We presuppose that reality exists and that truth is that which is in accordance with reality. Whether something is true or not is based on whether it is in accordance with reality or not. Therefore, the only thing for an intellect to do is to determine what is true or not true and they are either right or wrong about it.
We could begin by saying that the meaning of a fact can be true and it can also be untrue. That is to say that one can interpret a fact to mean another thing is true and be correct or incorrect about it but it is still separate from the fact that was interpreted. Nonetheless, there is coherency in asking "is the meaning of the fact in accordance with reality?" After all, there are many contexts where the meaning of a fact can be proven, such as within probability, physics, economics etc.
Thus the arrangement of facts can conclude in another fact, there can be a logical or causal relationship between the arrangement of facts, the conclusion and the truth value of the conclusion. The conclusion may not have been able to have been reached in another way than by demonstrating it through an arrangement. Nonetheless, the truth value of the conclusion was not determined by the truth value of what was arranged. The truth value of the conclusion is quite simply the result of the conclusion being in accordance with reality. That it took us the arrangement to understand the conclusion or reach the conclusion demonstrates the usefulness of the arrangement but not its truth value.
I don't believe so. Look at the above example, from (1) (2) and (3) it is reasonable to conclude (4). And when it is reasonable to infer a thing on some basis, it is true that it is reasonable to do so. A particularly stark example is that the syllogism: A => B, A, therefore B, requires that A=>B is true. But perhaps you would not see the inference A=>B, A as an arrangement of facts. — fdrake
Reasonableness is a characterisation and cannot be a truth, you create a ruleset for when something is or isn't reasonable and when the conditions are fulfilled then the characterisation becomes
justified but this justification doesn't create a truth value. It is only true that you believe it is justified. The functionality of the ruleset was never dependant upon being in accordance with reality in the first place.
It seems to me you are conflating the fact that facts require agents for explication (through arrangement and narrativisation) for the dependence of facts upon agents' explication of them. An error like saying whether things fall to the ground when dropped depends upon our scientific accounts of gravity. You need to adopt a narrative and arrangement to explicate any aspects of reality; that makes it error prone. But not all accounts (= fact + arrangement + emphasis + narrative) are equally vindicated - they support their conclusions with different strengths. — fdrake
I am not sure how you reached that conclusion, so I can't rebut except to say "no, I'm innocent!".
You said you are not conflating truth with reasonableness, logic, strength of arguments and the like but you clearly are. Reasonableness, logic, validity, they're all characterisations defined by mutually agreed upon rulesets which function without accordance with reality being necessary. They're equally applicable in reality as they are in fiction. I don't know what purpose it serves to bring these things up to me, at the very least, there is no diagreement in the usefulness of these things, I am not trying to suggest that all arrangements are equal by every measurement or that they can't be characterised as being unreasonable, illogical, invalid or whatever else.
You did a good job in the OP describing a few mechanisms that bias can block the generation of relevant truths. I think you have invalidly inferred from the fact that we are necessarily biased when interpreting anything to the claim that interpretations of facts (with biases) are equally vindicated. — fdrake
I am not positing that arrangements are of equal quality, I am suggesting that any evaluation of the arrangement needs to go beyond whether the facts arranged are in fact true. Something which I think is self-evident but people ignore it because they enjoy having the authority that comes with your position being true.
Keep in mind also that arrangements don't just generate truths but also oughts, perspectives, characterisations and many things which we hopefully agree are very subjective. That is more so where our biases become important than merely trying to figure out the truth - where bias just appears to be a hindrance.
That's clearly an invalid argument. The number of arrangements doesn't say anything about their quality, only whether there are reasonable accounts does (and how many there are).
Does the fact that we disagree that your conclusions follow from your premises mean that there's no truth of the matter? — fdrake
It says something about their quality of all being true - considering they're contradicting. If I have true premises and a valid conclusion and you have true premises and a valid conclusion and the result is two contradicting conclusions from the same premises then calling them both true is just absurd. How can two contradicting conclusions both be in accordance with reality?
Given that some people take X=all the evidence about the shape of the Earth and conclude A=The Earth is flat, and some people conclude B=The Earth is approximately a sphere. The only distinction between concluding A based on X and B based on X is taste in your account. It makes it entirely useless at assessing arguments on their strengths and weaknesses. — fdrake
Impossible. You know full well that X proves B so why this example?
Which, ultimately, makes the function of this idea be entirely its discursive role. What ideas you throw the idea at to criticize. It can only be applied based on personal taste - tearing down what you dislike, leaving in place all you like. It's a version of faith, but a shallow one. It works to support any commitments you already have by rendering your tastes the last account standing, the only one you have not applied it to. — fdrake
Can you rephrase if you still feel this is valid?