What do you mean when you say, "The term's prerequisites are specific and meaningful"? — Leontiskos

That the term refers to things with specific, shared characteristics.

A complex phenomenon is hard to see, like a faraway object. — Leontiskos

I dispute that ideologies and religions are singular things, within English, they are expressed as singular, but this was a mistake. Islam exists as "a religion", and nationalism exists as "an ideology" but these terms aren't unpinned by anything real that holds them in place. There are a near-infinite number of ways to interpret and practice a religion or ideology, the ideas can expand endlessly and can be influenced by a myriad of different factors. There are no rules that prevent Islam from taking on new interpretations, new cultures, and new practices. We're never comparing like-to-like, and we never really know what we're dealing with.

Islam prerequisites could be argued to just be a belief in God and in that Muhammad was his prophet, and that's it. That's not nearly good enough. A term needs far stricter prerequisites to be worthwhile to analyse. The vast majority of what we think of as Islam is optional, and can be removed or added, without any difference to how we reference it. It's like trying to conduct a critique on a book that changes each time it's opened. We need better tools for referencing that have stricter prerequisites, or else analysis is a wasted effort.

I don't agree that vengeance is an umbrella term in any sense. I could understand why different interpretations of the concept add to the complexity in a way that's somewhat similar though.

So, modern philosophy begins with "first define your terms", and be specific*1. — Gnomon

Does defining one's terms work in reality? The logic of what a term refers to, and the interpretation of that logic is at the heart of philosophy, and language. If someone offers an understanding of a concept you don't agree with, it makes sense to dispute it, doesn't it?

I don't agree that the examples you have given are not underpinned by something real. For example, do you say that there is no real phenomenon in the world and in history that the term 'Islam' refers to? — Leontiskos

Islam refers to a host of real phenomena, an unfathomable number, well beyond human capacity for comprehending. That's not the point though, the problem is the logic of what is being referenced by the umbrella term, and whether that logic has a meaningful pattern. The issue isn't umbrella terms at all, it's about whether the term's prerequisites are specific and meaningful or not.

Each Muslim understands Islam differently, there's no consistency in how Islam is interpreted and applied, or what is and isn't part of it. Why would there be any pattern to that? It's like looking to understand a grouping of animals, cars and pianos, there's nothing meaningful in it. If a term's prerequisites haven't established a meaningful pattern, then there's no value in analysing that term, right?

Well if there is a complex phenomenon and we want to talk about it then we will need to use a word to reference it, no? — Leontiskos

What phenomenon? The examples of umbrella terms I've given are entirely intellectually manufactured groupings. Arguably, the entire problem here is that we're pretending like there is some phenomenon at play, something to study when there isn't.

Thinking about it, umbrella terms that are underpinned by something real, and represent convenient ways to talk about reality, might be fine. Perhaps that explains my issue. What I dislike are terms that group things using meaningless patterns and vague logic. Referencing various bits and pieces that have no business being thought of as parts of a whole, and the mistake is in trying to make sense of it.

So, I think we can use umbrella terms meaningfully, but they are best used in just those cases where we actually want to discuss the broad similarities that define a term. We have to be aware that, the broader the term, the more likely it is that different people have different exemplars in mind. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with your analysis of the issue of misrepresentative exemplars, however, I'm not sure that umbrella terms always have representative exemplars. If we take the average of the sum of all parts, that can still be misrepresentative, and an umbrella term may do more than just refer to the sum of all its parts, especially in philosophy. Consider also that terms such as Islam and capitalism don't have to be understood as umbrella terms.

You can talk about the differences between Christianity and Islam, provided the differences are a comparison of the most basic of basics. The nuances are all lost, the context is constrained to the utmost generalities, just the prerequisites for the applicability of the umbrella term. If the prerequisites for applicability are insufficient to understand the things being referenced, then the problems begin. We can't actually understand any of the approaches to Islam or any of the capitalist economies in that way.

I can't succinctly capture the entirety of the problem with my words just yet, but umbrella terms comprised of complicated ideas, especially those that aren't explicit as a reference of grouped ideas, there's something very wrong with them. There's so much confusion surrounding them because they're so removed from the ideas they're used to refer to. I can't describe it well yet, I'll need to think about it.

Is that more related to what your OP was getting at? — Leontiskos

You've reiterated the complexity of such terms, but avoidable and unnecessary complexity is objectively bad, and I wonder if that's why I don't like these umbrella terms. Of course, a term will be complex if it references a large number of hugely complicated and loosely connected ideas, but is there a good reason why we have to do that?

To just fathom the entirety of what such umbrella terms reference is a challenge before any analysis has begun. It's too much to think about, let alone think about in any detail. These terms facilitate misunderstanding, and I think that's shown in how prevalent misunderstandings of capitalism and Islam are, as they are with many such terms.

Though, perhaps my conclusion could be just that an umbrella term needs to be an umbrella term, and nothing more. If we had a term for "Islamic Approaches" that references all ways of practising Islam, then it'd be fine. "Islam" can't be a religion/ideology, the various interpretations of that religion/ideology and the practice of that religion/ideology. Maybe my point is just that such terms set us up to fail.

Having had some time after writing my OP, I see that the proper question is when an umbrella term can be used in another way, or how we determine whether a term is an umbrella term. As one who understands a term as an umbrella term and approaches it as one will understand where clarification is needed.

Do you think it is appropriate to label terms such as democracy, capitalism, Christianity, Islam, nationalism, and so on as umbrella terms? My argument for why they are umbrella terms is that the terms refer to a variety of distinct interpretations and approaches. In hindsight, it's this question that should've been my OP.

If you agree we can describe these terms as umbrella terms, do you agree that they function to reference more than just the diverse array of interpretations and approaches? To be frank, I'm struggling to describe the problem, there are too many contexts to deal with. Sometimes vagueness is what concerns me, but due to the variety that each term references, a person can't easily make these terms their own. Whereas concepts like "justice", "freedom" and "beauty" are easy to make one's own, it's difficult and inconvenient to reference one's ideology or religion like that.

I'm aware I'm probably not making sense, I find topics difficult to think about when they contain too many angles. I'll leave you with this disorganised mess, it won't be worth the effort to struggle to understand it, but if you think you can help, then please do.


Glad you got some value out of the OP. I've used umbrella terms in the manner I'm critiquing in my OP as well, it's unfortunately, a common practice that we learn from each other. I've still yet to replace the practice, and yet to fully grasp a satisfactory understanding of the issue. In terms of a philosophy forum though, yeah, a thread about "Christianity" probably isn't handling any of the nuances appropriately.

"My experience discussing philosophy" is an example of how umbrella terms are supposed to be used. As a convenient way to refer to a broad variety of different things, I'm not against their use, the OP criticises an umbrella term being the focal point of inquiry and analysis. My discussions on philosophy were not discussions centred around the term "philosophy", I didn't expect that wouldn't be obvious.

I would not say this is ipso facto asinine - it could be that racism is the reason. — Tom Storm

If you see someone being mistreated, and you stepped in to stop it, and explained it was wrong to do that, without ever mentioning the racial difference, what is lost?

That being said, you've remarked upon inconsistencies in treatment by race, and especially where no alternative explanation would be reasonable, that is fit to be described as racism. I never claimed I'm without tools to call anything or anyone racist, I only asked others to explain the tools they used.

There's a difference between recognising and acknowledging the experience of an Aboriginal who faces discrimination and hardship as a result of racism and identifying racism. Their experience is not the definitive tool for identifying racism, as the why is all important. The only exceptions are misdeeds, acts that are justified by no explanation, generally because of the intentional causing of harm.

No one says it is always 100% correct. — Tom Storm

You are talking about the simplistic definition of racism, as interpersonal prejudice. A definition that 180 has rejected the validity of. The comprehensive definition of racism goes ignores intent and ideology, so there is no need to guess. Within this definition, there is no concept of inaccuracy, we're talking about oppression and social realities, not guessing at the why. My comments to 180 weren't about racism as an ideology, but as a societal reality, keep that in mind. This confusion is the exact reason I made this thread, the term "racism" so easily and consistently causes misunderstandings, quite a mess.

Perhaps it would be best if I don't respond to your posts in the future. — T Clark

My apologies for the unnecessary offence my language caused, I shouldn't have said that "I can't be bothered". I dislike it when people talk about "white people" and "black people" so generally, and it bothers me to hear it. I despise prejudicial thinking, especially along racial lines, just as you do. I believe we are largely of the same mind on this issue where it counts. I just consider it wrong to group people by race and talk about their passions, thoughts, and responsibilities. It's that exact thinking that I associate with racism. Isn't it the very soul of racism, to talk about someone's race like that? As something more than just their skin colour? That's how I see it.

