How a term is to be defined depends on its function. Words are tools for communication, they don't contain some deeper truth.

So the question cannot be meaningfully answered outside of a specific communicative context.

As vivid as that prophetic future and possible murder may be in the utilitarian's skull, the insinuation is unjust because it convicts not only those who would commit such crimes (and their victims), but those who would not, punishing them alike. The punishment in this case is to deny people their right just in case, preferring instead to reserve the right for those in power. — NOS4A2

The interesting thing is though that we do that all the time. A dense population cannot possibly function without risk management, and risk management always involves "punishing the innocent", if you want to put it like this.

From drugs to waste management, from driver's licenses to zoning laws, regulation to avoid common risks is entirely normal. And I don't think that guns can be classified as anything less than risky.

And that is the peculiarity to which @Wayfarer also speaks. That in the US, and almost exclusively in the US, guns are not framed as a risk to be managed but instead as an integral part of the person wielding them. It would be only be a slight exaggeration to say that in the US, guns are people.

What is the fundamental difference between information processed by a mechanical computer and a brain? How can there be a fundamental difference in what is happening if all we are is mechanistic?
What is the implication of this for the idea that computers are just too mechanical to be, conscious, to love, to generate or understand meaning, to have a self or to have free will? How would changing notions of consciousness, meaning, morality, free will and self to make them fit with bodies as mechanical as any robot change these psychologically important notions? — Restitutor

I wonder if many people really believe that. Many might believe they believe it, but humans are very prolific in anthropomorphizing. We ascribe inner lifes to everything from our house cats to the weather.

So I think in practical terms it won't require much of a psychological change at all to consider machines as human in everyday interactions, though that will not necessarily extend to treating them as human.

As for the philosophical perspective, we have precious little reason to assume other people who look like us have a consciousness like ours. It's mostly just a practical assumption. What reason do we really have to exclude this or that from consideration?

Interesting that you describe the alleged deal as extremely generous.

Are you agreeing that assuming such terms were on offer (neutrality, recognizing Crimea, Russian speaker protections in the Donbas) that, at least in hindsight, that was a far better deal at that time than continued fighting turned out to be? — boethius

The sticking point is of course what you consider "neutrality" to mean. If it just means "don't join NATO but you get some multilateral security arrangement" then yeah that sounds like a pretty good deal that I would definetly take over fighting.

Of course if "neutrality" is understood to mean that Ukraine ends up internationally isolated, with no ability to, for example, join the EU or make security arrangements with anyone but Russia, then that's a far worse deal, and would likely just be postponing the conflict. I would only accept that if I had some plan to make sure I don't just end up invaded 5 years later in a much worse situation.

Therefore, the plan of keeping the Donbas conflict alive in order to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO essentially necessitates an eventual escalation of direct intervention of Russian forces to prevent the collapse of the separatists. — boethius

In fact we can be sure of this because it happened. In 2014.



An interesting read, but one should perhaps supply some context.

One the central witness for this Theory, Naftali Bennett, has himself addressed the interview and clarified:

https://web.archive.org/web/20230207191917/https://twitter.com/naftalibennett/status/1622571402430750721

So a more accurate translation of what was said is that the negotiations were abandonned by the west, and Bennet at the time thought this was premature and a mistake. The clarification makes clear that a deal was by no means a done deal and that Bennet himself is unsure of whether it would have been a good idea to make such a deal.

The second witness is ex-chancellor Schröder. Now Schröder is of course well known for his personal friendship with Putin and the very lucrative posts he received from the latter. So perhaps we should treat his "impression" with some caution, though of course everyone is free to decide how reliable he is.

Lastly there's the turkish foreign minister. But he doesn't actually say anything about the negotiations itself, and if you watch the interview (it's difficult with the automatic translate but you can pick up some things) you notice that he's emphasising that the negotiation are ongoing and that he will not say that either one side is closer to peace than the other.

So the evidence we do in fact have that Russia offered some extremely generous terms to Ukraine and the west prohibited Ukrain from taking the deal are: Schröders vague allusion and the statements of Mr. Michael von der Schulenburg (who provides no further justification). I guess we could also count the coincidence of Boris Johnsons visit and the end of the negotiations as evidence that Boris Johnson somehow did it, as the article does.

Does that measure up against the likelihood that Russia offered a peace deal that essentially involves a return to the status quo ante?

He did not try to conquer Kiev. The reason he invaded Ukraine is he wanted to force Zelensky to the bargaining table, so they could get some sort of agreement on Ukrainian neutrality, Ukraine not being in NATO. — John J. Mearsheimer

It's beyond me how anyone can take this seriously.

Not only was there no way for Ukraine to join NATO with the Donbas conflict unresolved.

Launching a demonstrative attack on your neighbours capital to get them to not join a defensive alliance with your enemies must be the dumbest plan I've ever heard. "Hey look how easily we can threaten your capital and take your land. Better not get any protection, that'd be bad. Also we're going to retreat after loosing some of our best troops and a bunch of equipment, so you'll know we mean business".

The correlation does exist if you use enough controls (or cherry pick your sample), but then hacking becomes a concern. The correlation is also strong if you consider all gun deaths, but then suicide is normally not what the debate is about (when you see a strong correlation between "gun deaths" and gun ownership, this is including suicides.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

What about studies that exclude suicide but do include accidental deaths?

but what Putin "might" do is "a limited incursion into unoccupied southeastern Ukraine that falls short of a full-scale invasion".

Which, if you haven't noticed, is what Putin ultimately does. — boethius

That's not what happened. I can't tell whether you're brazenly lying to my face or just for some weird reason unable to acknowledge anything that doesn't agree with your beliefs. In any event I see no reason to further engage with you.

Yeah, and if you'd continue reading rather than take out of context the one paragraph that seemingly agrees with you, you'd notice that the report is laying out exactly the plan @Jabberwock and me consider to have been the likely intent. It also supports the argument by @ssu that analysts expected the Ukrainian military to be destroyed as a cohesive fighting force in short order.

If you wanted to prove that you can't be assumed to argue in good faith, then you have succeeded.

Russia has now more soldiers and more experienced and battle hardened soldiers and have learned how to effectively employ combined arms at scale (which they did not have experience with until this war, but only on a much more limited scale) as well as integration with drones. — boethius

Yeah, sure, and no doubt we'll soon see them rolling up the front in their Armata tanks, while a fleet of SU 57 jets clears the way.

there is still this adherence to what should by now be obvious propaganda. — boethius

Oh, the irony!

Russia's war fighting capability is likely far higher now than at the start of the war. — boethius

My god you have completely lost it.

Not only do you believe in Putin the 4D playing master strategist and that all western information is propaganda.

You seriously believe that after taking massive casualties, loosing hundreds of armored vehicles and artillery and bring reduced to buying artillery ammunition from north Korea Russia is at peak fighting capability.

This is no longer just motivated reasoning it's complete fantasy. Not even russian propaganda would make such an absurd claim.

