refers to an equal and distinct variability of one aspect in relation to another. Which aspect is matter and which is anti-matter makes no difference - one automatically assumes the other, and it is only the relation that we perceive and name ‘matter’.

Yet you’re not understanding dualistic symmetry as circular. Instead you refer to it as yin-yang, which you claim is the same idea. It isn’t - it’s a rendering of triadic symmetry using a dualistic structure. The symmetry of the yin-yang symbol is in our relation to its duality: assuming a variable reference point (an observer) in relation to it.

So, if we’re looking at matter/anti-matter for instance as a yin-yang structure (with both aspects perceivable), then we’re assuming a reference point outside of it. Which means that we’re no longer looking at a dualistic relation, but a triadic one. The third reference point can be assumed fixed and central in relation to two differentially variable points, or variable in relation to a dualistic relation of two definitive ‘opposites’ (ie. the black and white symbol). It’s like the difference between a geocentric and a heliocentric perspective. Applying the notion of yin-yang as a dynamic symmetry enables us to perceive, explore and understand all three reference points in relation to each other, not just the two opposites in relation to ‘us’ as a fixed point.

The map is not the territory. “Ceci n’est pas un pipe” (Magritte). The yin-yang symbol is not the symmetry.

Symmetry, in the context that you seem to be concerned about, seems limited to the number 2 (binary). Hence, your objection since you seem to detect a third party. You say, "...any binary relation is asymmetrical, unless observed by a third party." What you're saying is that dualistic symmetry can only be in the presence of a third party. That's your position on the issue.

Firstly, you've made a statement the relevants part of which I've reproduced above for clarification purposes but, do forgive my lack of astuteness, I don't see an argument backing up your claim of the necessity for a third party for the symmetry to hold. You do realize that you concede that there are two sides in play, otherwise the "third" in your third party doesn't make sense. If there are two (sides), the duality, yin-yang, the symmetry is complete. A third party neither makes nor breaks the symmetry. — TheMadFool

My position is that dualism is asymmetrical when viewed from within. The apparent symmetry of any dualistic philosophy conceals a third relational aspect. Yin-Yang is an example of this - if we perceive two sides then the symmetry is complete, but only because a perspective exists that is neither yin nor yang, and therefore capable of perceiving the two sides. So this completion of symmetry is necessarily inclusive of a third party, regardless whether or not it is ‘perceived’ as such by any party.

Try Edward Abbott Abbott’s ‘Flatland: a Romance of Many Dimensions’.

Here I am observing the duality of hot vs cold. I also appreciate my participation in the duality of gender. Too, I'm alive and thinking (fingers crossed) as opposed to something dead and unthinking. These are all instances of me becoming cognizant of my own role in the duality of yin-yang. Am I outside myself? To recognize, to become aware, of the duality, the yim-yang of it all doesn't require a third party. Plus, playing the devil's advocate here, this mysterious third party will automatically it seems constitute a duet with an anti third party. — TheMadFool

No, it won’t automatically constitute a duet - the ‘anti third party’ is the duality with which it interacts. And you’re not understanding yin-yang here, which demonstrates that any difference between hot and cold, alive and dead or male and female is arbitrary without an affected third party to distinguish between them. A third party enables awareness of difference between dark and light - this awareness is fundamental to the notion of yin-yang. You’re attributing five-dimensional self-awareness to two- and three-dimensional structures. Of course you are outside of your ‘self’ when you cognise its role in the duality of yin-yang.

A binary relation is asymmetrical - any claim of ‘symmetry’ is relative to a third party observer
— Possibility

We're part of the symmetry. The third party is an illusion or, to be blunt, the third party doesn't exist. How could one be both inside (a part of the universe) and also outside (not a part of the universe - the third party)? — TheMadFool

Exactly - this is the problem with your thesis. Read the rest of what I wrote. I agree that we’re part of the symmetry, but any binary relation is asymmetrical, unless observed by a third party. If we are part of a binary relation, then we can only observe the other. And this isn’t symmetry.

Symmetry is ‘invariance under transformations’ (as per @jgill’s definition). In what way can we transform (by translating, reflecting, rotating or scaling) our relation to an all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good being that would preserve any of its features? Or more simply, in what way can we translate, reflect, rotate or scale any of these ‘symmetry’ relations you’ve described in the OP - from our position within it - that would leave any property of the relation unchanged?

Yin and Yang, properly understood, are interchangeable - in symmetry, there is no preference for one side or the other - they are equally different. But this can only be achieved by accepting that we can embody both sides equally, or neither. It has nothing to do with what the extremes are - it’s about observing the symmetrical quality of any relation from outside of it. The third party is not an illusion - it’s necessary. It is commonly overlooked in Western approaches to Eastern philosophy that there is always a practical aspect: a way of interacting.

So, if we’re part of the symmetry, then the symmetry is not a binary relation - some inherent dance of opposites. It has to be minimally triadic. Yin-yang is not universal symmetry - the symmetry lies in our observation/understanding of yin-yang. It’s a dance for three. As is any symmetry of the particle/anti-particle kind.

There are two ways to relate to your axiom at 1:
A. As a third party observer, external to the universe and its ‘symmetry’;
B. As an aspect within the universe, subject to this ‘symmetry’.

If we assume the third party observer (ie. abstraction), then the rest of the argument logically follows (barring your understanding of ‘symmetry’, but I’ll get to that). It is when we position ourselves within the universe (as we are) that we have to assume or embody one side of this ‘symmetry’ in order to ‘prove’ the other.

So, you ‘prove God’ (as per 6) only to the extent that you accept your own relative position as powerless, ignorant and bad. The moment you consider yourself to BE good, knowledgeable or capable even to a small degree, your relation to God as absolute dissolves.

My main issue with your thesis is that 2 does not follow from 1. A binary relation is asymmetrical - any claim of ‘symmetry’ is relative to a third party observer. As Rovelli says, “entanglement is not a dance for two partners, it is a dance for three”.

So what you consider to be ‘opposites’ are such only in relation to a third party observer. Symmetry is arguably more accurate and stable as a triadic relation - one where an observer can embody any position (eg. energy-quality-logic).

