Pondering Plato's worlds (long read)

Carmaris19

Ok, I am new to both philosophy and this forum, and I am working off of just a basic intro textbook explanation of this subject, so
I apologise for any lack of etiquette I may have or if this subject has been over done.

Moving on though--I would like to discuss my thoughts on Plato's "world of becoming" and "world of being" (forms) as well as hear other peoples' thoughts on what, when first explained to me, sounded like a bunch of hooey, but now (after reading over it like 10 more times) find to be a rather interesting and enlightened take on things (even if I ultimately still disagree with its conclusions).

First off a simple summary of my understanding of the topic. I believe Plato argued that there was a material reality (the world of becoming) that was indeed "real," but that there was a deeper--immaterial--nature of reality (the world of being) that was more real.

The argument for why this world of being is more real than the world of being is in essence this: the ultimate reality should first of all be unchanging (perhaps I guess because if something can readily be given up, i.e changed, then it is not essential to reality? IDK not the interesting part to me except in setting up the basis for more ponderings). The world of becoming (material world) is in constant change though--so it cannot be the "essential" reality.

The world of being though is a world of "perfect forms) however--or rather ideas. Ideas do not change. I will give 2 examples. The first is that of the perfect right triangle. He argues that it does not exist in the world of becoming because there will always be imperfections from a shakey hand or imperfect drawing surface. The "true" right triangle lies in the world of being.

The second example is of a chair. Chairs exist in the material world, but they vary in shape, color, comfort, etc. You can change just about any detail of a chair--but ultimately those details are just ideas we have applied to the chair. The ideas themselves--say wheels on the bottom, or lumbar support--are immaterial "forms" that do not change. Lumbar support, no matter what it's called or how it is implemented, will always be the same--and a right triangle will always have 3 sides and a 90 degree angle, regardless of any changing material details. For this reason, the world of being is argued to be the truest reality.

I believe this is the jist of what he is saying. When I first heard this, I thought it was stupid to consider ideas more real than (basically what I consider) reality--but as we move to more abstract ideas (like the self) I find that we begin to see some very interesting ideas that while I can't say have sold me on the tenets of immaterialism, are still surprisingly brilliant. This is where my pondering begins.

I assume we all experience having a mind--but what does it mean in regard to Plato's worlds that the mind we experience is not immune to change? Perhaps it means that besides our bodies being a part of the world of becoming, so too is our mind. Perhaps it means that not only can we never truly experience the mind of another, but that we can never even accurately experience our own mind (which means we can never fully claim to know even our own self). I argue it could even possibly mean that experiencing material reality is experiencing the formation of your own mind.

Here's my thinking: if what is ultimately real does not change--then an ultimately real mind cannot change. If your mind changes-- then what you are experiencing as your mind cannot be the ultimate reality of your mind.

After your death, as far as we can tell in the world of becoming, your mind does not change. What actions and ideas you left behind as your legacy will be all there is of "you," and this argument applies to me too as far as I can guess. You can write books, building charities, and conquer countries in life--or you could have a change of heart and begin a new life script, but in death you are set in stone. The memory (or rather ideas/ideals) people hold of your life will be all that anyone knows of your mind (as is already the case), and these ideas will be all that remains of "you" so to speak--particularly if you consider the mind to be the essential "self." So hopefully I have illustrated properly what I mean by material reality being like experiencing the formation of your own mind so I can move on to some other implications I think Plato's argument might hold.

I think that another interesting idea this (not experiencing you true self, ideas more real than material, etc) brings up is that the idea of you is more real than the material you, and admittedly this is where it gets harder to jive with for me because it seems to imply conflicting truths.

So to pick an easy target let's take Hitler (groan, I know, only for the sake of easy recognition and not ). All we know of his mind is his legacy of violence and hate, his political views, and that sort of thing--things that are spoken of statically, never changing. We assume that he is forever unapologetic in essence--his mind is formed in our minds by the legacy of his actions.

What not everyone agrees on is whether his ideals were valuble or not and perhaps how to interpret sertain things. I dare say that Hitler thought his views were not only valuble but righteous, while most of the rest of the world disagreed. So if one individual (you) thinks that they are good, but another individual (the rest of the world) thinks they are bad--and ideas are the ultimate truth--then how can this conflicting truth be settled? Are your own ideas of self more real than the ideas another holds of you, or are we to hold that both views are always true? Do others know you better than you know yourself? I can't find a truly satisfying answer in my understanding of Plato's world's.

