A quick negotiated settlement was obviously the preferred outcome, but I think it's pretty much unthinkable that the Russians did not plan for a situation in which negotiations failed. — Tzeentch

Then why did they have those long lines of stalled transport for a week or two, and why did they run short of so many things so quickly? Can they not count?

Then why did they have those long lines of stalled transport for a week or two, and why did they run short of so many things so quickly? Can they not count? — unenlightened

The inactivity of the Russian forces in northern Ukraine during the initial stages of the war in my view reflects their purpose as I have described it. Had the purpose been to overwhelm defenders and surround and occupy Kiev, we would have seen an entirely different pattern, more like we saw during the battle for Bakhmut and Avdiivka but much larger in scale.

What are/were the Russians running short of?

What were the Russians running short of? — Tzeentch

Anecdotally, they were running short first of fuel, then of personal equipment for troops, and then of munitions and tanks and even training facilities for the reinforcements. But perhaps that is all Western propaganda.

Anecdotally, they were running short first of fuel, then of personal equipment for troops, and then of munitions and tanks and even training facilities for the reinforcements. But perhaps that is all Western propaganda. — unenlightened

Supposedly they were also running short on artillery shells, yet scarcely a day has gone by that the entire frontline hasn't been peppered by Russian artillery, so I do tend to take such reports with a grain of salt.

But from a military perspective, the Russians probably expended a large portion of their offensive capacity on the initial invasion. After the initial invasion failed to conclude the war through a negotiated settlement, the Russians changed their force posture towards defense and they started to dig in. At that point the demand for supplies changes also.

For example, the Russians may have been running "low" on tanks and fuel, but since they probably weren't planning further large-scale offensive operations that could also be the normal picture one would expect after the initial invasion was concluded and they entered a period of recuperation.

I think Putin thought the same about Zelensky. A puppet he could knock over in a few days.Do you think Russia began this prepared for a long war of attrition? — unenlightened

Even within your own logic, a puppet of who?

Obviously the US, and the US was clearly not interested in peace, rejecting to even discuss Russia's peace proposal before the war nor anything else (as well as forbidding their vassals in Europe of doing so of their own accord).

So, assuming you're correct and Putin views Zelensky a puppet of the US, why wouldn't said US puppet do what he's told and implement US policy of rejecting peace?

Russia built up a massive war chest, over 600 billion USD, over nearly a decade; why would they do that if they were not preparing to finance a potential long war of attrition.

More troops could have been committed to the initial invasion, but if the primary military goal was to secure the land bridge to Crimea then clearly the commitment was sufficient.

There's also not only the military sphere, but the Kremlin needed also to prepared and balance things for massive sanctions and economic disruption: hence prosecute the war with professional troops and mercenaries so as to overcome the initial shock of sanctions with minimal additional disruption to the civilian population.

Of course, certainly it can be argued a better strategy was available, diplomatic or militarily, but this idea that the war was initiated on some sort of whim without careful thought and planning is really quite ludicrous. There was already a war in the Donbas supported by Russia for 8 years, so clearly it is on the minds of military and political leaders that if there's no diplomatic settlement then a military solution is the only alternative. Putin received far more criticism within Russia for not intervening sooner, but obviously a war of this size and right next to Russia would be complicated, hence clear indications of preparation.

Had Russia mobilized more troops for the initial invasion, it risks Ukraine mobilizing and a blitz to take the key territory becomes harder rather than easier.

Likewise, had things been prepared even better, every soldier knowing they will be going to war and exactly what they will be doing, it again risks Ukrainian mobilization and hundreds of thousands additional dug in troops and the bridges out of Crimea mined, shelled and bombed rather than massive columns of Russian armour just rolling into South Ukraine (which clearly the Ukrainians were not prepared for and completely collapses their lines West of the Donbas allowing the Russians to conquer the land bridge).

Which also goes to explain such observations:

Anecdotally, they were running short first of fuel, then of personal equipment for troops, and then of munitions and tanks and even training facilities for the reinforcements. But perhaps that is all Western propaganda. — unenlightened

In addition to @Tzeentch already mentioning that perhaps Russian forces were adequately supplied for the advances they intended to make in the initial invasion, any giant operation is going to have all sorts of anecdotal problems along with major setbacks and confusions. No one here is arguing the Russian invasion went perfectly according to plan, we're just pointing out Russian decisions do make sense.

The idea that Russia is an irrational actor was quite clearly a myth created in the early days and sustained for over a year (sometimes cherry picking true but pretty expected things like equipment SNAFU's as well as obvious lies like exorbitant number of casualties), as it avoids the difficult question of how Ukraine is going to prevail over a far larger opponent.

You don't need a viable plan if you're fighting an army of essentially retarded monkeys.

No one here is arguing the Russian invasion went perfectly according to plan, we're just pointing out Russian decisions do make sense. — boethius

The idea that Russia is an irrational... — boethius

No one here is is arguing that either, at least not any more than any human group is fundamentally irrational at any time.

So, assuming you're correct and Putin views Zelensky a puppet of the US, why wouldn't said US puppet do what he's told and implement US policy of rejecting peace? — boethius

I'm not a military expert, but what happened looks to me to be modelled on the WW2 German invasion of France, a high speed blitz takeover of the Capital avoiding the main defensive forces to remove the government and replace it with a Vichy style government of the strategically unimportant regions, and annexation of, in this case, the entire south coast. Zelensky removed has no chance to dance to anyone's tune. Given an ex comedian with no political pedigree in charge, that is not an irrational plan. That obviously didn't happen, and then there was a strange pause before the withdrawal and regrouping. It looked like a winning plan until it didn't, which was when the airport couldn't be secured.
There was even a Pro-Russian faction with support from oligarchs and security services waiting to step into the breach.

