That's the thing, isn't it - what counts as an object depends on the conversation.

If I am playing word games, it's because that's what much of philosophy is. So let's do it self-consciously - Sort through the word games and see which ones make sense.

Words like objective and subjective have a useful place in some conversations. But when they get attached to truth and reality and such, they take us up the garden path. — Banno

But all along you were the one insisting objects are "out there" and that they are there regardless of beliefs. Now you're saying that they are just an element in a language game, and what matters it whether it makes sense. But "making sense" is something mental, and doesn't reference anything objective.

So I am confused what your position is now

What I was pointing out is contrary to this, from you:

It seems fairly obvious that there is no "thread" as an object "out there".

That the thread has pats - posts and words - does not render it any less. — Banno

Right, but what you're doing seems to me to merely be a word game. Since you brought up "the thread", and I am reacting to that, linguistically "the thread" is the object of our discussion. That of course doesn't say anything about whether it's also an object in other respects.

If you were to replace "the thread" with "the posts" or even "the words", then we might get closer to an agreement.

I cannot agree with you there. Have you heard of the "absurd"? Reductio Ad Absurdum? All valid philosophical terms which criteria of judgement is common sense or common life experience. — Samuel Lacrampe

The problem with that is that both people need to agree that the conclusion is absurd. Otherwise, why bother with this thread? You could as well have said "Hume says this, but clearly it is absurd, therefore he is wrong".

No sir. The onus of proof is on he who disrupts the status quo, and the status quo is that it is not normal to hallucinate. — Samuel Lacrampe

Oh that's clever. So you get to set the status quo and then get to ask everyone for proof?

How is a teapot unobservable? — Samuel Lacrampe

Let me quote the original argument: "If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes.

Are you confusing the terms objectivity and subjectivity perhaps? Objectivity is defined as "external reality". — Samuel Lacrampe

Dictionary definitions are not arguments. That's how the term is generally used. Hume essentially questioned whether that use was actually correct.

True. I should have said that both science and philosophy aim for truth, which is conformance to reality. — Samuel Lacrampe

That sounds good.

As previously mentioned, it is defended by the fact that the alternative method (that more complex explanations are more reasonable until proven false) leads to a reductio ad absurdum. Can't prove that invisible unicorns don't exist? Then they exist. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't think that those are the two only options. When discussing metaphysics a "true agnostic" position exists, i.e. there are simply things we can't make reasoned statements about one way or another.

List 'em, then. — Banno

Well for one you're assuming I am even looking at something. Perhaps my computer is reading the text out for me.

If I am looking, how do you know what language the text appears in to me? Perhaps it's translated. How do you know whether the formatting, colours, the order of posts etc. Is anything like it looks to you? I could be using a specific device, or a specific software, that you don't.

But most importantly you see a different thread because in your thread, you make different posts than I do in mine. You have a bunch of background information about you that I don't, and vice versa. You automatically know what you meant with your posts. I don't.

Notice that this is no longer about what is true, but what is established as true. The conversation has surreptitiously moved from truth to belief. — Banno

Because truth and belief are connected. Sure, you can have a notion of "objective truth" that is completely divorced from whatever anyone thinks about the world. But by that same token, it'd be completely empty. If there is no way to establish truth, then judging things as true or false is pointless. And aren't you the one complaining about unnecessary confusion?

Reality does not care what your consensus is. — Banno

One liners won't convince anyone. If you want to have a discussion, address my actual argument.

That's an odd thing to say. There is a thread that I see, you see, Coben sees,

Now it can't just be in your head, since both Coben and I also see it. And further we each see the same thread - and post to it.

SO I'd go so far as to say that here you seem to be wrong. — Banno

And I'd go so far as to say that you're making a bunch of unjustified assumptions about what I and Coben see. What do you think you know, and how do you think you know it?

That seems to be wrong, too, as a general rule. WE do after all make incorrect conclusions from the available evidence.

What I want to emphasis here is that the evidence does not make something true; rather the evidence leads it our belief.

That is, that belief and truth are quite distinct. — Banno

But how do we establish truth in the context of physical reality? By making conclusions based on evidence. So the only way you know that a conclusion you made was wrong is if either you, or someone else, arrives at a different conclusion that includes the same evidence, i.e. falsification.

How do we know that the theories about Phlogiston were incorrect? Because we have new theories and a consensus that they were wrong.

The major: agreed, all empirical knowledge is grounded in experience, which is always subjective;

The minor: agreed, there is no reason to think, and it is counterproductive to suggest, that which appears to the sensibility of a plurality of perceiving subjects is not the same for each of them;

The conclusion: does not follow from the premises, in that consensus-based becomes the condition for the premises, rather than consensus alone being a valid judgement given from them.