I would however venture to say that I believe others may indeed know you better than you know yourself, this is the basis of our criminal court system (of judge and jury), as our society does not see it fit or just that a person be able to judge their own actions--but I wasn't wanting to steer this topic towards justice and ethics perse, so much as just mention that people are considered inherantly biased towards their own views.

Some further issues (kind of)-- if the world of being is unchanging, then your true mind is unchanging (the basis of my argument that you experience the formation of your mind rather than the mind itself), then it seems we've lost a bit of our definition of a mind.

Minds require the ability to think, which requires the ability to change (as opposed to say a rock, which as the old saying "dumber than a box of rocks" seems to imply do not change or think), but if it changes then it is of the world of becoming--not being. If it does not, or more specifically, cannot change then it does not fit the typical definition of mind (or alive), so where does the mind fit in to this view at all? All is mind? There is no mind or it is otherwise an illusion? Is it a third essential aspect of reality? Does the mind consider things after death but never change, like a stubborn old person that won't or otherwise can't change their ways?

Regardless of the answers to these questions, I feel like Plato has presented a good cause to behave how you wish to be perceived because in essence, to be is to be perceived. Or to wash it down a bit, you ain't no good if you aren't perceived as such.

I think that's all I have on the topic for now. I'm open to hear your take on either Plato or my own take on him/ponderings.

Metaphysician Undercover

What not everyone agrees on is whether his ideals were valuble or not and perhaps how to interpret sertain things. I dare say that Hitler thought his views were not only valuble but righteous, while most of the rest of the world disagreed. So if one individual (you) thinks that they are good, but another individual (the rest of the world) thinks they are bad--and ideas are the ultimate truth--then how can this conflicting truth be settled? Are your own ideas of self more real than the ideas another holds of you, or are we to hold that both views are always true? Do others know you better than you know yourself? I can't find a truly satisfying answer in my understanding of Plato's world's. — Carmaris19

If you have read Plato's "Republic" you will understand that he introduces "the good". Though it is often presented as Plato's "idea of good", it is not really an idea, more like an ideal. The good is said to be what makes ideas intelligible, like the sun makes visible objects visible. So if another person's ideas (like Hitler's) are not consistent with "the good", they will appear as unintelligible.

Valentinus

I believe this is the jist of what he is saying. When I first heard this, I thought it was stupid to consider ideas more real than (basically what I consider) reality--but as we move to more abstract ideas (like the self) I find that we begin to see some very interesting ideas that while I can't say have sold me on the tenets of immaterialism, are still surprisingly brilliant. This is where my pondering begins. — Carmaris19

It is good to read the actual dialogues because the accounts of them capture some of what is going on but the experience of dealing with the relentless comparisons of what is to be agreed upon or not gives one a chance to agree or not at any point. Socrates scared the crap out of many people who confronted him. It is important to know why.

The matter of the "material" is presented both as a topic of cosmology in a mythical register along side of attempts to talk about perception in real time. The Timaeus in contrast to the Philebus, for example. The mixture pissed off Aristotle and he did his own thing.

Starting like Aristotle did is good.

tim wood

The ideas themselves--say wheels on the bottom, or lumbar support--are immaterial "forms" that do not change. — Carmaris19

I've read that the Greek idea of nature was that it is essentially imperfect. In seeking perfection (not necessarily for its own sake, but for the means and tools to give an account of the world), they (read: Plato) had resort to an un-natural "world" of perfect forms. I, myself, think of the forms as just "the ideas" formalized, but I'm pretty sure my view as such is completely inadequate as any basis for understanding Platonic thinking. A problem with Plato - that I have, anyway - is that much of the dialogues seem so easy and transparent, when they're anything but.

Carmaris19

↪Metaphysician Undercover

I have not read the republic, but I am familiar with his cave analogy, though with my admittedly limited perspective on it was that it showed the difference between truth and reality, reality being what you experience/believe, truth being how reality "really is." Otherwise though, for the sake of continuing dialogue, I invite you (and others) to fill in for Plato with your own interpretations, insites, and ponderings:smile:

I knew a good/bad example was not what I was going for but I did it any way :chin:. Scale it back from Hitler to daily life, and I was sort of trying to relate this issue of personal perspective to things such as knowing whether you are being reasonable in your interpersonal relationships and such--which I know has some basis in (personal) morality, but that is not what I am getting at.