No one here is is arguing that either, at least not any more than any human group is fundamentally irrational at any time. — unenlightened

This has been argued many times, I can cite previous conversation if you want.

But good to know you aren't arguing this, in which case it should be pretty easy to see Russia's strategy does make sense and has worked well in terms of securing the land bridge to Crimea. Of course, there have been pros and cons to every decision which can be debated.

I'm not a military expert, but what happened looks to me to be modelled on the WW2 German invasion of France, a high speed blitz takeover of the Capital avoiding the main defensive forces to remove the government and replace it with a Vichy style government of the strategically unimportant regions, and annexation of, in this case, the entire south coast. — unenlightened

Well that's clearly not the Russian strategy or they would not have bothered advancing in the South at all, they would have only fought in the South insofar as it fixes Ukrainian troops there, so as to dedicate the majority of their resources to take Kiev.

Of course, I have zero issue believing the preferred outcome for the Russians is that Ukraine completely capitulates, and failing that Zelensky accepting their peace deal would be second best.

The Russians military plan, however, is clearly to take the land bridge to Crimea, which is what they do in essentially a week, and then pacify the cities involved, and their operation in the North serves to keep Kiev's main focus there.

Now, both taking land in the South and pressuring Kiev is certainly significant leverage in negotiating a peace deal, especially if Russia was offering to give that land back (which they were) and it was clear after the outbreak of the war that Ukraine was not in NATO and was not going to be. It was certainly the "rational thing to do" from the Russian point of view, but I would have hard time believing the Kremlin doesn't have the experience required to know people don't always do the rational thing as you see it and did not prepare accordingly (which they clearly did, amassing hundreds of billions of USD, hoarding gold, preparing an alternative payment system and so on).

Zelensky removed has no chance to dance to anyone's tune. Given an ex comedian with no political pedigree in charge, that is not an irrational plan. That obviously didn't happen, and then there was a strange pause before the withdrawal and regrouping. It looked like a winning plan until it didn't, which was when the airport couldn't be secured.
There was even a Pro-Russian faction with support from oligarchs and security services waiting to step into the breach. — unenlightened

You seem to think it would be easy for the Russians to replace Zelensky without lengthy and costly urban warfare in Kiev.

The scenario where what you describe is possible (with the forces Russia commits to Kiev) is one where Ukraine forces essentially don't put up a fight and Russian tanks can roll into Kiev uncontested. Again, that would certainly be the ideal scenario for the Russians and they certainly would have done that if there was no resistance.

However, Russian actions are completely inconsistent with some sort of blind belief that taking Kiev and replacing Zelensky would be easy, and as @Tzeentch points out the Ukraine military and government is filled with right with extremists who would just stage a coup if you did somehow manage to put in place a Russian puppet.

Ukraine has been preparing with support of the US for precisely this war for 8 years, there's CIA all over Ukraine, there's Nuland's famous "he's our man" and "fuck the EU" (yet the EU doesn't mind at all; indeed, "please commence with the Fucking" is the EU diplomatic position).

This whole idea that conquering all of Ukraine should have been easy is totally baseless: Ukraine is huge and difficult to sustain logistics even without resistance (it's not trivial to move tens of thousands of men and equipment and supplies), Ukraine has the largest army in Europe with the largest gaggle of armour, and their military is full of fanatical anti-Russian extremists (there are also moderates, and I'd agree that Zelensky isn't a right wing extremists, but there would be zero reason to expect moderates to dominate decision making).

Even within your own logic, a puppet of who?

Obviously the US, and the US was clearly not interested in peace, rejecting to even discuss Russia's peace proposal before the war nor anything else (as well as forbidding their vassals in Europe of doing so of their own accord).

So, assuming you're correct and Putin views Zelensky a puppet of the US, why wouldn't said US puppet do what he's told and implement US policy of rejecting peace? — boethius

Because in Putin's view, Zelensky is an effeminate westerner. A comedian, a joke.

He'd never put his life on the line. When shit hits the fan he'd turn tail and flee. Even the US apparently did not expect him to stay put, as evidenced by the "I need ammunition, not a ride" episode.

More troops could have been committed to the initial invasion, but if the primary military goal was to secure the land bridge to Crimea then clearly the commitment was sufficient. — boethius

What troops exactly?

Russia built up a massive war chest, over 600 billion USD, over nearly a decade; why would they do that if they were not preparing to finance a potential long war of attrition. — boethius

There's also not only the military sphere, but the Kremlin needed also to prepared and balance things for massive sanctions and economic disruption: hence prosecute the war with professional troops and mercenaries so as to overcome the initial shock of sanctions with minimal additional disruption to the civilian population. — boethius

You're kinda answering your own question here.

Furthermore it doesn't seem like either the russian industrial base or the military establishment had actually prepared for a long war. Nor was the information space prepared. Perhaps the best example is the use of "special military operation" which certainly does not suggest a years long battle of attrition.

Of course, certainly it can be argued a better strategy was available, diplomatic or militarily, but this idea that the war was initiated on some sort of whim without careful thought and planning is really quite ludicrous. There was already a war in the Donbas supported by Russia for 8 years, so clearly it is on the minds of military and political leaders that if there's no diplomatic settlement then a military solution is the only alternative. Putin received far more criticism within Russia for not intervening sooner, but obviously a war of this size and right next to Russia would be complicated, hence clear indications of preparation. — boethius

I don't think people suggest it's a whim so much as ideological blindness from living in a filter bubble - which is a common hazard of an authoritarian regime.

