Very good opening post. I agree with what you say.

The only thing that I could say which is thoughtworthy, is that chances are that you, yourself, and every one of us, would not be here and striving if it were not for societies, and societies would not exist without discomfort to the individual, of which morality is only one source of discomfort.

It's an exchange... life, good life, for discomfort.

@Judaka,

For context, you should know I have only read four of your OP's:

1. "Personal Morality is Just Morality"
2. "Morality is Coercive and Unrealistic"
3. "Morality=Sexuality"
4. "The Inequality of Moral Positions within Moral Relativism"

When it comes to morality I tend to follow Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. This position is sometimes referred to as Aristotelian-Thomism (A-T). On this view morality is intrinsically bound up with rationality and immorality is intrinsically bound up with irrationality. Ideally what I should do is write a new thread setting out the basics of the A-T view, because lots of modern philosophers would find it curious and also objectionable. Yet because I don't currently have time to field a full thread, I will just pull at a strand of the topic in this post.

[Original Post] — Judaka

Let me try to reproduce a piece of your argument:

1. Our moral views are inherited and we do not have control over them. They are forced upon us.
2. We are committed to our moral views.
3. Our moral views must therefore be defended. {Follows from premise 2}
4. Therefore, a defense of our moral views is something we are forced to undertake, not something we choose to undertake. {From 1 & 3}
5. Therefore, moral defense is no more than "mental gymnastics" or post-hoc rationalization. It is a rational defense of what is non-rational.*

Is that a fair assessment of your view?

Here is is a central piece of evidence for this argument within your OP:

Even if one does speak honestly in a moral context, we can never be sure, because it's a coercive environment that forces people to take an unrealistic and unnatural stance. A moral defence is a necessity, not a choice. — Judaka

Now I am tempted to think that if we grant your position for the sake of argument, then it follows that no one can speak honestly in the defense of their moral claim. This is because a defense is a rational undertaking; morality is not rational; and it is not possible to honestly defend a non-rational thing by means of rationality. Or perhaps you are only saying that one could honestly believe--mistakenly--that morality is defensible apart from mental gymnastics and post-hoc rationalization?

Thanks,
Leontiskos

* It could be objected that reason should be distinguished from will or choice, but I here collapse them because the common view is that a defense of one's moral view is a rational defense and not a non-rational defense rooted solely in will or choice.

Thanks for making the effort to understand my argument.

Is that a fair assessment of your view? — Leontiskos

Unfortunately, it isn't. I can understand your conclusion, but those four OPs don't give a good sense of my moral views. They're mostly the results of more specific thoughts that I had which prompted me to make a thread. Morality is an incredibly complicated topic, but I will try to summarise my position, and maybe I might make a thread about my overall views later. I have given a brief summary already in this thread, so let me quote it.

The word "morality", as with many other complex English words, is bloated, filled with concepts that are distinct from each other, but also applicable in the same contexts. I distinguish between three separate concepts labelled as "morality".

The first is the evolutionary basis, that we are concerned about fairness, justice, and rules and think in terms of loyalty, betrayal and revenge. Could throw in the aversion to incest, perhaps some gender norms, it's debatable. The key features here are the emotional and psychological responses.

Secondly, there is a discussion about morality, which deals with the interpretation of what should or can be considered fair, reasonable or just. The evolutionary basis of morality just seems to entail a hatred of unfairness, but how something is interpreted to be fair or not is quite flexible. It could range from stoning someone to death over a minor offence to viewing violent responses as universally unjustified.

Thirdly, there's the morality that I'd call "philosophies of morality", which are not purely based on emotion or psychology and don't have to be at all. They can be completely divorced, and even a critique of the evolutionary basis of morality, such as emphasising logical and unbiased thinking. This might overlap with the second in providing an outline for understanding moral concepts such as fairness and justice — Judaka

What's inherited is an ability to perceive things in a moral sense, not our moral views. Your understanding of Aristotelian-Thomism falls into this third category, and I am sure that you found it appealing or true, and weren't forced to choose it. A-T would influence how you interpreted moral themes, and using this understanding, you could make rational arguments for your moral positions. By the way, before now I'd never heard of A-T, I've just read a summary to get the gist of it.

2. We are committed to our moral views.
3. Our moral views must therefore be defended. {Follows from premise 2} — Leontiskos

In my OP, it isn't necessarily one's moral views that need to be defended, it's one's moral views that are doing the defending, and thinking of one's moral views as acting to defend is central to the OP.