Our discussions usually end up in the same place, no matter what we're discussing. I believe it's because of your view of language, and I generally have the same issue with those who view word meanings as having stringent, objective definitions. When you say "exploitation", I insist on understanding this as "That which I interpret as exploitation". If you've explained it to me before, then I know what that means, and if not, then it's unclear.

Why someone might call something exploitation is varied and often depends on what it's being contrasted against. If you call low pay exploitative, or child labour exploitative, those are two very different claims, because of the different contexts, and thus of the specific contrast. The logic being used, and the nature of each claim are different. If you then said a case of child labour was exploitative because of the low pay, that might be surprising considering the contrast of child vs adult that was made.

The less context and contrast there is, the less I understand the logics behind employed, and the more ambiguous you become. Qualifying that the exploitation is "systemic" only contrasts against non-systemic. It doesn't help me to understand what it is that you're referring to. I'm perfectly aware that you understand very well what you're referring to, but your language hasn't helped me to understand it.

Nobody else could either, the people who say they do are wrong, and if they tried to replicate your understanding, they'd fail or at least be inaccurate. You can't just make a word representative of your understanding in the definition and then use it and expect others to understand. Language is public, terms don't belong to you, they reflect a very general meaning, and that's unavoidable considering their purpose.

It's not "hard"? How do you know whether you got it right or not? If you can't tell when you're right or wrong, how do you know how accurate you are? If you can't tell how accurate you are, how are you in a position to say whether it's easy or hard to do?

You can often see a deliberate structuring of society - use of law, rules and etiquette to set limits upon identity and autonomy of people who do not belong to the dominant race and class structure. But to some extent this is an interpreted process. — Tom Storm

That's true. I've talked about the importance of ending neoliberal capitalism, and I accept racism is part of this conversation. Since social policies would be disproportionately beneficial to minorities. We could examine resource allocation by location and spot inconsistencies, or we could look at how police practices differ in different jurisdictions and criticise differences in predominately white communities versus black.

Finding and correcting inconsistencies and coincidences that coincide with the pattern of racism is our best means of preventing it.

In terms of prejudice, the mistake in searching for inconsistencies is in using white people and minorities to do it. If you see one person being rude to another, with no pattern, and take the racial difference as proof of racism, that's asinine, is it not? It is easy to see it in action if you require almost no evidence for seeing it, it depends on how one responds to ambiguity.

I'm comfortable with subjectivity, and I don't feel like it diminishes the value of what's being said. You are indeed, having to interpret the applicability of your terms, and the circumstances in which they can be used. That doesn't mean that you are wrong, or that if someone disagrees with you, we're now at some kind of impasse.

I think what you've written has been a rewording of the comprehensive definition of racism that I outlined in my OP. You've described outcomes, without mentioning the logic behind them.

For example, if we give a context like police brutality, there are distinct differences in outcomes when documenting by race. This is part of systemic racism and the comprehensive definition of racism. That's because that definition is a literal documentation of disparities in outcomes.

In terms of describing when a particular case of police brutality is part of this problem, well, nothing in the description of comprehensive racism tells us how we'd do that. Which is what I'm pointing out.

I want to hear the logics that someone could use to understand how you'd arrive at different conclusions in dealing with specific cases. Or tell me why I don't need to hear them.

A business saying "we're not making enough money" is a perfectly reasonable statement (assuming they are going broke) and so is "white people don't like, trust, or respect black people". If they did those three things, we wouldn't have a race problem, — BC

That depends on how you understand the race problem. 180's outlining of the problem wouldn't be solved by just that. I'm not sure what to say, Clark's outlining doesn't make any sense, and I don't think I can be bothered to have a serious debate on it.

What?! — BC

Yeah, I know, sorry.

To be fair, the actual kind of progress that would be helpful would be the undoing of neoliberal capitalism, a total overhaul to the US ideology of car-centric urban planning, implementing free healthcare, legalising drugs, providing free housing to the homeless, an overhaul of how taxing generates revenue for the government and so on.

All I'm saying is that I reject the notion that a person's race entitles them to a specific history. The history of a nation should belong to the citizens of that nation. The "in-group" must be diminished by dismantling the barriers that prevent assimilation into it. Slavery was done on the basis of race, but it's also part of American history, and it was perpetrated by Americans. An American of any race should be allowed and feel comfortable with seeing it as part of their own history, as both oppressor and oppressed.

Similarly, a German who's not ethnically German should feel comfortable taking responsibility for WW2 as ethnic Germans do and probably should be encouraged to do so in the same way, since they're all Germans.

I reject the use of race as an interpretative lens, its meaning and importance should be diminished whenever possible, that is my view. Becoming colour-blind so to speak.

Well, I think "descriptive talk" like yours tends to confuse bigots with racists. — 180 Proof

How so? I'm just asking for your framework for interpreting something as contributing or perpetuating to racism, in a descriptive manner.

Within philosophy, the desire to "own" terms is commonplace, I'm familiar with the intent and have frequently come across it over the years. I view moral terms as ambiguous, generally speaking, they're applied by different people with different ideologies according to what works best for them. I let others define their terms and explain how they work, that's my compromise.

This is why many such terms are redefined in a legal context so that we can clearly understand the logic that qualifies the term, at least that's the intention.

Terms like "exploitation" emphasise moral concepts such as unfairness and justice, which ultimately, makes them highly subjective. It's unfortunate that you refuse to see it that way. My opinion isn't based on my preference, it's based on reality, it's based on how people use the word and what the word means.

Language needs to be flexible to allow people to express themselves, it's inconvenient I know. You'll only be able to convince people who share the exact same ideology and perspective as you do, to use the word as you do. Insult everyone else if it makes you feel better about it, I suppose.

As I wrote previously - white people don't like, trust, or respect black people. — T Clark

This is kind of the same level as a business saying "The problem is we're not making enough money". Okay, but the why is essential, explaining the problem in this most basic, inaccurate way, as a massive generalisation, that's pointless. Imagine if we did this in engineering, and said "The problem is simple, something isn't working properly". Great... thanks for the insight. Even if your explanation was technically true, so what? It's too general, to the point of being misrepresentative, you should know better.

This whole thread is about looking at society using race as a lens. — T Clark

No, it's about acknowledging the disconnect between ideology and intention from the simplistic to the comprehensive definition of racism. 180 has the right idea, in simply abandoning altogether the idea that ideology and intention are relevant because quite simply, the comprehensive definition of racism provides no framework for differentiating the various logics and intents at play. Which is what this thread is about.

You seem to be saying that considering race a cause of social inequality in the US is wrong. First, I think that ignores history. Second, as I noted, this whole discussion is about the effects of race on American society. — T Clark

How did you take what I said as a claim that race isn't a cause of social inequality in the US? I just think it's not that important going forward, besides as a lesson to learn from. Race inequality isn't something I care about, but I do care about inequality. Equality of outcomes between races, I don't care about, but I would like to see people treated fairly and with dignity.

The source of the problem and possible solutions might be complex, but the problem itself is simple as pie. — T Clark

Okay, what's "the problem"?

I don't know what this means. I described what I mean and provided examples. If you're saying that you don't recognize or accept the conditions I've described, I don't know what else to say. It seems obvious to me. — T Clark

I'm aware of your capability to interpret using race as your lens, my concern is whether you're able to know when not to do that.

This seems naive to me. Worse than that... willfully blind and self-serving. — T Clark

Why is it naive?

Who is this "we" that "needs to interpret" what's "harmful"? — 180 Proof

I meant "one".

As I comprehend (& use) the term, racism is first and foremost an ideological-juridical-sociological concept — 180 Proof

Fair enough, my OP was about how this interpretation requires a change in how we think about racism on an interpersonal level, using the simplistic definition (prejudice), and I'm satisfied with your answer. That being said, the word "racism' has a lot of power, and how it's defined and understood matters to a lot of people. I don't know to which authority you think you can demand others use the comprehensive definition, but the alternative you condemn is common use.

I have been referencing the comprehensive definition of racism, so we've mostly on been the same page.

Is a specific harm to "the relevant demographic" structural (re: exploitation)? systemic (re: discrimination)? or social (re: exclusionary)? If yes to any of these questions, then that specific harm is racist – and those functionaries who carry it out or who uncritically benefit directly (or indirectly) are themselves racist. — 180 Proof

Okay, thanks.

Racism & racist are terms with strong moral meaning, and so where I disagree with you, I will reject your language use, for I have no other choice. The alternative would have me justify and defend racism & being racist, which you may interpret me to be doing as you like, but I can't actively do that, it's an untenable position. Many of the other moral terms you've introduced here function in that same way.

That's why I prefer to talk descriptively. I have no idea what you would and wouldn't interpret as exploitation or exclusionary and so on. But I can agree that how one interprets is what determines whether something is part of the comprehensive definition of racism, as I argued in my OP.