A plurality of congruent individual knowledges is merely an agreement, and such commonality in itself cannot be sufficient reason for the knowledge, for it then becomes possible for agreement to be the ground of knowledge, which contradicts the major. — Mww

You're right, the conclusion as written contradicts the major. I think I have unnecessarily doubled up on the knowledge part. It should actually be the other way round: the a consensus of individual knowledge forms our shared physical reality.

So, a subject is a view? Are you saying that is all that you are - a view of the world? The "internal vs. external" is a product of the same problem as the "physical vs. non-physical" - dualism. I am not just my view of the world. I am a human being - an organism of which my view is only one part. — Harry Hindu

The view still has to be explained though. If the universe is just a bunch of objects strung together by cause and effect, how is it possible for some object to have an internal perspective?

Why do you think you keep trying to get me to agree and see things how you see them? What is the purpose of that? — Harry Hindu

This is a philosophy forum. I am not saying there isn't anything objective or true.

I asked you how you move your "physical" arm with your "non-physical" mind? You need to show me the same respect that I have shown you and answer my questions. Do you agree or disagree that there is a causal relationship there? — Harry Hindu

My physical brain is moving my physical arm. Whatever the mind does beyond the physical I don't know. The physical phenomena are representations of the non-physical reality. So the mind is not strictly speaking in a causal relationship with anything physical.

Do you disagree that there is a causal relationship between imagining flying to the Moon and the existence of "physical" rockets that fly human beings to the Moon? Could human beings travel to the Moon without first having imagined it and then imagined the plans for the design of a rocket ship to get them to the Moon? — Harry Hindu

That's a good point. The imagination does seem so be necessary to cause the following developments. But if you were to look at the chain of events that led from, say, the evolution of humans to spaceflight, where would you find the imagination? Could it be described?

No because it is abnormal (using common sense alone, the normal is to not hallucinate), and so we would need to further explain the cause of that abnormality. In contrast, we don't need to further explain the existence of an oasis, as it is not abnormal. — Samuel Lacrampe

"common sense" won't fly in a serious discussion. You have to actually give reasons why it's "not normal" to hallucinate. Perhaps we are all hallucinating all the time?

Might as well believe that the whole world is an illusion, on the mere grounds that it is logically possible. But logically possible does not entail reasonable. For this, we appeal to further principles of reasonableness like Parsimony. — Samuel Lacrampe

How is parsimony going to help if everything is an illusion?

All I will say for now is that it is a perfectly accepted scientific principle, and that the alternative (that more complex is more reasonable) leads to a reductio ad absurdum: Can't prove there is no teapot in space? Then we'll believe there is. — Samuel Lacrampe

The application of the principle is far from clear even in the context of empirical science. There is plenty of discussion around just how to measure simplicity. In an epistemological discussion, it's not clear whether the principle applies at all. The Russel's Teapot example can be solved in other ways. For example, one might say that statements of existence or nonexistence about an object which is defined as unobservable are equally meaningless.

I'm not sure that statement makes sense. Reality implies objectivity. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think that this is the conclusion you wish to argue for in your argument, so you cannot use it as a premise. The problem Hume brings up is exactly that there seems to be nothing connecting reality (the things we experience) and objectivity.

And as both philosophy and science aim to predict reality, what works for science for that aim also works for philosophy. — Samuel Lacrampe

That would make the scientific method a fully general method to solve all philosophical problems, and that is clearly nonsense. Philosophy isn't necessarily concerned with predictions. Epistemology, for example, is concerned what we can know, not what we will know.

Note also that the Principle of Parsimony was first introduced not for science but for philosophy; and that science is a branch of philosophy (ie the search for truth), specializing in what is empirically verifiable. — Samuel Lacrampe

While this is true, William of Ockham, whose name has become attached to it, used it two differentiate between hypothses about phenomena, so a domain that we know attribute to empirical science. But regardless of it's origin, the principle must stand for itself.

Now that seems a bit odd. You and I agree that this thread is in English, I presume; and we do this as a result of having read the thread - that is, as a result of having made certain observations. Why balk at the claim that, that this thread is in English is an objective fact? IT's not, after ll, based on some individual preference in the way subjective facts are... — Banno

Why call it objective? It seems fairly obvious that there is no "thread" as an object "out there". Everything we do with the text (that's not actually stored as text anywhere outside our minds) is a mental exercise.

I already said I had no issue with using the term objective like you propose here, unless it's a discussion specifically about epistemology or metaphysics.

