It's really about the ethics of killing foetuses/babies and the ethics of whether women can decide to remove foetuses/babies from their own respective bodies. Most of the attempts to define "personhood" and appeals to biology are indexical pivots to influence someone one way or the other. What is really a debate about the ethics becomes a semantic quagmire, because everyone is throwing out shallow exclamations rather than speaking about the underlying ethical positions they hold.

I avoided that suggestion deliberately. Yes, it is true that many of these arguing "Universal (pre)determinism envision the are talking about the absence of alternative possibilities, but how does this make sense? To say something is a possible event is to speak of context where the future is not yet defined. That's why a suggested outcome is a "possible" outcome, as opposed to "The Outcome."

(Pre)determinism only has "The Outcome." At no point is what is yet to happen undefined such that it makes sense to speak of possible event(s). Under (pre)determinism, there is only the actual (states as will exist). Since everything is defined by an initial point alone, there are no possible outcomes to play in the world. Effectively, all events are subsumed into the one initial event. The presence of the initial event (supposedly) defines the presence of all existence events, logically collapsing the identity of every state into the initial one. This is obviously nonsensical as each state is it's own logical identity. For there to be one state, say a Big Bang, it doesn't define the presence of anything else. If there is to be a universe of plants and galaxies, it take those objects to exist. (Pre)determinism (and its assorted concepts, such as Lapace's demon) is logically incoherent and we are right to reject it.

Determinism is a different question though. What do we mean by it? Well, we are essentially saying that one state will exist after another. Cause and effect. That for each state of the world, there will only be one particular outcome which occurs, regardless of what happens. In other words: we are talking about the actual. To talk about determinism is to speak not of possibility, but rather of the logical expression of the actual. The events that actually happen after one another, to which there can be no challenge or alternative.

Where (pre)determinism goes wrong is failing to realise that determinism is about the actual. Instead, they take the actual and misread it as having consequences for possibility. Supposedly, the fact there is only ever one actual outcome means there were no possible events, as if it didn't take each state in its own moment to define the actual. This is a category error. The possible is not the actual. Possibility is what might happen. The actual is what does happen. They cannot touch each other. What actually happens has no effect on what is possible. One set of events occurring doesn't mean other outcomes are not possible. It just means they didn't happen. Possibility is always concurrent with the actual.

If we properly understand the possible and the actual, what we get is a wholly deterministic world in which anything is possible. The actual turns form being the opposite of possibility to an instance which is possible. All this handwringing over whether events are "deterministic" or not is revealed to a waste of time build on a fundamental misunderstanding of the possible and actual. The question doesn't make sense. It is not a question of finding evidence and proving a deterministic link.

Since any event is actual, it is necessarily determined, not by "the initial state," but by causes prior to it. Any event is also, by definition, one possible instance of what might happen, so it is one instance of a possible outcome. Logic tells us that both determinism and possibility are logically necessary.

So, I think TWOD is right to question the coherence of the idea that our beliefs can be determined by the past (in the sense that they would necessarily follow from the past "state of the universe" conjoined with deterministic laws). For sure, our beliefs can be strongly influenced or, to some extent "governed" by intelligible social or cultural or cognitive forces (e.g. strong sources of cognitive bias that social or evolutionary psychologists are studying). Those are conditioning forces, or hurdles, that fall short from absolving us from our cognitive responsibilities and hence, also, from negating our powers to acquire knowledge.

So, there are two sorts of deterministic forces that we are subjected to. Intelligible forces of the first kind (cultural/cognitive, etc.) are sources of bias in our abilities to judge, but they fall short from completely determining us. Our awareness of them doesn't lead to a justified sentiment of powerlessness, but, on the contrary, ought to raise our awareness of our cognitive responsibilities. We have the power to, and therefore are responsible for, defeating our own biases. And then there are sources of "determination" of our "behaviors" that are strict and inescapable. We can't violate the laws of physics, and those laws, in conjunction with the past (physical) "state" of the world govern what it is our physical "bodies" do and how our brains are configured. But the doctrine of universal determinism is incoherent because it attempts to lawfully bridge the gap between (physical) "body" and human bodies, between physical process and human behavior, between brain states and states of knowledge. But there are no such bridging laws. Physics and psychology disclose only partially overlapping empirical domains. The concept of a cause may also bridge them somewhat, but not in accordance with deterministic laws. — Pierre-Normand

I’m afraid to say this rather missies my point. Under my argument, there is only one sort of determining force: existing things causing other existing things, whether those things involves the expression of “laws of physics (e.g. rocks failing to the ground)” or “cognitive responsibility (e.g. whether or not someone understands that a group of people have particular right or not).“ All that’s different between these deterministic relationships is the states of existence involved and their differing expressions.