Yes, I don't think I expressed myself well. I didn't mean to disparage your way of seeing things. It's just that you and I talk about moral issues in different terms in ways that can seem contradictory. — T Clark

If I recall correctly, we hadn't had any disagreements in the thread we talked about morality, but perhaps I said something I disagreed with that you left unaddressed. I won't speculate as to the nature of this apparent difference.

Agreed and, as I noted, I think my way of interpreting conditions is more likely to help us understand the situation better than by talking about racism. It's important for us to know that 40 million Americans face daily, grinding humiliation and that we, white people, all share responsibility. — T Clark

Racial hatred might be less ambiguous, but I think it's also misrepresentative, and the rules for your applying it are non-existent, which I find unacceptable. Racial discrimination or prejudice would at least not be misrepresentative, since that's what you think you're seeing.

Also, I reject racial and ethnic histories, cultures and groups. I don't think white people are responsible for anything, and as I told you before, I would prefer to see black Americans taking responsibility for slavery as Americans. That would represent the kind of progress I think would be helpful.

Contemporary prejudice is complicated, it's not based on any single thing, and the reasons for it are vast and complex. How we understand racism should be reflected in these complexities. Your understanding is far too simplistic, why is it so lacking in nuance?

We agree that the comprehensive definition of racism requires an imbalance of power between the group doing the oppressing and being oppressed. However, we can't rely on, for example, Israel telling us explicitly that they're doing as they are due to racism, we need to interpret it. We can't read minds though, and we can't prove intent, and the pattern more than anything proves the oppression. For something to be considered racist, we need to interpret it to be harmful to the relevant demographic. In fact, you've argued an unwillingness to upend the legacies of racism to be racist. The inaction's harmfulness is what makes it racist, yes?

Basically, we can't parse between what's racially motivated, and where some other motivation is at play, and we can't be expected to prove it, so long as we interpret harm, we'll describe it as racism, is that fair? The label is given when one interprets its harm and does so using their own methods. The "how" and "why" something is racist is that it causes harm to the relevant demographic. Do you agree?

To clarify, I understand you'd word it differently, as that's how morality is, you can replace harm with some dramatic, evocative language. I just want to know in a descriptive sense, how you'd avoid calling any harm to the relevant demographic as racist.

It seems to me it is evident that many white people are very prejudiced against most black people. There are stats that validate this observation, but anyone with eyes and ears can see prejudice in operation without having to look very far. — BC

I'm unsure to what extent the stats validate the observation.

If the government takes two municipalities and over a century, gives one immensely preferential treatment. Then in year 101, says, okay, this unfair treatment is over, each municipality is free to do with their tax revenue what they wish, and we'll treat each the same. Well, one city is going to have quality infrastructure, well-educated and high-income citizens, access to employment etc. The other will have none of that, plus a ton of social problems and issues due to a century of neglect and oppression.

In that case, the statistics and the disparity in outcomes wouldn't prove that the government wasn't now giving equal treatment. Since the historical context might suffice.

At any rate, I feel like we could at least agree that under neoliberal capitalism, there's zero chance these two municipalities would ever come to be on par. The differences would only be sure to increase. I'm certain of that, and perhaps you are too, so then, how can you expect me to assume the disparities in outcomes prove racial hatred?

The disparity in outcomes won't heal without positive action, their existence just proves that hasn't happened yet, and the degree of influence of racial hatred is unclear.

In previous discussions, the difference between your and my moral sense has become clear. You have focused on more or less codified social moral rules while I have focused on personal empathy and kindness. Sometimes it seems like we are talking different languages and can't understand each other. — T Clark

I'm not sure why you got that from our previous discussions, I told you morality is heavily rooted in emotion and personal feelings, it is the ability to perceive things as right/wrong, fair/unfair, justified/unjustified. I view moral rules as applied selectively, and factors like compassion and emotion are highly influential in that. As a force for social control, the majority view has that effect and is intended, but I differentiate it from other forms of social control because it's based on moral sense, which is more danger prone and less practical than say, the social contract.

I'm just pointing out the issue with interpreting racism, and that basically, this relies a lot on how one's method of interpreting it. As far as I can tell, if that man had the police called on him, it was due to the owners being suspicious of men or the poor rather than black people, it's likely that you wouldn't be able to tell.

There's a difference between feeling compassion for someone and claiming when something immoral took place. If one interprets racism whenever a minority is treated badly, even if the offenders insist on some other reason, how can that not be a problem? How can there be no burden of evidence on you whatsoever? I agree with BC, that anti-racism education isn't the issue here, one can't expect centuries of oppression and neglect not to have lasting consequences. Most of the issues described by the comprehensive definition won't be resolved without major intervention.

For example, take a taxi driver who doesn't pick up black males at night, in an area where black males are disproportionately likely to rob them. That's racism, no doubt. But it's not an irrational, nonsensical prejudice, is it? He's gotten robbed a couple of times, he's traumatised, it is racism, it's wrong of him, but I'm sympathetic. When the overriding nature of morality mandates irrationality, there's a problem with that.

I think the US economic system fucks over the poor and disadvantaged. I want this fact to be part of the discussion. I don't want racial hatred to be assumed whenever it might be applicable, is that wrong?

BC, we've talked about neoliberal capitalism in the past, and I imagine you might agree that it's not in the best interests of disadvantaged minorities for a variety of reasons. Its upending would do much to cure the disparity in outcomes between racial groups. How does this factor into the topic of the comprehensive understanding of racism? In my view, the social realities won't resolve themselves, even if the factors perpetuating them involved no racially-based motive. Should "ending racism" be understood as addressing such factors, such as neoliberal capitalism and others?

White people don't like black people... There is no "ism" there. It's just a fact. It's not ideology or philosophy, it's the way the world, or at least the United States, is. — T Clark

Making assertions without evidence or justification isn't very helpful.

If you don't want to provide evidence, tell me how you've reached this conclusion. I suspect you're not told as much by offenders, so you must be interpreting it, and I suspect you are interpreting through the effect, as I said in my OP. Since you're aware that you can't prove intent or belief, the effect is all you've got. Requiring a proof of some kind would destroy your position, right? I don't say this to invalidate you, since intent isn't always required within morality, and action & effect can suffice, but I want to clarify how you're thinking about this.

In an effort to be genuine and transparent, it's my view that the comprehensive definition's subjective standard of evidence is unacceptable. Invalidates it apart as a valid moral critique, and makes it only useful descriptively. So, although I do recognise the need for flexibility, I also can't agree with allowing anyone to interpret whatever, however, with no rules or standards.

I think a significant problem in describing AI is that our language revolves around our human experience. Things like intent, subjectivity, consciousness, thoughts, and opinions, and we can say an AI will never have these things, but only in the sense that we have them. Which I think you're saying as well.

As for the conclusions, of fear of AI's capacity as moral agents, I don't get it.

There's a lot of focus on the negatives of AI, but the AI that is given access to power will be far superior moral agents than any human could ever hope to be. They would operate on something akin to law, which is vastly superior to "moral interpretation", which can be bent and twisted as is useful.

There is one single idea that sums up 99% of the problems of human society, "conflict of interest". Those with the power to do what is in the best interests of the many are also presented with the opportunity to do what's best for themselves at the expense of the many, and they often choose the latter. It's unlikely that an AI would ever have such a problem.

Humans aren't good moral agents at all, we're garbage. Someone without power, who thinks philosophically about what's best for the world, isn't who AI should be compared to. It's when someone acquires power, and has resources at their disposal, who fears not the wrath of the many, and possesses the freedom to unabashedly act in their best interests. In this sense, I would take an AI overlord over a human overlord any day, it would be so much better, especially assuming even minor safety precautions were in place.

If we're talking about humanity in isolation, compare our potential for good and evil, and one can make an argument for talking about the good over the bad. If we're comparing humanity to AI, honestly, humans are terrifying.

Analyse human psychology, and it becomes clear, that AI will never match our destructive potential. Don't judge humanity in the aggregate, just those with power, those with the freedom to act as they wish.

Your descriptions focus on societal reality on a broad scale, in other words, they've reiterated the comprehensive definition I've outlined. They don't explain the how & why of when we use them in specific cases to identify the "theory & practice" or implementation.

How can we identify the "theory & practice"? Why is something part of the "theory & practice" of racism? I hope your answer can show why an interpretation of harm to the relevant demographic is inaccurate.

I agree the term "racist" is misleading, in more ways than one. I don't know what the term should mean within the comprehensive definition of racism.


I believe it would be the type of thinking that is found harmful, not the instance of its use. I do recognise that someone could find it offensive for other reasons than harmful and the general notions of "immoral" or "wrong" are also applicable. The condemnation of sexism/racism isn't part of a larger effort of condemning prejudice, nor is it part of a condemnation of generalisations. It's because of their history of harm that these terms have any weight to them. We're quite happy to do prejudice and generalise in some contexts, aren't we?