We are limited by our system’s unavoidable relation to everything else (gravity), by the variability this entails in the system (randomness), and by its finite access to energy (physical). But by the same token, more information can always be acquired about a system: anti-gravity, determinism, the non-physical and God represent awareness of relative powerlessness and ignorance, and our efforts (both good and bad) to relate to this. We can only imagine a third party observer external to these qualities in the universe, and so we strive for an understanding of ourselves in relation to them.

Rovelli uses Planck's Proportionality Constant ( ħ ) as a symbol of quantum level "communication" in the form of Information or Energy. The constant defines a "quantum" of Energy and a "bit" of Information. As you say though, it always takes two to "entangle", to communicate. But he also makes a distinction between a Syntactic exchange (equivalent to a geometric relationship), and a Semantic interchange, which conveys Meaning between minds. That's my interpretation of course, He doesn't put it in exactly those terms. He does say, however, that "entanglement . . . is none other than the external perspective on the very relations that weave reality". (my emphasis) And you can define that third party to the exchange as a scientist's observation, or more generally as Berkeley's "God" who is "always about in the quad". That was the bishop's ontological argument for a universal Observer, who keeps the system up & running, even when there are no Quantum Physicists to measure the energy/information exchanges of minuscule particles. My own Enformationism thesis came to a similar conclusion. — Gnomon

Rovelli’s use of the h-bar is not as a symbol of quantum level ‘communication’ - it acts as a qualitative limitation in any calculated prediction.

And it actually takes three to ‘entangle’ - and this is the point I think you’re missing with Rovelli. He makes it pretty clear in his criticism of alternative QM interpretations that to suggest such an unprovable axiom is grasping for certainty where there is none. Rovelli shows that a Cosmic Mind - just like a parallel universe or unobservable - isn’t necessary at all, but that it’s a source of comfort: to assume that someone is always observing, reassurance that the tree continues to be. This is where we have made errors in our descriptions of reality.

“We cannot rely upon the existence of something that only God can see.” - Rovelli

The way Rovelli sees it, it makes no sense to state that two systems S and S` are entangled if there is nothing with respect to which this can be determined. Consolidating an ‘entangled system’ only confuses the issue, because this entanglement does not necessarily exist for any system. It is determined as a joint property of the two systems only in relation to a third system S``, and cannot be assumed as a property of either system S or S` in relation to another system with which they might interact at any earlier or later time.

So we DO need to identify this third party for RQM. Your quote from Rovelli is incomplete: “Entanglement, in sum, is none other than the external perspective on the very relations that weave reality: the manifestation of one object to another, in the course of an interaction, in which the properties of the objects become actual.”

According to the relational interpretation of QM, there is no ‘Cosmic Mind’ or ‘universal Observer’, no privilege of subject over object. There are simply systems of information, and the two postulates:
- the maximal amount of relevant information about a system is finite;
- it is always possible to acquire new relevant information about any system.

Omniscience cannot be determined as a property of any system at this level. That’s not to say that either G*D or the notion of omniscience is necessarily impossible. Just that positing the ‘necessary’ existence of a Cosmic Mind as a system that is ‘always observing’ is not compatible with RQM. The notion of ‘Cosmic Mind’ refers to a qualitative infinite, an upper limitation or event horizon, while Planck’s constant refers to a lower limitation. They’re heuristic devices, not objects. That we consider the existence of a Cosmic Mind necessary to imagine all the semantic information and causal energy in the world speaks to the limitations of our own mind, not of reality.

Back to IIT, though - I think the above postulates highlight the limitations of a quantitative theory. Relevant information is that which counts for predicting future interaction with the system. Consciousness isn’t just about quantity, but about relevance: what counts for predicting future interaction.

I doubt that Tononi had Star Trek technology in mind as he developed his theory. But the notion of quantifying consciousness would be a necessary step in that direction. The question remains though, if the quantitative values (objective numbers) would also include qualitative values (subjective feelings). Or would the holistic Self be filtered-out in the process of reducing a person to raw data? — Gnomon

An informational ‘bit’ is a consolidated binary event - a resultant spatio-temporal state of a system, reduced to the smallest identifiable interaction as energy (electricity) passes from one qualitatively static structure of matter in momentary contact with another. You can’t quantify information as a ‘bit’ outside the qualitative structure of an electronic system.

I don’t think Tononi can identify consciousness as a similar binary event, because there seems to be no way to control the qualitative variability of structure in a system complex enough for such an event to be identifiable amongst the noise. What he has identified is more like the least significant prediction of consciousness. Just as an informational ‘bit’ value depends on energy (electricity) flowing through a static system, I would argue that the ‘value’ of consciousness more accurately refers to non-commutative variables of attention and effort in an ongoing energy event.

From what I understand, the accuracy of Tononi’s ‘psi’ (ie. reduced to a single quantitative value) seems restricted to quantifying the probability of interaction changing an energy event in a particular way. But is that really ‘consciousness’? Any prediction assumes a particular qualitative structure of attention and effort, and loses accuracy in ‘predicting consciousness’ the further that qualitative structure differs from human. Like Shannon’s ‘bit’ in an electronic system, I’m yet to be convince that you can reliably quantify consciousness as a ‘psi’ value outside the qualitative structure of a human system.

Reducing a person to raw data isn’t the issue, though - it’s when we assume that the complexity of this raw data can be rendered as purely quantitative value (without qualitative structure) that we start to ignore contextuality. This is demonstrated in Heisenberg’s tables of data.

PS__Rovelli's book focuses on the fundamental physical quantum-level inter-connectedness of the universe -- as the "web of relations that weaves reality". But, as a sober scientist, he avoids speculating on such meta-physical holistic notions as Cosmic Consciousness. He does, however, in a footnote, comment on Thomas Nagel's Mind & Cosmos : "on a careful reading, I find that it doesn't offer any convincing arguments to sustain his thesis". — Gnomon

Like Rovelli, I don’t believe there is any reason to posit a Cosmic Consciousness. But I would suggest that it’s more the self-justifying preference for consolidation that he objects to than any metaphysical aspects. Nagel’s book is pure speculation - a challenge to ‘do philosophy’ - and personally I don’t see it making any reasoned argument for Cosmic Consciousness. Nagel simply wasn’t prepared to dismiss the metaphysical sense of interconnected purposiveness harboured in teleological discourse. I think Rovelli shows that consolidation for its own sake isn’t necessary to include this metaphysical sense - that a collaborative and open-ended dialogue with our own ignorance is more conducive to scientific endeavour than tying it up in a comforting metaphorical bow. But perhaps it comes down to whether one is inspired by the question or the answer...