My prediction is this statement will prove to be far more truth for the Ukrainians than the Russians. We'll see how the war ends which side died more on the strength of wishes than sober analysis. — boethius

This seems less a prediction and more an unshakeable conviction, which is why any discussion with you about reality on the ground just runs in circles.

What I would argue is immoral is simply throwing your hands in the air and refusing to negotiate at all. If the war must end in a negotiated peace at one point or another, then at every point in time there is a deal that exists that is reasonable to take. Ok, perhaps it is not on offer, but you cannot know what deal you can achieve if you don't make an honest effort to negotiate. If the initial offer is too high to accept, well maybe your counter party is starting high to then settle somewhere in the middle; you have to actually make counter proposals that are acceptable to yourself in order to see where your counterparty is willing to meet you: this is what Ukraine does not do, the Russians propose something and Ukraine does not bother to even make a counter proposal. — boethius

There were several rounds of negotiations which presumably included an exchange of proposals, so I don't know why you'd assume that it's only Ukraine that doesn't want to negotiate.

The point of maximum leverage for a smaller power is at the start of the war and being able to credibly threaten a long and costly war as well as all sorts of unknowns not only in the war itself but external events (some other crisis may emerge for the larger power, so all these risks need to be priced into the situation). Of course, the point of maximum leverage does not mean your counter party sees it that leverage and responds accordinly, but it's when you have maximum leverage that you want to push for the best deal you can easily achieve. — boethius

As I recall there were constant diplomatic efforts during the troop buildup. Is Ukraine also solely responsible for all of these failing?

Of course, any peace deal would involve compromise and the West immediately framed things as any compromise would be a "win" for Putin, rather than a rational framework where there is some acceptable compromise that is not a win for Putin but as much a compromise for the Russians as for the West and Ukraine, and most importantly avoids immense and prolonged bloodshed, suffering, global food price increases and creates a global schism in economic cooperation. — boethius

So you don't credit the argument that a war of aggression, or a threat with such a war, cannot become an instrument in international politics?

This goes back to the core of the moral question: if we're only concerned about limiting damage, doesn't that leave us fatally exposed to an agreessor?

Can we discount spite as a reasonable response? Might spite not be called for in certain situations?

My main question is: What if there were greater existential threats to humanity than climate change, would the apathy on those issues not be good reason to be spiteful over all the climate change hype? — Merkwurdichliebe

I think this would be entirely to convenient. A nice and easy self-absolution.

If there are greater existential threats, then of course we would have to fight them concurrently. Of course since climate change is heavily bound up with our economic system, we'd need to be doing that regardless.

Spite is the easy way out. Masking your own unwillingness to act by pointing to the hypocrisy of others.

What if the problem of climate change has less to do with human caused carbon emissions, and more to do with the natural phenomenon of human conflict, transgression, &c.? Could science even measure that? — Merkwurdichliebe

Then we'd try to address that. Certainly the problem of climate change goes beyond simply making a few personal choices. It's a systemic issue. But starting from the perspective that it is some metaphysical force that cannot be addressed anyways is again a very convenient way to justify one's one comfortable inactions.

My biggest fear now is that humanity and the earth will be decimated by the attempts to "solve" global-warming/climate-change — Agree-to-Disagree

But the earth and humanity are already being decimated. It seems very silly to cling to this specific status quo as if it were suddenly the divine providence, as opposed to just another contingent situation we find ourselves in.

I understand, self inflicted decimation, so that even if all the models turned out to be entirely accurate, so that the current green revolution were the perfect solution, we will have weakened ourselves in the global arena so much that there is little hope of enforcing the green agenda on the will-be global hegemons that care little for our green agenda. — Merkwurdichliebe

Are you under the impression that the western way of life currently stands any chance of surviving? Because I don't. Right now, the authoritarian, technocratic vision, which in some ways is being pioneered by China, is clearly winning. And this is not just a case of "China taking over" but of an inability to envision an alternative to clearly falling systems.

But if we agree the Russian plan isn't incompetent then that's progress in the debate. — boethius

I think it all depends on what assumptions the planners were making.

Clearly Russia had an immense geographical and political advantage, being able to attack Ukraine at will from several directions with zero fear of a preliminary disruption.

Clearly also Russia had the clear material advantage, and could reasonably assume to have air supremacy as well as a significant advantage in armored vehicles and an overwhelming advantage in artillery pieces.

Overambitious military campaigns have been waged with far less obvious advantages. Indeed if you read military history, the amount of people who have been killed by overconfidence and wishful thinking is staggering.

Now that it is revealed Russia is not easy to beat, suddenly even the Western media is reporting Ukraine has "pressure" to negotiate. Which is the obvious end to this and extremely tragic (at least for Ukraine) as there is no way to get a better deal than what they could have negotiated at the start of the war and there's no way to get the hundreds of thousands of dead back to life. — boethius

There was never any doubt that the war could only end in some negotiated peace. But the conditions of said peace will always depend on the situation on the ground.

Since we're on a philosophy forum, perhaps we should ask the question in terms of moral philosophy: Is the moral choice to give up and negotiate a peace immediately? How much of a chance of success do you need to morally send soldiers to their deaths in a war?

This is also a suitable time to remind everyone here that as I predicted at the start of the war, the advanced hand held missile systems supplied to Ukraine will go straight into the hands of terrorists. — boethius

That's an incredibly sketchy source citing anonymous reports that cannot be checked. I would not put much confidence in this article.

In particular the point about casualties is the main determining factor. — boethius

It's not, however, a quote, so it's really just the author's opinion. And the author is not some military analyst but a venture capitalist (and friend and ally of Peter Thiel, one of the most dangerous evil fuckers on the planet, imho anyways). For someone decrying western propaganda you're very willing to take this all at face value.

Burning irony is a major contributor to global warming. — BC

One could say that, in a sense, spite really is a major contributor.

In Putin's view Zelensky is an actor and so perhaps Putin expects it's entirely possible Zelensky plays whatever part the US wants him to play. — boethius

Putin would know from experience that even your vassals don't always do what you want them to.

Is maybe called "a script" written by Western propagandists to create such a good "episode" as you call it in the Zelensky mythology. — boethius

Maybe, but without evidence, we wouldn't assume such plots.

But even if Zelensky fled, the rest of the Zelensky government (especially anything to do with defence) are right wing extremists, so there would be no reason to expect Zelensky fleeing would somehow mean Ukraine capitulating. — boethius

It would have done serious damage to cohesion and morale. Quite possibly Putin remembered the collapse of the Afghan army when the president fled.

Russia could have mobilized before the war and committed literally millions of troops to conquering and occupying all of Ukraine, or then simply built up a larger standing army over the 8 years of fighting in the Donbas where it is clear a military resolution maybe required.

Russia doesn't do either of these things, but rather prepares a force that can feasibly take and hold the land bridge to Crimea, which is obviously proven by the fact that are there right now as we speak. Further military goals, such as taking Kiev, would have required far more troops or then dedicating essentially their entire force to that one objective in hopes that it ends the war.