We can break the “laws of physics.” All it would take is a change in causal relationship (e.g. nearby masses react to stay in the same spot unless acted on by an outside force) between existing objects. In this sense, the world is no more “restricted” then our own behaviour. It’s just the objects which are us, as far as we have observed, are caused to express certain meanings more often than we’ve seen the world breaking present “laws of physics.” The behaviours we end up taking are, in fact, inescapable, in every case. We can no more violate what we end up doing than the path of a rock falling to the ground. Our bodies and decisions are “physical” in nature (similarly, “laws of physics” are just as "escapable," as QM alludes to; how the world works might change at any moment) .


Like all sorts of other systems in nature, they are cause of action we end up taking. Physics and psychology are overlapping empirical domains by definition: both involve the existence of humans states responding to the world around them. They are about the same objects. Indeed, the causation of “cognitive responsibility” involves the relationships of the “laws of physics” (reactions within the body and to the environment, chemicals, molecules, atoms, etc.,etc. )”

“Universal (pre)determinism” is about something else entirely. It’s not about trying to bridge the gap between humans and the rest of the world. Rather, it’s about trying to say some state of the world is logically necessary on the grounds of another, such that we could merely look at the position of an atom and tell everything that would ever exist. Without, you know, actually ever observing or even knowing anything about a future state of the world. The goal is to say that, logically, because X (X on its own), Y must be. It’s actually about possibility rather than the determination of any state. “Universal (pre)determinism” is about claiming there are no possible outcomes, in favour of saying there is a logically necessary one. Its problem is it attempts to talk about future caused events while denying they can be (as there are no possible outcomes) entirely.

If your beliefs are the result of pre-determined causes beyond your control, they would be held by pure happenstance (i.e. it's just the way things are). — Hanover

How exactly are you planning on executing free will in this situation? This argument suggests free will must executed by one's present belief, such that one's beliefs weren't determined by a prior state of oneself. How then can states of myself prior to my present belief control that I hold the belief in the future? Free will becomes impossible. No matter what I think, my beliefs will always be of random whim. I would have no control over them because I couldn't take action prior to the belief which would cause myself have it in the future.

In other words: all our beliefs would be happenstance without determinism.

Agents, I would have thought, are rational animals and thus belong to the category of substance (ousia). A state is a particular determination (in one specific respect) of a substance. It is expressed by a predicate, whereas an agent is typically designated by a proper name (or demonstrative), and characterized as the sort of substance that it is by a "substance form" concept, (e.g. the concept of a human being). I don't know what it could possibly mean to say that agents are states. What would they be states of? — Pierre-Normand

Ah, but that is the metaphysical error which is at stake here. We cannot be of substance. Substance is constant. No matter what happens in the world, substance remains the same. In the chaos of ever changing, destroying and forming states of existence, substance doesn not move or alter. Substance is identical at all these moments (i.e. "the world," "the set" which is of all existing things). The distinction and change which is characterises states of existence cannot be found in substance. To say otherwise would be to argue that, for example, that my hand and my foot had the same identity as existing states. They don't. My existing hand and foot are always different. Substance cannot be an existing state. We (and everything else) are states of nothing.

The reverse of the common approach is true: substance is of states. Any existing state (whether a human emotion or a rock) exists on it own terms and expresses substance. Substance cannot have any form.

All the controversy over predicates and proper names is born out confusion about substance. Since we initially consider substance and then search for its form which defines and object, we limit the definition of any object (existing state) to what we say or name in that moment. Our reasoning about substance prevents us from considering objects on their own terms. We think there can't be an object which extends beyond what we say because, we think, there can be no object without us saying the form of substance.