IIT seems to be intended as a step toward computerizing Consciousness. — Gnomon

I think the main focus of IIT is more in predicting consciousness with greater accuracy.

And Reality is the "organizational structure" of the world. Ironically, this approach to physics places the emphasis on the mental links (relations, meanings) instead of the material nodes (substance). So, some of his fellow physicists will find that promotion of Mind above Matter to be tantamount to Panpsychism. Although, Rovelli doesn't go quite that far in his book. — Gnomon

I wasn’t aware that Rovelli had a new book - I’ll need to check it out, thanks. From what I understand of his previous work, it doesn’t surprise me that he was heading this way. He has shown previously that the organisational structure of reality is not based on ‘substance’, but on multi-dimensional relations between attention and effort in a particular system of logic. ‘The Order of Time’ described a four-dimensional structure of reality, and acknowledged that our capacity to describe it as such suggests at least another aspect of reality worth exploring - one in which the idea of ‘substance’ breaks down and the logic of grammar fails us.

Without reading his book, I think it’s important to note here that ‘Mind’ refers to a structure of relations between attention and effort in a system of logic. Mathematics as the system of logic in quantum physics would parse this structure clearly, dissolving the mind-matter barrier in a way that doesn’t even raise the question of panpsychism. I think it’s how we restructure this into concepts of language that raises the question.

Panpsychism simply refers to the notion that the organisational structure of reality is at least as (dimensionally) complex as the structure of the human mind. The relations between attention and effort which form ‘matter’ as we understand it are part of a larger structure of relations that extends both above and below our own capacity for attention and effort at any one time.

Maybe we're missing something very important. Suppose we do manage to discover the mathematical formula for consciousness but then what does that mean? Does it relate the state of consciousness with the variables energy, charge, etc.? My understanding of science gives me the impression that, yes, the mathematical formula for consciousness is going to be as general as that. The upside is consciousness will no longer have to be organic i.e. it can be replicated on other kinds of media. The downside is specific, particular consciousnesses won't be possible. I guess this all squares with my intuition that specific/particular consciousnesses, like yours or mine, are a function of what consciousness is processing. So, while consciounsess itself maybe generic, common to all, an individual one can be created by feeding it specific thoughts.

Mary's room issue plays a central role in my personal view regarding all things mind. I recall mentioning in another conext the difference between comprehension and realization. I don't know how true this is but geniuses are supposed to feel equations, arguments, whatnot i.e. they're capable of getting a very personal, subjective experience when they encounter objective but profound arguments and elegant equations - the words, "profound" and "elegant" reflect that aspect of realization as opposed to mere comprehension. So, yeah, although Mary's Room argument suggests that getting an objective account of the color red is missing the subjective experience of red, my take on it is, a person who's in the habit of realizing instead of just comprehending will, by my reckoning, be able to experience red just by reading up all the information available on red. I hope all this makes sense at some level. — TheMadFool

I think maybe you are missing something important: quality. We tend to split quality into:
- what we can isolate from affect (that is, what we can consolidate into quantised concepts) and
- the affected quality of experience - what we attempt to quantise as emotions, feelings or ‘qualia’.

The ‘profound’ or ‘elegant’ quality of certain equations is an affected relation to their structural quality beyond logical or mathematical concepts. It’s an aesthetic quality, irreducible to concepts but nevertheless entirely reasonable, rational.

I understand quality to be pure relational or organisational structure: an existence of relation without substance. In language, we can’t really make sense of quality until we attribute it as a property of. We talk about the ‘qualities’ of an object, of an experience, or the ‘quality’ of a relationship, or an idea. This is because quality is highly variable phenomenologically - it appears differently, according to the relative positions of everything, including ourselves.

So, an objective account of the colour red is complex and uncertain. In my experience there is a qualitative structure of logic and energy I call ‘red’ and a qualitative structure of logic and energy (attention and effort) I embody in relation to it. As another experiencing subject you can relate to this structure I embody and adjust your predictive distribution of attention and effort to account for our relative difference in position, so that you can predict how you might have related to this ‘red’ in my position, and how I might relate to ‘red’ in your position. When you reduce this complex relational structure to a concept, for efficiency you would ignore overlap and exclude variability (noise), similar to digital sampling. So the concept ‘red’ that we share is not an actual structure, but a typical qualitative pattern of logic and energy, relative to a predictive logic and distribution of attention and effort that you or I can embody in relation to it. And we can actualise this concept in a variety of structural forms, according to available energy and common system logic.

So, for Mary to predict an experience of ‘red’, she would need to work backwards. In reading available information on red, she would need to find a way to relate all that information to a predictive logic and distribution of attention and effort that she can embody in relation to the information. To do that, she would need to be aware of the differences in relative position between the embodied relation that generated the information (the observer/measuring device), and her potential embodied relation. So it’s not just the information on red that she needs, but how that relative position might be similar and/or differ from her own.

But she wouldn’t actually experience red until she embodies the relation - until the moment of interaction between available energy and qualitative patterns/structures in a common system logic. So the question is really whether Mary can predict and therefore recognise an experience of ‘red’ when she encounters one.

I think a challenge to creating a theory of consciousness is that we really aren't all the same.

For me, silencing judgment is easy. It's my baseline. I used to put it this way: I can stare and 2 +2 without being aware that it equals 4.

Suspension of judgement is a very valuable tool. It's a two edged sword though. You have to make judgments to live.

This might be a reason for starting with a bare bones theory: so focusing on what's most basic for all of us. — frank

These are interesting points.

I agree that the faculty of judgement - our capacity both to suspend judgement and to render one - is a key aspect of consciousness. For this reason, it surprises me how few philosophers have explored Kant’s third critique - or simply browsed it in relation to the first, barely getting past the second moment.

I can be aware that 2+2 can equal 4 without choosing to attribute this potential relation with much significance in the moment. My focus is on the qualitative structure: the relative position of shapes and lines on the screen. It isn’t necessarily that I’m unaware - but I’m currently not ‘being aware’ - of the quantitative significance of what I’m observing. I’m always reminded of a childhood ‘trick’ stating that “one plus one equals window”, or the illusion drawing of seeing the young woman or the old one. As I see the young woman, I ‘know’ that the old woman exists potentially in the same structure - I just can’t ‘observe’ both at once.