I suppose that "ism" is yet another example of how the terms really should've been relabelled but nonetheless. The comprehensive definition does describe some important aspects of racism, and the simplistic definition can be trivialising. Neither of them works well in every context, and there should be two different words, that we could use whatever is most appropriate. I do think when we condemn racism, we are often condemning "The justification and acting out of X, Y and Z using racism", rather than "Prejudice is bad", right? In that sense, the comprehensive definition has some validity.

I tentatively agree with your analysis, I would only argue that it doesn't work that way in reality, though not because it couldn't.

Flagellation, as I understand you, means being exceptionally demanding of oneself to maximise good, and not settle for "good enough". Consequentialism is a lens for interpreting what's moral, but it mightn't act in a way that defines one's lifestyle.

Morality is supposed to be overriding of all other considerations but in the mundanity of day-to-day life, I wonder whether the pragmatically-minded consequentialist would really call ignoring the most negligible of differences immoral. Will they perceive the difference between the best outcome and close runner-up as worth tolerating any inconvenience for themselves or others?

Moral frameworks such as consequentialism have their merits, but if they're sold as mandating irrationality produced by the overriding feature of morality, that burden would outweigh the value. Anyone who isn't into this "flagellation" will find a way to worm their way to rejecting the necessity, doesn't matter how compelling your logic is. It is pointless to be pedantic about logic, there's a need to be emotionally compelling. Ultimately, people need to be motivated and inspired, and for that, sometimes "good enough" needs to cut it.

If the difference is actually substantial, then I agree. Outcomes are relative, and ignoring a vastly better option because one's preferred option is "good enough", would undermine consequentialism.

But where are you going with this? If I agreed, where would you take us? I assume you are going to say that unfixability is unfalsifiable, and that optimists who focus on the fixable can never be deterred because we can never prove that something is unfixable. — Leontiskos

Right, my claim is that there is no mechanism for switching gears, an understanding that drastic improvement is possible will never be invalidated. There will always be more things to try, or more ways to try the same things. Nuance changes in the method or removing problems that stood in the way, such as one's mindset, habits or level of effort.

I think this is probably where we disagree. I would say that even if truth is only something that we approximate, it is still crucially important. — Leontiskos

I agree that the truth is crucially important, but even the most ardent effort to understand it will still leave much ambiguity. When dealing with uncertainty, ideas of risk/reward come into play, and we must decide what options work best. The risks as a culture of judging ourselves as less capable than we are in influencing our personal outcomes, and of risk that judging ourselves as more capable than we are. That is what we must juggle.

Nonetheless, I understand that nuance matters, and I'm asking a question too broad to answer properly.

I understand you are still having difficulty understanding the idea of "unfixable factors" or "unfixable problems". Fair enough. I've seen enough to know that I'll need to rethink how I refer to these concepts. I don't want to try to salvage them.

We have very similar views, and where we seem to disagree, possibly, we would agree if the nuances were laid bare.

I generally think of this topic more in terms of concepts such as free will, responsibility, blame, deserve and other such ideas that we've touched on and agreed are highly relevant.

As well as the question of the degree of influence a person's actions have over their personal outcomes, in a variety of contexts. It's that question that I tried to express using "fixability", you would've understood me better had I omitted the use of it.

In my example of the person who had a cocaine addiction from infancy there is neither blame nor responsibility. — Leontiskos

True, though this is a case where a person had no control over the outcome at all. It becomes murkier when someone did ostensibly have a way to avoid the consequences of their problem or when they're actively contributing to it. You've let Bill off the hook where his parents taught him bad spending habits, whereas many wouldn't. Differences in opinion on what diminishes the responsibility one has for their actions and to what extent, that's where the conflict takes place.

That's an oversimplification, to be sure, the problem's a lot deeper than that. I generally dislike the concept of blame, it's an aspect of morality that I dislike.

Although I've yet to bring it up, the concept of "deserve" is an even greater issue than responsibility and blame, though they're all related. I can't go into depth about them without making a new thread really, and I imagine I'd just be preaching to the choir anyhow.

I still think my disease example serves as an analogy. — Leontiskos

Hmm, but a disease is so straightforward, it ignores the complexity of human psychology and emotions, of our environments and the multitude of factors that go into making us who we are. Each person is a unique case with unique circumstances. Different personalities and capabilities, and a variety of other issues may be related to the underlying problem.

In the context of self-help, Bill is the antidote, and his effectiveness is dependent upon many factors, including his will, and free will, or just will is of tremendous issue in this topic. There are so many reasons why an attempted change might not work out, far beyond what would be true of a potential antidote.

With a disease, truth is very achievable and should be our goal, and since you can see personal outcomes as comparable, I guess that explains our difference in opinion there. There is growing clarity though, and perhaps one day, they will be more comparable, but I doubt it'll happen in my lifetime.

I stand by that. Both are necessary but I would give greater weight to education. The same would apply in general to the way that we address problematic phenomena in a society. Both would usually be necessary. — Leontiskos

Fair enough. I agree with it as a long-term strategy, though I'd argue the views we're disparaging are pretty much mainstream. Conquering ideas of free will, and educating people about systemic and genetic factors, is not purely a philosophical task. Science will do the heavy lifting, I have faith in it happening, eventually.

Thanks for participating in this discussion with me. I'm impressed by your willingness to engage with such a complicated, original topic, despite it being presented suboptimally. I appreciate your effort to ensure we weren't just talking past each other.

Although I'm happy to continue discussing something if you feel it's worthwhile, and I'll let you reply to what I've said regardless, I'm pretty comfortable with where we're at.

We're aligned in aiming to disrupt the flow of capability -> responsibility -> blame and other related ideas. If I assumed truth was an option, and there was no need for something else, then I'd orientate myself around it. To some extent it is, and to the extent it wasn't, I'm sure you'd advocate for the same nuances I wanted, and you've agreed to many of them already.

As for self-help, well, sometimes people are just selling hope because hope sells. Probably, as you've suggested, the issue is the quality of the self-help. High-quality self-help wouldn't produce the problems I've described. Education + changing attitudes + increasing awareness of the complexity of factors & will, changing how we perceive responsibility and blame, etc, I can agree with all of this.

Okay, that's helpful. So we are engaged in something like epidemiology? That makes sense. As I was thinking about it I concluded that a very crucial aspect of this discussion is philosophical anthropology, which we could pragmatically define as the study of what humans beings are and what humans beings are capable of. I think it is the various different forms of philosophical anthropology that different interlocutors bring to the table which produce such divergent views on these issues. — Leontiskos

Yeah, great summary, I hadn't heard of the term philosophical anthropology, but it describes well our focus.

I only recently realized that the thing you are contrasting with 'fixable' is 'improvable', and that is a more subtle distinction. — Leontiskos

I had meant to contrast improving personal outcomes, from drastically improving or solving them. Basically, the significance of the effect promised by self-help solutions.

What I mean by "unfixable factors" is that any solution would fall outside of what can reasonably be construed as self-help. Replace unfixable with unimprovable if you prefer, I agree that it is clearer.

Okay, good. I am glad that the conversation is bearing some fruit. I am now beginning to see a lot of nuances pop up as well, especially with the improve vs. fix distinction. — Leontiskos

I probably shouldn't have made that contrast, I generally don't like picking words apart like this, I should've said improve vs drastically improve instead, but no matter.

It's an interesting distinction. — Leontiskos

Perhaps I screwed up here as well, but I'm not sure whether the nuance different I wanted to convey got across or not. By impersonal, I meant, advice produced for mass consumption, or non-personalised. "How to Improve At X - for anyone" vs "How to improve at X - personal plan for Bill". Your response indicates you may have interpreted in some other way.

We could tighten this up a bit if we qualified the claim to be, "Incurable at this point in history." — Leontiskos

Sure, but I don't accept that a disease compares the complexity of a human being and personal outcomes.

Within personal outcomes, there are people who do well and people who don't, so from the get-go, we know success is possible, but not what factors are needed to produce it. Those who display success vary across so many factors, thus we know it's not a simple answer. Each case is unique, with a different set of circumstances for each person, an incomprehensible web of interplay between factors.

I have contended that there is no mechanism for knowing our limitations for influencing our personal outcomes. No matter what is done, there will always be something else that can be done. Do you disagree with this?

We will always assume improvement is possible, if not drastic improvement, and that means that if a person really had the desire to change, they could. Consider it a hyperbole, there are undoubtedly exceptions. It's not your views that produce this problem, and I already know you are unimpressed with the views that produce this problem, so I won't expand on it.

