So according to you, literally every statement is objective, including statements about qualia and preferences?
— Echarmion
Are qualia and preferences part of the world? Do qualia and preferences establish causal relationships with the world? If not, then you aren't part of the world. You would be non-existent. Imaginings and delusions cause people to behave in certain ways. Imaginings and delusions are themselves caused by states-of-affairs in the world. — Harry Hindu

While imaginings and delusions are real and objective in the sense that they exist, what they are about is inaccurate, and in that sense they would be subjective. Like I said, subjectivity is projecting mental states onto things that don't have mental states, or aren't those mental states. Projecting your delusion or imagining onto the world as if it were also a state-of-the-world besides just being a delusion or imagining in the objective sense (you'd have to be able to distinguish between delusion and reality to be able to distinguish between subjectivity and objectivity), is what subjectivity is.

No. It's not. You keep making objective statements, seemingly without knowing it. Each sentence you just wrote is an objective statement about you, and you are part of the world. — Harry Hindu

I am not part of my world though. I cannot be both the subject and the object. You're arguing that there is no subject, which means your epistemology is stuck in the 17th century.

Are qualia and preferences part of the world? — Harry Hindu

That's the hard problem, isn't it? They don't seem to be.

Do qualia and preferences establish causal relationships with the world? — Harry Hindu

That question doesn't make sense. Qualia and preferences aren't events, and only events have "causal relationships".

If not, then you aren't part of the world. You would be non-existent. — Harry Hindu

The subject doesn't technically exist, since existence is a relationship between the subject and an object. If you think that there are only objects, then of course this discussion doesn't makes sense to you.

Imaginings and delusions cause people to behave in certain ways. Imaginings and delusions are themselves caused by states-of-affairs in the world. — Harry Hindu

How is that related to the topic?

I am not part of my world though. I cannot be both the subject and the object. You're arguing that there is no subject, which means your epistemology is stuck in the 17th century. — Echarmion

I didn't say your world. I said the world. The world is not yours unless you're a solipsist.

If you are not part of the world, then how are you communicating with me and others?

If by subject, you mean process or relationship, then I can agree with that. I wouldn't know what you mean by subject other than a type of object. You refer to subjects just like you do objects in your use of language, so what is the difference?

That's the hard problem, isn't it? They don't seem to be. — Echarmion

The problem is only hard if you're a dualist. The mind is part of the world because it has a causal relationship with the world.

That question doesn't make sense. Qualia and preferences aren't events, and only events have "causal relationships". — Echarmion

Causes and effects have causal relationships. Qualia and preferences are caused by other states-of-affairs and are themselves causes of states-of-affairs in the world. If you don't agree, then I ask how you move your body (physical) with the intent of your mind (non-physical)? The answer is that there is no physical vs. non-physical dichotomy, and therefore no hard problem. It is all part of the same world.

The subject doesn't technically exist, since existence is a relationship between the subject and an object. If you think that there are only objects, then of course this discussion doesn't makes sense to you. — Echarmion

So objects and subjects don't exist, only process/relationships (Whitehead)? I might actually start to agree with you here, but then we'd be talking about, and agreeing on, the actual state-of-affairs, which would be objective. Whenever you assert how things actually are, you are attempting to be objective.

If by subject, you mean process or relationship, then I can agree with that. I wouldn't know what you mean by subject other than a type of object. You refer to subjects just like you do objects in your use of language, so what is the difference? — Harry Hindu

Yep, you don't have a concept of a subject. It figures. So what is your internal perspective then? If you're not a subject, what are you?

The problem is only hard if you're a dualist. The mind is part of the world because it has a causal relationship with the world. — Harry Hindu

Actually the problem is just as bad because no causal process to explain qualia has been discovered. If everything is objects, there'd have to be some physical process that converts, say, electric charge into feelings. You talk as if this process was common knowledge, but it's not, and you haven't provided any.

So objects and subjects don't exist, only process/relationships (Whitehead)? I might actually start to agree with you here, but then we'd be talking about, and agreeing on, the actual state-of-affairs, which would be objective. Whenever you assert how things actually are, you are attempting to be objective. — Harry Hindu

Are you at all familiar with the whole "existence is not a predicate" argument?