So back to the keys. You agree, I assume, that getting the keys out of the car does not consist in getting everyone to believe that the keys are out of the car... It's not the consensus that makes the fact true? So some how knowledge is consensus-based, but truth isn't? — Banno

Getting the keys is an action. Presumably, you can both feel and touch the keys. You don't need other people to tell you what you see and touch.

What's the fact you want to establish? That there are objectively (in the strict sense) keys in the car? I believe that to be impossible, on account of there being no objective source of information. If you want to ask "where (physically) are my (physical) keys", then the answer is whatever you conclude based on the available evidence. Theoretically, everyone with access to the same evidence should arrive at the same conclusion, but in case they don't, the consensus opinion would be most likely to have the desired result.

Again, it's not the consensus that leads to a statement's being true, though, is it? Although it might lead to our believing it to be true. — Banno

Depends on what your definition of true is. If I want a theory that will produce accurate results regardless of who applies it, that does depend on a consensus. If something works for me, but everyone else says it fails for them, then what I have is something subjective.

SO your claim is now that knowledge relies on consensus, but that consensus does not imply knowledge? — Banno

Intersubjective knowledge kinda requires a consensus by definition. If the knowledge (or propositions) about the physical isn't shared by several subjects, it's not intersubjective.

My position is that insofar as our knowledge about reality is based on experience, it's not objective. It is also, however, not just subjective, since we have methods to establish an intersubjective reality. We're not all experiencing wildly different realities after all. It stands to reason that the common elements in the experiences of different subjects are the result of objective reality asserting itself. That doesn't make the collection of subjective experiences themselves objective though, so the conclusion I arrive at (which I agree seems weird) is that our knowledge about phenomenal, physical reality is indeed consensus-based. And this is, I think, supported by looking at the actual history of scientific advancement.

You are not claiming that consensus implies truth, then. Good. — Banno

Not in an objective sense, no. It might still be practically useful to have a version of subjective truth.

So, how does consensus relate to truth? — Banno

Well if you look at practices like the repeatability of experiments and peer review, it seems that consensus has an important rule in eliminating subjective bias. And in doing so, it should, assuming we maintain proper methods, bring us closer to truth.

I suppose that would be a shortened way of referring to the reference of an intersubjective proposition. Is that so? I would understand it like that. — David Mo

The reference would be the subjectively perceived phenomena?

The term intersubjective does not refer to means of expression or objects, but to properties of knowledge or propositions, to be more exact. The internet forum is not itself intersubjective, but the content that is expressed through it. You can make statements that are based on something that actually exists (objective), on a merely personal appreciation (subjective) or on a reference that you share with a more or less wide group of people (intersubjective). — David Mo

Ok, so would it make sense to say that "intersubjective reality" is a set of propositions about phenomenal reality shared by a group of subjects?

You can make a personal use of the word. But you should know how it is used in contemporary philosophy to avoid confusion. — David Mo

Yeah I agree. I came up with the word because it seems descriptive for what I mean.

SO if you lock the keys in the car, but you and everyone else believe that the keys are in your pocket... — Banno

How do I lock the keys in the car if they are simultaneously in my pocket? You are acting as if I am claiming that there are two physical realities. I don't though. If you want to claim the keys are in the car while physically appearing to be in my pocket, you'd have to justify that first.

The shift is towards that which results in greater survivability. The bee sees the world in a way that leads to his survival. Those who smell garbage as sweet probably don't survive well, regardless of what garbage really smells like, whatever that means. — Hanover

Yes, that's about how I think it works. Though we cannot in the first instance say that our perception is based on survivability, since that's a theory based on our observations.

Noticed that you’ve so far only addressed intersubjective reality in the singular. Although all this might go without saying, I wanted to make it explicit that each and every culture is its own intersubjective reality; as is each unique religious worldview, here including atheism; each unique language and its embedded semantics; and so forth. I have extreme doubt about such being anything but a practical joke, but the flat earth society, if their proclaimed belief is real and not mere deception, would be just one intersubjective reality among many. On the other hand, our tangible objective reality - if it is deemed to impartially effect (causally) all coexistent sentient being - can only be singular by entailment. — javra

Yes, there could be countless intersubjective realities. The reason I used the singular so far is that I was concerned with the idealised "human" intersubjective reality, i.e. what would result if there were no bias, mistakes etc. While that will never practically be the case, it serves as my baseline for what could be called "practical reality".