I agree that it "can often be enough," but this is different from the claim that he is necessarily culpable. This is important because if we do not have sufficient knowledge then we are not justified in drawing the conclusion that Bill is at fault. If we do have that knowledge then of course we can draw the conclusion. — Leontiskos

Sure, good old Bill is off the hook - for now, but my claim was of a general nature, I agree that the nuances matter. I'd say the general sentiment is innocent until proven guilty, but one can argue against that, as I have little doubt you would.

Unjust blame occurs because there is an overemphasis on fixable factors, or because unfixable factors are being mistaken for fixable factors (which amounts to the same thing). — Leontiskos

I agree, and also that education can help, though the other major problem is free will, which I will make a thread about soon. I believe certain conceptualisations of free will are a primary source of the issue, I imagine that you would agree.

(To be clear, I am not claiming, nor do I suspect, that you yourself have these faulty ideas. I tend to think that we are talking past one another on that topic.) — Leontiskos

I understand you are just clarifying it, but I'll counter-clarify that I never had any such misconceptions.

Overall, we seem to mostly agree on the issues. When I was considering making a thread about this topic, I had a few lenses to choose from, and one was personal responsibility and blame. I do recognise these two concepts as being relevant to this issue, but I view them as symptoms more than anything else. If a person is in control of their personal outcomes, then they should take responsibility for them, and they should take the blame for them. I view this as a logical connection, it seems you don't agree. Nonetheless, you agree with the relationship of the emphasis on fixable factors and blame, and that's good enough for me.

As I said previously, the "truth" is not a feasible option, and I'm not sure to what extent the view of personal responsibility, deserve and blame, paired with an emphasis on fixable factors and free will, can be called irrational. I can offer an alternative to it, but my claim of superiority comes from a belief that it produces better outcomes, paired with some disagreements about free will.

You've agreed that an emphasis on these unfixable factors helps produce these ways of thinking, and you've said education can be a solution. Although it was earlier on in this discussion, where you undoubtedly had a different understanding of what we were talking about, you said the self-help context should exclude unfixable factors. Do you stand by that?

Is it accurate to say that you think we should be able to proceed as normal, and just educate people to get rid of their irrational interpretations?

A thing is either superior to something else or it is not. A thing is either flying or it is not. — Matt Thomas

That the claim absolutely was made or wasn't made, is irrelevant to the logic of the claim. I agree that the claim that something is superior to something else is either made or it isn't.

Anyway, perhaps you subscribe to an understanding of language that is incompatible with mine. You can't just interpret for yourself what it means for something to be relative and absolute, and then explain that the words are redundant. They're clearly not redundant, as long as you understand they convey a particular meaning, and not whatever meaning you've made up for them.

If something is X, only because of its relation to something else, then it's relative, if it's X regardless of anything else then it's absolute.

It doesn't matter if you isolate the claim to itself, it's about the logic of the claim. A word such as "superior" can be described as relative, because it simply can't function without comparing one thing to something else. A word like "flying" could be described as absolute because it's a binary, something qualifies as flying or it doesn't.

That being said, I'm not confident that I even understand the OP, it could be interpreted in a multitude of different ways, but I decided to assume the context here is linguistics.

I am asking what that single issue is supposed to be. Again, I am concerned that there is more than one issue at stake, and that multiple issues are being conflated. — Leontiskos

Fair enough. I had imagined when writing this thread, an impersonalised, generic approach to self-help, distinctly different from the personalised advice a psychologist would offer. An explanation of an issue that impacts millions of people, such as the obesity epidemic, in terms of fixable factors, would talk about what is within an individual's ability to control. Their choices, actions, habits, decisions and so on. It would understand the obesity epidemic as being a product of bad choices and solvable by smart choices.

A narrative or conceptualisation will function as an argument, providing premises and a conclusion. The distinction between improvement and solving a problem is an important one. If self-help limited itself to simply improving personal outcomes, rather than identifying the determinative factors as fixable ones. If it didn't promise to solve problems, but just improve outcomes. Then it could focus on fixable factors without emphasising their importance beyond what is compatible with acknowledging the importance of unfixable factors.

I'm happy to acknowledge that a conceptualisation of an issue within the context of self-help can exist separately from a conceptualisation that a social scientist would create. But not if the self-help narrative identifies causes & suggests solutions on a large scale, in a way that clearly competes with the explanations social scientists or other experts might give.

It's also a question of when the self-help conceptualisation is to be applied. If every time someone brings up an issue or a personal outcome, it automatically established a context of self-help, then this will have a social conditioning effect. When can a person talk about a personal outcome outside of the context of self-help? Is that even possible?

I appreciate your questions though, I'm not sure if I had a thorough answer to them before thinking about it. I am starting to see some nuances, like in the "improve vs solve" distinction, "personal vs impersonal" approaches and understanding when the self-help context is active vs inactive, that could provide a framework for resolving my concerns.

If we want to talk about self-help, then I assume we want to talk about the strongest form of self-help, lest we strawman the notion of self-help. — Leontiskos

I'm not sure what it would mean if my criticism wasn't valid when applied to the strongest forms of self-help, but it might not be. I had mostly imagined things like a book, a video, a lecture, an anonymous discussion such as on a forum, and things like that. A psychologist who writes a book might be valid for critique, but probably not a psychologist who knows their patient, and provides solutions specific to them. I didn't actually realise that the personal vs impersonal distinction mattered when I wrote the OP, it was only through this discussion that I noticed. I may not have realised otherwise, so thanks for that.

f all conceivable and available interventions have failed, then there is justification for the claim that the problem is unfixable tout court. — Leontiskos

Exhausting all conceivable and available solutions seems impossible to me. That being said, I am not familiar with the new psychological approach you refer to, so I can't comment on whether it is possible there or not. When it comes to "effort", we get back into free will, and issues like self-control. For example, there are many solutions to obesity that are guaranteed to work, if they're actually implemented. Of course, the entire problem is in the implementation, and this is how free will miss the point. We can say the diet would've worked if it were followed, and failed only because the effort was insufficient.

Will, method, mindset, habits, routine, medication, self-control, meditation, mindfulness, environment, social circumstances, mental health, physical health, the list of areas we can address just goes on and on. It's inexhaustible.

Sorry, I should have been more explicit about the error. That Bill fixed his spending habits does not imply that he is responsible for creating the problem in the first place. The problem may be due to bad parenting, for example. — Leontiskos

Bill's spending habits represent his choices, made with intent, aware of the consequences, and represent his actions. If they are the problem, but not his fault? Under what conditions would it be his fault then? What's special about bad parenting, that one couldn't argue any nature or nurture influence couldn't be used to resolve a person of responsibility for anything they did?

One is responsible for themselves just generally, and their property, and for fulfilling their obligations. If the cause has been a problem that was within Bill's power to fix, even if it wasn't of his making, that can often be enough to put the blame on him.

Your interpretation here, well, I'm not going to insist it's wrong, that's not necessary, but it's a complete deviation from normative responsibility. Even beyond responsibility, just what is "Bill"? If not his actions, intent, decision-making and so on. Can his habits even be differentiated from him, that we could blame them without involving him at all? Well, I'm not sure how much these questions matter to the overall discussion, you can be the judge, but I don't understand your thinking here.

This is the question of whether we ought to combat false societal beliefs with education and argument, or with societal conditioning. — Leontiskos

I'm not sure it's a false belief, it's an interpretation, there is no real right or wrong here. Whether it's better to blame Bill or not for his spending habits... I feel overwhelmed here. This question goes far beyond the scope of the topic. Our answer would have ramifications across a diverse range of contexts.

My OP contends that by emphasising fixable factors, we're necessarily going to put the blame on people for their problems. I still believe that is true, but are you disagreeing with that? Is your solution to rethink the way blame and responsibility function on a conceptual level?

I imagine AI will make state terrorism more potent than it has ever been, and it will make totalitarian states better at being totalitarian, we're already seeing that in China. Which pairs AI technology + the social credit system to monitor citizen behaviour and ensure compliance with the regime's goals.

My argument though is that AI will enable smaller players to do much more than they ever could before. A group that previously lacked technical know-how and expertise, that didn't have the resources to pull off big operations, AI will give them those capabilities. It has the potential to be a tremendous boon to any group, and unlike most advanced military technology, accessibility won't be an issue.


I thought the context was small groups and individuals, but regardless, I agree that knowledge can manifest as power, just rarely, in comparison to all the things one can know about.

In most cases, I think what you're talking about is incredibly exciting, and I can think mostly of examples where it will be used for good.

The propaganda and misinformation aspect is an interesting one, I'm not sure to what extent AI can excel at something like this, but I agree, it is concerning.