Had Russia mobilized more troops for the initial invasion, it risks Ukraine mobilizing and a blitz to take the key territory becomes harder rather than easier.

Likewise, had things been prepared even better, every soldier knowing they will be going to war and exactly what they will be doing, it again risks Ukrainian mobilization and hundreds of thousands additional dug in troops and the bridges out of Crimea mined, shelled and bombed rather than massive columns of Russian armour just rolling into South Ukraine (which clearly the Ukrainians were not prepared for and completely collapses their lines West of the Donbas allowing the Russians to conquer the land bridge). — boethius

I don't know about that. After all the russian troop buildup was anything but subtle. Secrecy was clearly not the concern. I rather think that the calculus was that the constant pressure would undermine morale and lead to the planned collapse.

In addition to Tzeentch already mentioning that perhaps Russian forces were adequately supplied for the advances they intended to make in the initial invasion, any giant operation is going to have all sorts of anecdotal problems along with major setbacks and confusions. No one here is arguing the Russian invasion went perfectly according to plan, we're just pointing out Russian decisions do make sense.

The idea that Russia is an irrational actor was quite clearly a myth created in the early days and sustained for over a year (sometimes cherry picking true but pretty expected things like equipment SNAFU's as well as obvious lies like exorbitant number of casualties), as it avoids the difficult question of how Ukraine is going to prevail over a far larger opponent.

You don't need a viable plan if you're fighting an army of essentially retarded monkeys. — boethius

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality.

There's two possibilities: either Russia really planned a sweeping takeover of the country, at least to the Dnieper. In that case the plan clearly failed.

Or Russia simply made an elaborate multi front assault to have an easier time capturing a land bridge to Crimea, as well as Donetsk and Luhansk. In which case they should have had a far easier time and far less losses than they did.

I'm not a military expert, but what happened looks to me to be modelled on the WW2 German invasion of France, a high speed blitz takeover of the Capital avoiding the main defensive forces — unenlightened

But this is ridiculous.

What modern army is going to model their defense on 1940's France? Have you seen a Ukrainian Maginot Line anywhere?


Holding on to Kiev was Ukraine's most obvious goal, so taking Kiev while avoiding the main defensive forces is a non-starter. If anything the main body of the Ukrainian forces was located in and around Kiev.

Taking it would have required a force several times larger than what the Russians deployed on the Kiev axis, and months of grueling urban combat. Nothing in the Russian force posture suggests they were getting ready for such an operation.


Furthermore, as I've often argued here, occupying Kiev is unlikely to have been the Russians' goal for several reasons. One reason is that due to extensive US / western support it is unlikely that it would have made a large impact on the military situation. The Ukrainian army remained operational, and leadership of the war could be conducted from elsewhere.

What modern army is going to model their defense on 1940's France? Have you seen a Ukrainian Maginot Line anywhere? — Tzeentch

Kinda. The entire eastern front is heavily fortified. There's a reason Bakhmut and Avdivka remained standing even as russian troops surged from Crimea to Mariupol.

Holding on to Kiev was Ukraine's most obvious goal, so taking Kiev while avoiding the main defensive forces is a non-starter. If anything the main body of the Ukrainian forces was located in and around Kiev. — Tzeentch

All the reports I read assumed that that Ukraine's strongest forces would be at the eastern front, and that cutting them off from Kiev might be a russian goal.

Taking it would have required a force several times larger than what the Russians deployed on the Kiev axis, and months of grueling urban combat. Nothing in the Russian force posture suggests they were getting ready for such an operation. — Tzeentch

But not if a shock-and-awe operation, including a massive airborne flanking move, lead to panic and a collapse of morale.

Furthermore, as I've often argued here, occupying Kiev is unlikely to have been the Russians' goal for several reasons. One reason is that due to extensive US / western support it is unlikely that it would have made a large impact on the military situation. The Ukrainian army remained operational, and leadership of the war could be conducted from elsewhere. — Tzeentch

Well Putin called it a "special military operation" with the goal to "denazify and demilitarise". If that is an indication of how the operation was conceived, then it would suggest that the goal was indeed as least as much political as military.

Although of course far more focus was paid to damage to civilian zones, the shelling of industrial zones was covered even by the Western media. — boethius

It is reported that about 150 people died in the 'shelling' of Kiyv in that period. It is hard to estimate, but it seems most of those were victims of missile strikes (executed from Belarus), which as we know at worst can kill up to 20-50 people at a time, if it strikes heavily populated area. So as far as artillery shelling is concerned, it is hard to estimate the effect, but it must have been rather negligible. E.g. Kharkiv, actually WAS shelled and the number of victims was about three-four times greater (although even here many attacks were with missiles, not from ground forces).

Now obviously a peace deal was not reached, but shelling industrial zones (of which the military value is repurposing to ) was clearly one purpose of the push to Kiev. — boethius

Nice backtracking here... So we agree there was no 'two-month' shelling of miltiary targets? The Antonov factory was hit, because it is on the outskirts of Kiyv, as I have acknowledged, Russians got in range that allowed them to shell far suburbs of Kiyv. Still, the effects of that shelling were rather insignificant.

"Overnight, high-precision air-launched missiles destroyed an ammunition factory near the town of Brovary in Kyiv region," Konashenkov said.

So obviously advancing to Kiev would also accomplish this purpose of being able to destroy factories of various kinds. — boethius

Russians needed to advance to Kiyv in order to use air missiles, which were launched by planes from the territory of Belarus? Would you agree that knowing the difference between artillery shelling and air-launched missiles is rather important if you want to discuss such matters? Or is is all the same to you?

Which for all the reasons I explain, is clearly not true. It's completely coherent to send a small force to fix a large amount of troops, destroy plenty of factories and infrastructure, apply significant political pressure, while 15% of the country is conquered in the meanwhile.