I’ll add that, to me at least, if these categories of “personally subjective realities”, “intersubjective realities”, and “the singular objective reality” are taken to be valid, they’d then retain the same properties regardless of which ontology happens to be the correct one: e.g., they’d apply just as much to idealism (it’s all psychical stuff in different forms) as they would to physicalism (it’s all physical stuff in different forms). The only main differences would be the metaphysical implications. — javra

It'd be more a question of what you think the order is: do the objects develop subjectivity, or do the subjects develop objects?

I think I understand your point, that to quantify the likelihood or probability of hallucination demands a reference that must be more certain. But rather than using Probability, I am using Complexity of the explanation to appeal to the Principle of Parsimony. Regardless of the probability, the explanation that the object is real is simpler than the explanation of collective hallucination, because it would also need to explain where the hallucination comes from, and how come it is so consistent among all subjects etc. — Samuel Lacrampe

Two problems:

First, the principle of parsimony cannot deal very well with hallucinations. "I'm hallucinating" is a very simple explanation, and while I am hallucinating, perhaps I am also hallucinating the people that agree with me. Are more complex hallucinations also more complex theories?

The bigger issue is that you haven't justified the principle of parsimony. Why is the less complex explanation closer to reality? Is reality obligated to be simple and parsimonious?

The reason we can use the parsimony as a principle in the scientific method is because we're concerned with making predictions, which means making working models of reality. A simpler, more inclusive model is more useful than a complex, less inclusive one. But it's a tool for of practicality, not objectivity.

You're talking about truth, right? Subjective truth versus intersubjective truth versus objective truth? If that's the case, then it's subjectively true that ice-cream tastes good, but objectively true that ice-cream tastes good to me. — Hanover

That sounds about right.

If it's intersubjectively true that the earth is flat, that matters to someone other than the metaphysician, especially if there is one objector who happens to be right. If that weren't the case, then great discoveries are false prior to their discovery and only become true when enough people believe in them. — Hanover

I think that this is not as bad as it sounds. For one, it is practically the case that our knowledge about the world relies on a consensus. I haven't personally been to space. For another, I am not saying intersubjective truth is divorced from objective truth. As long as proper methods are applied, the consensus will generally shift towards that most in line with objective truth, since objective truth has the annoying tendency to reassert itself.

Essentially, I think of intersubjective truth as an interface between the objective and the subjective, but one where we don't know which parts are from which side.

But since we're talking about truth, of what value is perspective, which is what objective and subjective reference? I'm not the first to remark that you have to have a view from somewhere, else it'd be a view from nowhere. So, is the earth flat? From my perspective it's not, but I can't pretend to know that objectively. I only think that, which is the way every person thinks when they think they've got something right.

I think the solution is either (1) there is an objective perspective we cannot know because we will always be situated somewhere, or (2) the question is incoherent because you cannot ask what something would look like if you were standing no where. — Hanover

There is also the corrolary: not only do you have to have a view from somewhere, it also must be a view of something. It's not a perspective if the subjective is all there is. To have an internal perspective also requires there to be something external.

So while I feel like 2 isn't entirely wrong, there must be a way "it is like", even if there is no looking involved. So that gets us back to 1.

But then, how can he justify that what is beyond the physical cannot be perceived? Surely this a metaphysical claim about the nature of whatever it is beyond the physical? — Nagase

I think it's just a matter of definitions. The physical is that which can be perceived.

But some things CAN be perceived. And the PUP connects the perception to conclusions about reality, which is metaphysics. — Samuel Lacrampe

It's only metaphysics if you specify non-empirical reality, because empirical reality is the domain of physics, no meta involved.

The problem with your argument (which itself would count as metaphysics) is that you never reference anything beyond the phenomena. You say a collective hallucination is "less likely" but what is that judgement based on? If you're basing it on empirical research on hallucinations, then you're just referencing another phenomenon, which might be just as illusory as any other.

Humes problem was that he couldn't find a way to anchor our perceptions to something beyond perception. Adding more perceptions doesn't help.

If by subject, you mean process or relationship, then I can agree with that. I wouldn't know what you mean by subject other than a type of object. You refer to subjects just like you do objects in your use of language, so what is the difference? — Harry Hindu

Yep, you don't have a concept of a subject. It figures. So what is your internal perspective then? If you're not a subject, what are you?

The problem is only hard if you're a dualist. The mind is part of the world because it has a causal relationship with the world. — Harry Hindu

Actually the problem is just as bad because no causal process to explain qualia has been discovered. If everything is objects, there'd have to be some physical process that converts, say, electric charge into feelings. You talk as if this process was common knowledge, but it's not, and you haven't provided any.