But seriously, there is a difference between subjective, intersubjective, and objective. The objective part here is that we're somehow exchanging information. The intersubjective part is that we're using an Internetforum, computers, the English language etc. And then we each have a subjective interpretation of what is said and why, with a small model of what the person saying it might be like.

Unless you're specifically doing metaphysics or epistemology, there isn't any reason to differentiate between objective and whatever is intersubjective for all humans. — Echarmion

You're talking about truth, right? Subjective truth versus intersubjective truth versus objective truth? If that's the case, then it's subjectively true that ice-cream tastes good, but objectively true that ice-cream tastes good to me.

If it's intersubjectively true that the earth is flat, that matters to someone other than the metaphysician, especially if there is one objector who happens to be right. If that weren't the case, then great discoveries are false prior to their discovery and only become true when enough people believe in them.

But since we're talking about truth, of what value is perspective, which is what objective and subjective reference? I'm not the first to remark that you have to have a view from somewhere, else it'd be a view from nowhere. So, is the earth flat? From my perspective it's not, but I can't pretend to know that objectively. I only think that, which is the way every person thinks when they think they've got something right.

I think the solution is either (1) there is an objective perspective we cannot know because we will always be situated somewhere, or (2) the question is incoherent because you cannot ask what something would look like if you were standing no where.

If you thought that your assertion was actually subjective, then why say it at all? What use would it be for others? — Harry Hindu

First, anything I say wouldn’t be purely subjective, that being reserved for what I think. Second, for whatever I say, the use of it by others is up to them.

You're talking about truth, right? Subjective truth versus intersubjective truth versus objective truth? If that's the case, then it's subjectively true that ice-cream tastes good, but objectively true that ice-cream tastes good to me. — Hanover

That sounds about right.

If it's intersubjectively true that the earth is flat, that matters to someone other than the metaphysician, especially if there is one objector who happens to be right. If that weren't the case, then great discoveries are false prior to their discovery and only become true when enough people believe in them. — Hanover

I think that this is not as bad as it sounds. For one, it is practically the case that our knowledge about the world relies on a consensus. I haven't personally been to space. For another, I am not saying intersubjective truth is divorced from objective truth. As long as proper methods are applied, the consensus will generally shift towards that most in line with objective truth, since objective truth has the annoying tendency to reassert itself.

Essentially, I think of intersubjective truth as an interface between the objective and the subjective, but one where we don't know which parts are from which side.

But since we're talking about truth, of what value is perspective, which is what objective and subjective reference? I'm not the first to remark that you have to have a view from somewhere, else it'd be a view from nowhere. So, is the earth flat? From my perspective it's not, but I can't pretend to know that objectively. I only think that, which is the way every person thinks when they think they've got something right.

I think the solution is either (1) there is an objective perspective we cannot know because we will always be situated somewhere, or (2) the question is incoherent because you cannot ask what something would look like if you were standing no where. — Hanover

There is also the corrolary: not only do you have to have a view from somewhere, it also must be a view of something. It's not a perspective if the subjective is all there is. To have an internal perspective also requires there to be something external.

So while I feel like 2 isn't entirely wrong, there must be a way "it is like", even if there is no looking involved. So that gets us back to 1.

As long as proper methods are applied, the consensus will generally shift towards that most in line with objective truth, since objective truth has the annoying tendency to reassert itself. — Echarmion

The shift is towards that which results in greater survivability. The bee sees the world in a way that leads to his survival. Those who smell garbage as sweet probably don't survive well, regardless of what garbage really smells like, whatever that means.

Noticed that you’ve so far only addressed intersubjective reality in the singular. Although all this might go without saying, I wanted to make it explicit that each and every culture is its own intersubjective reality; as is each unique religious worldview, here including atheism; each unique language and its embedded semantics; and so forth. I have extreme doubt about such being anything but a practical joke, but the flat earth society, if their proclaimed belief is real and not mere deception, would be just one intersubjective reality among many. On the other hand, our tangible objective reality - if it is deemed to impartially effect (causally) all coexistent sentient being - can only be singular by entailment.