Now, why would Russia not mobilize millions of soldiers has the obvious answer of that being disastrous economically, therefore war aims in Ukraine are limited by manpower and resources. — boethius

Sure, this would make sense. But it's simply not what happened. Russia did land it's crack paratroopers at Hostomel. Russia did send a huge convoy towards Kiev. Russia had large amounts of troops around Charkiv.

All of these were destroyed or withdrawn, with large losses in manpower and materiel. The troops on the left bank of the Dniepr fared better, but again were only withdrawn when their position clearly was untenable.

None of that can be explained by your theory, but can be explained by the alternative.

I'm answering the question of whether Putin expected a quick and easy war or then prepared for a long war, which is the topic of discussion at the moment. Building up a large war chest is a pretty strong signal of preparing for a pretty large war. — boethius

Or a long round of sanctions and insurgency. It's not conclusive towards any particular plan.

The Russian troop build up was clearly subtle enough to prevent Ukraine mobilizing and digging North of Kiev and North of Crimea.

Russia would stage a large exercise every year around Ukraine not simply to prepare for an eventual war but to make it unclear if they were actually invading or not. Many commentators were calling it mere sabre rattling and a show of force. You even had Boris Johnson assuring everyone that there wouldn't be tanks rolling across the plains of Europe, that's not going to happen.

Now, the US did publicly say Russia would invade, but this was pretty close to the actual invasion date and it may not have been feasible to mobilize, and, in anywise, Ukraine chooses not to. — boethius

Seems like a rather large gamble, especially since the troops obviously stayed out after the exercise. I suppose we cannot rule out that Russia simply wanted to keep everyone guessing by not making any further preparations.

200 000 troops is simply far too little to achieve the first objective, so if they aren't irrational then that was not their objective.

For the second objective, they achieve it, mostly uncontested in the first couple of weeks, and we have little idea of Russia's actual losses and we have even less idea of what their toleration for losses is.

Certainly it's possible that they expected less losses to achieve more. Or it maybe just the cost of doing business from the Russian command's point of view.

What is clear is that the initial priority is to keep losses to professional soldiers and mercenaries in the first phases of the war, and they do achieve that at least for quite some time. — boethius

Imho the epistemologically sound position is to use what information we have and make an educated guess.

Even if we take reports on russian losses with a heavy dose of salt, and furthermore assume that they'd generally make sound and rational decision the evidence points to various military failures resulting in heavy losses.

Clearly a successful operation should not have resulted in Russia now fighting trench warfare. It should not have resulted in a grinding siege of Bakhmut, or the rout in Charkiv.

Something went badly wrong.

What modern army is going to model their defense on 1940's France? Have you seen a Ukrainian Maginot Line anywhere? — Tzeentch

Kinda. The entire eastern front is heavily fortified. There's a reason Bakhmut and Avdivka remained standing even as russian troops surged from Crimea to Mariupol.

Holding on to Kiev was Ukraine's most obvious goal, so taking Kiev while avoiding the main defensive forces is a non-starter. If anything the main body of the Ukrainian forces was located in and around Kiev. — Tzeentch

All the reports I read assumed that that Ukraine's strongest forces would be at the eastern front, and that cutting them off from Kiev might be a russian goal.

Taking it would have required a force several times larger than what the Russians deployed on the Kiev axis, and months of grueling urban combat. Nothing in the Russian force posture suggests they were getting ready for such an operation. — Tzeentch

But not if a shock-and-awe operation, including a massive airborne flanking move, lead to panic and a collapse of morale.

Furthermore, as I've often argued here, occupying Kiev is unlikely to have been the Russians' goal for several reasons. One reason is that due to extensive US / western support it is unlikely that it would have made a large impact on the military situation. The Ukrainian army remained operational, and leadership of the war could be conducted from elsewhere. — Tzeentch

Well Putin called it a "special military operation" with the goal to "denazify and demilitarise". If that is an indication of how the operation was conceived, then it would suggest that the goal was indeed as least as much political as military.

Even within your own logic, a puppet of who?

Obviously the US, and the US was clearly not interested in peace, rejecting to even discuss Russia's peace proposal before the war nor anything else (as well as forbidding their vassals in Europe of doing so of their own accord).

So, assuming you're correct and Putin views Zelensky a puppet of the US, why wouldn't said US puppet do what he's told and implement US policy of rejecting peace? — boethius

Because in Putin's view, Zelensky is an effeminate westerner. A comedian, a joke.

He'd never put his life on the line. When shit hits the fan he'd turn tail and flee. Even the US apparently did not expect him to stay put, as evidenced by the "I need ammunition, not a ride" episode.

More troops could have been committed to the initial invasion, but if the primary military goal was to secure the land bridge to Crimea then clearly the commitment was sufficient. — boethius

What troops exactly?

Russia built up a massive war chest, over 600 billion USD, over nearly a decade; why would they do that if they were not preparing to finance a potential long war of attrition. — boethius

There's also not only the military sphere, but the Kremlin needed also to prepared and balance things for massive sanctions and economic disruption: hence prosecute the war with professional troops and mercenaries so as to overcome the initial shock of sanctions with minimal additional disruption to the civilian population. — boethius

You're kinda answering your own question here.

Furthermore it doesn't seem like either the russian industrial base or the military establishment had actually prepared for a long war. Nor was the information space prepared. Perhaps the best example is the use of "special military operation" which certainly does not suggest a years long battle of attrition.

Of course, certainly it can be argued a better strategy was available, diplomatic or militarily, but this idea that the war was initiated on some sort of whim without careful thought and planning is really quite ludicrous. There was already a war in the Donbas supported by Russia for 8 years, so clearly it is on the minds of military and political leaders that if there's no diplomatic settlement then a military solution is the only alternative. Putin received far more criticism within Russia for not intervening sooner, but obviously a war of this size and right next to Russia would be complicated, hence clear indications of preparation. — boethius

I don't think people suggest it's a whim so much as ideological blindness from living in a filter bubble - which is a common hazard of an authoritarian regime.

Had Russia mobilized more troops for the initial invasion, it risks Ukraine mobilizing and a blitz to take the key territory becomes harder rather than easier.

Likewise, had things been prepared even better, every soldier knowing they will be going to war and exactly what they will be doing, it again risks Ukrainian mobilization and hundreds of thousands additional dug in troops and the bridges out of Crimea mined, shelled and bombed rather than massive columns of Russian armour just rolling into South Ukraine (which clearly the Ukrainians were not prepared for and completely collapses their lines West of the Donbas allowing the Russians to conquer the land bridge). — boethius

I don't know about that. After all the russian troop buildup was anything but subtle. Secrecy was clearly not the concern. I rather think that the calculus was that the constant pressure would undermine morale and lead to the planned collapse.

In addition to Tzeentch already mentioning that perhaps Russian forces were adequately supplied for the advances they intended to make in the initial invasion, any giant operation is going to have all sorts of anecdotal problems along with major setbacks and confusions. No one here is arguing the Russian invasion went perfectly according to plan, we're just pointing out Russian decisions do make sense.