So objects and subjects don't exist, only process/relationships (Whitehead)? I might actually start to agree with you here, but then we'd be talking about, and agreeing on, the actual state-of-affairs, which would be objective. Whenever you assert how things actually are, you are attempting to be objective. — Harry Hindu

Are you at all familiar with the whole "existence is not a predicate" argument?

although I admit, it's much too easy to follow the crowd, especially when one is cowardly. — Merkwurdichliebe

Cute :wink:
Have fun in your little corner.

What are you blabbering about? Who's all in on it? — Merkwurdichliebe

So let me put this in simple terms:

You make a claim "the CDC is fabricating numbers to induce a panic", and provide some evidence in support.

Then I say "what about all the other countries?". This is evidence that contradicts your initial claim. You need to deal with this contrary evidence somehow, or else your claim is weakend.

You say "well they're all doing the same". Instead of updating your view based on the contrary evidence, you simply incorporate into your view. You updated your claim from a US conspiracy to a world conspiracy, without supplying further evidence. Logically, your new claim would need much more and much stronger evidence, since it's so much broader. But since you simply took my objection and turned it around, you have no such need. That's the small leap of irrationality that leads to a big dumb conspiracy theory.

No. It's not. You keep making objective statements, seemingly without knowing it. Each sentence you just wrote is an objective statement about you, and you are part of the world. — Harry Hindu

I am not part of my world though. I cannot be both the subject and the object. You're arguing that there is no subject, which means your epistemology is stuck in the 17th century.

Are qualia and preferences part of the world? — Harry Hindu

That's the hard problem, isn't it? They don't seem to be.

Do qualia and preferences establish causal relationships with the world? — Harry Hindu

That question doesn't make sense. Qualia and preferences aren't events, and only events have "causal relationships".

If not, then you aren't part of the world. You would be non-existent. — Harry Hindu

The subject doesn't technically exist, since existence is a relationship between the subject and an object. If you think that there are only objects, then of course this discussion doesn't makes sense to you.

Imaginings and delusions cause people to behave in certain ways. Imaginings and delusions are themselves caused by states-of-affairs in the world. — Harry Hindu

How is that related to the topic?

Oh, of course, it's just absurd to think other states than the US would deceive and disinform its public. Yes, it's absolutely impossible. — Merkwurdichliebe

Ah yes, the classic "they're all in on it" argument. Turning contrary evidence into supporting evidence with just one small leap of irrationality.

There you go, that would be another posited-as-objective facet. — Coben

I am not claiming it as objective, it's just a practical assumption. Not everything that refers to objectivity is automatically a claim.

I am not sure what you mean by the object being referred to. I was saying that what I just quoted, if it is saying that 'we don't (which might mean 'can't') know whether or not our experiences are objective' then it is making a claim about reality and an claim to objectivity. — Coben

Just linguistically, the object of that sentence is "our experience". So what I am making a claim about is experience. If you want to substitute "reality" for "experience" you're already presupposing realism.

Unless you mean something along the lines of "we are part of objective reality, so every claim about us is also a claim about objective reality". But in that case you're switching perspective to some theoretical "universal subject", and the notions of objectivity and subjectivity become meaningless.

I actually think it might make more sense to replace 'experiences' in that sentence. I don't know what I would be saying if I said my experience was objective. My conclusion, my idea, my assertion, that seems more like something that could be objective when contrasted with subjective (ideas, conclusions...etc.) It's a bit like you don't have true or false things, but rather true or false statements. — Coben

Yeah, I think you're right about that. It'd have to be something like our conclusions based on experience, since experience necessarily refers to a subject.

Essentially, what we want to know is "can we find truth that's independent of our own perspective", right?

I'm sorry, but your use of intersubjectivism is incorrect.
An objective proposition corresponds to the external objects.
The proposition that depends on the subject is subjective
The proposition that is common to several subjects is intersubjective. — David Mo

That's actually how I intended to use the term. Can you point out to me what I did wrong?

If this is an assertion about epistemology...iow something in the family 'given the fact that we perceive in this manner and...(other reasons). then we cannot know if our assertions are objective or subjective'
then that is still an objective statement. — Coben

What's the object being referred to? Epistemology is about my knowledge as a subject. Substituting "we" for "I" is based on the assumption that human minds are alike.

...which is part of the world. Your knowledge of the world, accurate or not, is part of the world. — Harry Hindu

That's like saying New York isn't part of America, but part of the universe. My ability to know things is a subjective ability. It might be objective to some other observer, but that's beside the point.

Doubt is part of the world.

You don't seem to understand that your mind's state is part of the world. — Harry Hindu

So according to you, literally every statement is objective, including statements about qualia and preferences?