It's a pretty common sense manoeuvre and if Ukraine "called the bluff" and sent significant resources to the south and undermanned their defence of Kiev, then maybe Russia would have taken the opportunity to pour in troops and storm the city. — boethius

Defenders, especially with limited means, assign such resources which are required for defence. Fixing a larger force against a supposedly smaller force which is obviously not able to accomplish its goals is not a prudent military move. And, again, Russians, did not destroy 'plenty of factories and infrastructure' from ground attacks. So far you were able to name one factory, located in the suburbs.

"Long-term 'siege' " is a nice but lame strawman. Where do I say a long term siege is necessary to apply political pressure? — boethius

Because 'short-term siege' is very unlikely to work. It is not a siege if the resource flow is practically unrestricted and there is no significant attrition involved. Russians did not surround the city, they did not threaten the supply lines in any way and they were not able to apply significant attrition. 'Blitz siege' is a contradiction in terms - you cannot achieve the goals of a siege quickly.

Russia sieges Kiev until Mariupol is fully taken (the withdrawal is the week after the surrender of the remaining Azov forces), tries to negotiate a peace during this time, a peace deal is not reached, they can't maintain their positions, so they are forced to leave. — boethius

What? Russians have already withdrew from Kiyv suburbs by March 27th, i.e. before the talks have concluded, with most of the force gone from the north by April. The Azov forces have surrendered on May 20th. You clearly have no idea what you are talking about...

The Russians are not routed and captured but have an orderly withdrawal when they retreat, so they obviously had enough fire power to hold their positions and get resupplied.

If it was a risky mad dash blitz the capital with only 4 days of fuel, then they would have all been captured when that failed. — boethius

No, because Ukrainians did not have enough forces to attack them and it would still be a risky manouver. And yes, they had enough firepower to hold against Ukrainian attacks for some time, but not to put pressure on Kiyv from afar - the composition of the force itself assumed quick ground attack, not barrage of the city. Still, they had to leave Bucha, Irpin (the towns closest to Kiyv) after about two weeks (not two months), not because they have accomplished anything (the talks were still underway), but because they had to. Most of the northern force has already stalled midway by the middle of March (the infamous 'Kiyv convoy'), Ukrainians began counteroffensive maneouvers and liberating villages back from March 15th.

Now, I have zero problem with the idea that the ideal scenario for the Russians is that the Ukrainians simply fall apart in terms of C&C and there's a near complete capitulation, or then no defence of the city is organized and they're able to take the city with a small force and the population accepts a total Russian victory. However, they do commit enough resources to maintain the positions they take around Kiev the time to accomplish full occupation of major cities in the south, particularly Mariupol.

However, what is clear even in your scenario is that there is not enough man power to take Kiev waging urban combat even against a small amount of defenders.

I of course agree that total capitulation by Ukraine would be the a preferred outcome of blitzing to Kiev, and if that was plan A then the Russians clearly had a plan B, but we seem to agree that their plan is not conquest of Kiev against any significant resistance. — boethius

Except they did not commit enough resources, that is why they could not maintain the positions they took around Kiyv and had to leave quite soon after they have arrived. The supposed 'siege' lasted about fifteen days and has accomplished very little - they have overstretched their supply lines significantly and simply could not hold their positions. They were not routed, but had to leave a lot of equipment. So no, there was no plan B at all - they have made a quick strike, they have failed and they had to leave. To say that the 'Kiyv convoy' was somehow planned is insane - no battle plan assumes forming a 60 km column of troops most of which were never deployed.

Because in Putin's view, Zelensky is an effeminate westerner. A comedian, a joke. — Echarmion

In Putin's view Zelensky is an actor and so perhaps Putin expects it's entirely possible Zelensky plays whatever part the US wants him to play.

For example, maybe

He'd never put his life on the line. When shit hits the fan he'd turn tail and flee. Even the US apparently did not expect him to stay put, as evidenced by the "I need ammunition, not a ride" episode. — Echarmion

Is maybe called "a script" written by Western propagandists to create such a good "episode" as you call it in the Zelensky mythology.

But even if Zelensky fled, the rest of the Zelensky government (especially anything to do with defence) are right wing extremists, so there would be no reason to expect Zelensky fleeing would somehow mean Ukraine capitulating.

What troops exactly? — Echarmion

Russia could have mobilized before the war and committed literally millions of troops to conquering and occupying all of Ukraine, or then simply built up a larger standing army over the 8 years of fighting in the Donbas where it is clear a military resolution maybe required.

Russia doesn't do either of these things, but rather prepares a force that can feasibly take and hold the land bridge to Crimea, which is obviously proven by the fact that are there right now as we speak. Further military goals, such as taking Kiev, would have required far more troops or then dedicating essentially their entire force to that one objective in hopes that it ends the war.

Now, why would Russia not mobilize millions of soldiers has the obvious answer of that being disastrous economically, therefore war aims in Ukraine are limited by manpower and resources.

You're kinda answering your own question here.

Furthermore it doesn't seem like either the russian industrial base or the military establishment had actually prepared for a long war. Nor was the information space prepared. Perhaps the best example is the use of "special military operation" which certainly does not suggest a years long battle of attrition. — Echarmion

I'm answering the question of whether Putin expected a quick and easy war or then prepared for a long war, which is the topic of discussion at the moment. Building up a large war chest is a pretty strong signal of preparing for a pretty large war.

I don't know about that. After all the russian troop buildup was anything but subtle. Secrecy was clearly not the concern. I rather think that the calculus was that the constant pressure would undermine morale and lead to the planned collapse. — Echarmion

The Russian troop build up was clearly subtle enough to prevent Ukraine mobilizing and digging North of Kiev and North of Crimea.