But none of these above examples - line drawings or mathematics - refer to actual judgements. It’s all simulation. We’re not risking any effort one way or the other. What we’re doing is exploring the variability of potential/significance in observing the same physical system by changing the organisational structure (logic-based mathematics or quality-based aesthetics) in which we distribute our attention.

IIT begins with a physical event we refer to as consciousness, and is proposing an underlying logic-based organisational structure that would lend a mathematical predictability to this event.

Classical science, as a rule, relies on aligning organisational structures between observation/measurement devices. Its modern error margins on a cosmic and quantum scale lie in the assumptions it makes about this supposed alignment. Quantum mechanics demonstrates the qualitative variability in predicting a physical event by using a logic-based organisational structure to determine the predictive distribution of energy (ie. attention/effort).

So when quantum physics brackets out this qualitative variability, it has to acknowledge both a probabilistic uncertainty in the distribution of energy, and a particle-wave property duality.

IIT, too, brackets out the qualitative variability of consciousness in an attempt to predict its occurrence in relation to a specific logical system. So I imagine that, even if we could more accurately quantify consciousness as they propose, the theory is going to have to admit to a similar probabilistic uncertainty in the physical (material) location of this consciousness, as well as a duality in its properties. So it won’t address the hard problem of consciousness any more than quantum physics addresses its own phenomenology. But I think it may improve the way that logic-based systems and structures interact with consciousness.

I just don’t think that humans, or indeed all life and all energy, are entirely logic-based systems. We can’t keep pretending that this qualitative variety in organisational systems doesn’t alter predictive distributions of energy (attention and effort) whenever we take our focus off the numbers. In my view, the key to the hard problem of consciousness lies in this energy-affect property duality. Perhaps we can explore this capacity to translate potential energy-affect between quantitative and qualitative organisational structure, in much the same way that an artist switches between two ways of looking at the world.

Just offering a different (unconventional) perspective - I’m enjoying this discussion of IIT, by the way. I hope it continues.

Who is to suggest what education we should achieve? Why do we have to learn what we do? What effect does it have in our life? What effect will it have in creating our future? In the time of making decisions, which path will it make us take?

Our choices are nothing more than a result of our experience, and our experience certainly affects our brain, our choices, our decision making process due to the change of thoughts in our consciousness. Now to make a certain decision, to ensure that we don’t fall onto a curse, shouldn’t our knowledge be certain, to perfectly decide our choice making in the future? Well, almost all knowledge might have some sort of positive applicability in our lives. But we aren’t certain of the result of the overall. And probably some knowledge won’t even have any value? So what’s the reason of letting it exist? — n1tr0z3n

Do you really believe that by limiting knowledge, we increase certainty? All that does is ensure our choice appears to be a perfect decision - until we’ve made it. Our minds are not the same as computers - knowledge without significance is quickly relegated. It’s not a matter of letting it exist, but attributing significance, value, potential. But this attribution is naturally uncertain - we should always be prepared to make adjustments and seek more information as required.

History, if we think about the moment of Hitler when the Nazis killed thousands of thousands Jews, what idealism about the world does it create in us? When we learn about fabricated political events of the past, doesn’t it mislead our choices and perception in case of the existence of politics and government? So shouldn’t we acknowledge about the things that we are learning, we are perceving before we let it enter our mind? Like filtering out the things a person shouldn’t learn, something that will lead him to make BAD decisions. Because can’t this knowledge actually affect our mindset, our perspective in the overall? Like, when to forgive people and when not to, which decision we should make in which situation, which path should we take? Which rule shall we follow? Our knowledge, the things we learn, in an overall way, does affect us. It affects how we think, how we percieve the world. — n1tr0z3n

How do we judge a ‘bad’ decision? How can we predict one, or what are the conditions in which we are more inclined to make a ‘bad’ decision than a ‘good’ one? How can we answer these questions without learning something that could lead us to make ‘bad’ decisions? I don’t think that learning about Hitler and the Holocaust, for instance, creates any particular idealism about the world - I think that very much depends on the rest of our experiences, and the context of the learning process.

What we should be learning is not just about isolated facts and figures, but about our capacity and limitations in determining truth and value from information. In a world where so much data is now freely available without filter or governance, calling for censorship is unrealistic. That horse has bolted.

So shouldn’t we be considerate when it comes to plan which knowledge to offer? Based on which idealism should a person have on which situation which might lead him/her to take the accurate decision? — n1tr0z3n

I will admit here that my own education (and that of my children) has not been without ideological bias, especially in the early years. I think that ideology can be an effective scaffolding of awareness, connection and collaboration, but it should be tempered with developing critical thinking, scientific method, broadening awareness and a healthy dose of skepticism. Otherwise it cannot lead to an ‘accurate’ decision, just a prevailing illusion of certainty.

Now this concept might actually be the opposite of freedom to someone, but is it ok to let someone make bad decisions and let him get into issues and letting his life get ruined instead of creating a least perfect environment for him? In which he can freely choose which path to take and his choices won’t affect his future decisions. At least for a bit.

There are infinite possible ways to IMPROVE THIS WORLD! Think about Artificial Intelligence, we can use them to describe the possibility of that person falling into a certain decision point, and which idea does that person have to have to make a nearly accurate decision in that point? It's not just our knowledge, it's creating a nearly perfect environment for the people. — n1tr0z3n

It’s not about creating a ‘nearly perfect’ environment. People need to learn where their own limits are, and why there are limits. And they need to be responsible for them.

If you filter out all the things that you predict will lead people to make ‘bad’ decisions, you’re limiting their capacity not only to be aware of the world, but also to confidently predict the difference between ‘good’ decisions and ‘bad’. If you never let them discover that your imposed limits are not their limits (which should start around the age of two), you teach them to expect a perfect environment available for them. Any decision they make that leads to a less than perfect outcome will then be your fault for failing to create perfection - even though you know they’re more than capable not only of thriving in this nearly perfect environment you’ve carefully fashioned, but one that’s far less perfect. If only they knew.

So, when you finally let them see the real world, they don’t know how to tell ‘good’ decisions from ‘bad’ ones. They only know how to blame you for their suffering.

Education is about scaffolding an increasing capacity for awareness, connection and collaboration. I think it’s important to give someone enough information to make ‘bad’ decisions as well as ‘good’ ones, as long as they also have enough information to confidently tell the difference.