I’ll add that, to me at least, if these categories of “personally subjective realities”, “intersubjective realities”, and “the singular objective reality” are taken to be valid, they’d then retain the same properties regardless of which ontology happens to be the correct one: e.g., they’d apply just as much to idealism (it’s all psychical stuff in different forms) as they would to physicalism (it’s all physical stuff in different forms). The only main differences would be the metaphysical implications.

Then the philosophers become involved... and off we go up the garden path. — Banno

Don't blame the philosophers. There is no philosopher here and things are messy enough.
In my opinion, we ordinary people have more problems with words than (some) philosophers (not all).

Can you point out to me what I did wrong? — Echarmion

The term intersubjective does not refer to means of expression or objects, but to properties of knowledge or propositions, to be more exact. The internet forum is not itself intersubjective, but the content that is expressed through it. You can make statements that are based on something that actually exists (objective), on a merely personal appreciation (subjective) or on a reference that you share with a more or less wide group of people (intersubjective).

As I said, neopositivism and philosophical analysis exclude the first option. An intersubjective proposition is close to objectivity when admitted by everybody, but it is not the same concept.

You can make a personal use of the word. But you should know how it is used in contemporary philosophy to avoid confusion.

For one, it is practically the case that our knowledge about the world relies on a consensus. — Echarmion

SO if you lock the keys in the car, but you and everyone else believe that the keys are in your pocket...

Then they are revised until complete accuracy is achieved. — Templisonanum

This seems to be the easiest solution, but it is not so easy in practice. The process of refutation of a theory never involves a single theory but a set of theories that include the basic and secondary ones. The scientist's dilemma is which of them to reject. For this dilemma there is no algorithm. It is intuitive and there are some extra scientific implications. This uncertainty explains the changes in the laws that are even considered essential for science.

Therefore, accuracy in science is relative and objectivity is never assured.

Metaphysical inquiry can lead to the theory of the undivided particle - the monad, which as we know from physics to be true, from observing elementary particles. — Templisonanum

Leibniz's monads and Democritus' atoms had nothing to do with the contemporary concept of atomic particles. They were speculative. Their characteristics were not empirical. They had no extension, for example. And according to the ancients, they spawned numbers. You're a rational monad, you see.

For the same reason you cannot say that Jules Verne "advanced" to NASA interplanetary travel. (Actually, there is more distance between Leibniz and Bohr than between Verne and Gagarin)

While imaginings and delusions are real and objective in the sense that they exist, — Harry Hindu

Generally, in philosophy the concept of objective is reserved for knowledge that refers to what is outside the mind of the subject. It can be forced to mean that in introspection the mind is both subject and object, but this is an exception to the rule that should be emphasized so as not to create confusion.

The shift is towards that which results in greater survivability. The bee sees the world in a way that leads to his survival. Those who smell garbage as sweet probably don't survive well, regardless of what garbage really smells like, whatever that means. — Hanover

Yes, that's about how I think it works. Though we cannot in the first instance say that our perception is based on survivability, since that's a theory based on our observations.

Noticed that you’ve so far only addressed intersubjective reality in the singular. Although all this might go without saying, I wanted to make it explicit that each and every culture is its own intersubjective reality; as is each unique religious worldview, here including atheism; each unique language and its embedded semantics; and so forth. I have extreme doubt about such being anything but a practical joke, but the flat earth society, if their proclaimed belief is real and not mere deception, would be just one intersubjective reality among many. On the other hand, our tangible objective reality - if it is deemed to impartially effect (causally) all coexistent sentient being - can only be singular by entailment. — javra

Yes, there could be countless intersubjective realities. The reason I used the singular so far is that I was concerned with the idealised "human" intersubjective reality, i.e. what would result if there were no bias, mistakes etc. While that will never practically be the case, it serves as my baseline for what could be called "practical reality".