Russia would stage a large exercise every year around Ukraine not simply to prepare for an eventual war but to make it unclear if they were actually invading or not. Many commentators were calling it mere sabre rattling and a show of force. You even had Boris Johnson assuring everyone that there wouldn't be tanks rolling across the plains of Europe, that's not going to happen.

Now, the US did publicly say Russia would invade, but this was pretty close to the actual invasion date and it may not have been feasible to mobilize, and, in anywise, Ukraine chooses not to.

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality.

There's two possibilities: either Russia really planned a sweeping takeover of the country, at least to the Dnieper. In that case the plan clearly failed.

Or Russia simply made an elaborate multi front assault to have an easier time capturing a land bridge to Crimea, as well as Donetsk and Luhansk. In which case they should have had a far easier time and far less losses than they did. — Echarmion

200 000 troops is simply far too little to achieve the first objective, so if they aren't irrational then that was not their objective.

For the second objective, they achieve it, mostly uncontested in the first couple of weeks, and we have little idea of Russia's actual losses and we have even less idea of what their toleration for losses is.

Certainly it's possible that they expected less losses to achieve more. Or it maybe just the cost of doing business from the Russian command's point of view.

What is clear is that the initial priority is to keep losses to professional soldiers and mercenaries in the first phases of the war, and they do achieve that at least for quite some time.

Except they did not commit enough resources, that is why they could not maintain the positions they took around Kiyv and had to leave quite soon after they have arrived. — Jabberwock

Again, in a fixing operation, your goal is to commit the least amount of forces needed to tie up a maximum of the opponents forces.

Even if there's no fog of war and your enemy knows you have relatively few troops in the area, they can nevertheless not be certain you will not divert more troops at any moment in a surprise push; therefore, especially is the target is critical such as the capital, sufficient resources are likely to be devoted to make a proper defence (it would be a massive gamble to bet otherwise, and even if you bet right, your enemy may see you're undermanning the defence and take advatnage). So, even if Ukraine / US intelligence, knows Russia's Northern operation is mostly about diverting the bulk of Kiev's attention and reserves to its defence, they may easily have little choice but to do so in any case (which is what actually happens).

All nations are lands stolen and lies of the people who steal it, who cares which cat-funt of a nation is taking turns pretending they own the very nature they will eventually return to in death. — Vaskane

This is the argument in a nutshel that Kiev should have taken Russia's peace terms before or then after the war broke out: where the border is exactly has relatively little consequence on the lives of the people living in the Donbas (who no one really disputes are Russian speakers that are largely partial to Russia) whereas the war has had quite a large consequence on many people's lives far removed from the Donbas.

So it was not 'two-month shelling of military targets' and 'Russia sieges Kiev until Mariupol is fully taken', just two of your claims that were patently false, now it turns out it was never those things you have claimed they were! It was a 'fixing operation'! A 'diversion'! You have made very specific claims and was proven wrong. You cannot even get the dates right. You can own up to it or pretend that it has never happened, it is up to you.

In Putin's view Zelensky is an actor and so perhaps Putin expects it's entirely possible Zelensky plays whatever part the US wants him to play. — boethius

Putin would know from experience that even your vassals don't always do what you want them to.

Is maybe called "a script" written by Western propagandists to create such a good "episode" as you call it in the Zelensky mythology. — boethius

Maybe, but without evidence, we wouldn't assume such plots.

But even if Zelensky fled, the rest of the Zelensky government (especially anything to do with defence) are right wing extremists, so there would be no reason to expect Zelensky fleeing would somehow mean Ukraine capitulating. — boethius

It would have done serious damage to cohesion and morale. Quite possibly Putin remembered the collapse of the Afghan army when the president fled.

Russia could have mobilized before the war and committed literally millions of troops to conquering and occupying all of Ukraine, or then simply built up a larger standing army over the 8 years of fighting in the Donbas where it is clear a military resolution maybe required.

Russia doesn't do either of these things, but rather prepares a force that can feasibly take and hold the land bridge to Crimea, which is obviously proven by the fact that are there right now as we speak. Further military goals, such as taking Kiev, would have required far more troops or then dedicating essentially their entire force to that one objective in hopes that it ends the war.

Now, why would Russia not mobilize millions of soldiers has the obvious answer of that being disastrous economically, therefore war aims in Ukraine are limited by manpower and resources. — boethius

Sure, this would make sense. But it's simply not what happened. Russia did land it's crack paratroopers at Hostomel. Russia did send a huge convoy towards Kiev. Russia had large amounts of troops around Charkiv.

All of these were destroyed or withdrawn, with large losses in manpower and materiel. The troops on the left bank of the Dniepr fared better, but again were only withdrawn when their position clearly was untenable.

None of that can be explained by your theory, but can be explained by the alternative.

I'm answering the question of whether Putin expected a quick and easy war or then prepared for a long war, which is the topic of discussion at the moment. Building up a large war chest is a pretty strong signal of preparing for a pretty large war. — boethius

Or a long round of sanctions and insurgency. It's not conclusive towards any particular plan.

The Russian troop build up was clearly subtle enough to prevent Ukraine mobilizing and digging North of Kiev and North of Crimea.

Russia would stage a large exercise every year around Ukraine not simply to prepare for an eventual war but to make it unclear if they were actually invading or not. Many commentators were calling it mere sabre rattling and a show of force. You even had Boris Johnson assuring everyone that there wouldn't be tanks rolling across the plains of Europe, that's not going to happen.