The idea that Russia is an irrational actor was quite clearly a myth created in the early days and sustained for over a year (sometimes cherry picking true but pretty expected things like equipment SNAFU's as well as obvious lies like exorbitant number of casualties), as it avoids the difficult question of how Ukraine is going to prevail over a far larger opponent.

You don't need a viable plan if you're fighting an army of essentially retarded monkeys. — boethius

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality.

There's two possibilities: either Russia really planned a sweeping takeover of the country, at least to the Dnieper. In that case the plan clearly failed.

Or Russia simply made an elaborate multi front assault to have an easier time capturing a land bridge to Crimea, as well as Donetsk and Luhansk. In which case they should have had a far easier time and far less losses than they did.

I do wonder why though. What is the specific motivation?

I'm sure there are places that have less corruption than the U.S. I'm not sure their system would work for a country as large and diverse as the U.S. It also amuses me when Europeans trash the U.S. while living under the umbrella of protection we've provided for their whole lifetimes. — RogueAI

This doesn't seem to be an uncommon attitude among Americans. I always found this way of arguing kinda odd.

It is after all precisely because the US provides the umbrella of protection that we Europeans are so interested in US politics.

At least on my part, I'm genuinely concerned about the health of the US democracy. And it would seem to be false pride to reject criticism because you're yet strong.

What we're experiencing with Trump, Fox News, Newsmax, Sean Hannity, Rush Limbaugh, this whole phenomenon of alt-right, alt-facts, conspiracy theorists, demagogues, etc. is all what I would call the necessary evil of living in an open, democratic society with free speech. — GRWelsh

It is not simply a question of democracy. There's also the economic system to consider, the state of technology, and who wields it.

The current situation is not simply the result of "free speech running it's course" but of a combination of crises.

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. In order to make a threat you have to be visibly capable of employing a force that is able to fulfill that threat. In fact, usually when you make a threat, you try to exaggerate the projected force.

So: how exactly can you strenghten your position in negotiations by sending against a city an army which is obviously incapable of taking or surrounding it? — Jabberwock

There seems to be some strange compulsion to imagine secret knowledge, that only a select few are privy too. Things cannot simply be how they look. Everyone can infer intentions and goals by looking at the actions taken and statements made.

But some people need to be different. They need to see beyond the veil that ordinary minds cannot pierce. And so there must be shadowy forces that really move everything. You can treat US imperialism just as much as some metaphysical form of evil as imaginary demons. Apparently this even happens to otherwise sane and well informed people.

Do you think that these topics are not relevant to climate change? — Agree-to-Disagree

They are. But it seems to me you're not interested in what everyone else has to say, and rather in having a soap box to display your "scepticism". Which I'm putting in quotes because unlike actual scepticism, it mostly looks like motivated reasoning adopting the aesthetics of scepticism.

Case in point being that you only reply to the bits of posts that you feel comfortable with, ignoring the rest.

So according to you there is evidence for horoscopes, the loch ness monster, bigfoot, yeti, aliens, UFO's, homeopathy, conspiracy theories, ghosts, etc. — Agree-to-Disagree

Sure. There's evidence.

These subjects are in the news repeatedly, but that doesn't mean that the odds of them being true is increased. — Agree-to-Disagree

I was referring to an event specifically, that means something happening at a specific time and place. Things get trickier when we deal with other subjects more broadly, and I wanted to start simple.

Assume you know nothing about either the event X or the sources. In the three scenarios:

A) There's no reporting on X,
B) a single source is reporting X happened,
C) 10 sources report X happened,

would you not agree that the chance that X did actually happen is highest in scenario C?

The ECS has been notoriously difficult to pin down. Even after decades of scientific investigation the IPCC says that there is high confidence that the ECS is within the range of 2.5 °C to 4 °C, with a best estimate of 3 °C. So why should we suddenly believe a new value of 4.8 °C that is reported in the news? This is outside of the high confidence range stated by the IPCC. And as far as I know the IPCC has not accepted this new value. — Agree-to-Disagree

I'm making no argument regarding that specific claim.

I am discussing climate change. What are you doing here? — Agree-to-Disagree

Are you? Because it doesn't look like that's what you're doing.

Plenty of evidence they wanted to get rid of Jews, which is what Balfour intended. — Benkei

Perhaps that was a reason, but whatever the exact intentions behind the declaration it was never turned into British policy.

Unfortunately plenty of people have heard about it and thus remember the history as "Britain promised Palestine to the Jews and thus Israel was created". Really the Balfour declaration has very little to do with the actual formation of Israel.

Meanwhile British policy does have a whole lot to do with the history of Islamism and antisemitism in the Arab world.

Not interested? Ok then. What are you doing here though?

Okay. If it was in the news then it must be correct. :wink: — Agree-to-Disagree

How about some basic epistemology?

If an event is reported in the news, that is evidence the event happened, correct? Mind you, not conclusive proof, but evidence.

And if several news stations report the event, then it is more likely the event did occur, correct? It is possible they're all simply repeating the same story, or have made the exact same error, but prima facie it still increases the odds.

If taking Kiev was the principal Russian objective, how come the fighting around Kiev resembled nothing like we saw in places where actual bitter fighting took place? And how come they only deployed 20,000 troops to participate in the battle and they never made any serious effort to surround the capital let alone capture Kiev? We would expect massed firepower. — Tzeentch

You're merely claiming they did not make a serious effort. But maybe they were simply intending their plan to actually work, take key points around Kiev with an airborne assault and then quickly overrun the defense with air power and one massed column.

They did employ massed firepower, particularly from the air, but apparently underestimated Ukrainian air defense.

The Russians are responding to a western action, namely the militarization of Ukraine. They probably expected 'the West' to be more reasonable.

Instead, the United States is completely content to sacrifice Ukraine, and the EU is too dimwitted to understand what is even going on. — Tzeentch

Straight out of the propaganda playbook. Of course the actual invader who is actually responsible for the wave of death and misery unleashed by the invasion is the good guy. It's all the fault of the evil and stupid West.

It's russians who are doing the killing, not the US. Perhaps you ought to remember.

Nonsense. Jeffrey Sachs gave us clear accounts of what the people involved told him happened. Are you really going to argue he is 'pro-Russian'? The guy is as genuine as they come. — Tzeentch

Yes, actually. He was fucking hosted by Vladimir Solovyov during wartime...

Noam Chomsky, Seymour Hersh - all pro-Russian too? — Tzeentch

Yes on Noam Chomsky, his position against US imperialism mean he will always tend to portray the US as the villain, though he does not actually claim the negotiatians failed because of US and UK intereference, he merely considers it a possibility.

Seymour Hersh is not, though he is perhaps a bit too reliant on sensational anonymous sources in recent times. Still, he has often been proven right at the end. I could not find anything about Hersh repeating that particular claim though. He is mainly known for his theory that the US sabotaged Nord Stream.