4. Therefore, a defense of our moral views is something we are forced to undertake, not something we choose to undertake — Leontiskos

In order to prevent the negative consequences that would result from admitting the immorality of something, one is incentivised to make a moral argument for it. An example to keep things simple; it is immoral to lie, one is caught lying and is thus incentivised to justify their act of lying.

5. Therefore, moral defense is no more than "mental gymnastics" or post-hoc rationalization. It is a rational defense of what is non-rational.* — Leontiskos

To continue on, if a justification is given for the act of lying, although it could be convincing, whether their justification is a convenience or a legitimate interpretation of theirs will be difficult to ascertain.

The mental gymnastics comes from the strong incentive to conclude that one is in the right and this bias may very well be the basis for one's moral introspection.

This is more complicated than someone just lying to get out of trouble, it's a problem that pervades the entirety of moral thought. As the person applying moral principles, there is a conflict of interest. It'd be absurd to let a judge rule on a case where they were the defendant, right? But that's the very position that we're all in.

It's not just personal benefit. To defend our political, economic, religious, social, and cultural views with moral arguments, we're incentivised in all these cases as well. Concluding our views or beliefs are immoral means having to abandon and condemn them. My goal isn't to paint morality as soullessly self-serving, I aim to be nuanced, and my views on morality are complex.

I hope this clarified my OP.

(Permit me to ask for a quick clarification before responding to some of your points)

Thanks for correcting my misunderstanding and clarifying your view. I suppose I was trying to bite off a small piece of the OP, and I chose the notion of coercion. I tried to model the coercion in step 4 of that argument. Are you saying that the coercion comes from self-interest, and not from premise 1 of the argument I gave? I'm trying to understand your claim that morality is bound up with coercion - "A moral defence is a necessity, not a choice."

Self-interest or self-preservation are themes inherent to coercion in general. There are many coercive aspects of morality, and moral themes, such as retribution, duty, revenge and justice, can manifest as strongly coercive environments. This thread is far from an exhaustive analysis on the subject, though perhaps it should've been.

As for what you've outlined, I'd need you to explain the premises further.

My intent was that my previous post would've dispelled the notion that your summary had any validity to me, if it hasn't, then I'll need you to expand on it. Can you expand on "our moral views are inherited"? Explain how they're inherited, or where you got this idea from. When you say "they are forced upon us", what is forced upon us and how? Could you give an example? Or use a quote of mine that you were trying to paraphrase in this premise?

In short, I don't think a commitment to one's moral principles, and a desire to defend one's moral principles, is in any sense related to how I'd argue morality is coercive. Even if we were forced to defend our moral views, unless there is some consequence for giving a bad answer, then it wouldn't be coercive.

Self-interest or self-preservation are themes inherent to coercion in general. There are many coercive aspects of morality, and moral themes, such as retribution, duty, revenge and justice, can manifest as strongly coercive environments. This thread is far from an exhaustive analysis on the subject, though perhaps it should've been. — Judaka

Okay, I just did a close read of the thread and I think I have a better grasp of what you are saying. Sorry, I should have done that earlier, but I figured that reading a handful of your OP's and skimming this thread would give me enough to go on.

My intent was that my previous post would've dispelled the notion that your summary had any validity to me... — Judaka

It has dispelled them. :smile: At least mostly. Here is one question I have that is related to my construal:

Having an acceptable moral defence for one's actions or stances is necessary and therefore coerced [...] One must retrospectively defend their position morally, even one that was formed outside of the moral context. — Judaka

Why is having an acceptable moral defense necessary and coerced? Is it the same idea you gave in your first reply to me, "...one is incentivised to make a moral argument for it..."? Is it more proper to call it incentivization rather than strict necessity? Or am I conflating two different things?

Although there are a lot of different related ideas, from reading the thread I would want to try to simplify it in this manner. "Morality is coercive" means that morality leads one person or group to force another person or group to do things. For example, a society which has a law against murder is thereby forcing its citizens to not murder. Is that the idea? Or at least a big part of it?

---

Let me respond a bit to the post I've neglected:

Unfortunately, it isn't. I can understand your conclusion, but those four OPs don't give a good sense of my moral views. — Judaka

Fair enough. And some of those OP's are dated, so I wasn't sure if your views have remained the same on all points.

Morality is an incredibly complicated topic... I have given a brief summary already in this thread, so let me quote it. — Judaka

Good, thank you. This was probably the bigger piece of the puzzle for me than anything else in trying to understand your view on coercion. Presumably you are using 'morality' in the first sense in your OP?