Now, the US did publicly say Russia would invade, but this was pretty close to the actual invasion date and it may not have been feasible to mobilize, and, in anywise, Ukraine chooses not to. — boethius

Seems like a rather large gamble, especially since the troops obviously stayed out after the exercise. I suppose we cannot rule out that Russia simply wanted to keep everyone guessing by not making any further preparations.

200 000 troops is simply far too little to achieve the first objective, so if they aren't irrational then that was not their objective.

For the second objective, they achieve it, mostly uncontested in the first couple of weeks, and we have little idea of Russia's actual losses and we have even less idea of what their toleration for losses is.

Certainly it's possible that they expected less losses to achieve more. Or it maybe just the cost of doing business from the Russian command's point of view.

What is clear is that the initial priority is to keep losses to professional soldiers and mercenaries in the first phases of the war, and they do achieve that at least for quite some time. — boethius

Imho the epistemologically sound position is to use what information we have and make an educated guess.

Even if we take reports on russian losses with a heavy dose of salt, and furthermore assume that they'd generally make sound and rational decision the evidence points to various military failures resulting in heavy losses.

Clearly a successful operation should not have resulted in Russia now fighting trench warfare. It should not have resulted in a grinding siege of Bakhmut, or the rout in Charkiv.

Something went badly wrong.

Have you seen a Ukrainian Maginot Line anywhere? — Tzeentch

No, but I have seen a Russian one.

The scenario where what you describe is possible (with the forces Russia commits to Kiev) is one where Ukraine forces essentially don't put up a fight and Russian tanks can roll into Kiev uncontested. Again, that would certainly be the ideal scenario for the Russians and they certainly would have done that if there was no resistance. — boethius

That's all I'm saying, they went for a quick decapitation of the government alongside a push for a land bridge and as much coast line as they could, including Odessa which would have given them control of the 'breadbasket', a powerful lever in international relations. Without that regime change, it looks like they are now resigned to at best a frozen conflict for the indefinite future, because they still don't seem to have the numbers to occupy and subdue the whole country.

What's incoherent about applying political pressure, a fixing operation, shelling targets of military value for 2 months as well as causing a flood of refugees out of Ukraine? — boethius

I literally state:

So it was not 'two-month shelling of military targets' and 'Russia sieges Kiev until Mariupol is fully taken', just two of your claims that were patently false, now it turns out it was never those things you have claimed they were! It was a 'fixing operation'! A 'diversion'! — Jabberwock

It's quite usual that large military operations accomplish several things.

It's honestly remarkable how committed people are to believing the initial Russian invasion that conquered 15% of Ukrainian territory of critical strategic importance to the long term security of Crimea, itself of critical strategic importance to the Black Sea and already housing a large Russian military base, as some sort of military catastrophe for the Russians and brilliant victory for the Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians won some battles but on the whole lost significant territory.

That's all I'm saying, they went for a quick decapitation of the government alongside a push for a land bridge and as much coast line as they could, including Odessa which would have given them control of the 'breadbasket', a powerful lever in international relations. — unenlightened

Well we agree that Putin would have preferred total unconditional surrender, but there's really zero reason to believe Putin or anyone in Russia thought that likely. Rather, the Kremlin publicly pushes for their peace proposal of giving back the entirety of the Donbas to Ukraine, in exchange for recognizing Crimea, Ukraine staying out of NATO, and some autonomy and language protections for Russian speakers in the Donbas.

But again, that Russia prepares for 8 years and amasses a large war chest and clearly had a feasible plan to deal with "the nuclear option" of massive sanctions (as their plan clearly has worked so far) is really strong evidence the Russians don't think the task easy (else they would have done it sooner) nor that they are confident task will be quick (why prepare such a large amount of finance and gold; indeed, analysts before the war were pointing out the obvious fact that Russia was amassing large reserves precisely to be in the position to fight a big, long war, or then at least credibly threaten to in order to get the deal they want).

Without that regime change, it looks like they are now resigned to at best a frozen conflict for the indefinite future, because they still don't seem to have the numbers to occupy and subdue the whole country. — unenlightened

I guess you can use the terms "resigned to" if you want, but the conflict is not frozen for the indefinite future.

A frozen conflict is one where significant fighting ceases, such as in Korea, and there is a standoff: neither a peace agreement nor fighting and so the military conflict, in terms of fighting, is frozen.

That is not the case in Ukraine, there is intense fighting everyday, and unsustainable rates of casualties and equipment losses on both sides.

The difference is, of course, Russia is a far larger country than Ukraine and so at loss rates even somewhat close to parity, Russia will win the war of attrition.

The media doesn't stop comparing things to the trench warfare of WWI, which is a somewhat good enough analogy, but then simply jumps to the conclusion that therefore it is a frozen conflict. The front line in WWI was immobile for most of the war and most of the front, but WWI was hardly a frozen conflict and the unsustainable rates of attrition meant one side was going to win and one side was going to lose. The United States entering the war made the massive difference of available resources to one side.