Accusing the other side of partisanship is intellectual poverty. — Tzeentch

Looking at the source of a claim which cannot otherwise be checked is basic due dilligence. You wouldn't believe a US press release about them discovering Putin's secret Ukraine plan, dating from 20 years ago, either.

The Ukrainian general staff reported 31 BTGs moving on Kiev. That's roughly 21,000 soldiers. This figure never changed over the course of the month-long battle.

The Wiki article actually says ~20,000 irregulars + 'an undisclosed number of regular fighters' - Yea, I wonder why it's undisclosed? Perhaps the Battle of Kiev couldn't be spun into an 'heroic Ukrainian victory' if the Ukrainians were actually outnumbering the Russians on the defense, eh? — Tzeentch

You're guessing though.

The 60,000 figure comes from a Seymour Hersh interview in which he suggests 40,000 regular troops + 20,000 irregulars, but even if we take your figure and suppose 40,000 defenders, that still puts the Ukrainian forces at a 2:1 advantage. — Tzeentch

I'd have to see the actual interview, since again Hersh has been known in revent years to rely on anonymous sources which tell sensational stories.

For urban fighting a city like Kiev we'd expect 3:1 in favor of the Russians as the bare minimum - we'd expect as much as 10:1 in one were planning for success. — Tzeentch

It is obvious the Russians did not expect Ukraine to fight seriously. That doesn't mean they did no want to take control of the city.

More like, it's impossible to twist the numbers to fit an 'heroic Ukrainian victory' narrative even if you wanted to. — Tzeentch

Russia is an overwhelming superpower that is impossible to defeat. Except when it is defeated, then it was actually weak and it's not really a victory even.

You mean the propaganda you've been binging on over the last year?

Yea. Let's ignore that.

Casualty figures do not suggest the type of bitter fighting we have seen elsewhere in the war. If the Russians intended to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses with massed force and firepower, we would expect an entirely different picture. — Tzeentch

And you would know, because you're the military expert and we'll just have to believe you. The only thing we have actual evidence for, as far as I can see, is that Ukrainian losses were quite light, while the russian advance elements suffered heavy casualties.

This is entirely consistent with Russia abandonning the operation after failing to secure necessary preliminaries, and realising the Ukrainian army was going to stand and fight.

Blah blah.

I hear an exhausted mind. You're just having a hard time coping. — Tzeentch

I figured you deserved a chance at a normal discussion, but alas, it seems I was wrong. — Tzeentch

Whatever. If you want to quit just do it.

Ignore what evidence?

I went and looked for ISW tally of Russian and Ukrainian losses, as even if heavily biased towards supporting Western narratives, I'd nevertheless be surprised if they were arguing Ukraine is inflicting the many multiple times more losses required to win a war of attrition with the Russians.

I ask you to actually cite the evidence you're referring to in the context of you complaining about the lack of evidence to support facts you don't dispute ... and you just claim I'm ignoring your evidence by asking for the actual evidence??

Oryx I also did not ignore but pointed out their methodology of just looking at videos published by Ukraine and taking them at face value is not even moronically intellectually dishonest but pure propaganda; it's essentially just relabelling Ukrainian propaganda and then considering it independent. Absolute rubbish. — boethius

Right, you don't ignore it, it's just all rubbish, presumably compared to some mysterious source you have yet to reveal to us.

What anger. I ask you questions.

That the questions don't need answering because the answers are so obvious closes the case that you are a complete fool. — boethius

And you would know from experience.

You ask for "the evidence" to support my arguments, I ask you what evidence you want to see, and then you say you aren't asking me to prove any of the facts needed to make my argument that: bigger army with more capabilities is very likely to win a war of attrition. — boethius

Perhaps you should reread what I wrote, since I did not ask you for evidence.

Since the invasion, Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands more troops thus essentially creating another army compared to the first army that invaded.

Again, what are you disputing? That Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands additional troops? Or just you'd quibble about calling such a mobilization another army? — boethius

So you do agree that Russia has lost it's entire peacetime army after all?

This is just false. Plenty of military analysts pointed out that 200 000 troops is not enough to overrun Ukraine, that Ukraine is huge, that Ukraine has the largest Army in Europe, can mobilize hundreds of thousands of additional troops, is supported by US / NATO weapons, logistics and intelligence.

Go and find even one expert pre-war military analysis that concluded Russia would overrun Ukraine in weeks, then contrast your failure to find even with "everybody". — boethius

I can find plenty of references ot people saying Ukraine will be overrun within weeks, but no direct claim by any military analyst.

https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-invasion-predictions-wrong-intelligence/32275740.html
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/03/the-will-to-fight-lessons-from-ukraine.html

So maybe you are right and military analysts did not actually predict this and I merely remember baseless claims from the media.

Can you support your claim of what military analysts said?

Academic, think tank, and even talking heads in the media all agreed that essentially the maximum aim of the Russians would be to create a land bridge to Crimea compared to a minimalist incursion to simply protect the Donbas separatists. The idea Russia would be conquering all of Ukraine in weeks did not exist.

Of course, Ukraine could capitulate, but all there was pretty wide consensus that if Ukraine decided to fight it can put up a serious fight and would not be easy to defeat. — boethius

I think I just provided some evidence to the contrary, but feel free to provide your own.

What parity? — boethius

The parity on the actual battlefield, where Russia is not actually winning currently.

Since it's far larger, Russia can match Ukraine's total war and also keep running its peace time economy at the same time. — boethius

Hence it hiked it's military spending to 6% of GDP which, given the profusion of shadow budgets, translates to somewhere between 10 and 20% of total GDP in terms of actual spending. That's Soviet Union levels of military expenditure.

Russia needs to balance the war effort with maintaining a functioning economy and also domestic support for the war. — boethius

Exactly. Hence why it cannot simply declare total war.

This is what the West was betting Russia would be unable to do, especially under the "nuclear option" of massive sanctions.

That was the theory of victory, some sort of internal Russian collapse. Since that didn't happen, Ukraine is now screwed as there was no military backup plan. Ukraine fighting was supposed to trigger some sort of Russian revolution and so there was no need to defeat the Russian military in the field. — boethius

The plan is merely to increase the price of the war for Russia to a point where the russian regime is no longer willing to pay it. A "collapse" is not required.

Anyways, with the end of the war we'll get a better picture of what the losses have actually been. — boethius

And in the meantime you'll just ignore the evidence because it suits you. Because that's proper epistemology, apparently.

I've provided plenty of evidence throughout this discussion to support my points.

For the matter at hand however, it's not under dispute that Russia is the larger force. You don't dispute that, neither does anyone else. The argument is straightforward that the larger force is likely to win, especially in a a war of attrition that is the current configuration of the war.

The argument is so obvious based on so obvious facts that asking for references just highlights your confusion as to where you are, what your purpose in life is and what is happening generally speaking. For, you, nor anyone else, disputes these facts, so there is no need to support them with citations.

I point out that actual evidence is needed to believe the contrary: that despite being a smaller country with a smaller military and less capabilities, that Ukraine is going to win or there is even a viable path to victory.