If you think it can be construed as a single issue, then what would that issue be? — Leontiskos

I think that conceptualisation of the issue itself should acknowledge a broad array of factors influencing the outcomes, without providing a conclusion. Self-help should focus on one's personal circumstances while remaining mindful that their circumstances belong to themselves alone. Fixable issues are testable, you can see their impact, but unfixable factors can only be understood in a broader sense. The context of self-help can focus on what's actionable, while using actionable factors to conceptualise relevant issues can be viewed as an overreach, wishful thinking, that can't be substantiated.

The trouble with conceptualisations prioritising fixable factors is that the available methods are inexhaustible and there exists no mechanism to prompt reconsideration of the importance of unfixable factors. It manifests as one's endless self-assurance about failure proving only flaws in method, mindset or some other fixable thing.

What mechanism could there be? If the fixable factors are predominately determinative of the outcome, whether as cause, solution or both, then some combination of changes should resolve the issue. Failing to find that solution just proves the need for review and adjustment, it will never prove anything else. The only way it ends is when the relevant parties just give up, but even then, giving up doesn't mean acknowledging the fixable factors as less important, it just means it wasn't feasible to continue trying.

Do you have a mechanism for knowing when fixable factors can be considered less important than previously thought? How many times does a person need to fail, or in what manner, that we could conclude the problem wasn't with the particular method, but in the assessment of fixability?

A psychological counselor shouldn't need to always offer reminders that they are a psychologist and not a social scientist, especially in a world with so many specialized disciplines. — Leontiskos

Acknowledging the existence of unfixable factors doesn't require expertise in them, and they belong to no single field of research, some are part of the field of psychology. Nurture & nature influences can be construed as unfixable or beyond one's control too.

As I understand it, a balance must always be struck between two or more things. — Leontiskos

Well, it is a spectrum, but someone could reject the OP's title and tell me that there should be no balance and that we should only emphasise fixable factors. I conceive of the status quo of self-help as emphasising fixable factors, so, to me, striking a balance would be accomplished by promising less from fixable factors and making a greater effort to acknowledge unfixable factors. Especially the former, self-help should aim to improve personal outcomes, not relentlessly promise to be the difference between failure and success.

Though, I hadn't intended psychologists to be the focus of my critique, as getting help from a psychologist is well, not representative of self-help, since it entails outside, professional help. I'd still be willing to include actions done by the individual to help themselves that were recommended by a psychologist, but the actual sessions themselves? And the psychologist being the focus of our critique? That's outside my comfort zone because I imagine psychologists do acknowledge unfixable factors, likely more than almost anyone else, but I also don't have much experience in the area.

I disagree with all three sentences here. — Leontiskos

I don't believe that having the ability to fix a problem implies that one is responsible for creating the problem in the first place — Leontiskos

If Bill improves his spending habits and has an improvement in results, what is that he would be fixing? His literal spending habits, right? Most fixable factors are like that, they're within our control for a reason. One is rarely solving an external problem here, they're changing how they do things. It can make sense to conceive of a change as a solution, I know not everything is the same as the spending habits example. However, you are generally changing yourself, how you do things, how you think about things and so on.

Disagreeing with the statements is fine, but are you claiming that as statements, these sentences would be unreasonable? Even Bill himself, had he improved his spending habits and had it resolved his financial woes, would probably agree with all three. If one replaces a bad way of doing something, a bad mentality, or a bad habit and changes it and the problem goes away, surely that implies that the cause was in what was changed. It doesn't prove it, but it certainly implies it, right? Depends on the particulars, I guess.

It's not about whether you or I agree anyway, we both know plenty of people would and do agree with them. I believe it is partly due to the emphasis on fixable factors in the conceptualisation of the problem. It's not about whether it's true that "Bill should've known better", it's about whether it's true that many will think it, and we already know the answer.

If you agree that others would conclude that way and that emphasising unfixable factors is a solution to counter this, then is there something else that you'd argue could fulfil that role instead? We emphasised fixable solutions as important and then they sometimes deliver the promised results. Even when they don't, it doesn't prove that they couldn't, if implemented correctly. Free will is an important concept here, glad you brought it up, because a lot of the time, fixable factors aren't quite so black-and-white. If Bill has impaired impulse control, which explains his poor spending habits, that complicates matters.

We can ask people to be kind for kindness' sake, but when pairing free will + emphasising fixable factors, there is little reason not to blame people for their outcomes, right?

That's right, but this would be leveraging a focus on non-actionable factors as an actionable intervention. — Leontiskos

It can be that but I am also advocating for it to be part of the overall conceptualisation of the issue, so I don't think it's just a reaction to need. Anyway, we agree on this point, there needs to be some acknowledgement of what is and isn't within our control.

At the end of the day it may be that that monstrous question of "the truth" is unavoidable — Leontiskos

:fear:

My words are often intended to be applicable to multiple different contexts or layers, but this is not apparent to someone who is not familiar with me. — Leontiskos

Philosophy is generally high-level and one does need their words to be applicable in multiple contexts as a result, so I do appreciate that. If I am aware that another is referring to a broad range of contexts, I can try to avoid making assumptions, but that will make everything said more generic, and less meaningful, so if I think I can interpret what's said through the lens of a context, then I will.

This is a worthwhile distinction, but in your defense an exclusive or near-exclusive focus on actionable factors will automatically emphasize the importance of these factors. That is how I was reading the OP’s language of ‘focus’, and I think it is an important issue to consider. — Leontiskos

:up:

Returning to this recurring claim, I would say that it is a bias for the speculative scientist but not for the psychologist. Biases are not absolute. They are relative to one's end. — Leontiskos

I agree. Biases are necessary for thought, one shifts through and selects information as befits their purpose. One's purpose and context will be important in helping one to determine which biases are appropriate and which aren't. However, we can't treat these two contexts you've set up, of the speculative scientist and the psychologist as being entirely separate, especially in terms of conceptualising the issue.

To begin with, different contexts conceptualising differently often serve as competing narratives, not mutually inclusive of one another. For example, if one utilises biases of actionability or fixability to conceptualise the causes of poverty through the lens of self-help. One may address topics such as spending habits, investing, budgeting, procuring additional sources of income, and so on. While not definitively mutually exclusive with a view of poverty that emphasises economic and social factors, these two views often conflict with each other.

If the conceptualisation was aimed at producing a "How to improve outcomes in X", then how much of one's outcome in X is determined by a failure in the identified areas for possible improvement?

Also, with regard to the factors identified for possible improvement, in this action-orientated conceptualisation, how achievable are they, and what kind of level of success can they produce?

Even if one would present their conceptualisation as restricted to the context of self-help, the answers there have unavoidable consequences elsewhere. If individual factors reliably predict success, and anyone can accomplish this success with effort, then that will have implications on an explanation of the issue as largely systemic, environmental or genetic, etc.

If in the example of poverty, let's say there's a guy named Bill, who could clearly improve in actionable areas, such as his spending habits or budgeting. If our self-help conceptualisation would emphasise the power of proper spending habits and budgeting, to the extent that improving in these areas could drastically improve his situation, I'm not sure you can logically deny all of the negative implications this might have. Though it may depend on how they've been articulated, and nuance is important here.

The self-help conceptualisation isn't just a convenient fiction, it's asserting a truth, that Bill's circumstances could be resolved if he tried. If the source of the problem is systemic, and Bill isn't at fault, then why are his outcomes completely within his control? If believing that fixing one's inability to manage their money properly would produce such a substantial change, then isn't that issue largely responsible for creating the problem in the first place? Even if it wasn't, an adult should've known better, and Bill's failure to fix this problem up until now would make him responsible for it.

One who subscribes to the self-help narrative will interpret the issue through the lens of that narrative and is within their rights to use what it asserts is true to complement their understanding. Unless the self-help narrative is acknowledged as fiction, which, it isn't. If the psychologist makes promises about what can be accomplished to motivate you, nothing about the context tells you that your should think your psychologist is lying or telling you half-truths.

I'm not saying there is no nuance possible to avoid or lessen the above, but since striking a balance on fixability is the topic we're discussing, I'd want you to explicitly outline how you'd approach the issue. Do you agree that we can't just do whatever we want within a self-help context, and not expect it to spill over into other contexts? And do you agree how we conceptualise within the context of self-help will influence the impact of this spillover?

If it was possible to just have no spillover, then there'd be no need for my OP, so I reject the idea of it.

I'd also argue that a psychologist - or oneself, shouldn't just focus on what's actionable. Psychology has a lot to do with the impact of thinking about and conceptualising problems. While it's not good to tell someone everything is unfixable and there's nothing they can do to improve their situation. It is important to emphasise the importance of factors outside of one's control to relieve stress, improve self-image, help build realistic expectations and so on.

My suggestion is that the contraries which need to be balanced are a focus on improvement and a focus on adequacy — Leontiskos

I misunderstood your second part the first time I read it. I can understand what you're trying to say, and while I do have some other ends I'm concerned with, I am happy to focus on these two outcomes and agree they are important. Fixability is just a factor that influences them, and we don't actually care about fixability beyond its role in influencing other factors, I agree with that.

