Imagine a world where everyone adopts behavior that is universalizable. Wouldn't all immoral behavior be absent? I would really like to see an immoral act that can be universalized which would contradict my belief that Kantian morals need to be adopted in toto to be realized as true instead of the partial treatment in the murderer at the door thought experiment. — TheMadFool

You're not wrong. In a world where everyone adopts universalizable behavior, no immoral acts would happen. It's just that I don't think Kant assumed, or even required as a prerequisite, that this state would occur. In Kants system, creating the actual "state of freedom" is the business of laws, not of morality.

I cite you, you cite my friend, and my friend cites me. It is absolutely trivial to game that system. — alcontali

I have an anecdote about that. I once discovered a citation circle. Several publications referenced each other for support, but none actually contained the original argument nor a citation of an original source. Worse, the only non-circular citation was to an article that argued the exact opposite.

Do you agree that Kant's morals in the world, at present, is like a fish out of water, destined to die?

We have to put Kantian morals in its proper environment - one in which all Kantian principles are in effect. — TheMadFool

I think this is a misunderstanding. Kant's morals are personal. The goal of acting morally is not primarily to make society a better place. Rather, Kant argues that to act morally is to be free. You follow the rules because by doing so, you overcome all outside, contingent influences on your actions.

Hume claimed that causality is simply a habit of the mind - when a conjunction of events repeat in time and over space it's considered causation. He claimed that there's no logical necessity in causality - we can't prove it. Basically it's inductive in nature - a matter of a given conjunction of events repeating itself. — TheMadFool

Yes, I think Hume was correct here. Causation is valid as an inductive principle, but causation itself cannot be deductively proven.

If all of causation is like this - merely inferred from a repeating conjunction - then it's possible that causation isn't real and is just a habit of the mind constructed to see patterns.

If the above is true then freewill is possible since we usually reject it because we believe causality is real. If causality isn't real then freewill is possible! — TheMadFool

To add to this, the entire realm of the physical world - where causation is a useful principle - is only a mental model. The internal perspective, where we experience freedom, is entirely outside this model.

That said, many causal arguments come with an account of the mechanism which explains how the cause leads to the effect. To use my previous example, a slap stimulates the nerve fibers and that's what's felt as pain. When this is done, a mechanism of cause-effect provided, it strengthens the argument for causality being real and not just a habit of the mind. However, this isn't the case too because the causal mechanism, whatever it maybe, is itself nothing more than a conjunction which we know is not real causation. — TheMadFool

Yes, I'd argue the same thing. We can go into more detail on the events that happen. But we don't know whether the order we automatically put these events in is objective.

Every cause has an effect. An event that always suceeds another one is thought to be the effect of the preceding event which is said to be the cause. — Sheik Yerbouti

How do we actually know this though, given that you acknowledge we don't actually observe causation, but merely correlation?

For example, most activity in medicine revolves around administering poisons and liberally cutting into people's bodies. Therefore, absolute rules such as "You shall not administer poisons" or "You shall not chop off other people's limbs" are nonsensical. In such case, you could as well close all hospitals, because that is pretty much all they do. — alcontali

Where do you get the idea that only absolute, abstract maxims pass the categorical imperative?

No, I mean by default wrong what I said I mean. Now address the argument not the label I have attached to it. The label is correct and all you're doing by disputing that is a) not focussing on the issue at hand and b) revealing your ignorance.
Engage the argument or go away and start your own thread in which you use whatever labels you want to attach to things. — Bartricks

I said I would accept the argument for the purposes of this discussion. Now, what next?

Do we really want others to be free to cause injury? Is that sort of freedom moral? — Marchesk

They're not free to do so under Kantian morals. But we are not responsible for making them into moral beings.

Kantian ethics ignores this and permits individual horrible things to happen (like causing a murder by telling the truth) as long as society in general is better off if everyone follows the rules. — Congau

Kantian ethics is not really concerned with making society "better off" in some material sense. Rather, it's about being free in a positive sense, while being a member in a society. It is actually a personal system.

It allows us to cause injury with open eyes and it’s therefore an immoral system. — Congau

It allows us to allow others to cause injury. Because it takes the freedom of others seriously.

But what did we get from Sarah Sanders other than the bullshit she chose to present? — frank

Nothing of much value, I'd agree. But at least someone had to stand there and tell lies, knowing they were telling lies, by looking people in the eye.