You, nor anyone else, can now present such evidence that Ukraine is "winning" against the odds, or even a remotely plausible theory of how Ukraine could potentially win.

The best that is offered is that it's hypothetically possible for a smaller force to defeat a larger force or then larger forces have tired of war and gone home in the past.

Failing to answer such questions and find any evidence, you feebly retreat to demanding I provide evidence to support my position.

You really want evidence that Russia is the larger country with the larger military? Or do you really want evidence that the war at the moment, and since a while, is not a war of manoeuvre but of attrition?

Or do you want me to through the basic arithmetic required to understand that in any attritional process of even remote parity (of which there is no reason to believe any asymmetry is in Ukraine's favour), the larger of the abrading assemblies has the advantage.

Or do you want me to cite CNN citing Ukrainian top officials saying exactly the same thing? — boethius

I didn't ask you to prove any of these, but I'm glad you got all that anger off your chest.

I lauded Finland for using military action to support feasible political objectives and conserving their military force through defending rather than working themselves up into a delusional war frenzy and promising to "retake every inch of Finnish lands" before recklessly throwing themselves at prepared Soviet Defences.

Now, it just so happens that Finland had suitable geography to defend against a larger force, one reason to gamble on costly military defence rather than capitulate.

Ukrainian political leaders are fools for not using their military leverage (before it is exhausted) to negotiate the best possible terms for peace. — boethius

I guess we'll see when the war is over. After all Finnland did loose, while Ukraine hasn't lost yet.

I'm referring to the fact that Russia has far larger professional standing army, far more reservists and conscripts that can be mobilized. Are you disputing this fact? That Russia, being larger, has far more manpower available? — boethius

Yes actually, in terms of effective manpower. It does not have "far more". It has far more population, but it's ability to train and equip effective frontline forces, while still superior to Ukraine's, is not decisively larger. As evidenced by the fact that there's a stalemate and Russia has been struggling to rotate degraded units.

And this famed second army does exist and is still in reserve. It may simply be used to simply continue the attritional fighting and rotate and replenish troops or maybe it will be used for some large offensive maneuver anywhere along the border with Ukraine / Belarus. — boethius

Oh god you're actually serious...

What straw man? I'm discussing the propaganda pervasive at the start of the war that the Russian army was incompetent and easy to defeat. Propaganda that was essential to convince the West and Ukraine to rush into total war. — boethius

At the start of the war everyone assumed the russian army would overrun Ukraine in weeks, as far as I remember.

For, if you paused to reflect that Russia is far larger and the degree to which, man for man, Ukraine would need to outperform Ukraine with less military capabilities (air, sea, armour, drones, electronic warfare etc.) the doubt may creep in that maybe Ukraine cannot win a total war with Russia and it would be much better for the Ukrainian people and Europe to negotiate a peace, compromise with the Russians to save lives and as much Ukrainian sovereignty as possible. — boethius

Maybe it cannot, but for one Russia is not as of now fighting a total war in Ukraine and, for another, military capabilities seem to be about at parity for now, which means that Ukraine certainly has not lost the ability to negotiate from a position of strength.

Of course, no need for such sober deliberations if the Russian soldier is some hapless retarded child wandering around the battle field in a blissfully ignorant whimsy.

Again, the position that requires evidence is the idea that Ukraine can inflict massively asymmetric losses required to win.

My position is based on the facts that are not in dispute: Russia is larger and has more military capabilities and there is no reason to believe Ukraine can somehow win in such a disadvantaged position. — boethius

Again apart from the fact that they have alredy suffered three major defeats in this war and have had obvious problems replacing both men and materiel.

To be sure I'm not claiming Ukraine is certain to win, but so far the war has certainly not demonstrated Russia's overwhelming superiority.

My guess would be something along the lines of:

- Occupy strategically vital areas, ergo landbridge to Crimea.
- Try to force the West to negotiate a quick end to the war through a show of force around the capital. — Tzeentch

Why would "the West" be the one negotiating in such a scenario?

In March/April 2022 the West blocked a peace treaty that was in the final stages of being signed, signaling the end of the first 'phase' of the war. The Russians shifted gears, rearranged their lines to cover vital areas and be able to withstand a long war since they were probably overextended initially.

And that's pretty much the war in a nutshell.

The media has been propping up this war to no end, but it really isn't much more complicated than that. — Tzeentch

Which is still an unsourced claim that's only repeated by people with a known pro-Russia bias.

Clearly. All that connects Crimea to Russia is the Kerch bridge, which would not last a day under normal war-time conditions but was probably spared due to political reasons. (i.e. the Americans pressuring the Ukrainians not to push the Russians too far, as per ↪boethius
arguments).

Imagine what the Russian situation would have looked like had the US been able to continue their militarization of Ukraine. — Tzeentch

So the Americans are holding the Ukrainians back, but at the same time the Americans are the one threatening Ukraine's neutrality. Yeah makes sense....

For example, only 20,000 Russian troops participated in the battle of Kiev. Woefully inadequate to effectively occupy a city of nearly 3 million inhabitants, not to mention the some 40,000 - 60,000 Ukrainian defenders. It's just not feasible by any stretch, considering a 3:1 advantage is pretty much the bare minimum for large-scale offensive operations.

There was a 3:1 advantage alright, in favor of the Ukrainians. — Tzeentch

Not the answer to my question.

Also no idea where you're getting your numbers from. Per Wikipedia Ukraine had 20.000 regulars and 18.000 irregulars across the entire northern front, while Russia had some 70.000 regular troops.

And finally you're assuming perfect information and foresight on the part of Russia.

Of course, this was spun as a heroic defense by Ukraine. It obviously wasn't. — Tzeentch

Obviously. It can't be because that would disagree with your narrative.

The Russians rolled up to Kiev and then stood there for about a month to see if the negotiations would bear fruit. Skirmishes took place and of course the Russians took losses. That's what happens during war. The Russians aren't afraid to break a few eggs in order to bake an omelet. — Tzeentch

Yes, let's ignore the entire well documented battle and go with your fantasy of russian forces leisurely rolling up to the capital to wait for negotiations. Maybe the unicorns also came down to greet them?

It's just sad at this point.

No, I'm not.

The US was investing billions of dollars into Ukraine even before the Maidan and the 2014 Crimea invasion. That's what they're openly admitting. — Tzeentch

Changing the goalposts. Not a surprise.

The US is admitting to giving the Ukrainians billions in military aid - a country that had a critical role of neutral buffer between East and West, and you say "so what"? — Tzeentch

It was not the point under discussion. But do keep changing the subject whenever one of your so called arguments fails.

To put it in academic terms; the US fucked around and found out. — Tzeentch

How many US soldiers died? And how many Russians?

He does not. In his 2022 lectures he says something along the lines of 'the Russians intended to capture or threaten Kiev' (which was already a controversial statement at the time). In more recent lectures he states outright he doubts that the Russians ever intended to capture Kiev, and that's the argument I am making. — Tzeentch

You're not making an argument, you're repeating a claim. If he changed his tune that's too bad, but only illustrates he's loosing his grip on reality. It happens all too often to people who get too drunk on their own theories.