If, on the other hand, we begin an object, all these problems disappear. Speaking meaning is no longer required for an object to exist. Form of an object becomes not a feature of existence (i.e. a form of substance) but rather an expression of the object (i.e. substance is of the object). Existing human aren't present by the concept of a human being. Instead, they are an existing state which expresses the concept of a human being. Agents are existing states which express the concept/meaning of awareness and reaction to their environment.

Speaking an name or a predicate is no longer required to define the object. Any object may have more than meaning than is spoken in a given name of predicate. Indeed, all objects have more meaning than is spoken in a name or predicate, for neither name or predicate amount to a description of every aspect and relation of an object. Sometimes there is even meaning which is not spoken about in a used language. There are an incalculable transfinite number of meanings we could speak about every object. The meaning expressed by any object extends beyond the description we give about it, in any and every case.

This is nonsensical. Your beliefs can't be a predetermined result because it takes your belief's existence to result in the relationship. Not only can we not tell what you belief will be from the states which preceded it alone, but it is not even defined because the prior state isn't your belief. The version of determinism you are proposing is logically incoherent.

The problem is that holds a misunderstanding of causality. It is always deterministic. Any casual relationship, by definition, has one state relating out of another. Agents are states. One's willing is a state of existence which causes another state of existence (future action). In this respect it it just like any other state of existence. One specific state then results in another. Willing is merely another from causal relationship, it's presence determining the future event in conjunction with that event itself.

All too often we confound ourselves when talking about the causation of future states. We take the abstraction of a meaning of casual states (e.g. "laws of reality)" and treat them as if the are an outside actor which acts to force future events to one logically necessary outcome. We ignore that any casual relationship needs it determined result (the effect) to be defined. The abstractions we like to offer up as the supposedly limiting "laws of reality" are actually immanent to specific causal relationships we have encountered. The outcome of a causal system is not determined into one outcome by an outside force of the "laws of reality." It is an expression of that specific system itself (those existing states of cause and effect together).

Therefore, in casualty, the determining of a future state, places no limit on what is possible. The abstractions we have noted in past casual relationship needn't apply to any other we encounter. That's always a question of the particular state of the case and effect of the specific relationship. Determinism is not the opposite of possibility, but runs concurrently with it. Everything is determined in a world where anything possible. For any action taken or event caused, it was possible for it to be otherwise.

"Laws of reality" do not determine anything. States of existence (including our will and actions), in there respective causal relationships, are the determining actors. They are the "deterministic laws" and so there is no outside force which can constrain states of the world to one necessary outcome. Prior conditions cannot form a causal (and deterministic) relationship. Determined events have no link to "laws of reality," whether we are talking about our will or the movement of a rock (any time it's possible a rock could have moved differently) .

Thus, there is no need to negate determinism to maintain liberty of spontaneity. We have liberty of spontaneity under determinism. Any action we cause, we determine, with our will could possible be otherwise. Agent causation, as you describe it, is an unnecessary effort to protect possibility in the world. It's a response to the idea determinism entails the elimination of possibility. It's an attempt to paper holes left by the mistake of posing of casual relationships as defined by a prior state alone. Far better to get to the root of the problem and take out this logical error in our analysis of casualty entirely, to call out the error of supposing that deterministic relationships can be given by citing a prior state on its own.

Even more critically, it is required for free will. The point of free will is that , in our consciousness of the world and actions, a state of ourselves determines what our future actions are. The point of thinking: "I will now write this post rather than read my book," in the context of free will, is it is a causal state which results in my future action. "Freedom" with respect free will is pointless. If the state of myself (which we might call "The Decision" ) doesn't cause my action in the future, if it doesn't set me taking one specific action in the future, I cannot control my actions. If I was "free" to be anything at any moment, I could not have functioning free will. My actions would be entirely random. What I thought I would to in the future could have no causal effect on what I ended-up doing. Free will is necessarily deterministic and requires the absence of absolute "freedom."

If you believe the nonsense that human action is somehow defined without any reference to our circumstances, sure. The compatibilist rejects this. For them the sort of freedom you are talking about doesn't exist. Free will doesn't exist in that sense for them. In this respect they are in perfect agreement with you. No human action takes place in an environment without the presence of some sort of force which limits or threatens the actor involved.