"When one finds oneself participating in an endeavor, entirely without merit - one withdraws!"
- Leopold Alexis Elijah Walker Gareth Thomas Mountbatten of Albany

The word "pity" always sounds bad, but is it ever bad to pity someone? Going by dictionary definition you aren't looking down on them. Simply empathizing with problems they are having in their life which aren't necessarily permanent? — TiredThinker

Pity originally comes from the idea of ‘piety’, which is a quality of relating to others in a way that accepts the social order: such as respecting your parents and elders, religious obedience, or caring for the poor.

The most common use of ‘pity’ refers to a particular feeling of unpleasant affect in relation to accepting and empathising with the suffering and misfortune of others - interpretable as both sorrow and compassion.

Interpreting pity as sorrow affects the individual as a negative emotion, motivating them to reduce or express the unpleasantness in themselves. To do this, they could cry, say ‘I’m sorry’, give their spare change to charity, click ‘like’, pretend they didn’t see, or change the channel, among other options.

Interpreting pity as compassion affects an accepted relationship with others, motivating one to reduce relative unpleasantness by accepting suffering themselves and sharing their good fortune in order to reduce the relative suffering and misfortune of others - more closely aligning both experiences to some extent. They could do this by sharing a meal with a homeless person, giving more than feels comfortable, etc.

Pity is often differentiated from compassion by assuming the direction of intentionality, towards the self (pity) or towards others (compassion). Some observable actions are easier to differentiate in this way than others. But the idea is to recognise the difference in ourselves.

Gibberish. — Bartricks

More gibberish. — Bartricks

Gibber. Rish. — Bartricks

Oh do enlighten me. — Bartricks

There’s really not much point - you’ll just dismiss it as ‘gibberish’. Which only demonstrates complete and utter ignorance on your part. Blatant unwillingness to understand an alternative viewpoint is not philosophy. What a waste of time.

No she isn't. Nothing I've said gives you any ground for thinking such a thing. She's not a language - languages don't issue instructions, people do. So Reason is a person - a mind. So, one of us. Just she's also going to be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, by virtue of being the one among us whose attitudes constitute reasons. And thus she will qualify as God. So the exact opposite of what you said. She - God, Reason - is a personality. And nothing stops her having a flesh and blood body too, if she so wished. — Bartricks

I didn’t say ‘God’ was a language - I’m saying that you have a particular perspective of Reason as an experience of mind from eternity - one that infinitely prefers logic. I’m arguing that a philosophical understanding of reason would transcend this preference for logic that you attribute to your description. I’m saying that God/Reason as a personality or mind is only one aspect of potentiality.

As for Reason having a flesh and bone body, or wishing anything - while I’m not disputing a relational structure between reason, intentionality and flesh, I will argue that bias or affect does come into this at some point. I’m wondering where you think that point is, and how it arises. I don’t see a clear relational structure here that follows from logic to flesh - not without affect.

And a bloody good job I'm doing too, if I do say so myself. And why is 'follow reason' in inverted commas? You show already that you're not interested in doing so, not seriously, and that you've already made your mind up about how things are with Reason. — Bartricks

Sure, ‘good’ by your limited understanding of reason. This is what I mean about interpreting my words and actions as if my relative position is against reason, just because it doesn’t align with your perspective. I’m not against reason - I’m wary of the inaccuracy of reason bound by logic. I place ‘follow reason’ in inverted commas because I disagree with your limited perspective of reason as bound by logic. I do the same with those who profess to ‘follow God’ by rejecting gender diversity, for instance. It’s just an interpretation of what it means to ‘follow God/reason’ that’s biased against an aspect we both recognise as existing. I don’t believe that reason necessarily excludes the illogical. You do.

You do realize this argument proves God, right?

1. Imperatives of Reason exist
2. Existent imperatives require an existent mind to bear them.
3. Therefore, imperatives of Reason are the imperatives of an existent mind
4. A mind whose imperatives are imperatives of Reason will be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent
5. Therefore, the mind whose imperatives are impertatives of Reason - Reason - is a mind who exists and is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent
6. An existent mind that is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent is God
7. Therefore, God exists.

You don't think it does, because you don't follow reason. If you did, you'd know the conclusion follows and the premises are all true far, far beyond a reasonable doubt. — Bartricks

You do know there’s a difference between reason and logic, right?

Your premises are true only within a limited (and arguably inaccurate) understanding of Reason, imperatives, God, mind, and the relation between omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence. You see, none of this is real. It’s all just signs and symbols, with a logical structure only. As long as you convince yourself that reality is structured only according to logic (not according to ideal quality or affect/energy), then sure, this might appear to logically prove that God exists.

But it doesn’t really prove anything.

God, mind, science, benevolence, potence, existence and reason all refer to ideas that embody different qualities according the logical relations in which they appear. Mind exists as a possibility, while an existent mind consists of potentiality. But an existent imperative is not only contingent upon the potentiality of an existent mind but also on the intentional (affected) relation of that existent mind to a temporal state of being. Otherwise it’s just words, with no imperative quality at all.

So, the existence of any imperative - yes, even an imperative of reason - is contingent upon consciousness, which muddies the waters of certainty. But we don’t even have to look at consciousness, we can just take a closer look at 4.

A potentially existent mind which has or ‘bears’ existent imperatives is potentially limited by these imperatives (in relation to consciousness). For an existent mind to be omnibenevolent, it would logically be bound by imperatives of reason. Yet for an existent mind to be omnipotent, it cannot even be potentially limited by imperatives at all. And for an existent mind to be omniscient, it would recognise this as a logical contradiction. So, a mind that is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent with imperatives is either an illogical possibility, or logically impossible.

Therefore, God is not just an existent mind, but an idea that extends beyond the bounds of logic. The existence of God is a relation to truth. You can limit it to logic if you prefer, but the existence of God as a mind with imperatives is not beyond reasonable doubt.

I agree, I'm just pointing out that brevity is a grammatical skill that can be learned; I would say it's a sign of intelligence, but not wisdom. But the wise are often brief. Brevity is seductive because it suggests wisdom, regardless of whether there is wisdom behind the brief statement. — Noble Dust

I did pause at ‘brevity’ - I don’t think it’s a measure of wisdom in itself, but I do agree that along with ‘probative’ it’s a necessary quality of the question, as is the silence surrounding it.