I am getting at the idea that an idea of you is more real than the material you that is talking to me right now, do you follow me? The material you is a smartphone to me. All I know of you is your post. Going back to Plato's cave, perhaps you are a human that could track me down and show me you are not a bot, and my reality of you would change, and I would not "hold the idea" that you were just my phone any longer, until then-- and perhaps after if I chose to be an ass about it :wink: --how can I or you know which is the truth? How do you know you are not just an app in my smartphone or vice versa? In essence I understand Plato's argument to say that it is irrelevant-- you are what you convey.

If you convey intelligence, that's (part of) what you are, so on and so on...but neither you personally nor anybody else can "know" the true form of you. You cannot because you are self biased, and others cannot because (besides that they are self biased) one can only know beyond doubt the presence/contents of their own mind. In essence, your true form (and that of reality) is immaterial--not experienced.

The ideas of you though, unlike your body, those last forever....That you were intelligent, powerful, douchey, creative or good willed. That you wanted to save all the whales or hunt all the gorillas, or were a painter. Those ideas do not change--you can pick them up or drop them while you are alive and change who you (or others) "are" so to speak, but once you die you have in essence "become" a "being". The ideas held of you will be all that remains for the rest of the world to know (if they ever do), and only the ideas of you and the ideals you carried in life will remain--though they will remain forever, and you will not. Thus by way of the idea that what is real never changes (ahem, dies): the ideas about you are more real than the "you" you experience.

Enter where I believe the argument is saying that we are experiencing the formation of our own minds. In this material reality we are essentially becoming ourselves--beings--and once we become so we will be perfectly "our selves," whom we will be forever. In essence you are your legacy/the mark you leave on the world. I know I haven't read his actual works, but surely this word game (becoming/being) is not possible by coincidence, am I on to anything here?

I suppose when it comes down to it that there are conflicting ideas about a person is irrelevant if the bottom line is that you are the legacy you leave on the world, and that no mark will be universally favorable--until say someone claims Picaso isn't a painter--then with morality/right and wrong out of the picture we see where I mean to show that the idea gets too murky for me to make sense of.

Or is Plato perhaps just saying that truth is immaterial, even though reality is material?

↪tim wood

That makes sense, but I feel like the quest for improvement is just as well fueled by experiencing both inferior and superior quality to ones standard experience, or just general discomfort.

I feel that way about all interesting philosophy though (particularly metaphysics), seemingly straight forward, perhaps even easy to dismiss at first--but ultimately surprising in it's brilliance. I struggle to be positive of the difference between metaphorical and literal arguments at times (particularly with immaterialist views) and have to read things several times over to come up with enough understanding to discuss it properly. Some topics are just so far out.... Like reality for example.

↪Valentinus

I'm not sure I follow what your saying other than I need to read more.

Why did Socrates scare people? Could you clarify what Timaeus and Philebus reference? I am what you might call a low brow philosopher... Or rather my education is not my strong suit :cry:

Metaphysician Undercover

I am getting at the idea that an idea of you is more real than the material you that is talking to me right now, do you follow me? The material you is a smartphone to me. All I know of you is your post. Going back to Plato's cave, perhaps you are a human that could track me down and show me you are not a bot, and my reality of you would change, and I would not "hold the idea" that you were just my phone any longer, until then-- and perhaps after if I chose to be an ass about it :wink: --how can I or you know which is the truth? How do you know you are not just an app in my smartphone or vice versa? In essence I understand Plato's argument to say that it is irrelevant-- you are what you convey. — Carmaris19

Try looking at it this way then. From your perspective, all you know about me is the ideas that you have of me. You assume that there is a material me, somewhere. However, since the ideas of me are what are immediately present to you, in your mind, and the material me is just some assumption that you create from those ideas, the ideas of me are more real than the material me.

Carmaris19

↪Metaphysician Undercover

Right, that's sort of what I was getting at, and my understanding of the work. Do you have any thoughts on my other ideas; that the ideas others hold of you are possibly more accurate than your own (you are what you convey), or that we as material bodies are becoming immaterial minds?