The funny thing is, any assertions we make are assertions of objectivity. So if we say we are subjective beings, then we're making an objective truth claim. So in order for us to say that we are subjective beings we have to assume there is objectivity that we can utilise in the first place. — Cidat

The claim isn't necessarily "we are subjective beings". It could just be "we don't know whether or not our experiences are objective". They might be, but we cannot just assume they are.

Right. So a crash wouldnt happen because of the design of the plane, but for some other reason that has nothing to do with the design of the plane. — Harry Hindu

You should tell Boeing. Perhaps that'll convince the authorities to let their newest plane operate again.

You're making objective claims about how the world is for everyone. — Harry Hindu

No, I am not making claims about the world, but rather claims about our ability to know the world.

"Everything is subjective" is an objective statement as it is being asserted to be true for everyone. — Harry Hindu

Unless the person saying it uses it as a general statement of doubt, in the form of "everything is subjective, including this statement".

It's weird how often people forget that the world is larger than the US, and the CDC can therefore not fabricate numbers across the globe.

Well, presumably he doesn't - there are, after all, only perceptions-of-replies, subjective stuff, not objective at all. — Banno

We're all subjects imagining other subjects doing subjective stuff. It's subjects all the way down.

But seriously, there is a difference between subjective, intersubjective, and objective. The objective part here is that we're somehow exchanging information. The intersubjective part is that we're using an Internetforum, computers, the English language etc. And then we each have a subjective interpretation of what is said and why, with a small model of what the person saying it might be like.

Unless you're specifically doing metaphysics or epistemology, there isn't any reason to differentiate between objective and whatever is intersubjective for all humans.

see, Pneumenon, not only do you not see with your eyes, you don't actauly have a computer — Banno

He doesn't? How does he write his replies then?

I see the computer with my eyeballs. It's not inside of my eyeballs, or inherently eyeballish. — Pneumenon

Your eyeballs merely react to some photons. It's your mind that sees the computer. And, even according to 20th century physics, the computer isn't really a continuous object.

So long as you do not take this to mean that you cannot predict anything. — Banno

I don't :wink:

It depends on the goal. If the goal was accomplished, how can it be said that it wasn't accurate? — Harry Hindu

If there was a chance it'd go wrong, then the prediction wasn't completely accurate. A well designed plane can still crash.

Objectivity is possible through analysis, prediction, and success. Which is to say you analyze the properties of something, say a planet and its motion, you predict where it will be, and upon receiving data on its coordinates in space which align with your prediction then that is an objective truth. The same can be applied to any empirical science and to state otherwise would imply the observation to be merely by chance, yet, we can accurately predict the functionality of matter, alter to our will, which necessarily requires objective perception. — Templisonanum

It does not necessarily require objectivity, it could be dumb luck. But that kind of thought doesn't get us anywhere.

I think I mostly agree with you, but I wouldn't call it objective perception. It's not the perception that's objective, it's analysis of the shared patterns of our subjective perceptions. Those patterns, or rules, are objective, even if all the actual content of our perception is fabricated.

For example, you cannot predict whether or not with complete accuracy if someone will have an adverse emotional reaction to something, since the essence of which does not exist. — Templisonanum

You cannot technically predict anything with complete accuracy. Emotional reactions should not, in principle, be different.

But I don't think you need perfect metrics to do science; to do science, all you require is indicative metrics. If our empathetic judgments are better than chance at judging mental states, that's enough to use them as measuring tools in double blind studies. Even better, after multiple applications of such methods are performed over a period of time, we could perform meta-analysis on studies to gain insight into whether or not empathy in such applications is a metric of at least something. Such use of empathy as a part of scientific investigations I would not consider unscientific. — InPitzotl

I think you're thinking about this from a perspective that is too technical. Every person's mind will be different, and so will every person's empathy. Yes you can still arrive at averages that you can use as indicative metrics. But that will filter out those individual differences. The internal perspective can not be recreated that way, it can only be intuited or imagined. Without that perspective, are you studying the mind, or merely behaviour?

So I would be happy if the physics we know appears closed, in the sense that we don't know we have such holes; but I cannot fathom calling this current state of physics complete until we at least patch the holes we know are there. — InPitzotl

I think you have misunderstood me. I didn't ever refer to a "current state". I wrote "can be complete". At what time it is or will be complete doesn't matter.

There is a difference between "being objective" as an observer and arriving at objective truths. The former is not possible, the latter arguably is, in a very limited field.

True. But I think that the significance of "rare" is itself connected to teleology. Rare things are significant because of their use for us, either in terms of productive use or as status symbols.

As for special and unique, it seems to me humans are special and unique, individually as well as as a species. We imbue everything with our own personal meanings.