That's not my claim. I just think that's an extraordinarily weak explanation, probably borne of lazy thinking by lesser minds, and not really worth considering. — Tzeentch

Oh, lesser minds, is it? Unlike your, extraordinary mind, which knows all there is to know, without even having to deal with pesky reality on the way.

If the Russians are a bunch of dummies then why are we even discussing? Victory is surely right around the corner. I can't wait to see it. — Tzeentch

Strawman. Not a particularly interesting one either.

Ah, but here's the strategy.

The Russians bit off a strategically relevant chunk that is small enough for them to pacify.

I would not be surprised if there is going to be a second invasion of Ukraine which follows roughly the same pattern. Mearsheimer seems to believe as much. He expects the Russians to take another belt of oblasts to the west of what they have occupied now. — Tzeentch

Using it's secret, second army, which will no doubt ride into battle on their magic unicorns.

But of course you don't think so because Putin the master strategist has already decided he has enough.

War requires sacrifices and military friction supposes failures small and large. That's the nature of war. — Tzeentch

Unless you're Ukraine. Then military friction is actually a sign of imminent collapse and every loss is a devastating defeat.

But luckily for Bibi, for Americans (and the West) there is Judeo-Christian heritage and the Jews are Gods own children, so everything Bibi does is OK. — ssu

Kinda off topic, but this result is so odd given the history. It seems to me that in many respects, Islam is closer to Judaism than to Christianity (the divine law, the fixed rituals, the rules about food and dress).

And the early Arab invaders were described as a Jewish sect by some contemporary observers.

Apparent to whom? What evidence? — boethius

Apparent from reading reports by the ISW, Oryx, or various commentators who cite their sources.

You demand others provide evidence (often of completely obvious things to anyone following the conflict, which is what we do here) and yet provide none yourself. — boethius

I demand argument mostly, and some reference to facts on the ground rather than airy declarations.

You, I might remind you, have provided zero evidence yourself.

While Ukraine was "winning" the battle for Kiev, Russia simply rolled out of Crimea (on bridges that were neither bombed nor shelled) and created a land bridge from Crimea to Russian mainland. — boethius

So are the Ukrainians fools for strategically deciding which front to defend? Because earlier you lauded Finnland for that strategy.

However, true that Ukraine was at least able to defend Kiev and did not entirely capitulate and clearly demonstrated that if Russia was to settle things militarily it would be extremely costly (which it has been). Of course, when a smaller force makes such a demonstration to a larger force it is extremely likely that continued fighting will be even more costly to the smaller force.

Therefore, the smaller force should aim to use the leverage of the prospect of a costly and risky war (not only in itself but in terms of extrinsic events) to negotiate a peace on the most favourable terms. — boethius

These are the kind of airy statements unmoored from facts on the ground that I meant earlier.

Unfortunately, if temporarily winning one battle among many losses, against what is essentially an imperial expeditionary force (not remotely the whole your adversary can muster) — boethius

Hahaha, yeah the famed second russian army they kept in reserve. Too bad it never made it to Ukraine...

Why the myth of the incompetent Russian soldier who essentially wants to die was so critical to make Ukraine's commitment to further fighting and explicit refusal to negotiate make sense. You'd have to believe that the Russian soldier is essentially retarded to maintain the idea that the Russian army won't figure out some effective use of all its equipment, assuming you believed the propaganda that Ukraine was inflicting asymmetric losses on the Russians (rather than what was likely: Ukraine was suffering significantly more losses maintaining ground against Russia's professional and better equipped army and then later mercenaries). — boethius

You're discussing a strawman. The russian army has demonstrated ability to learn in various areas. That said it still seems to suffer from C&C flaws, which aren't surprising in an autocratic regime.

But anyway what's the point of discussing when you're clearly have a very different picture of reality but don't seem interested in naming your sources.

That's not what we saw in the north. — Tzeentch

You should tell the paratroopers at Hostomel. Or all the dead tank crews on the road to Kiev.

You can't win a war without taking casualties. Pretty obvious. — Tzeentch

Pah. A weak evasion. Is that what you call a discussion?

Crimea became strategically vulnerable when the US sought to change Ukraine's neutral status. — Tzeentch

After 2014? Again you're not even trying.

If you're saying that, I highly doubt you actually understand the implications of the size and disposition of the initial Russian invasion force.

It's a clear indicator of the fact that they had limited objectives going in. — Tzeentch

Oh really? What major maneuver forces were held back?

Flimsy? It's right there on the US state department's website. :lol: — Tzeentch

Again you're mixing together times and places to create a lie. Why? I don't believe you're simply unable to keep a coherent timeline in your head.

Or maybe you'd rather hear it from chief neocon Nuland in 2013. Even before the violent coup d'etat of 2014 the US was already deeply involved in Ukraine. — Tzeentch

Yeah "deeply involved", so what?

I never said anything like that. — Tzeentch

In that case I retract my claim insofar as it implied you did. But plenty of people who did now make the same arguments you do.

I've actually extensively argued the opposite. It is clear by Russian troop counts and disposition that capturing all of Ukraine (or Kiev, for that matter) was not their goal. And Mearsheimer makes that point as well. — Tzeentch

Out of curiosity, I looked this up, but all that Mearsheimer says is that Russia would have been unable to take all of Ukraine, but he does actually say they intended to capture Kiev.

Capturing all of Ukraine would be crazy, and would have invited an US-backed insurgency. In fact, there are good indications that is what the US was planning for.

Here is a lovely panel by CSIS in which they elaborately explain why occupying Ukraine would be a terrible idea, and how stupid the Russians are for trying it. The joke turned out to be on them, however, since the Russians never did.

They even invited Michael Vickers - the man responsible for the US-backed insurgency in Afghanistan against the Soviets. He literally states the insurgency they could create in Ukraine would be bigger than the one in Afghanistan. — Tzeentch

I think the joke is on the Russians for failing at their objective. Your claim that Russia couldn't possibly have intended something that would have been a bad idea doesn't seem convincing given that the entire war is a spectacularly bad idea either way.

If Russia was convinced they couldn't possibly occupy Ukraine because of US interference why did they think they could invade in the first place?

The US was in the process of creating a fait accompli. They almost succeeded. — Tzeentch

More empty, outrageous claims.

It's called evidence. Actual evidence is needed to support the idea that Ukraine is winning or can win in this case against a larger and stronger opponent. Otherwise, without evidence to the contrary it is reasonable to assume that the much larger and more powerful force is going to win a military confrontation. — boethius

Ukraine won the battle for Kiev, the battle for Charkiv (that one actually was a major rout) and the battle for Kherson.

Russia meanwhile has demonstrated the ability to take territory by assaulting a relatively small sector of the front with a large, grinding assault. But the losses this causes are apparently very heavy and it's very slow. Ukraine meanwhile has failed to penetrate heavy russian defenses.