I’ll add that, to me at least, if these categories of “personally subjective realities”, “intersubjective realities”, and “the singular objective reality” are taken to be valid, they’d then retain the same properties regardless of which ontology happens to be the correct one: e.g., they’d apply just as much to idealism (it’s all psychical stuff in different forms) as they would to physicalism (it’s all physical stuff in different forms). The only main differences would be the metaphysical implications. — javra

It'd be more a question of what you think the order is: do the objects develop subjectivity, or do the subjects develop objects?

SO if you lock the keys in the car, but you and everyone else believe that the keys are in your pocket... — Banno

How do I lock the keys in the car if they are simultaneously in my pocket? You are acting as if I am claiming that there are two physical realities. I don't though. If you want to claim the keys are in the car while physically appearing to be in my pocket, you'd have to justify that first.

I’ll add that, to me at least, if these categories of “personally subjective realities”, “intersubjective realities”, and “the singular objective reality” are taken to be valid, — javra

I guess "intersubjective reality" is a metaphor. What's intersubjective is the proposition. We share it or we don't share it. The enunciated means a state of facts. I do not share those facts with the others. They can exist in a world that is not mine, but nevertheless I can share the same statement. This is what makes it intersubjective.

Example:
Imagine a man who has an optical problem from birth and sees the colors red and blue interchangeably. When we are together we both say "This is red and that is blue" in the same way, that is, we point out the same things. Each of us will really be seeing something different subjectively, but we will say the same thing. Our statement is intersubjectively the same. And that's what matters.

The term intersubjective does not refer to means of expression or objects, but to properties of knowledge or propositions, to be more exact. The internet forum is not itself intersubjective, but the content that is expressed through it. You can make statements that are based on something that actually exists (objective), on a merely personal appreciation (subjective) or on a reference that you share with a more or less wide group of people (intersubjective). — David Mo

Ok, so would it make sense to say that "intersubjective reality" is a set of propositions about phenomenal reality shared by a group of subjects?

You can make a personal use of the word. But you should know how it is used in contemporary philosophy to avoid confusion. — David Mo

Yeah I agree. I came up with the word because it seems descriptive for what I mean.

What?

SO your claim is now that knowledge relies on consensus, but that consensus does not imply knowledge?

You are not claiming that consensus implies truth, then. Good.

So, how does consensus relate to truth?

Ok, so would it make sense to say that "intersubjective reality" is a set of propositions about phenomenal reality shared by a group of subjects? — Echarmion

I suppose that would be a shortened way of referring to the reference of an intersubjective proposition. Is that so? I would understand it like that.

The point is that this reality is not objective, but subjective even though it is related to others through language.

Example:
Peter and Paul are seeing something flying in the sky.
What is that?, says Paul.
Peter: I don't know.
Paul: It has the shape of a son of man.
Peter: Yes, and it has a red cape.
Paul: And red underpants!
Peter: Yes, and blue tights!
Paul: It wasn't a bird, it wasn't a plane! Was it Jesus?
Peter, Paul & Mary: No! He's Superman!!!

How they arrive at a common proposition? By referring to their respective subjective impressions. Objectivity is absent from the dialogue. Only intersubjectivity.

SO your claim is now that knowledge relies on consensus, but that consensus does not imply knowledge? — Banno

Intersubjective knowledge kinda requires a consensus by definition. If the knowledge (or propositions) about the physical isn't shared by several subjects, it's not intersubjective.

My position is that insofar as our knowledge about reality is based on experience, it's not objective. It is also, however, not just subjective, since we have methods to establish an intersubjective reality. We're not all experiencing wildly different realities after all. It stands to reason that the common elements in the experiences of different subjects are the result of objective reality asserting itself. That doesn't make the collection of subjective experiences themselves objective though, so the conclusion I arrive at (which I agree seems weird) is that our knowledge about phenomenal, physical reality is indeed consensus-based. And this is, I think, supported by looking at the actual history of scientific advancement.

You are not claiming that consensus implies truth, then. Good. — Banno

Not in an objective sense, no. It might still be practically useful to have a version of subjective truth.

So, how does consensus relate to truth? — Banno

Well if you look at practices like the repeatability of experiments and peer review, it seems that consensus has an important rule in eliminating subjective bias. And in doing so, it should, assuming we maintain proper methods, bring us closer to truth.