Here are the key points from the latest Time update on the war, just without a paywall:

Yet Zelensky’s belief in ultimate victory over Russia has only “hardened into a form that worries some of his advisors,” according to Shuster, who describes Zelensky’s faith as “immovable, verging on the messianic.” One of Zelensky’s closest aides tells Shuster that, “He is delusional. We’re out of options. We’re not winning. But try telling him that.” This of course runs counter to all the propaganda pumped out by Ukraine and repeated by Western media sources. But increasingly it’s only Zelensky who still believes his own press clippings. — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

Staggering casualties have decimated the Ukrainian army. Ukraine has refused to disclose casualty counts throughout the war, dismissing the increasingly-credible reports of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian casualties as Russian propaganda. But another close aide to Zelensky tells Shuster that casualties are so horrific that “even if the U.S. and its allies come through with all the weapons they have pledged, ‘we don’t have the men to use them.’” — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

Conscription policies are draconian. Another fact dismissed as a “Putin talking point” is that Ukrainians have had to resort to ever-more draconian conscription policies to replenish their military’s ranks. Shuster lays out the unpleasant reality: “New recruitment is way down. As conscription efforts have intensified across the country, stories are spreading on social media of draft officers pulling men off trains and buses and sending them to the front. Those with means sometimes bribe their way out of service, often by paying for a medical exemption.” The corruption became so widespread that Zelensky fired the heads of all the regional draft offices in August, but the move backfired as lack of leadership brought new recruitment nearly to a halt. — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

Morale is collapsing. Even patriots don’t want to die serving as canon fodder for a doomed military strategy. Within the officer ranks, there is growing dissension bordering on mutiny. — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

Corruption is uncontrollable. It has long been a “Putin talking point” that Ukraine’s government was shot through with corruption. And yet Zelensky has been getting an earful about exactly that from its U.S. and NATO allies, who don’t want to see their billions of dollars in aid disappear into the pockets of corrupt officials. — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

In particular the point about casualties is the main determining factor.

To win a war of attrition with the Russians, Ukraine would need to inflict several times more casualties than it incurs; a central myth justifying rejecting peace talks but of which there was never any evidence and plenty of reason to believe it is in fact Russia inflicting heavier casualties due to having superior air power and more artillery.

This is also a suitable time to remind everyone here that as I predicted at the start of the war, the advanced hand held missile systems supplied to Ukraine will go straight into the hands of terrorists.

On October 27th a number of Middle East outlets reported that during anti-HAMAS operations in and around Gaza IDF uncovered caches of European and US-made military hardware (АТ-4, NLAW rocket launchers) supposedly originated from Ukraine.

Several sources have confirmed that around 2022 HAMAS and Hezbollah have established a clandestine supply line from Ukraine to Lebanon, Iraq and supposedly Syria to deliver shipments of weapons from Ukrainian military warehouses in Lviv, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Khmelnytskyi, and Chernihiv regions. This supply line is operational since 2022. For the past year thanks to this supply line HAMAS obtained an unidentified number of MG3 machineguns, M72 LAW grenade launchers, at least 50 units of Javelin FGM-148 ATGM, several dozens of MILAN ATGM, 20 units of Stinger FIM-92 MANPADS, 20 units of L118 towed howitzers, 30 unites of Switchblade drones, about 100 of Phoenix Ghost Drones and approx 50 Black Hornet Nano reconnaissance drones. — Hamas sourcing weapons in Ukraine

The next Pikachu face moment will be when these advanced compact missile systems are used on European soil both for terrorist and criminal purposes.

And we may even experience actual undesired terrorism, not just terrorism that "just so happens" to serve existing Western policy objectives.

The difference is, of course, Russia is a far larger country than Ukraine and so at loss rates even somewhat close to parity, Russia will win the war of attrition. — boethius

Wars of attrition are not fought to the last man standing, they are fought till one side loses the will to fight and disengages, as the U.S did with Vietnam and the S.U. did with Afghanistan. The attempted coup in Russia did not happen in a vacuum. There is a limit to what the Russian people will accept.

I do tend to take such reports with a grain of salt. — Tzeentch

You take anything negative about the Russian invasion with a grain of salt. Perhaps too much salt for your health?

Wars of attrition are not fought to the last man standing, they are fought till one side loses the will to fight and disengages — RogueAI

Well if we agree that the current fighting is attritional, then tiring out the Russians is a much better strategy than throwing battalions at heavily fortified positions based on the entirely delusional belief that it was possible to push the Russians out of Southern Ukraine.

Certainly larger armies have simply tired out and gone home in the past.

However, unlike the US in Vietnam or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan ... or the US in Afghanistan, there are far more reasons for Russians to fight in Ukraine. There's also some critical structural differences between those wars, mainly that it requires far more finance to support Ukraine than the Taliban or the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Insurgency is also common to these examples but not so present in South Ukraine.

I would definitely agree that Russia tiring out would be certainly a possibility after years and years of fighting, but I'm arguing here Ukraine (and Western supporters) can't sustain years at this level of intensity.

It's quite usual that large military operations accomplish several things.

It's honestly remarkable how committed people are to believing the initial Russian invasion that conquered 15% of Ukrainian territory of critical strategic importance to the long term security of Crimea, itself of critical strategic importance to the Black Sea and already housing a large Russian military base, as some sort of military catastrophe for the Russians and brilliant victory for the Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians won some battles but on the whole lost significant territory. — boethius

The thing is that nobody denies that Russians got a lot of territory and put Ukrainians in difficult situation. Yes, the southern campaign was much more successful. What is remarkable, and rather ridiculous, is the need of some people to paint any Russian failure (because the northern WAS a failure, by any reasonable means) as some kind of cunning Russian plan, in spite of quite obvious facts. In arguing for that some people even go as far as make up their own 'facts', such as 'two-month shelling of Kiyv' or 'siege of Kiyv lasting longer than the siege of Mariupol'. Unfortunately for them, such facts are quite easy to check and correct.

You take anything negative about the Russian invasion with a grain of salt. Perhaps too much salt for your health? — ssu

Causes high blood pressure :grin:

This is also a suitable time to remind everyone here that as I predicted at the start of the war, the advanced hand held missile systems supplied to Ukraine will go straight into the hands of terrorists. — boethius

That's an incredibly sketchy source citing anonymous reports that cannot be checked. I would not put much confidence in this article.