Trumps impromptu "briefings" have a very different dynamic. One where Trump controls the setting. He can begin and end them at will without it seeming out of place. This suggests a different kind of stance on the accountability of government.

Those are little things, and it's easy to dismiss all these concerns as petty. I believe, however, that institutions are curcially important to a democracy. Proper procedure, political correctness, a certain decorum keep the system from slipping towards autocracy.

If previous presidents had the internet as a tool for informing the public, would they have used it? What's the role of the press today? — frank

The internet is different from a press briefing though. You cannot put someone on the spot and force them to answer. Professional journalists can be more dangerous to a politician than random Twitter users.

It's also not like previous presidents did not use the internet. Obama used Twitter. I am sure the Bush administration released information online. What's different is not the usage of the medium, but the message being sent.

I only recently discovered that he got rid of Sarah Sanders because he wants to talk directly to the press (usually on the white house lawn with a helicopter in the background.) What's that about? — frank

It's about dismantling another political institution - White House press briefings. Dismantling political institutions is one of the core goals of the ideological leaders behind this administration (not necessarily including Trump himself).

If we were to compare Trump to any of the myriad people who spend their conscious hours opposing him, nine times out of ten you’d be comparing the exception to the mean, the legendary to the forgettable, the trophy case of history to its proverbial dustbin. — NOS4A2

We're off to a good start here.

Alas, I will never get such satisfaction. But there is one trifling thing I can always be certain of when listening to an anti-Trumper: Donald Trump is greater than them. — NOS4A2

Ah yes, true love. So nice to see someone expressing their romantic feelings without fear of ridicule and judgement. Regrettably, unless you kinda look like Ivanka Trump, I think your love shall remain unrequited.

I think I get it too now. If I get the option to switch, that means the game didn't restart. It's less likely I picked the right door initially. But, given that the game did not restart, it becomes more likely that I picked the right door. Not sure exactly how the mathematical operation looks though.

Monty hall problems are apparently difficult even if you know the basics.

I don't think the initial probability of picking a random door is 1/3. Think about it. — Purple Pond

Doesn't "initial probability" mean irrespective of all later factors? In which case I don't see how it could be anything but 1/3.

I have not incorrectly used the term 'Kantian' in referring to the argument I am focusing on in that way. — Bartricks

You have. It's quite annoying to see you butcher Kantianism in order to make it fit your preconceived notion. But since you blithely refuse to even consider any other view, there is no point in continuing.

If you cannot affect someone by creating them, kindly explain how you can affect someone by destroying them - and explain in a way that will not allow me to say the same about creating someone or that will not just involve making some arbitrary stipulation that has no support from reason. — Bartricks

Making people that exist no longer exist affects those people, since they loose everything.

As you think you like logic, here's an argument and you tell me which premise you dispute, or the first premise you dispute if you dispute more than one of them. — Bartricks

If by "default wrong" you mean that exceptions have to be justified, like in the cases of self defense or implied consent, I don't have a problem with that argument. I wouldn't personally structure it that way, but it's fine for the purposes of argument.

Actions and behavior. — NOS4A2

Not including speech, I presume.

I'm not saying this is incorrect, but some people try to explain the Monty Hall problem in terms of what the host knows and has to reveal. — Purple Pond

And that is relevant, because the reason you are getting additional information out of the host's decision is that this decision follows a predetermined rule.

You have recreated that rule though, by having the game terminate. If the game does not terminate, the player gains information.

Edit: the Monty Hall problem can always be solved with a decision tree. There is still a 2/3 chance to initially select the wrong door, and if you did, then you should switch if one wrong door is subsequently eliminated.

Thanks! For a general group (debate club), do you think there should be separate presentations on Kantianism and deontology? — Zachary Beddingfield

I'd say there would be too much overlap for a general audience. Kantianism is the best-known example of deontological morals, so the basics of deontology can be discussed as a part of that. Much criticism of Kantianism centers around the supposed "blindness" to outcomes, as in the often misunderstand case of lying for a good cause. That'd also be a general argument against deontology.

The question of artificial consciousness and what concern is due with respect to its creation (and destruction) is one which may well have relevance in the 21st century. The side benefit is that the question of consent will again be played out. In as much as dollars are in the mix here, we can expect that the question will be answered (or not answered) in a way which maximizes profit, so the quandary might find itself pushed out again. — JosephS

Presumably, the most profitable option will be to give no concern to AIs, at least initially. The question of what is morally permissible to create is a thorny one quite apart from that though.