Your understanding of Aristotelian-Thomism falls into this third category, and I am sure that you found it appealing or true, and weren't forced to choose it. A-T would influence how you interpreted moral themes, and using this understanding, you could make rational arguments for your moral positions. — Judaka

Interesting. Usually when I use the word 'morality' I am pointing to the set of prescriptive principles and actions that a person (or group) binds themselves to. So with regard to that concept, "Morality is coercive," I would say that morality contains within it a coercive possibility. This possibility need not manifest, but it often does.

It'd be absurd to let a judge rule on a case where they were the defendant, right? — Judaka

Yes, and I agree with you that post-hoc rationalization often creeps into moral reasoning.

Thanks - Your clarifications have helped me understand what you are saying, and have quelled any objections I might have had.

Sorry, I should have done that earlier, but I figured that reading a handful of your OP's and skimming this thread would give me enough to go on — Leontiskos

It probably should've but alas.

Why is having an acceptable moral defense necessary and coerced? — Leontiskos

What is "necessary" and "coerced" relies on interpretation, but generally, morality functions much like truth, if you're proven incorrect, then it's unjustifiable to continue on with the falsehood. The difference between what's necessary and incentivised might be nothing, it depends. If one feels it's necessary to get a promotion to work or if the promotion acts as an incentive, it's the same thing.

The distinction reflects the level of need, and at some point, when the stakes are high enough that "incentivise" becomes obscene, we wouldn't use it.

"Morality is coercive" means that morality leads one person or group to force another person or group to do things. For example, a society which has a law against murder is thereby forcing its citizens to not murder. Is that the idea? Or at least a big part of it? — Leontiskos

Coercion can be implicit and doesn't necessarily involve force, and that's part of my understanding when I use the word. Where a reasonable person would conclude that their failure to act in a particular way would result in negative consequences, then there is a coercive element at play. Especially if there's a power discrepancy as well, such as can occur within a group context.

I'd use the word coercion without necessarily talking about imprisonment or violence. There are a vast array of consequences that one may desire to avoid, and can thus be a coercive influence.

A law against murder for me, would not be a good example, because I think even an amoral society would have such a law, merely for the sake of preserving order.

Presumably you are using 'morality' in the first sense in your OP? — Leontiskos

I doubt I remained consistent, my meaning depends on the context.

As a word, "morality", is simply horrific. It has an essential role in referring to many distinct concepts, all of which are usually applicable in the same contexts.

Even just for me, morality as a word goes beyond referring to just the three concepts I laid out, those are just the cases of describing the source. If you want clarification on something specific, you can quote it, and I'll take a look.

Interesting. Usually when I use the word 'morality' I am pointing to the set of prescriptive principles and actions that a person (or group) binds themselves to. — Leontiskos

I see. The word is dangerous, it can be challenging to tell what people are referring to. Each of us engages with the concept in our own way, and it interferes with the role the word has in referencing.

Thanks - Your clarifications have helped me understand what you are saying, and have quelled any objections I might have had. — Leontiskos

Great.

What is "necessary" and "coerced" relies on interpretation, but generally, morality functions much like truth, if you're proven incorrect, then it's unjustifiable to continue on with the falsehood. — Judaka

Okay. I think this gets into definitions of coercion, and whether our relation to reason is heteronomous or autonomous. It is the question of whether reason is an external imposition.

The difference between what's necessary and incentivised might be nothing, it depends. If one feels it's necessary to get a promotion to work or if the promotion acts as an incentive, it's the same thing.

The distinction reflects the level of need, and at some point, when the stakes are high enough that "incentivise" becomes obscene, we wouldn't use it. — Judaka

I would want to say that everything that one feels to be necessary is incentivized, but not everything that is incentivized is necessary.

I'd use the word coercion without necessarily talking about imprisonment or violence. There are a vast array of consequences that one may desire to avoid, and can thus be a coercive influence. — Judaka

Let's look at the definition of coercion. The traditional definition hinges on the internal/external division (or more properly, the distinction between my own actions and the things which act upon me). For example, if I push myself across the floor I am not being coerced, but if someone else pushes me across the floor I am being coerced. Only in the second case is there an external cause forcing me to do something. Does this seem right to you?

On that traditional definition there may be some desires which are quasi-coerced, such as the avoidance you spoke of, but usually we speak of desires as acts of our own, which we are not forced to undergo. If I say, "I'd like to have some chocolate ice cream!", then I am not at the same time being coerced to desire chocolate ice cream. If I promise myself to sweep the floor today, I am not being coerced to sweep the floor (because the act comes from me and not from an external force). It is difficult to see how one could abandon this traditional definition while at the same time holding that there are any acts which are not coerced.