TheMadFool

Right, that's sort of what I was getting at, and my understanding of the work. Do you have any thoughts on my other ideas; that the ideas others hold of you are possibly more accurate than your own (you are what you convey), or that we as material bodies are becoming immaterial minds? — Carmaris19

Well, I read somewhere that we all wear masks. We never show our true selves to others but you can't hide from yourself. So, who's the better judge as to who you really are - yourself or other people?

Gary M Washburn

Hiding from oneself is a very popular activity these days, if you haven't noticed. But think of it terms of responsiveness and responsibility. Plato favorite rational principle is "aischron", or a kind of rational shame, a shame that, in the face of it, requires us to rethink and alter our opinions. Maybe even to participate in the differing of the world, if done with sufficient rigor and care for one's soul and that of others. Plato did not have a formal logic, Aristotle put us on that road. But what if contradiction only rules our views within the terms of our presumed formalism and antecedent terms? What if the only validity to the law of contradiction is that the last term in the commitment to it re-characterizes all formal rules and redefines all antecedent terms? I think Plato will open up to you a lot more richly if you read him in this light. Act (critical question), and response (rigorous preparation for the shame of the moment recognized the discontinuity of terms and formal rules). In this was two contraries cab become partners in the recognition of a growth in reason unprecedented in our presumptions and prejudices. And since we are parties to this growth, and yet always in an important sense opposed to each other in it, we do in very concrete ways share ourselves more fully than the terms of our world can ever offer to us.

Gary M Washburn

Alas, WiFi is only available periodically, so, bye, for now.

Fooloso4

First off a simple summary of my understanding of the topic. I believe Plato argued that there was a material reality (the world of becoming) that was indeed "real," but that there was a deeper--immaterial--nature of reality (the world of being) that was more real. — Carmaris19

That is the story, but we should not read Plato as we would a discourse on metaphysics. There must be an art of reading that corresponds to his art of writing. See the Phaedrus.

The argument for why this world of being is more real than the world of being is in essence this: the ultimate reality should first of all be unchanging (perhaps I guess because if something can readily be given up, i.e changed, then it is not essential to reality? IDK not the interesting part to me except in setting up the basis for more ponderings). The world of becoming (material world) is in constant change though--so it cannot be the "essential" reality. — Carmaris19

That is part of it. It is also a matter of truth and knowledge. If I am to know what is just then I must know something that is timeless and unchanging, otherwise what is just here and now may be unjust at some other time and place. In other words, it cannot be a matter of convention.

The world of being though is a world of "perfect forms) however--or rather ideas. Ideas do not change. I will give 2 examples. The first is that of the perfect right triangle. He argues that it does not exist in the world of becoming because there will always be imperfections from a shakey hand or imperfect drawing surface. The "true" right triangle lies in the world of being. — Carmaris19

“Form” translates ‘eidos’, which is the look or kind of a thing. The term ‘idea’ comes from eidos and has an interesting philosophical history that includes a turn from universality to subjectivity, from something independent of the human mind to something that is of or from the mind. The triangles we draw are images of the triangle “itself”.

The second example is of a chair. Chairs exist in the material world, but they vary in shape, color, comfort, etc. You can change just about any detail of a chair--but ultimately those details are just ideas we have applied to the chair. The ideas themselves--say wheels on the bottom, or lumbar support--are immaterial "forms" that do not change. Lumbar support, no matter what it's called or how it is implemented, will always be the same--and a right triangle will always have 3 sides and a 90 degree angle, regardless of any changing material details. For this reason, the world of being is argued to be the truest reality. — Carmaris19

Whether there are Forms of such things as chairs is problematic for Plato. See Parmenides. But then again, the Forms themselves are problematic for Plato. We may have an idea of a chair, a universal, but this does not mean that this idea has the ontological status of the eidos such as the Good, Justice, and Beauty. In all cases we do refer to some idea, but the Forms themselves are said to be beyond our knowledge.

I assume we all experience having a mind--but what does it mean in regard to Plato's worlds that the mind we experience is not immune to change? Perhaps it means that besides our bodies being a part of the world of becoming, so too is our mind. Perhaps it means that not only can we never truly experience the mind of another, but that we can never even accurately experience our own mind (which means we can never fully claim to know even our own self). I argue it could even possibly mean that experiencing material reality is experiencing the formation of your own mind. — Carmaris19

The analogy that Plato uses is to sight. Noesis, seeing the Forms, is passive. It is not like dianoia or reason with is active or constructive. In other words, there is no changing mind corresponding to the changing world. Knowledge of the Forms is stasis, or more precisely, exstatis.