In particular the point about casualties is the main determining factor. — boethius

It's not, however, a quote, so it's really just the author's opinion. And the author is not some military analyst but a venture capitalist (and friend and ally of Peter Thiel, one of the most dangerous evil fuckers on the planet, imho anyways). For someone decrying western propaganda you're very willing to take this all at face value.

The thing is that nobody denies that Russians got a lot of territory and put Ukrainians in difficult situation. — Jabberwock

... People definitely seem to be denying exactly that:

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality. — Echarmion

But if we agree the Russian plan isn't incompetent then that's progress in the debate.

Yes, the southern campaign was much more successful. What is remarkable, and rather ridiculous, is the need of some people to paint any Russian failure (because the northern WAS a failure, by any reasonable means) as some kind of cunning Russian plan, in spite of quite obvious facts. In arguing for that some people even go as far as make up their own 'facts', such as 'two-month shelling of Kiyv' or 'siege of Kiyv lasting longer than the siege of Mariupol'. Unfortunately for them, such facts are quite easy to check and correct. — Jabberwock

Neither I nor @Tzeentch are arguing it's some brilliant military move, but rather a very ordinary military move. Occupying the enemy with an attack in one place in order to advance in another place is extremely banal military tactic.

And you miss entirely the point, Russia does not need to brilliantly out maneuver or out perform Ukraine, they only need to be remotely close to parity.

Russia has won some battles, Ukraine has won some battles, if it's remotely close to parity then Russia is on the path to victory as they can absorb more losses.

If having capabilities Ukraine lacks entirely, such as significant air power and electronic warfare, gives Russia a better than parity performance (on the whole) then Russian victory is even easier.

Of course, one can argue the Russian population will turn against the war before some sort of military victory emerges. This was the theory at the start of the war, but few people argue it now.

Likewise, one can argue that perhaps Russia will win but the cost is not worth it on some given scale of evaluation.

As several have argued, Ukraine losing is ok as the war damages Russia. Of course, that's terrible for Ukraine and not morally acceptable Western policy for me personally; I also have my doubts whether the war is actually weakening Russia.

What is of interest in the debate about the "Russian competence" in attacking Kiev or retreating from Kherson / Kharkiv (from my point of view) is the mythological role this idea played in encouraging Ukraine to refuse peace negotiations, which if Ukraine cannot "win" (which seems common wisdom now) was a foolish decision (if you care about lives and even Ukrainian territory as Russia was offering to give it back in exchange for a quick termination of the war).

However, if we agree Russia's plan makes sense and was executed with basic competence, I am not trying to argue they are brilliant or over-performing the Ukrainians.

For the purpose of understanding the current situation, one need only believe performance is somewhat close to parity to conclude, as you say, Ukraine is in a difficult position as, by definition, the smaller party will lose a war of attrition at parity.

I strongly suspect Russia has been able to inflict several factors greater losses on the Ukrainians due to their having significant air power and electronic warfare, but I'm not trying to convince anyone of that and we'll have a better idea of losses on both sides after the war. Rather, my basic point, is that very strong evidence would be needed to believe that despite significant air superiority and having more of essentially every kind of capability, that somehow Ukraine is inflicting several factors greater losses on Russian forces.

Accepting such basic facts, how long Ukraine (and Western supporters) can last, and will Russian be able to match that in resolve, and if Russia does have an advantage (now or at some point) due can it translate that into decisive manoeuvres (encircling large Ukrainian formation, taking bridges etc.), are all questions open for debate.

@ssu is confident Ukraine can last many years. I have serious doubts that's possible at the current intensity, but is possible by retreating to more easily defendable positions or then simply territory Russia doesn't want to occupy, and then you'd have an actual frozen conflict. However, if the conflict is actually frozen with few attacks and casualties on each side, Russia would have no reason to randomly go home either. This would be the "rump state" Mearsheimer talks about.

Russia could have mounted a tidal wave offensive and rolled through had it the momentum of morale and purpose on their side. — Vaskane

You're very late to the discussion, all these points have been discussed already at length, but the 200 000 troops Russia committed to invading Ukraine are not remotely enough for some sort of total wave offensive.

Russia could have mobilized millions of troops and done what you say, but that would have very likely been both a social and economic disaster and result in years of insurgency and inability to occupy and pacify all of Ukraine.

Russia's war aims are clearly what is achievable without sacrificing the entire economy by mobilizing millions of people to dedicate to years of occupation, which is occupying the areas of Ukraine that are Russian speaking and partial to Russian rule. Crimea has been occupied by Russia since 2014 and there has not been any insurgency because Crimeans are the large majority Russian speakers that all evidence we have genuinely wanted to reunite with Russia.

The idea that Russia could have easily just "tidal waved" Ukraine (the largest country in Europe with the largest army, supported by US / NATO training and intelligence, preparing for exactly this war for 8 years) is just foolish.

It's a foolish mythology that was required to justify refusing peace talks altogether which was completely irrational without the belief that Russia was somehow incompetent and easy to beat. Any rational actor who cannot simply impose their will by force, will at least see what the other side is offering and try to negotiate an acceptable deal (now, maybe no acceptable deal would have been reached if negotiations continued, but you cannot know that if you don't try).

Now that it is revealed Russia is not easy to beat, suddenly even the Western media is reporting Ukraine has "pressure" to negotiate. Which is the obvious end to this and extremely tragic (at least for Ukraine) as there is no way to get a better deal than what they could have negotiated at the start of the war and there's no way to get the hundreds of thousands of dead back to life.

You take anything negative about the Russian invasion with a grain of salt. — ssu

I take media propaganda with a grain of salt, and if I binged on it as much as the average TFP poster then I would be very worried about my salt intake indeed.