Another tangential concern is that of embryonic genetic manipulation. If we assume that the resolution of things that are almost uniformly considered deleterious (e.g. sickle cell) meets no serious objection, we arrive at body enhancements. Under what conditions is it acceptable to 'enhance' a child, in utero, without their consent? Personally, I think a third thumb could be quite useful. Are there situations where the impossibility of getting consent would be treated as tacit permission for the enhancements? — JosephS

Consent seems more or less like a red herring to me. The problem is more basic than that: can we even make an argument about what kind of moral subjects should exist?

Yes, suffering is always bad, obvously. — Baskol1

This is obvious insofar as it's a tautology - bad things are bad. But that doesn't tell us anything about what "bad" means.

There's no objective standard, but that doesn't mean that anything goes or that we can't asses the matter sensibly. — S

I am just asking what we are assessing. Is life "bad" if I feel sad, or hungry, or frustrated right now? Do we add up all the times we fell this way? The antinatalist argument that life is "bad" seems to lack any metrics for which to establish this.

What do we actually mean when we say life is "good" or "bad"? Are we comparing? Is there some sort of objective standard?

All you guys can do is pretend you’re morally superior, but not actually prove it — NOS4A2

How does one prove to be morally superior?

Deontology is a principle according to which a moral philosophy can be built. Kantianism is a specific, deontological, philosophy.

But really reading the respective Wikipedia entries on the two should suffice to give an outline.

Vegetarians would be better off buying meat which was produced with higher ethical standards and supporting the companies that produce it. Life involves reproducing and death and natural death entails pain just as unnatural death does. Lament the living conditions of the animals yes, decrying their "murder" lacks understanding. — Judaka

The problem with this vein of argument is that it's currently impossible to produce nearly as much meat "ethically" as would be required to provide a significant part of the global population with meat. Buying meat produced with "higher ethical standards" is really only possible for a small group of wealthy people. Everyone else either has to be vegetarian or buy mass produced meat.

By a Kantian ethics I mean one in which it is the nature of the act - as opposed to its actual consequences or the character of the agent who performs it - that is the focus, and additionally where consent plays a central role in determining the ethical quality of that act. — Bartricks

Unfortunately, this isn't an accurate summary of Kantian ethics.

Er, the person you will have created exists at the time you create them - and can thus be affected by the act of creation. — Bartricks

Clearly they do not. The word "creation" refers to bringing something into existence. If whatever we are talking about already exists, we are not creating it.

You can even see that you are contradicting yourself by looking at the grammatical construction of this sentence. Things you will have done cannot be already done.

Again, assume you know that any person you create will live a life of immediate and unending agony. If you create that person the first moment of pain negatively affects them, yes? — Bartricks

But only because they already exist at the first moment of pain.

Imagine Jane knows that if she ingests a certain drug prior to conception, then any person that results will be deaf and blind and mentally retarded. She takes the drug. Has she negatively affected the person she creates? (Yes, obviously). — Bartricks

But the person would - could - never have been anything other than deaf, blind and retarded. How can we establish this is a negative affect without a comparable alternative?

Presumably you would agree that killing someone affects them - yes? So if taking someone out of existence can affect them, then so too can bringing someone into existence. — Bartricks

This does not follow. The two statements have no logical connection.

But really this is beside the point. I mean, just imagine that those who procreate are not creating new persons but rather bringing into this realm persons who already exist in another. After all, that's possibly true. Well now even you would surely agree that procreative acts significantly affect someone without their consent, yes? — Bartricks

Sure. If we're baselessly speculating, that's possible.

Now we do not know whether acts of procreation genuinely create a person who did not already exist or whether they force someone who already exists to live a life here. But it seems implausible to think that the morality of procreation hangs on which one of those possibilities is actual. — Bartricks

So, if we have to consider all possible options, what about the possibility that the souls, before they are incarnated, exist in a living hell much worse than this life, and all desperately wish to be born? Or maybe only the souls that press the big red button of consent are incarnated?

Yes there is - the person who is created. You're falsely assuming that to be affected by something you need to exist prior to the affect occurring. — Bartricks

How is that a false assumption? It's exceedingly obvious both as a matter of logic as well as general language use that only something that does exist can be affected. If you want to argue otherwise, the burden to establish that logic is on you.

Not procreating does not necessarily lead to the extinction of moral agents. — Bartricks

It does if it's universalised. Which is the whole point.