Even just for me, morality as a word goes beyond referring to just the three concepts I laid out, those are just the cases of describing the source. If you want clarification on something specific, you can quote it, and I'll take a look. — Judaka

Okay, fair enough!

Let's look at the definition of coercion. The traditional definition hinges on the internal/external division (or more properly, the distinction between my own actions and the things which act upon me). For example, if I push myself across the floor I am not being coerced, but if someone else pushes me across the floor I am being coerced. Only in the second case is there an external cause forcing me to do something. Does this seem right to you? — Leontiskos

As I said earlier, where a reasonable person would conclude that their failure to act in a particular way would result in negative consequences, then there is a coercive element at play. It involves influencing or compelling someone to act in a particular way using the threat of negative consequences.

A simple example might be that a lost tourist in a dark alleyway is approached by two men who tell him "Give me your wallet". They didn't physically rip the wallet from his person, but he would be reasonable in believing that this was not a polite request, and failure to comply will result in escalation. To avoid that, he hands over his wallet, but this action was coerced, and not done freely.

Coercion typically involves influencing how someone else acts, and this internal/external distinction is too narrow. One may have chosen to act as they've acted, but we need to look at the circumstances in which they've made the decision. When one's action was taken to avoid some negative consequence that has been established, then we can call that environment coercive.

Coercion can be seen as an embodiment of heteronomy, as it imposes external influences on individuals, making their actions and decisions subject to the will of others.

It's a complicated and nuanced topic because whether something is coercive relies on interpretation. We need to "realise" that the man didn't give over his wallet by his own free will. In that case, it's fairly straightforward, but it may not be so simple in other circumstances.

You can find things coercive without the negative consequence beyond physical threat. It could be financial damages, loss of respect, loss of friendship, social ostracisation, humiliation, shaming and any number of other things. For example, an abusive relationship might involve one partner coercing the other through threats of leaving them.

It's important to note that "coercion" within the context of law will not allow for the same kind of leniency in interpretation as elsewhere. One cannot conflate the legal term and usage outside of the legal context.

Also, there is a tendency to only use words with negative connotations in contexts that one disagrees with, and this is something I advocate against. If something is coercive only when the intention is malicious, or effect undesirable and not, for example, motivated by morality, and the desire to do good, then the term merely becomes its connotation and loses most of its meaning. If something is disqualified as coercion when you like the effect it produces, well, that's quite insidious indeed.

I would want to say that everything that one feels to be necessary is incentivized, but not everything that is incentivized is necessary. — Leontiskos

I think the context of the usage would be responsible for making it clear what someone meant, but sure.

Also, there is a tendency to only use words with negative connotations in contexts that one disagrees with, and this is something I advocate against. If something is coercive only when the intention is malicious, or effect undesirable and not, for example, motivated by morality, and the desire to do good, then the term merely becomes its connotation and loses most of its meaning. If something is disqualified as coercion when you like the effect it produces, well, that's quite insidious indeed. — Judaka

I agree wholeheartedly with this. I call it 'pejorification' (of a word). In fact, it seems to happen most frequently with the concept of morality, where one's own moral claims are considered 'moral', and the moral claims of others are considered 'moral meddling.' We saw it most recently, I aver, in your thread about "personal morality."

You can find things coercive without the negative consequence beyond physical threat. It could be financial damages, loss of respect, loss of friendship, social ostracisation, humiliation, shaming and any number of other things. — Judaka

Yes, I understand the gist of what you are saying. The classic example of this comes from Aristotle, with the captain of a ship who must throw his cargo overboard if his ship is to survive the storm, or a tyrant giving an order under threat:

That is generally held to be involuntary which is done under compulsion or through ignorance.

“Done under compulsion” means that the cause is external, the agent or patient contributing nothing towards it; as, for instance, if he were carried somewhere by a whirlwind or by men whom he could not resist.

But there is some question about acts done in order to avoid a greater evil, or to obtain some noble end; e.g. if a tyrant were to order you to do something disgraceful, having your parents or children in his power, who were to live if you did it, but to die if you did not—it is a matter of dispute whether such acts are involuntary or voluntary.

Throwing a cargo overboard in a storm is a somewhat analogous case. No one voluntarily throws away his property if nothing is to come of it, but any sensible person would do so to save the life of himself and the crew.