Here's my thinking: if what is ultimately real does not change--then an ultimately real mind cannot change. If your mind changes-- then what you are experiencing as your mind cannot be the ultimate reality of your mind. — Carmaris19

It is interesting, although Plato does talk about Mind, I do not think that he ever talks about Mind as a Form in the Republic, which is his most sustained discussion of such things. Although in the Phaedo he does talk about soul as Form.

After your death, as far as we can tell in the world of becoming, your mind does not change. — Carmaris19

We do find in Plato the myth of recollection, of what learns in death when the soul is separated from the body, that is, knowledge of the Forms. In the Phaedo he uses this as one of his “proofs” of the immortality of the soul.

Do others know you better than you know yourself? I can't find a truly satisfying answer in my understanding of Plato's world's. — Carmaris19

Plato’s Socrates calls himself a physician of the soul. In knowing what medicine his interlocutors need to cure their illness he knows them better than they know themselves. He frequently cited the motto “know thyself”.

Carmaris19

↪TheMadFool

That would be a question I don't have a satisfactory answer to in fancy philosophical terms, but my observation/experience tells me that it's really a combination of the two. Neither gets the whole picture, but neither is wholey blind. That being said I wasn't trying to answer through my own logic perse but through my rudimentary knowledge of Plato's sort of two world view.

↪Fooloso4

I can see that I am still holding a bit of my own philosophy in my considerations, only sort of giving up what I need to for a rudimentary understanding-- but good, justice, and beauty do not register high in my ontology as they seem to be very subjective things, and more of ideals than things I could consider as having forms. That is why I try to relate forms to material/more tangible things that we encounter in every day life like chairs and self rather than ideals that fuel peoples' political agendas and such. I would have to say that if a triangle has a form, a chair has to though, and if a self exists it must to have a form (imo).

I do see in the Phaedrus (at least the abridged version, that the soul is basically considered a self mover, and are considered immortal--so that would basically leave the question of whether your soul and your mind are the same thing...which if they aren't (at least on a perceptual) soul really doesn't seem to hold much relation to "you" so to speak and that immortality is meaningless without the form of your (functioning) mind.This certainly changes and helps my understanding of the Plato, but I liked my old version more :eyes: now there's hooey I would have to accept (afterlife) where as my prior understanding felt much more grounded in what we can know.

I don't see the relevance of Parmenides, especially as the basis of the discussion requires the acceptance of Plato's forms. My goal is to understand Plato and explore the implications of his philosophy (which is really the same thing).

TheMadFool

That would be a question I don't have a satisfactory answer to in fancy philosophical terms, but my observation/experience tells me that it's really a combination of the two. Neither gets the whole picture, but neither is wholey blind. That being said I wasn't trying to answer through my own logic perse but through my rudimentary knowledge of Plato's sort of two world view. — Carmaris19

You're right. It's a combination of the two (self and others).

Who was it who said ''you can fool some of the people all the time, all the people some of the time bu never all the people all the time''?

Abraham Lincoln?

What about ''never trust anyone''? Isn't this advice precisely because we can never see behind the mask I talked about.

Fooloso4

I can see that I am still holding a bit of my own philosophy in my considerations, only sort of giving up what I need to for a rudimentary understanding-- but good, justice, and beauty do not register high in my ontology as they seem to be very subjective things, and more of ideals than things I could consider as having forms. — Carmaris19

That is precisely the point. By treating them as eternal, unchangeable Forms they are no longer a matter of opinion but of something known by the philosophers who rule the city. On my reading of Plato they are not ideals, in fact the Republic is fundamentally anti-idealist. On the one hand there is the public teaching - these things exist and are known by those few who have transcended the cave. They should lead since they alone know the truth. On the other, if we recognize that we do not know, that human wisdom is knowledge of our ignorance, then we should be skeptical of ideals because they are based on ignorance. But of course the city in the Republic is a city in speech. There is no city like it and there cannot be. The reason is, that the paradigmatic philosopher, Socrates knows that he does not know and as a careful reading of the text makes clear is telling a story about philosophers who know things that he does not and no one else does either. It is all a noble (kalos - which also means beautiful) lie.