I realize that; but the OP is inviting the implications of that answer, and Nagase in my estimation is responding to said invitation. — InPitzotl

Well, in any event I was merely pointing out that I had my doubts about the statement.

I'm not sure I follow. What would combining the scientific method with empathy to get a sense of the mind look like and, if someone did something like this, then how are they being unscientific? — InPitzotl

I'd describe empathy as "imagining yourself in somebody else's situation". Imagining situations isn't an application of the scientific method, it's not an observation. So it's unscientific in that sense.

As to how it looks: you might know from observation that someone is in a bad mood today. You use empathy to get a sense of how their mind feels.

I'm having problems here. If someone were to tell me that, by applying the scientific method to physics, one can arrive at a complete understanding of physics, I would think that such a claim itself was unscientific. — InPitzotl

Yes the claim is unscientific in a strict sense. It would be a metaphysical claim.

If it were false with physics that one could come up with a complete understanding of the parts, I don't know how to infer anything from it being false with mind; and if that's the case, then I really don't see the distinction you're pointing out. — InPitzotl

Well if your understanding is not complete, what else would you apply to physics? If there isn't anything else, then whatever is beyond the scientific method is beyond any understanding whatsoever. I'd say that if we have understood all we can possibly understand, then our understanding is complete.

I think the question begging accusation is a bit backwards. A reasonable a priori answer to this question is "possibly", or, "perhaps; let's find out". The answer, "no, because minds are private" is the dubious one; that is the answer that begs the question (assumes its conclusion). — InPitzotl

I did not give that answer though. I just wanted to point out that the exact relationship is worth thinking about.

The question boils down to whether the mind has observable effects from the outside and whether those effects can be used to infer facts about the mind. That minds are private in the way described in the original post does not suffice to entail that it has no observable effects that can be used to infer facts about the mind; all it really entails is that such methods cannot reveal facts about the mind "directly". — InPitzotl

Sure. I wouldn't claim that minds have no observable effects. But the question is whether looking at observable effects allows you to "study" the mind, or whether you need to combine that information with unscientific methods, like empathy, to actually get a sense of the mind.

To me it's painfully obvious that we can indeed study the mind, by which I mean we can derive facts related to how the mind works, using indirect means and scientific approaches. What might be a much more interesting conversation than simply denying reality would be to explore what we could study by such methods and what we cannot. — InPitzotl

This all sounds reasonable. I would just question whether we are studying "parts of the mind" or rather "manifestations of the mind". The difference being that if you can study parts, you arrive at an accurate and complete understanding of the parts. If you can only study a manifestation, that's not necessarily the case.

I don't espouse the belief that we are somehow a unique and significant manifestation of the universe, but I don't discount the possibility either. — Pantagruel

I mean, I think we are significant, but not on the basis of rarity or some cosmic teleology.

Notice that there are other ways of measuring things than just by directly observing them. For example, we do not directly observe forces, but we can measure them by indirect observations. Similarly, we cannot directly observe "the mind", but we can understand it by indirectly observing people's reactions. — Nagase

I think that, in a way, this is begging the question. Can we study the mind by observing people from the outside?

Incidentally, I think this is congenial to a point John McDowell repeats over and over again. We tend to think of minds as organs, as if they were "located" in some sort of para-space, which we cannot access and hence must somewhat guess its contents. McDowell urges us to drop this talk and instead recognize that to talk about minds is to talk subjects of a mental life, i.e. to talk about people. So in some sense we can in a sense see the person's mental states because they show us (unwittingly, in some cases, such as the infant's) their mental states. — Nagase

I like this perspective. Minds are people. But is knowing a person the same as studying their behaviour? Is, for example, empathy a way of studying another person?

Selection bias, on the other hand, poses challenging epistemological problems in the same line as Sleeping Beauty, Doomsday, etc. — SophistiCat

Though debates about these frequently seem just as intractable as those around theism. Answers to these problems rely so heavily on your basic epistemological stance that it's hard to make a convincing case to someone who doesn't have the same background.

Specific speculative claims about what is unknowable are unwarranted conjectures.

It seems to me that claims to know the actual limits of the world -- as distinct from the limits of the "known world" -- are instances of such speculative claims. In my view you have signed on to such a claim, seemingly without realizing that this is what you are doing. I agree such claims are unwarranted, which is why I've been objecting to them here

By contrast, the claim that it seems we cannot know whether some facts or features of the world are unknowable in principle for creatures like us is arguably not speculative at all. It's not an empirical or metaphysical claim about what the world is like. It's an epistemological claim that seems to follow from any reasonable conception we might assign to terms like "know" and "world". — Cabbage Farmer

I think I agree with this. I just don't think claiming that infinity cannot exist in the "world" is a specific claim in that sense. It's a general statement about the concept of infinity.