Measure wisdom by the questions it asks. — unenlightened

Bingo. I was going to say wisdom is measured by the probative nature of questions asked. I was going to add something about silence, and brevity, too. But I think those come close upon the heels of a probative question. — James Riley

This seems to me spot on. Wisdom is as much about not doing or saying, and what one does with a lack of knowledge/experience.

My philosophical views do not reflect my tastes. I had no desire to believe in God, and no vested interest in doing so, yet now I do due to philosophical reflection. Lots of my views are like this. Don't you change your views when you encounter arguments for views you do not yet hold yet cannot refute?

Of course, many are not like this and decide approximately what's true in advance of philosophical investigation and then look to philosophy to provide them with rationalizations of their convictions. But those people are not really doing philosophy. For they are not trying to follow reason but trying to get reason to follow them. — Bartricks

I do technically agree with most of this - even though you and I rarely agree.

I will say, however, that this God you now believe in consists of a formless quality that you attribute to a certain language structure of three letters. How you might describe or define ‘God’ is then a matter of taste.

I also think that you’re willing to ignore or exclude feeling or desire for the sake of logic, but this is arguably a narrow reasoning. I get that you’re trying to ‘follow reason’, but I’m afraid we’re really not as rational in word and action as we might assume. We only appear rational by projecting affect or emotion outward as ‘logical’ judgement or evaluation.

My own philosophical reflection might have been a mirror image to yours. Except it brought me instead from an existing belief in God to a broader understanding that I hold, despite a desire to believe. I cannot refute the existence of ‘God’, as you say, but nor can I refute its non-existence. Logic would insist that only one of these can be true, and yet nothing but ignorance or judgement either way would tip the scales. My philosophy, therefore, must allow for both possibilities, even as I’m aware that my words or actions at any time will always be interpreted as if only one is true.

So, despite what reason tells me, I cannot ‘follow reason’ with entirely rational action. I can only render reasoning with affect, logically excluding one possibility or another. Any attempt to explain such an inclusive philosophy seems paradoxical, contradictory or illogical. Which is how I think you justify a change in view by ignoring the equally unrefuted possibility that ‘God’ does NOT exist.

I’m not really interested in an argument about the existence of ‘God’. I merely wanted to illustrate what I see as a distinction between reason and logic. Logic is arguably as much a matter of taste as Shakespeare’s timeless question.

That's a nice picture. But do you think it's ever feasible? For one cannot agree even on the deepest philosophical foundations. Whoever says that non-being is always and in every form and without form preferable to being, does not come to a common denominator with someone who says that being is better in and for itself and in every manifestation than non-being. — spirit-salamander

Looking for a common denominator is a reductionist methodology - you can’t move from disagreement to common denominator without first reaching for an agreement, a common space of meaning. In terms of being/non-being, that comes from acknowledging that, despite your preference, neither exists in and for itself, but that they exist only in relation to each other. So ‘better’ is a personal preference that has no bearing on objective reality, on what’s possible.

According to my theory, however, your vision could be achievable if people become more and more alike and similar. That is not excluded, provided that one believes in biological and also cultural evolution. The corners and edges in the different personalities, which corners and edges just seem to dispose philosophically haphazardly, are carried off so slowly until everything is smooth and equal. All would then devote themselves in the future merely to the one philosophy. — spirit-salamander

I think you’re assuming that other personalities objectively have corners and edges (but not yours), that you can accurately define or judge them by these, and that your perception of that corner or edge is not just an indication of your own limited awareness. Ultimately, this sounds like essentialism. if everyone just ignored their differences, and focused ONLY on what we have in common, then we’d all get along...How ignorant and isolated would we need to be to perceive everything as ‘smooth and equal’?

Taste may decide which direction we fail at philosophy, but succeeding at it requires overcoming such biases. — Pfhorrest

I’m not sure we really overcome such biases entirely, though - at least, it’s difficult to articulate this level of objectivity. I think we can be aware of them and adjust for them, but it’s always interpreted as relative. You and I might consider our understanding to be unbiased, but I think that our reductive methodology - that is, how we render our thoughts as words or actions - will be largely a matter of taste.

I don’t think this is necessarily failing at philosophy. I think people can only evaluate someone else’s philosophy based on their own interpretation of the words or actions, which are a limited aspect of the entire process.

Personally, I think what philosophy might be moving towards is a logical and qualitative structure that enables the most accurate awareness of, and adjustment for, the energy biases in our interactions.

These biases are a large part of English language use, requiring the kind of linguistic acrobatics that took us through Russell and Wittgenstein, among others. I think they demonstrated that writing a complete philosophy which would either eliminate or overcome such biases is an exercise in futility. Some aspect will always be missing, which I think is whatever we hold back or reject of ourselves as irrelevant to the philosophy as described.

Any philosophy that hopes to ‘succeed’ in written form will need to not only account for what is missing - a lesson in humility, no doubt - but also make ‘space’ for diverse interpretations from bias.

Society at large is concerned with the aesthetic rather than actual change, this is a problem we're facing currently. Is that more-or-less correct? — Judaka

I’d agree with this. Most people don’t really want changes they haven’t already accepted, and most of those who push for ‘change’ aren’t really aware of what will change or how it will affect them. I think this played out with both Obama and Trump, and even with Brexit. The appearance of intention towards change is sufficient - it has all of the righteousness and none of the responsibility. And it gives us the freedom to complain about the actual road to change when we’re expected to make adjustments and sacrifices.

I think it is likely you would be misunderstood and misrepresented if you used the word "woke" or "wokeism" without first defining what you take these terms to mean. Though that's probably true of anyone who doesn't use the term as just a generic insult. But perhaps I'll start using your definitions anyway, my interpretation of the terms aren't productive, I need another term to describe minority positions within what it means to be woke. I don't know if the aggression I spoke of can be blamed entirely on virtue signalling or aesthetic compliance but that aggression in an ideal world would belong to a different term that doesn't represent something entirely different. — Judaka

I don’t like to use these terms - I tend to always place them in quotation marks - for me this indicates that its meaning is not identical to the concept. I think language consists of word/grammar/sentence structures, the quality of the idea to which it refers, and its affected context. This aggression you refer to is affected context - it’s about the position of the experiencing subject in relation to the quality of the idea, particularly their distribution of attention and effort. So yes, in an ideal use of language, the notion of aggression would not be assumed in relation to this term.