Acts of this kind, then, are of a mixed nature, but they more nearly resemble voluntary acts. For they are desired or chosen at the time when they are done, and the end or motive of an act is that which is in view at the time. In applying the terms voluntary and involuntary, therefore, we must consider the state of the agent’s mind at the time. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III.i (1110a)

I am happy to agree with Aristotle in his treatment of the voluntary and involuntary. What concerns me is the possibility that your definition of coercion is too lenient:

It is difficult to see how one could abandon this traditional definition while at the same time holding that there are any acts which are not coerced. — Leontiskos

Here is the definition of coercion (or compulsion) that I would adopt, which comes from Aristotle:

• LeC: "An act is compulsory when it has an external origin of such a kind that the agent or patient contributes nothing to it"
  
  • (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III.i, tr. Thomson).

I wonder what your definition would be? I assume it would reflect these things you have said:

There are a vast array of consequences that one may desire to avoid, and can thus be a coercive influence. — Judaka

As I said earlier, where a reasonable person would conclude that their failure to act in a particular way would result in negative consequences, then there is a coercive element at play... — Judaka

When one's action was taken to avoid some negative consequence that has been established, then we can call that environment coercive. — Judaka

Does this allow us to say that "there are any acts which are not coerced"? My act of eating chocolate ice cream is at least in part taken to avoid the negative consequence of not-having a delicious treat. My act of eating lunch is taken to avoid the negative consequence of hunger, etc. Or is the key to distinguish between those consequences that have been established by natural causes and those consequences that have been established by human causes?

The case which pertains to this thread is as follows. Presumably we agree with Aristotle that in the case of the tyrant there is a mixture of voluntariness and coercion, but I do not yet agree with you that there is a non-social element of morality which is coercive. That is, your claims in this thread for the idea that morality is coercive seem to be twofold: morality is coercive in both a social and non-social way. I agree that it is coercive in a social way, but I do not agree that it is coercive in a non-social way. I suppose I agree with @Pantagruel in this matter. For example:

A moral defence is a necessity, not a choice. — Judaka

Having an acceptable moral defence for one's actions or stances is necessary and therefore coerced... — Judaka

To say that one is coerced to have a moral defense is different from saying that one is coerced to observe a social moral code. Under what definition of coercion is one universally coerced to make a moral defense? Are you claiming that the need to make a moral defense is precisely a matter of social conditioning, or something...?

Thanks,
Leontiskos

In those quoted statements, I am referring to contexts of a social nature and not a universal one. A moral defence was supposed to have implied a reason for defence, which I don't think would be present in terms of introspection.

Comparatively speaking, what normally causes social anxiety or fear pales to a display of moral outrage. People, probably many on this forum, may outright declare you to be worthless should you express the wrong opinion. Even someone fearless may decide it's better to not lose friends or stir trouble, and respect to be earned if you say the right things. — Judaka

Hypocrisy, inconsistency, intellectual dishonesty and so on, are just logical consequences of the coercive environment created. One is forced into taking an unnatural position and knows fully that the wrong answer could have serious negative repercussions. — Judaka

The context for my OP was always social, and so I expected my words to be interpreted in this way.

Is morality coercive in a non-social way? I don't think so, not under normal circumstances. Perhaps one could criticise themselves or say things to themselves that were coercive, but that's about it, and that would be a non-standard use of the term.

My title "Morality is coercive and unrealistic" is certainly taking into account social factors, and this is why I didn't agree with my OP using "morality" as any of my definitions. We can talk about the "morality of X thing", or "X source morality", and we can talk about the effects of morality in a social context. When I say "morality is coercive", I am talking about morality in a social sense, it is the aggregate actions of the group that creates the coercive environment. Morality is just a garbage word, and I'm unsurprised that you've misunderstood me.

I certainly do think that people bend and twist concepts and ideas in moral contexts as it suits them, but if that's the motivation, then it's not coerced. It's a statement of power, for one to be able to perceive things as it suits them, quite antithetical to coercion.

I agree wholeheartedly with this. I call it 'pejorification' (of a word). In fact, it seems to happen most frequently with the concept of morality, where one's own moral claims are considered 'moral', and the moral claims of others are considered 'moral meddling.' We saw it most recently, I aver, in your thread about "personal morality." — Leontiskos

True, and I'm glad you agree.

Okay, thanks for explaining that to me. I understand now. I agree about these "effects of morality in a social context."

A law against murder for me, would not be a good example, because I think even an amoral society would have such a law, merely for the sake of preserving order. — Judaka

I found this comment interesting, but I think I will write a new thread rather than create a tangent here.