I'm not sure I would agree with this.

The fact that we "know something" or "know about something" -- a dog or a table, for instance -- does not entail that we know everything about it. It's not clear that we ever have "complete knowledge" of a thing we know or know about, or what it might mean to say that we do have complete knowledge of a thing.

Accordingly, I see no reason to object to the claim that partial knowledge of an infinite thing would count as knowledge. So, if the world is infinite in some respect, say in space or time, and our knowledge of it is finite, this would not entail that we don't know the world, but only that our knowledge of the world is partial and incomplete. But in this respect it would resemble our knowledge of many "finite things", like dogs and tables. — Cabbage Farmer

But even if "the world" is infinite in some respect, it is impossible to ever observe it in that infinity, since observing the infinite is, by definition, never complete. Even if we observed a seemingly endless succession, all we can ever say based on that is that the succession is indefinite.

So if we extend the meaning of "the world" to things that are, in principle, impossible to observe, we are doing unwarranted metaphysical speculation.

The claim we began by addressing is a claim to have proved that "there is no infinity". I take it you and I are still considering that claim when we use words like "universe" and "world" in this conversation. — Cabbage Farmer

The problem is that the claim "there is no infinity" isn't specific enough. Normally, when we talk about what is and isn't we're talking about physical reality, not theoretically possible worlds. We can discuss possible worlds, but I am not sure the conclusions would be very interesting.

What is the practical value of a conversation about whether "there is infinity"?

On my view, at least part of the practical value is that it directs our thoughts to consider the limits of our knowledge of the world.

Accordingly, I reject your ad hoc definition on practical as well as theoretical grounds. — Cabbage Farmer

Right. But you do see that my argument is essentially an epistemological one, so I does fit your definition of practical value.

I do not claim there is a "world behind the world". I say, by definition, there is one world; and it seems that world is knowable at least in part, on the basis of appearances.

My reply to your remark about practicality should suffice to indicate my position on the matter of relevance. — Cabbage Farmer

So do you agree infinity belongs to the part of the world that's not knowable?

I'll add this: If it's true, then it's relevant. It's my aim to practice clear, coherent, and honest speech in philosophical conversation, and to offset our tendency to error, confusion, and insincerity.

It seems to me that philosophical confusion, even in small and abstract matters, may have far-reaching personal and political implications.

I would characterize philosophical discourse as pursuit of a sort of personal and political harmony. — Cabbage Farmer

An interesting perspective. Of course, what "true" even means is itself a matter of philosophical discourse.

In what way do you say our knowledge creates reality?

I agree we have a peculiar way of participating in the world as sentient animals and as cultural animals with powerful conceptual capacities. I suppose we can say each sentient animal "creates" its way of participating in the world just by living, and this participation includes a way of perceiving the world and a way of acting in the world.

I see no reason to say that to perceive a world is to "create a world", nor that to perceive a dog is to create a dog. Nor that to understand a state of affairs is to create that state of affairs, nor that to run into a wall is to create that wall. And so on. So far as I can tell, that would be getting carried away with talk of our "creativity". — Cabbage Farmer

Well I think that there are neither dogs nor walls outside our heads. Those are categories put together by human minds on the basis of certain patterns in the information that these minds receive. There is some source of that information, but it's the mind that constructs the patterns. The patterns are not the information though, like the pattern on a sweater is not the fabric.

Do you mean to say that experience and scientific method "populate the world with all the content" of the world? What does it mean to say this?

Does it mean that when we perceive a dog, our minds somehow "populate the world" with a dog that in fact does not otherwise exist in the world, or with a dog that in fact is not otherwise "contained" in the world?

Here again it seems you may be conflating a conception of the world as it is in fact with a conception of our knowledge of the world.

Do you suppose the dog is not "in the world" and "does not exist", unless we know it? — Cabbage Farmer

If we abstract from all experience, talk of "the world" is meaningless. Fundamentally, the world is the collection of our knowledge about the world. We can reason, based on experience, that there are things we don't know about the world, and from that we get the idea of a larger world of which we know only some part. So the "conception of the world" is actually secondary and based on experience.

So if you lived on some undiscovered island and had never seen or heard of a dog, and neither did anyone you had ever seen or heard of, you might still know, based on experience, that you sometimes discover new animals. And hence you might say that "unknown animals exist". But would you say that "dogs exist"? You wouldn't, because the term "dog" is meaningless to you. Someone would have to explain a dog based on things you have already experienced for the claim to make any sense.