Although I'm not actually that familiar with TikTok, there has been controversy over its AI gathering data from its user's phones to recommend videos and such, do you have any familiarity with this controversy?

Knowledge can be a means to power, but rarely does it amount to much, and I'm not too sure what the actual concern is. Could you give a context? Does TikTok, or gambling apps using AI, or stuff like that, represent your concern well, or is it something else?

I don't subscribe to the fears about AI outside the context of automation, but the automatic distinction made earlier is significant in understanding the argument, at least by some. Once an AI has been given an order, it no longer requires any further inputs from a user to continue doing whatever it's doing. Thus, if it interpreted an order as requiring hostile actions to be taken against humans, then it would be on the same path that human-like ambition would set it on.

While an algorithm is the same in that, the threat of AI is that, well, it's AI, and the concern is out of the speed at which its capabilities are growing, rather than any capabilities it has now.

You're right that people are equivocating intelligence with human psychology senselessly.

Also, AI, no matter how intelligent, isn't a threat in the way some of those concerned are fearmongering about, without access to some form of military power. AI world domination plan:

1. Be smarter than humans
2. ???
3. World conquest complete

AI is dangerous in the context of neoliberal capitalism and automation, and all of this fearmongering about AI world domination is a convenient distraction.

Putting aside world domination, AI could pose serious threats, but the context is AI doing this of its own accord, and that's not a concern for me. But just pairing AI + terrorism should be scary enough. AI will rely on human intention for its wrongdoing, but that thought isn't at all comforting. :yum:

My biggest concern about AI, is its ability to acquire knowledge that humans aren't up to acquiring due to the enormous amount of data AI can process without getting bored and deciding there must be a more meaningful way of being.

Knowledge is power, and individuals or small groups with sole possession of AI determined knowledge can use such power unscrupulously. — wonderer1

I've never heard a perspective like this. Can you give an example showing the cause for your concern?

No worries. There was an ambiguity that I didn't quite understand, but I wrote my posts in such a way that they would apply both to personal outcomes and to a wider scope. — Leontiskos

The contexts are so different that I would read the same words differently based on whether I thought the context was personal outcomes, societal-level outcomes or both. I imagine the same is true for you in reading me. But nonetheless, such is the difficulty of communication, misunderstandings usually just go under the radar, and thus appear far less common than they are. Since my OP is responsible for establishing the context out of nothing, I should be more explicit in the future.

Applying one's energies to what is attainable is not biased, it is rational and realistic. I tried to give a reason to focus on the unfixable, namely adequacy. What would be your reason for focusing on the unfixable? If you think we focus too much on the fixable, then what reason do you offer for why we should focus on the unfixable instead? — Leontiskos

Looking for that which is attainable is itself a bias, and this topic requires us to choose between competing narratives, that can't be separated simply into right and wrong.

I want to go a bit deeper into the terms "focus" and "emphasis". I was using these terms interchangeably in my OP, but thinking about your comment made me realise my mistake. While they can be used interchangeably sometimes, the difference between these two terms for me is that focus merely directs attention, whereas emphasis asserts importance. That's a very important difference because here, within the context of action, we should direct our attention towards - or focus - on what's actionable and what's attainable.

A focus on actionable factors wouldn't cause feelings of inadequacy within the appropriate context of "doing", only emphasising the importance of these factors would do that.

Basically, having already conceptualised something and then focusing on improvable components for practicality's sake is completely agreeable to me. It's partly because we can sharpen our context like this that I disagree with emphasising fixable factors while forming our perspective on an issue. I believe the mistake made by many pragmatically-minded people is in viewing the way their conceptualisations emphasise fixability as being pragmatic.

While there's nothing wrong with a bias on what is attainable within the context of action, there is something wrong with it within the context of conceptualisation. To think of fixable factors as being largely determinate of outcomes due to one's biases or as a conscious choice is what creates feelings of inadequacy and many of the other issues I described in the OP.

I don't necessarily think we should emphasise unfixable factors instead, and I am still working out exactly which biases I would advocate for. What I do feel is that "the truth" is just monstrous. How could we ever know when there are so many factors involved without even knowing the extent of each factor's influence? And then there being so many possible solutions or responses to those influences, that they might be mitigated or changed. I have a lot of criticism towards the conceptualisation that maximises fixability, and if I had to choose, I'd prefer something far more ambiguous.

We'd admit that we don't know how possible it is for someone to accomplish their personal goals and that one should just seek to improve as they can. By conceptualising issues in ways that don't necessarily provide a simple conclusion, the subsequent ambiguity would allow for flexibility. We could feel that it was possible for someone to have poor outcomes without forcing them to take responsibility for it, but we could still encourage a belief that improvements were possible.

If an overemphasis on fixability produces feelings of frustration, incompetence, impotence, inadequacy, and despair, then this remedy is to the point. — Leontiskos

I think the issues you're talking about are more closely related to nihilism than individualism. But I won't say too much about it, since it'll be too confusing to have parallel discussions, and we won't be able to give either the attention they deserve. I'll just say that I do agree patience is important when dealing with one's personal outcomes, and that impatience compounds many of the issues I've described in the OP.

I've been speaking in the context of self-help and personal outcomes. I had thought the last part of your previous comment strange but I failed to make the connection that we were talking about different things.

It still makes sense to talk about this topic outside of personal outcomes, but I'd prefer to deal with a narrower context. I'm struggling to contextualise your statements, and I'm not sure what context you're imagining that I'm using.

Also, while this issue of fixability emphasis is important for personal outcomes, whether it's important in other contexts or not, I'm not as sure. Fixability, for me, is largely defined by actionability, and within a group context, actionability is complicated by politics, so the terms don't necessarily translate well.

When you talked about individualism and personal responsibility, I thought this was in reference to issues like poverty, obesity or mental health etc. In terms of thinking about someone as a victim of poverty and the economic situation, or being responsible for their own situation - and for getting themselves out of it.

Sorry if my OP was unclear, but I had been talking about an individual's capability in influencing personal outcomes, not societal-level outcomes. :worry:

Regarding emphasizing either the fixable or the unfixable, if we are concerned with motivation then the fixable emphasis will be optimal, whereas if we are concerned with adequacy then the unfixable emphasis will be optimal. If someone needs to be motivated to act, then they should focus on the fixable because this will bolster the sense that their actions will not be in vain. — Leontiskos

Would you agree that the impact of emphasising fixability on self-image is greater and less manageable than the impact of a balanced approach or emphasising unfixable factors on motivation? Interpreting a strong emphasis on unfixable factors as justifying a defeatist attitude is equally toxic, to be sure. However, a balanced approach, or even an emphasis on unfixable factors, wouldn't detract from the possibility of noteworthy improvements. Motivation can come from this possibility.

I do agree with your pragmatic approach of conceptualising based on one's circumstances, but it flows against the pragmatic approach of how one should approach a highly fixable problem. If the inadequacy is produced by an emphasis on the fixable factors, and one perceives a problem as fixable, then switching to blame unfixable factors upon recognising their feelings of inadequacy will be damned.

It goes against the spirit of the trial and error process, setbacks in a context of a fixable problem should be responded to by promoting a positive outlook and perseverance. Such a move of switching to emphasising unfixable factors would draw a lot of criticism for many different reasons. Is that something you can also foresee, and do you agree it's a problem for your proposal?

I see individualism as a large part of the problem here, because it tends to overemphasize personal responsibility. I still prefer individualism to a strong collectivism, but it has its dangers. — Leontiskos

Individual agency, responsibility, and self-reliance are themes of individualism. One is encouraged to focus on their own abilities, actions, and choices as the primary determinants of their outcomes. One is expected to take personal responsibility for their successes and failures, and a focus on unfixable factors is antithetical to that.

Within collectivism, there are still strong themes of personal responsibility. High expectations are placed on individuals, and failure to meet these expectations will be perceived as a personal failure. There's less of a focus on individual differences, and an inability to match the outcomes of your peers might be interpreted more harshly than within individualism. Societal norms and group standards are applied to everyone equally, and the focus on fixability might take a more critical form. It is harder to blame unfixable factors within a collectivist society because they're not affecting everyone. Those who fail to meet these standards, even if unfixable factors are blamed, will not be looked upon kindly.

Natural human biases seem sufficient to me to explain why we're largely focused on fixable factors. Unfixable factors also tend to be highly complex, requiring a sophisticated understanding, while fixable factors are generally simple, and one naturally has familiarity with the relevant concepts.