I would have to say that if a triangle has a form, a chair has to though, and if a self exists it must to have a form (imo). — Carmaris19

Why would a chair have to have a form? It is, after all, something to sit on, and several things will serve that purpose. But if we want to be comfortable then someone will design something to sit on that supports the back and may have other features that distinguish a chair from a stool. There is no eternal, unchangeable model that the chairs we sit on are copies or images of.

Why would the self have to have a form? What is the relationship between a self and the Self?

I don't see the relevance of Parmenides, especially as the basis of the discussion requires the acceptance of Plato's forms. My goal is to understand Plato and explore the implications of his philosophy (which is really the same thing). — Carmaris19

The Platonic dialogue Parmenides, which takes place between Parmenides and Socrates as a young man. Parmenides raises several problems with Socrates’ idea of Forms that Socrates is unable to solve. Since the dialogue takes place when Socrates is still young it raises questions as to the status of Forms in Plato’s philosophy as represented by the character Socrates.

The assumption that Plato holds to a “theory of Forms” should not be taken at face value. His irony should not be ignored. His skill as a writer, his art of writing, his poesis, should not be ignored. What he says in the Phaedrus about the art of writing - comparing the well written work to a living animal with each part having a function working together to form a whole, tells us how a well written work should be read - as a whole, with each part having its function working together in a particular way to form that whole.

In the Republic the myths of the poets, the authorities on the gods, are replaced with a philosophical poetry. A new mythology of eternal Forms known only by a few.

Valentinus

Why did Socrates scare people? Could you clarify what Timaeus and Philebus reference? — Carmaris19

Well, I think Fooloso4 has been much more helpful in his remarks than I was in mine. My reference to Timaeus and Philebus was to emphasize the range of responses to the "corporeal" in Plato. The range is evident in the Republic as well in terms of mythological visions being joined with arguments that reveal what the nature of what we encounter may be. Where those elements converge or diverge are themselves matters of contention and inquiry.

My observation about scaring people was given only to encourage you to read the actual arguments themselves to experience Socrates as the one who asks for agreement or disagreement in the relentless way he does. Reading summaries of the dialogues evades that element and turns an encounter into a definition. You enter the discussion for the first time when you go, "wait, why did you agree to that?"

TheMadFool

That would be a question I don't have a satisfactory answer to in fancy philosophical terms, but my observation/experience tells me that it's really a combination of the two. Neither gets the whole picture, but neither is wholey blind. That being said I wasn't trying to answer through my own logic perse but through my rudimentary knowledge of Plato's sort of two world view. — Carmaris19

I understand that a balanced assessment would require both internal (self) and external (other) evaluators. How does Socrates figure in the equation as he's known to have remarked ''the unexamined life is not worth living''. Who do you think Socrates trusted more - the self who recognized the man behind the mask or the other who catches you without your mask?

CCTV cameras come to mind. What does one do when no one's looking?

Anyway, as for Plato's world I think that it's a good observation and actually speaks to my point - the real is hidden behind a veil/mask.

Carmaris19

↪TheMadFool

I would assume Socrates trusted himself more on account of not being able to know the mind of another, so I suppose there's not much choice from the individual's perspective. That being said, this doesn't account for whether or not you are aware or in denial of any make-up/smudges under the mask. It's easy to rationalize one's own behavior, not so much another's. Basically it seems as though trusting one's own perception of the self wins by disqualification... A cheap win no doubt, but a win none the less.

I'd say that in soceital terms though, if we consider the court systems, your opinion of yourself or your intent means squat--you will be rewarded and punished by the outcome of your actions-- not the intent-- and this extends to every aspect of life (you don't get the apple for intending to pick it, you get the apple when you actually pick it.) Does this mean that the real "you" is best recognized by it's effect on the world as opposed to any intent behind the actions? Is the will a bad marker of the self?

↪Fooloso4

I'm a bit simple so forgive me if I am understanding you wrong, but are you saying Plato was trying to put forth a system of belief for why he (or people like him) could be in charge of the city by claiming to have knowledge he clearly cannot have had? Politics man.....