I suppose that would be a shortened way of referring to the reference of an intersubjective proposition. Is that so? I would understand it like that. — David Mo

The reference would be the subjectively perceived phenomena?

The reference would be the subjectively perceived phenomena? — Echarmion

Directly, yes. In the second instance, objects constructed as handfuls of sensations under a form.

SO your claim is now that knowledge relies on consensus, but that consensus does not imply knowledge?

You are not claiming that consensus implies truth, then. Good.

So, how does consensus relate to truth? — Banno

Consensus increases the perceived potential information of a subject, enabling them to theoretically approach a more accurate or objective view of truth than the one subject’s sensory experiences alone. But this additional information is relative to unfamiliar perspectives, and so is less certain. The more information we obtain about these different perspectives in relation to our own, the more accurate our resulting view of truth.

To use a recent example, the more clearly the blind men can ‘map’ each of their relative positions and experiences using additional information (asking questions, etc), the more accurately they can piece together a view of the elephant. But at this stage they have only increased perceived potential information: they’re better placed to make sound predictions and hypotheses, but not yet to claim this view of truth as knowledge or fact.

Intersubjective knowledge kinda requires a consensus by definition. If the knowledge (or propositions) about the physical isn't shared by several subjects, it's not intersubjective. — Echarmion

...which seems to me to be saying no more than that if several folk agree on something, then they agree on something. Surely this does not apply to knowledge per se? That is, your observation here applies to intersubjective knowledge alone; and hence we can still ask if all knowledge relies on consensus; and follow this up by some analysis of that knowledge which relies on consensus and that which does not?

My position is that insofar as our knowledge about reality is based on experience, it's not objective. — Echarmion

Now that seems a bit odd. You and I agree that this thread is in English, I presume; and we do this as a result of having read the thread - that is, as a result of having made certain observations. Why balk at the claim that, that this thread is in English is an objective fact? IT's not, after ll, based on some individual preference in the way subjective facts are...

...our knowledge about phenomenal, physical reality is indeed consensus-based. — Echarmion

So back to the keys. You agree, I assume, that getting the keys out of the car does not consist in getting everyone to believe that the keys are out of the car... It's not the consensus that makes the fact true? So some how knowledge is consensus-based, but truth isn't?

So, how does consensus relate to truth?
— Banno

Well if you look at practices like the repeatability of experiments and peer review, it seems that consensus has an important rule in eliminating subjective bias. And in doing so, it should, assuming we maintain proper methods, bring us closer to truth. — Echarmion

Again, it's not the consensus that leads to a statement's being true, though, is it? Although it might lead to our believing it to be true.

Consensus increases the perceived potential information of a subject, enabling them to theoretically approach a more accurate or objective view of truth than the one subject’s sensory experiences alone. — Possibility

SO you are saying something like that the more "perceived potential information of a subject" there is, the more true it is?

That's a big claim.

Perhaps you meant to say that the more "perceived potential information of a subject" there is, the more believable it is?

Well, yes, the more folk agree with you, the more you believe you are right.

Again, it's not the consensus that leads to a statement's being true, though, is it? — Banno

Does a statement's being true lead to consensus? (IOW if there is consensus on something is it a better bet than average or on statements that there is no consensus. Obviously consensus has been wrong.)And then if one is pragmatic might it not work to assume, at least until counterevidence or some screaming fault with current models, that X is true if the consensus believes it is? IOW take consensus evaluation that something is true might be a good heuristic, unless you have some strong reason not to.

I suppose underneath this I am getting at 'we never have direct access to truth' we have what works. Things are open to revision.

But truth and belief are quite different things. Believing something does not, except in specific circumstances, render it true; nor does a thing's being true make it believed.

SO a statement's being true does not lead to consensus. Nor is there a better chance of the consensus being true in virtue of that consensus - although hopefully we are more likely to believe what is true... nor is what is useful always what is true; so pragmatism gets nowhere.

You might do well to believe the consensus, if only for the sake of a quiet life.

Why would one think we never have access to the truth, direct or otherwise? We have access to lots of truths.