Perhaps we can agree that it does manifest differently within individualist vs collectivist societies though. As for which one is more likely to maximise fixable factors, it's hard to say, I'm not sure. Individualistic societies might place a stronger emphasis, but expectations of success in personal outcomes are higher in collectivist cultures, and that produces a similar effect.

In this case rather than looking at problems as fixable and unfixable, we should look at them as short-term fixable and long-term fixable. — Leontiskos

Both individualistic and collectivist cultures will involve comparing people to each other and focusing on personal outcomes. I wonder whether such a philosophical approach can ever represent the average person's mentality, though I feel that yours is a healthier approach than many of the others.

Those who believe in quietly contributing to long-term solutions with patience will also tend to view their own long-term problems with patience, rather than despair. — Leontiskos

I think you're right to bring up the importance of patience, it's something I overlooked. A strong emphasis on fixability combined with impatience is a dangerous combination and naturally leads one to despair. This topic of impatience is too complex for me to talk about right away, maybe I'll have more to say about it later.

It is that simple. — unenlightened

As I said, a model with no way of proving itself wrong can produce a 100% success rate, your analysis is permanently rooted in hindsight. After something happens, you can say whatever you want about it. If every time it rains, you want to say it's because God had a bad day, sure, why not. You'd never be able to know if God had a bad day and it didn't rain, so there'd be no way for you to know if you were wrong.

If you tell someone, "Go and become single-minded", or however else you'd like, then it becomes a method, and we get to see how good your method is. Or bad it is, to be more precise.

So long as becoming single-minded isn't something that can be attempted and failed, and you're allowed to only say it occurred after you see the result, then it isn't a real method. I could make up whatever shit I wanted to doing that, and so can you.

In seeking to fix the mind, one necessarily creates a division in the mind between the mind that needs fixing and the mind that is going to fix it. — unenlightened

Construe the act of replacing a habit, and of not making that effort, as one's choices. There are no contradictions in having a desire to change, enacting changes and the current state one desires to change.

Contradictory desires are unavoidable. Their mutual exclusivity isn't present in the mind. Wanting to avoid the health risks of smoking and wanting to smoke are logically consistent with each other, within the mind. The contradiction is in the incompatibility of these two desires in the real world. One isn't split between wanting to avoid the health risks of smoking and wanting to smoke, one wants both, they just can't have both.

If one chooses to quit smoking but continues to smoke, there is no contradiction here either. The mind is not static. When free of the urge to smoke, one chooses to quit, and when under the urge to smoke, one chooses to smoke. That the act to smoke contradicts the choice to quit isn't a contradiction within the mind at any single point in time. The contradiction appears that way only when judging the mind across time, but this is due to changes in conditions, not a state of contradiction.

Habits are formed by the mind, and in order to change one's habit, one has to change one's mind. How does the mind change the mind, without first changing its mind? — unenlightened

A desire to change one's habit can co-exist with that habit. You're creating contradictions that don't exist. Your role in choosing how to express these concepts is responsible for producing them, just express the same ideas differently and they won't be present any longer. Our desires don't contradict each other within our minds, they contradict each other in the real world.

How does the mind change the mind, without first changing its mind? On the other hand, it is very easy to change one's mind if one has a mind to, but the trick is to be single minded, and then one has no problem. — unenlightened

When two desires contradict each other, just remove one of the desires, to become single-minded, is that your solution?

Willpower, and the popular conceptualisation of will, as ever, are asinine. I had thought you were arguing the same, but then how did you reach this conclusion?

An approach that entails giving oneself orders, for the will to subjugate itself, to itself.

I'll bet, that in your mind, logically, if one became single-minded, the problem would be solved, so if the problem remains, then they can't have become single-minded yet. You perceive one's desire to smoke through their act of smoking, and so long as they continue smoking, the desire must be there.

In cases like this, it is simply unthinkable for anyone to have seriously attempted something like quitting smoking, and never once resented their contradictory desire to do the very thing that they're trying to quit. The very thing that thwarts their efforts every time, what possibility is there that anyone wouldn't at some point wish it would disappear?

This conceptualisation has no way to know itself as false, the method is only known to have been applied under circumstances of success. Give me a model for acknowledging the attempts at the method that fail and I'll re-evaluate it. Every time I encounter this willpower concept, it's always absent. It's just "If they wanted to succeed, they would've, so they mustn't have wanted it enough". I think if you actually acknowledge how often this approach fails, then it goes from a 100% success rate to 0.0001%, as it really is.

Each situation is multifaceted and complex, and attempts to simplify and conceptualise in ways that provide easy solutions is the very thing I'm criticising. If it's so simple, is everyone who fails just weak-willed and a fool? How can failure deserve anything but derision when the solution is something a 6-year-old could come up with?

In those quoted statements, I am referring to contexts of a social nature and not a universal one. A moral defence was supposed to have implied a reason for defence, which I don't think would be present in terms of introspection.

Comparatively speaking, what normally causes social anxiety or fear pales to a display of moral outrage. People, probably many on this forum, may outright declare you to be worthless should you express the wrong opinion. Even someone fearless may decide it's better to not lose friends or stir trouble, and respect to be earned if you say the right things. — Judaka

Hypocrisy, inconsistency, intellectual dishonesty and so on, are just logical consequences of the coercive environment created. One is forced into taking an unnatural position and knows fully that the wrong answer could have serious negative repercussions. — Judaka

The context for my OP was always social, and so I expected my words to be interpreted in this way.

Is morality coercive in a non-social way? I don't think so, not under normal circumstances. Perhaps one could criticise themselves or say things to themselves that were coercive, but that's about it, and that would be a non-standard use of the term.

My title "Morality is coercive and unrealistic" is certainly taking into account social factors, and this is why I didn't agree with my OP using "morality" as any of my definitions. We can talk about the "morality of X thing", or "X source morality", and we can talk about the effects of morality in a social context. When I say "morality is coercive", I am talking about morality in a social sense, it is the aggregate actions of the group that creates the coercive environment. Morality is just a garbage word, and I'm unsurprised that you've misunderstood me.

I certainly do think that people bend and twist concepts and ideas in moral contexts as it suits them, but if that's the motivation, then it's not coerced. It's a statement of power, for one to be able to perceive things as it suits them, quite antithetical to coercion.

I agree wholeheartedly with this. I call it 'pejorification' (of a word). In fact, it seems to happen most frequently with the concept of morality, where one's own moral claims are considered 'moral', and the moral claims of others are considered 'moral meddling.' We saw it most recently, I aver, in your thread about "personal morality." — Leontiskos

True, and I'm glad you agree.

Let's look at the definition of coercion. The traditional definition hinges on the internal/external division (or more properly, the distinction between my own actions and the things which act upon me). For example, if I push myself across the floor I am not being coerced, but if someone else pushes me across the floor I am being coerced. Only in the second case is there an external cause forcing me to do something. Does this seem right to you? — Leontiskos

As I said earlier, where a reasonable person would conclude that their failure to act in a particular way would result in negative consequences, then there is a coercive element at play. It involves influencing or compelling someone to act in a particular way using the threat of negative consequences.

A simple example might be that a lost tourist in a dark alleyway is approached by two men who tell him "Give me your wallet". They didn't physically rip the wallet from his person, but he would be reasonable in believing that this was not a polite request, and failure to comply will result in escalation. To avoid that, he hands over his wallet, but this action was coerced, and not done freely.

Coercion typically involves influencing how someone else acts, and this internal/external distinction is too narrow. One may have chosen to act as they've acted, but we need to look at the circumstances in which they've made the decision. When one's action was taken to avoid some negative consequence that has been established, then we can call that environment coercive.

Coercion can be seen as an embodiment of heteronomy, as it imposes external influences on individuals, making their actions and decisions subject to the will of others.

It's a complicated and nuanced topic because whether something is coercive relies on interpretation. We need to "realise" that the man didn't give over his wallet by his own free will. In that case, it's fairly straightforward, but it may not be so simple in other circumstances.

You can find things coercive without the negative consequence beyond physical threat. It could be financial damages, loss of respect, loss of friendship, social ostracisation, humiliation, shaming and any number of other things. For example, an abusive relationship might involve one partner coercing the other through threats of leaving them.

It's important to note that "coercion" within the context of law will not allow for the same kind of leniency in interpretation as elsewhere. One cannot conflate the legal term and usage outside of the legal context.

Also, there is a tendency to only use words with negative connotations in contexts that one disagrees with, and this is something I advocate against. If something is coercive only when the intention is malicious, or effect undesirable and not, for example, motivated by morality, and the desire to do good, then the term merely becomes its connotation and loses most of its meaning. If something is disqualified as coercion when you like the effect it produces, well, that's quite insidious indeed.

I would want to say that everything that one feels to be necessary is incentivized, but not everything that is incentivized is necessary. — Leontiskos

I think the context of the usage would be responsible for making it clear what someone meant, but sure.