As for the form of a chair-- you could call it the form of a seat if you prefer, but if there is no need for a form of a chair-- as in some basic idea/concept that is irreplaceable (a seat) to that entity (entity being a thing that exists), then I see no need for forms in general--neither triangle, chair, self, nor soul. If the idea does not apply to everything material, it does not apply period as far as I am concerned. Either there are immaterial forms of material things, or there are not--a mixture of material things with and without forms is incoherent as far as I can reason.

As far as a self vs the self, in the context I use it it is the difference between his/her self and your self--which is fairly irrelevent to this conversation. As far as the self needing a form--that depends on whether you consider the self material or immaterial. If it is immaterial then it is a form the person is experiencing a representation of-- if it is material then it (to avoid incoherance) must have an immaterial form that the person is experiencing a representation of. At least that is my logic.

I am not trying to argue against Plato's forms is why I don't see the relevance of Parmenides. I am trying to further my understanding first. It is easy enough to deny Plato's forms (especially without a full understanding) if that is one's goal, but that is not my goal.

Fooloso4

I'm a bit simple so forgive me if I am understanding you wrong, but are you saying Plato was trying to put forth a system of belief for why he (or people like him) could be in charge of the city by claiming to have knowledge he clearly cannot have had? — Carmaris19

Plato, like Socrates, was deeply ironical. In addition, the Republic can be read as the kind of defense of philosophy that Socrates did not give at his own trial. There is a fundamental conflict between philosophy and politics. The Republic reconciles that conflict by making the city subordinate to the philosopher. The Republic is the search for the meaning of and defense of justice. It begins with the soul but Socrates enlarges it to the city because he says it will be easier to see in the larger whole. One of the definitions of justice is minding your own business. One sense of this is that each part of the well ordered soul and city will its proper part based on what it is most suited for. In another sense, it means that there can be no justice as long as the philosopher is not free to philosophize. In line with this, Plato is saying: “mind your own business”, that is, leave us alone. But the city will not leave the philosopher alone unless it is convinced that philosophy benefits the city. And so, Plato invents the story of a realm of transcendent truths that can be known by those who ascend from the cave. A quest that leads to the truth and Good.

Politics man..... — Carmaris19

Yes, but a politics of the soul. He is quite clear that he did not intend for this to be the model of an actual city. The Greek city states are long gone but Plato is still here and is still a philosopher-king, whether his rule is in the form of Platonism or Christianity (Platonism for the masses/people), or those who see past the public image of knowledge to the insurmountable problem of ignorance.

As for the form of a chair-- you could call it the form of a seat if you prefer, but if there is no need for a form of a chair-- as in some basic idea/concept that is irreplaceable (a seat) to that entity (entity being a thing that exists), then I see no need for forms in general — Carmaris19

It may be that the forms are useful for thought rather than as the basis of ontology. See the discussion of the “divided line” in the Republic for the central importance of the image making. It plays a role in almost every aspect of the book from the images on the cave wall, to the image makers, to mathematical images, to the images of Forms (which reverses the way Forms are presented, that is, the Forms themselves are images, part of Plato’s image making). With regard to chairs, it is not that there is an eternal chair grasped noetically, but that we can create a chair in the mind, an image that we can use as a form, a model, to design an actual chair.

TheMadFool

I would assume Socrates trusted himself more on account of not being able to know the mind of another, so I suppose there's not much choice from the individual's perspective. That being said, this doesn't account for whether or not you are aware or in denial of any make-up/smudges under the mask. It's easy to rationalize one's own behavior, not so much another's. Basically it seems as though trusting one's own perception of the self wins by disqualification... A cheap win no doubt, but a win none the less. — Carmaris19

You're right. The self is ''better'' at self-examination not because it's better than other people but only because it has greater acess to information about itself than others. Nothing great in being able to see inside a room if you're inside it.

I'd say that in soceital terms though, if we consider the court systems, your opinion of yourself or your intent means squat--you will be rewarded and punished by the outcome of your actions-- not the intent-- and this extends to every aspect of life (you don't get the apple for intending to pick it, you get the apple when you actually pick it.) Does this mean that the real "you" is best recognized by it's effect on the world as opposed to any intent behind the actions? Is the will a bad marker of the self? — Carmaris19

That's a good point because we tend to filter information about ourselves given to the outside world. Courts recognize so testimonies about oneself are subject to examination. However, this can be construed as trying to get a look behind the mask - to see a person as s/he truly is which s/he already knows.

Pondering Plato's worlds (long read)

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