Valuing this quality as an appearance, isolated from either actual effective change or awareness of a broader reality, is where I think the issue lies.
— Possibility

I think you are right that this is a significant problem but there's a lot of disagreement about how these problems we're aware of should be addressed, by this definition of woke, I am woke but I disagree substantially with many others who are woke. I believe the culture war is in a large part, a result of these differing arranging of interpretations, facts, characterisations, narratives and solutions surrounding the issues that one who is woke is woke about. — Judaka

Sure. I don’t think it’s about agreeing with each other, though, but about intending to be aware of, connected to and collaborating with each other’s perspectives as much as possible. To BE ‘woke’ is to relate to this idea to some limited extent, and ideally, to recognise the diversity of limitations in others - including those who we might think of as ‘not woke’. Because to be ‘not woke’ is simply to lack awareness and intent, which is all of us to some extent, anyway.

I think there's tension between the claim that matter can produce consciousness, but not vice-versa. For example, it is claimed by many that if you arrange brain-stuff a certain way and run a current through it, you can produce the feeling of stubbing your toe. But if you arrange the feeling of stubbing your toe with the beauty of a sunset while listening to a Bach symphony, you don't a working brain from that. You never get anything material from mental states. Isn't this a problem for physicalists who believe in matter/energy conversion? Why not mental/physical conversion? Why is it a one-way street? — RogueAI

It’s an interesting question, and I haven’t read the rest of the thread yet, but I think there’s a misunderstanding here. Both your descriptions here assume both consciousness and a working brain exists. Producing a feeling is not the same as producing consciousness, and I’m not sure how you would ‘arrange’ feelings or experiences as you’ve described without a working brain.

The ‘feeling of stubbing your toe’ is a complex interrelation of ideas, including notions of ‘self’, ‘body’, ‘toe’, ‘movement’ and ‘impact’ as well as ‘unpleasant’, ‘sharp’ and ‘pain’. Potentially, it can all be rendered as a pattern of electric current through matter without understanding any of these ideas - provided that matter has sufficient experience to recognise and describe the pattern as ‘the feeling of stubbing your toe’. Otherwise how would you confirm this?

Conversely, one can theoretically arrange all of the above ideas in a particular way to construct a mental state that matches this pattern of electric current - without anyone ever actually stubbing their toe.

I define the political dispute as being about how we interpret discrimination, oppression, prejudice, equity and what should be done about a variety of social issues related to these interpretations. There's also a dispute in approach, to be "woke" I would characterise as being highly intolerant (of intolerance) as they define it. It can be quite aggressive, both in how it's done and how ambitious it can be. — Judaka

This comes from the difference between the meaning and definition of an idea. We define ‘woke’ not as an idea, but as a way of being - by how we perceive one’s intentions, politically, culturally or emotionally. There are many different ways to BE ‘woke’, and while it can appear intolerant and quite aggressively enacted, it can also be so subtle as to be unattributable (wu-wei). A person who might recognise themselves as ‘woke’ is referring to their awareness of social issues from an inclusive perspective, and their intention to effect change. But when we refer to another person as ‘woke’, we’re referring only to words and behaviour we can attribute to them, not to their thoughts or any other ways one can intend without being attributed with action.

So, a person who wants to appear as ‘woke’ will focus on aggressive, loud and vocal intention to effect change that is easily attributable. It isn’t about their awareness of another’s perspective, but about another’s perspective of their awareness. And it isn’t about them effecting a solution to social issues but about appearing to be aware by highlighting the conflict.

I think this comes down to how awareness of social issues have been taught and modelled. Media and literature portrayals highlight the conflict, and people are rewarded for words or behaviour that demonstrate awareness as well as political or emotional intent towards change. This is all we have asked from them for several generations now: appearance.

‘Wokeism’ refers to valuing the quality of awareness and intent in itself. What we’re starting to realise is that there’s more to ‘doing something about social issues’ than demonstrations and raising awareness. The fact is that effecting real and positive change in relation to social issues often looks very much like selling out or doing nothing.

As an example, much of the effect Lincoln had in relation to abolition cannot be attributed to him as actions or words demonstrating his intent towards change. In many ways he appears to have been hindering the ‘cause’. Yet it’s almost impossible to imagine abolition happening at the time without his collaboration. He certainly wasn’t an embodiment of abolitionist awareness or intent, but that’s not what creates lasting change. Lincoln understood that you need to recognise (without judgement) the broad reality of how things ARE (and how things CAN change) before you can effect change.

On the other hand, can the notion of ‘wokeism’ be applied in a narrow sense to Hitler’s effect on Germany, or even Trump’s effect on the US? Highlighting the conflict demonstrated awareness of a social issue and intent towards change, but why was this not ‘woke’? Is it because the focus was on effecting a particular change, and not on the quality of awareness or intent? Is it because the change intended had value only in ignorance of how the conflict fits within a broader awareness of reality?

Wokeism is not the problem, it’s just a symptom. We conceptualise our relation to ideas into affected structures such as language, and then reify these concepts as if the emotional, political or cultural significance we attribute is inherent in its meaning. The quality of awareness and intent has variable significance according to our perspective. Valuing this quality as an appearance, isolated from either actual effective change or awareness of a broader reality, is where I think the issue lies.

The term ‘woke’ originally referred to the idea of broader awareness in thinking that is inclusive of alternative and minority perspectives.

The term is affected, though, by one’s relative position to the idea. If this thinking appears to include awareness of one’s perspective or experience where others don’t, then such ‘wokeness’ has a positive valence. If it appears to challenge one’s attitude as ignorant or inconsiderate, then this ‘wokeness’ has a negative valence.

The term has since been applied more narrowly in reference to evidence only of those particular sympathies effecting change - championed by those actively seeking change, and perceived as a threat by those uncomfortable with the changes sought.

So those who employ a broader awareness in thinking without aggressively attacking the attitudes of others are now (understandably) distancing themselves from the term ‘woke’.

