Is Heidegger describing fundamental reality or human experience? Well, perhaps I seem impertinent. When others bring up authors I become impatient. Why do so many philosophy discussions hinge on the character of authors of texts? In physics, there is lots of interest in who Newton was, but we do not go on endlessly about the guy's psychic makeup in an effort to understand his three laws of motion. Why then do we do so in philosophy? There is a reason. Human character is the central theme and meaning and mystery of philosophy, and yet it is fundamental to the conduct of philosophy, especially in a scholastic or academic setting, to repudiate this. But despite this, careerists harp on personalities as if crucial to ideas. I read the same books others read, and maybe then some, but I see little point in lengthy discussions on the ideas of third parties. I prefer what might be called 'table stakes'. Fine, refer to texts and authors if you will, and certainly give credit where it is due, but discussions should be limited to the actual views of the actual interlocutors. Little is to be gained by bashing heads over what is going on in a third party's mind, though this is precisely what those who have or aspire to a career in the field not only deem a worthwhile activity, but the only activity permissible. I had one instructor who made an assertion to his class that he believed an original idea impossible. “The scariest thing in the world,” he said, “is a blank page!” This attitude derives from the very real circumstance that reason cannot proceed without its antecedent terms. It is from this that Heidegger derives the, false, assertion that “Dasein is always already in a world.” And, presumably because this is internally inexplicable, “Dasein is always in a mood.” I wonder if the term 'Dasein' might not have an alternative origin, not “Da-sein”, but “Das-ein”, that one there. It certainly biases us to regarding person as a quantifier. But time is a value or worth, not a quantity. And its most explicit term is the characterology of a necessary yet untenable presumption and prior, a priori, commitment to understanding time as a quantity. Quantum theory is a reduction. It is the derivative, the summation of mathematically defined and ordered probabilities reduced to presumably uniform quantities. What gets forgotten is that the result of this calculus enforces being unrecognized the real energy of the indefinable differences this process obscures. The enigma arises because one set of valid reductive terms results in a detectable event that represents one reality, while another set of equally valid reductive terms results in a contradictory event. Something is clearly going on that exceeds our confidence in the calculation. But what does this might be our misperception of the need for antecedent terms, or for how real and prior to our finding it we assume the world to be. That is, we take the received terms, rational logical or mathematical antecedence, or world, to be inductive. As if the product of the reduction were a justification or discovery of the inductive term antecedent to it. But the evidence, in quantum, cosmology, even logic sociology and political entities or polities, is that the product of the reduction is proof of the untenable character of the induction, and that, therefore, the intimate result of the reduction, the final reductive term, is the inductive term. That is, the changing character of our presuming induction is antecedent to rational reduction. In the world that difference reveals itself as an enigmatic universe, at the extreme scale, however obvious and profane and face-value may seem the macro. But its most explicit term, and language of presumed induction and rigor of reduction, is the characterology of that presumption. That is, it is the character of changing commitment to that presumption each of us is, and the drama of evincing that difference each of us is, through each other, to that presumption that discourse generates. It really is the most personal and intimate interactions amongst us that generates that language of our perceptions of even the most “objective” and “rigorous” calculative terms. The least term of matter is an unquantifiable probability, or mathematical impossibility. But even this has a real outcome, for chaos is only chaos if nothing in it pertains to the quantifier. However, if there are communities in this chaos that oppose each other in any term of that quantification, such that the untenable presumption of a priori induction becomes recognizable, then something real occurs, something as real as the wholesale re-characterization of antecedence. Hawkings thought we could obviate this by pretending that community, his 'string theory', is quantifiable. But the material effect of that infinitesimal chaos is not yet reductive enough for the full explication of the real. A further reductive term is required. That further reductive term, so far as we yet can know, is the human person, and the discourse of persons intimating the characterology, through each other, of the language of our changing confidence in the precedence of the quantifier. Heidegger is committed to Being as the inductive term a priori to reduction, and is therefore, either in his early or late works, not giving us any perspective of a real world.
Gary's 1st law: The least term of time is all the differing it is.