We are only permitted to prevent bad outcomes using means that pass the categorical imperative. — Bartricks

"Means" are not input for the categorical imperative.

Again, why? Because the nature of such acts is such that those affected by them cannot consent to them. — Bartricks

Are you claiming that only maxims that can assume the other party consents can pass the CI? Because that would be wrong.

Right, he’s an idiotic, unethical, libertine with a foul mouth. He’s full of bluster and arrogance. He’s a reality tv show host. He eats Big Macs and overdone steaks with ketchup. What is this but sanctimony and snobbery? — NOS4A2

Are you saying moral rules, especially as they pertain to good governance, are "but sanctimony and snobbery"? Because that would explain a lot.

What you're doing doesn't get us anywhere either. Refusing this statement but not providing an alternative. I can't convince you of this premise. It's a premise for a reason. If you don't share it then at least you wouldn't be a hypocrite for having children. — khaled

The alternative I am offering is, essentially, that future people have no moral weight at all. I don't like the implications of that, but I'd like to know if anyone can offer a convinving argument that they do.

I'm pretty sure one can say that consciously deciding to get pregnant and have a baby is "determining" the existence of the baby. And I'm saying we shouldn't do that. Also I don't get what determinism has to do with this. — khaled

But this is, as I pointed out before, self-contradictory. If we can decide to get pregnant, it follows that the existance of future humans is not determined. Which is to say, they don't exist, not even in the future. At most, their (future) existance starts the exact second the decision to have children is made. That means that while we are still deciding, we have to treat the future child as non-existant in the present and future.

I don't see a reason why that would be the case. Can you think of any othere scenarios when this "special case" comes into play? Or are you just treating birth differently? — khaled

The special case is creating new moral subjects in the first place. We could apply the same logic to the question of whether or not it is moral to create human-level-intelligence AIs for menial tasks (essentially as slaves).

That if an action results in harming someone in the future, it doesn't matter whether or not that person existed at the time the action took place. Example: Implanting a bomb in a fetus and setting it to blow up when the baby reaches 18 is just as bad as bombing an 18 year old (the age is besides the point here). — khaled

Even if I concede that point for the purposes of this argument, this still leaves the question of how future people can exist while we are still deciding whether we are going to create them.

I can't "convince you" of this. There is no logical argument for it. It's a starting premise. Although if you don't believe in it you'd have to say that implanting a bomb in a fetus and killing someone that way is ok or at least less wrong than just killing someone, which I find to be ridiculous — khaled

I cannot say what is right or wrong without some information on the motivations. I don't ascribe to consequentialist morals.

You cannot just call something "Kantian deontology" without actually looking at Kant's reasoning. There's not even any mention of the categorical imperative here.

What maxim are we talking about? At what level does it fail the categorical imperative?

Kant's moral system relies on reciprocal acceptance of others as moral subjects. How can future people take part in this?

The first thing I would do is replace the existing welfare system with a guaranteed minimum income, a lump sum that is paid monthly to all American citizens over the age of 18 regardless of their personal income or job. This would serve the purpose of providing a more equitable distribution of income (as all Americans would receive the payment) while eliminating the bureaucracy necessary in maintaining so many different types of welfare programs (Social Security, SNAP etc.). — KevinMcCabe

How would you deal with the problem of inflation and with people that have special needs?

Secondly, I would consolidate redundant state agencies with federal ones. There is no reason to have separate Labor Departments, taxation departments and the like doing the same job. Finally, I would consolidate federal agencies that perform similar functions into larger institutions. For example, agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the TSA would be either consolidated into the FBI or eliminated entirely. Specifically, the TSA's function would be better handled by local law enforcement agencies or airport security. — KevinMcCabe

What makes you confident that this would work? Is there research on the relative efficiency of states with many Vs fewer agencies for example?

Okay, so how does the mental trajectory which you admitted is constrained change course? Does one part of the mind act upon another? Isn't this just the homunculus argument? — rlclauer

It changes course by making decisions. You seem to be asking me to explain how decisions "work" in some other terms, that is to reduce them so some other process. But I am saying that decision making is not reducible to some other process. It is what it seems to you in your head.

And if one part of the mind acts on another to changes the trajectory, wouldn't the "acting" part also be constrained by these pro generative conditions? — rlclauer

We could think of the different parts that make up the "decision" combining in several possible ways, only one of which is chosen.