There is an assumption (particularly in US culture) that the landscape here is binary: that ‘woke’ refers to those opposing ‘non-woke’, or vice versa. This grossly oversimplified landscape appeals to those who prefer to speak or act without spending too much time, effort or attention self-consciously thinking. Cancel culture is an effort to simplify our interactions, to save ourselves the effort and attention required to include alternative perspectives or experiences in our thinking when they’re ‘obviously’ ignorant. But it’s a hypocritical approach that renders one side of the binary just as ignorant as the other - and is not what it means to be ‘woke’ in the original sense of the word.

The fact is that most of us are ‘woke’ (broadly and inclusively aware) in some aspects, but not all. It’s a work in progress, and we don’t always have the patience for a broader awareness in thinking all the time.

What is also often overlooked here is the other aspect of affect: arousal. Discomfort with potential change has to do with the time, effort and attention required to adjust our thinking in relation to what we have available. Those who resist changes in thinking are not necessarily opposing them, but aren’t ready to commit sufficient time, effort or attention to the change. How they justify this is often interpreted as opposition, but I think it’s far more complex than a binary such as ‘woke/non-woke’ allows.

You know how sometimes you look at someone and you just know they are super smart. You see the activity in their eyes and you see the most modest confidence one can see in an expression and you wish you could know what activities are going on inside their mind? They don't even seem that concerned with their immediate surroundings as most people are.

How often is this intuition a correct assumption of an actual intelligent person, or is it probably always too subjective to be true and they could totally be a dumbie? I assume recognizing intelligence must be evolutionarily necessary? — TiredThinker

I think it depends on the situation and the nature of their intelligence. I do think observing someone can often give a qualitative sense of intelligence or lack of it, but I certainly wouldn’t assume the intelligence of someone based on their appearance or demeanour. That way leads to prejudice and ignorance, as clearly demonstrates.

What it demonstrates is that one and the same object can have radically different properties at different times. And this is as true of minds as it is of anything else. The clay, when it is cuboid, has the property of being cuboid. The clay, when it is spherical, has the property of being spherical. The clay, when it is pyramidical, has the property of being pyramidical. It's the same clay, it just had different properties. — Bartricks

That a lump of clay can have different properties at different times - such as ‘being cuboid’ and then ‘being spherical’ - is a result of 3D restructuring due to interaction between the clay and an external process. That a person can have different properties at different times - such as ‘being pink’ and then ‘being blue’ - is a result of temporal restructuring due to internal interactions in the organism. That a body, a human being and a mind/person can all be the same ‘Bartricks’ is the result of conceptual restructuring due to one’s perception of that person.

If a person is perceived as just a body, then both their humanity and the potential of their mind are ignored as aspects of being a person. They don’t lose those aspects, they are merely perceived in ignorance of those aspects. In the same way, a person can perceive themselves as a human being, but have only a partial awareness of the potential of their mind.

On another level, ‘God’ can be conceived as a mind/person, but it’s only one aspect of the possibility of this idea. Similarly, ‘God’ can be perceived as a human being in ignorance of both their full potential as a mind/person and their relation to this idea.

The word 'concept' and the word 'idea' are synonyms. And God is not a concept (or idea, if you prefer). That's a category error. God is a person. A mind.

The idea of Bartricks is not Bartricks. I am Bartricks. A person. A mind. I am not an idea, even though you have an idea 'of' me. Ideas - concepts - are 'of' things. The things they are of are not themselves ideas unless, that is, we are talking about the idea of an idea. — Bartricks

Ideas and concepts are commonly mistaken for synonyms. Ideas are a relation to formless possibility/impossibility, or pure imagination. They transcend concepts, and must be subsumed within a conceptual structure or system in order to be useful. Language is one conceptual system. Aesthetics is another. Each human mind, too, is a conceptual system. The same idea has a different form by interacting with different conceptual systems.

So, we are talking about conception of an idea. The idea of an idea is still an idea, and remains beyond language.

God as person or mind is conceptual, as is Bartricks. But Bartricks is also a human being, or at least potentially a being with human properties (as far as I can tell from here). And Bartricks is also a body, although not just a body, and not just a human being. But what constitutes this ‘Bartricks’ - with which others interact - is an interrelation of ideas, not the person, not the mind. That I have a complete conceptual understanding of Bartricks would be an incorrect assumption. That YOU have a complete and accurate conceptual understanding of Bartricks would also be an incorrect assumption - of course, you ARE a complete conceptual understanding of Bartricks, but that’s not the same thing. And while it is almost certain that your understanding of Bartricks includes information that mine does not, it is at least possible that my understanding of Bartricks includes information that yours does not.

So there exists an idea of Bartricks that is not just the person, not just the mind. And accuracy in our understanding doesn’t preclude the possibility of its existence as such. But you and I have little in the way of shared qualities of experience in relation to this particular idea.

I may, however, have shared qualities of experience in relation to the idea of ‘Bartricks’ with other posters on this forum. I can discuss the idea of ‘Bartricks’ with them, and through the interrelation of these ideas, we can form a concept of ‘Bartricks’ - one which probably differs to some extent from the concept that you have of Bartricks. Now, I can argue that there are elements of truth in both concepts, but these concepts are only potentially Bartricks the person, the mind. And yes, it is more likely that your concept has more accuracy, but neither concept is entirely Bartricks. So, the person or mind that is Bartricks exists in relation to an idea - or more accurately, an interrelation of ideas.

So, while you can say that ‘God is a person/mind’, this assertion is conceived from a limited interrelation of ideas, reduced to a conceptual structure or statement.

Except it’s not your assertion. You don’t believe this statement to be true, and you don’t much care either way. You’re looking at the conceptual structure in a logical way, regardless of its truth value, its relation to any idea.

Yet for someone who can experience it as true (regardless of whether it is or not), this statement is only one qualitative aspect of ‘God’. Their relation to this idea extends beyond the conceptual or logical structure of this statement, in the same way we experience that a human being is not just a body. ‘God’ is not just a person, not just a mind. ‘God’ is a relation to an idea. And the person, the mind described in the statement is a limited conception of this idea.

Language doesn’t help us much here, and nor does logic. ‘The Tao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Tao’. Every statement, expression or thought we can make about ‘God’, the ‘Tao’, the ‘One’, the ‘Absolute’, etc subsumes the idea under a conceptual system. Any idea potentially exists only as a conception in relation to the idea. So most of this will not make much sense - especially if your own conceptual structure is limited by logic, which is limited by language. But then, I’m not really arguing against you. I just don’t think your argument, while logical, is as solid as you think it is.