That's the evidence, and it doesn't suggest either side is about to win decisively. At best it suggests a status quo peace.

They are winning the war. They have successfully conquered nearly a quarter of Ukraine, and arguably the most valuable quarter in terms of resources and the part that most speaks Russian. — boethius

But that wasn't the russian goal. And they have also wrecked their military to an extent that will likely prevent them from projecting serious military power for years.

That's a major defeat in my book.

Why didn't the US and NATO acolytes pour in all the advanced weaponry they have since trickled into Ukraine from the get go? Why aren't squadrons of f16 with all the advanced sensors and missiles and other munitions not patrolling Ukrainians skies as we speak?

The first year of the war, Ukraine had realistic chances of defeating the Russian forces that had invaded. Russia had not yet even partly mobilized, had not yet built up sophisticated defences, and were prosecuting the war with their professional soldiers and a band of mercenaries.

If the goal was to defeat Russia in Ukraine, it was certainly possible in the first months and year. Of course, that would not end the war but would be a humiliating military disaster for Russia, which combined with the disruption of the sanctions, would have solid chances of unravelling the Russian state as the Neo-cons so desired. — boethius

No-one wants the Russian state to unravel because then the nukes are unaccounted for and who knows what happens.

The point of the restrictions was, in part, to avoid just such an unraveling.

But also because popular opinion matters and while most people who looked at the matter concluded there was very little risk of a nuclear escalation, politicians aren't elected by foreign policy experts. People were very worried about a nuclear escalation, that has mostly faded by now.

Well, this is a discussion forum where people share and talk about their ideas. I'm more than comfortable within these topics not to have to cite sources for uncontroversial claims — Tzeentch

What is there to discuss if you don't justify your claims re the military situation?

Very difficult to understand where you're coming from.

Because the Ukrainians put up a valiant fight means Ukraine is somehow not in the process of losing the war?

I'm sure this type of emotional support counts for something to some people, but it count for nothing in the world of geopolitics. — Tzeentch

How many armored vehicles has Russia lost? How many artillery pieces? How many soldiers?

The defense has been a bit more than a "valiant fight". Russia isn't sitting around leisurely twiddling their thumbs while they wait for Ukraine to surrender. For almost two years they have thrown everything they have into the conflict, and lost a good chunk of that.

Crimea is extremely important to the Russians, so I'd disagree. — Tzeentch

They already had Crimea. Their goals obviously went way beyond that but this doesn't fit your narrative so you'll ignore both the very obvious stated goals (demilitarise and denazify) and also the evidence in the form of actual russian invasion routes.

Yes, and I'm sure that will happen any day now. — Tzeentch

If you think a country can go on spending more than 10% of its GDP on the military without ill effects I don't know what to tell you.

The US attempted to wrench Ukraine from underneath the Russians' noses, and spent some 10 years arming and training the Ukrainians for this very purpose. Financial investments go back even further. Ukraine is the US neocon project. — Tzeentch

So you claim. The evidence for this is flimsy as has been discussed ad nauseum already. In any event Russia had a perfectly good frozen conflict in Ukraine already.

Note, currently. — Tzeentch

Russian troops have been fighting in Ukraine since 2014.

Then Russia drew its line and is currently winning against a combined economic bloc that has over 20 times its GDP. — Tzeentch

If winning is wrecking your military and throwing away your international prestige and various lucrative trade deals, I'd hate to see what loosing looks like.

What has Russia gained, a bit of territory? That won't transform the russian economy. Russian arms have been exposed as sub-par, russian military doctrine as a failure. Russia is loosing influence in it's "near abroad", primarily to China, due to its inability to uphold commitments. The need to keep Chechnya quiet is forcing Putin to allow Kadyrov to amass a significant independent powerbase.

Really for someone to claim they "look at geopolitics" your view seems remarkably focused on a single coloured line on a map. There's a reason states have largely stopped the kind of territorial aggrandisement Russia is undertaking.

Russia's economy would collapse, Putin would be overthrown, the army would rebel, etc. - the Russians would be pushed back to the border and Crimea would be liberated.

It's obviously a humiliation, given how hard they went in with the rhetoric. — Tzeentch

I think you're substituting what officials have actually said with your idea of what they wished for.

What prediction are you even talking about? — Tzeentch

That Ukraine would fall within weeks. That the real russian army wasn't yet fully in the fight.

Kiev was supposed to fall "any day now" as you like to claim. Then it was Charkiw that was about to fall. None of it materialised yet there's still the exact same rhetoric about how Russia, with it's superior resources, cannot fail to win.

You fail to understand that the creation of Ukraine was based on a mutual understanding between NATO and post-Soviet Russia that Ukraine was to be a neutral bufferzone, necessary to avoid conflict. — Tzeentch

Ridiculous nonsense. Ukraine was a SSR and gained independence when Jelzin decided to dissolve the USSR. That was a result of internal USSR politics, not some imagined understanding with NATO.

It's the Americans who in 2008 at the NATO Bucharest Summit stated that Ukraine and Georgia "will become members of NATO", thus clearly signaling they were intending to change Ukraine's neutral status. That's what the Russians are and have been reacting to. — Tzeentch

Which was merely a reaffirmation of the previous policy, and in fact the plan was subsequently put in ice, as has been pointed out in this thread. Plus there's the previous point about NATO membership being impossible since 2014.

This isn't some effort of Russia to 'add Ukraine to its sphere of influence'. What a nonsensical view. — Tzeentch

Someone should tell Putin, because his statements very clearly say that Ukraine is an illegitimate state and should really just be part of Russia.

The binary good and bad, black and white, oppressors and oppressed is the fallacy that is continually made and needs to be examined. Israel’s failure with Netanyahu doesn’t negate Hamas having to be degraded and pushed from Gaza. Then the debate becomes about how to wage that war. — schopenhauer1

But shouldn't the debate be about how not to wage the war?

Seeing as waging the war cannot but advance the objective of Hamas, and that nothing past outright genocide offers itself as a continuation of the policy of containment.

War is the default option in part because of all the prior failures. In part also because Israel, from it's conception, necessitated the construction and entrenchment of a Jewish majority.

Destroying Hamas seems ultimately more a rationalisation than an actual goal. While Hamas is a real organisation with real goals, and it does have a real and specific impact, it seems absurd to assume that it'll be the last of its kind. So to reverse Clausewitz: what's the policy that will be the continuation of this war?

But what you leave out that is highlighted on the graph with a nice red highlighter, is how very out of the 400,000 year cycle the Co2 level is at the moment. We have thrown a C02 quilt on the planet that will warm it to a level unprecedented in at least the 400,000 years of that graph, it being obvious that the actual temperature lags behind the measure of the insulation. — unenlightened

This is usually the elephant in the room when it comes to discussions with climate denialists. Insofar as the denialism is motivated by an emotional need for climate change to not be true, which is often the case, it's usually straight up ignored.

But I do remember that @Agree-to-Disagree did acknowledge the effects of CO2 earlier in this thread, so one does wonder where all of this is going.