It sounds like you are just quibbling with the word determined because of the implications it has for your position, but the space that you have to put this "willing mechanism" seems to be non-existent in my view. — rlclauer

That's because it's not a mechanism in the usual sense of the word. It wouldn't be some sort of algorithm that calculates an outcome. Willing is simply the way the mind operates when making decisions. LIke how physical laws tell you how physical processes operate, without these laws having some "space" where they "are"

Since there is a mental state which relies on genetics, or some non-mental state, and this mental state is the first mental state, doesn't it follow that all subsequent mental states are in some way set on a trajectory by the "prime mover of mental states" (I am not talking about god), and thus, the configuration of the progenitor of mental states is really constraining the make-up of the mental states which follow from it? In my opinion, this would be an infringement on the freedom of a future mental state. — rlclauer

Mental states may well be "constrained" in some way, after all human thoughts tend to follow similar patterns. But what's important to note here is that mental states aren't necessarily deterministic. That means previous mental states, and sensory input, inform subsequent states, but do not determine them.

We're physical, our brains are physical i.e. we're all made up of particles. — TheMadFool

The physical is something that only exists in our heads. How then can we be physical if we contain the physical?

We have a long thread about that already: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6229/on-antinatalism

That's not what I was saying, but as I asked, what would you give as an example of a law that limits speech where speech isn't even necessary for it? — Terrapin Station

I gave an example of a law prohibiting insults. The text might even just refer to "insults" in general and that would include speech.

Right, just as arbitrary as the walking part of the crime. Just insert “walking” where “speech” is in your argument and the logic is exactly the same. — DingoJones

But I am not making up these definitions. One was given by Terrapin, the other is - more or less - an actual law making insults a criminal offense in Germany.

There are reasons why Terrapin and the German lawmakers choose to include some form of communicative act in the definition, but not the mode of locomotion. There is also a reason why we have a category for laws that restrict speech, but not for crimes that restrict what gait you may adopt. This is obvious, right?

I didnt say all talk involving categories is circular. Strawman.
I said you are being circular in your argument, and pointed out exactly why. — DingoJones

From your text, you only pointed out that my inclusion of speech is arbitrary, which I did respond to. If you think you have another argument I'd ask you to restate it.

Edit: it's perhaps worth pointing out that I was not arguing that certain speech acts should be criminal offenses under some optimal set of rules.

The speech only needs to be positively established because you are defining it as part of the crime, what Im saying is you could just as easily define walking in exactly the same way. Your inclusion of one as part of the crime and not the other is arbitrary, and based on a preconceived notions about speech that you hold. Do you see? You are assuming speech as part of a crime as part of your argument that speech is a crime. — DingoJones

I was initially referring to a specific definition Terrapin provided, which explicitly listed speech, so I am not assuming that speech is relevant. As to your point, it is of course possible to write laws including an arbitrary number of elements. What we're doing here requires categories, and categories are always arbitrary. This includes talking of "speech" or "speech acts" in the first place.

It does not follow that all talk that involves categories is meaningless or circular. For example, there are reasons why certain elements are treated as constituent elements of a crime and not others. If we're concerned about not demeaning other people for example, we'd consider the communication important, but not locomotion.

I'm saying that if someone says, "I'd consider certain things 'criminal insults,'" and they give you a specific outline, specific criteria for what they're referring to by that term, then trying to argue from a broader perspective based on other conventions isn't going to work. You'd need to just look at the criteria they spelled out, and the criteria could be anything. It's possible for their criteria to not even be about speech at all. — Terrapin Station

I am not sure what you're saying here. That it's wrong to take the hypothetical law you provided and assign it a category, such as "laws that limit speech"?

Not if someone is defining "criminal insult" so that it has nothing to do with speech. — Terrapin Station

That's, frankly, absurd. The act is a) criminal and b) a speech act. According to your logic, the vast majority of laws concerning insults and hate speech aren't actually about speech. So I guess the free speech utopia is already here.

Well you are just defining speech as a constituent element. Its no more constituent than the walking. — DingoJones

It is, because it's one of the things that needs to be positively established and will show up in the indictment. Walking won't.

Thats my point, the logic is the same so you aren’t being consistent when you include one and not the other. — DingoJones

I think this perhaps seems so due to not being familiar with the technicalities of law enforcement. There are elements of a crime which need to be enumerated in the indictment. Those can still come in different forms ( an insult can be words of a gesture), but the concrete form must be listed. Whether the person was walking or in a wheelchair, and what they had for breakfast, does not need to be listed.