The prosecution may be biased towards drawing this conclusion (in the face of evidence) while the defense may be biased towards drawing the contrary conclusion. But the regulative standards of the judicial process enjoins finding out whether the accused indeed acted freely, and culpably, or can be exculpated on ground of insanity (or rational incapacity). It's not two incompatible philosophical doctrines about free will that are put on trial, it is a human agent. — Pierre-Normand

I'd take my description a bit further. Free will is not even at stake here. These legal categories are measuring specific coercive factors on an agent, not whether their act was freely defined. The question is not whether anyone had a choice or not, but rather the circumstances of the choice and how it relates to legal and moral culpability. What we are trying to work out is not whether someone was free to choose otherwise. It is whether they chose in a certain way, so that we know how to respond to them and the risk they might pose in the future.

The serious point: we can't know whether a behavior is determined or freely chosen. No matter what I claimed, or you claimed, the claim would be open to challenge. — Bitter Crank

That's a misstep. We know the behaviour was determined (the causal chain leading up to that point) and we know it was freely defined (nothing prior to that behaviour defined its presence). To ask whether the act was determined or freely defined doesn't make sense. It was both. Whether it is thought a "choice" or not will really come down to if you are talking about an act someone consciously plans or subconscious response, and exactly how you are considering choice in that context.

Are we ever not coerced by anyone? A compatibilist will have to say, I suppose, that if coerced into a bad situation, say of being a slave, anything one does in that position within the confines of slavery is not really a free choice, in the same way that handing over our wallet is not a free choice with a gun pointed at us, because we are being coerced on pain of being killed, beaten, or whatever it might be. — The Great Whatever

You are still using the nonsensical libertarian version free will here. The compatibilist rejects this notion of free will. For the compatibilist, free will is about being the actor in a deterministic chain, without which events would be different. It's not about getting a good or pain free outcome.

So, for example, in the case of the gun being pointed at us, we have the choice, as we are the actor, of whether we ignore the command (and risk being shot) or follow the orders of the gunman (whether that be to hand over our wallet or press a button to partake in an act of genocide). In many cases, if not all, acts of free will our performed under the influence of coercion. It is still, however, our choice. We are still the actor who defines whether one things happens rather than another. One could say that compatibilism is the realisation that free will is concurrent, rather than mutually exclusive, with coercion. Free will is not whether one can do whatever they want without consequence. It is that one acts one way or another in a world where there are consequences.

Awareness does not dependent on being thought about or recalled in memory. Life does not need to think about how it had an experience to have one. And it is most definitely a conscious experience. I don't need to think about how the stove was hot for it to be hot. I just feel that in the moment. Our lives are full of moments of awareness we never think about, experiences which never in our memory. We do not have to think: "I am thinking..." to have a thought. It most certainly a conscious experience. Our analysis has already taken that has given by we are talking about conscious experiences.

To be aware of what we are thinking in any moment is a different experience than that (now former) moment. The "timeless" of experience is defined by how the moment of any experience is not the moment we are thinking about it. It applies to any experience, including experiences when we think about what we are thinking of. Let's say I experience a hot stove. Then I might think about how I experienced a hot stove. Then I might think about how I was thinking about a time when I experience a hot stove just a moment ago. And so and so on. In the moment, even experience is timeless. I don't place any of my experiences in time until I've passed into a different state of experience.

When TGW says people don't get the Schop quote, he is right. It's not merely trying to, as many people think, say that anything is dependent on experience, but rather trying to deal with the distinction of "timeless" of any experience or state of the world (the presence of a tree, for example, says nothing about time) in a world where overstate is placed within time. How can everything of time but "timeless" in this way? How can things be given on their own ("timeless") when all are other things (states of existence) are necessarily given with them (causality, everything connected in time)? That's the supposed paradox.

I can see no good reason at all to believe that, because I can see no genuine problem with the notion that they originated independently of our experiences. — John

They haven't "originally" occurred independent of our experiences at any time though. They are part of causal system all bound-up together. Ancestral events prior to us cannot be given without our experiences.

If we talk about past events, we have left behind discussion of any single moment. No moment has a "beginning." We can't say any moment the world "originated" at a time. We can say that some moment occurred at one time rather than another, but then we have left behind any discussion of a moment. We are talking about time and causality, all events bound-up together in necessary relation: there is no independence.

I more or less agree with TGW here. The temporally ordered sequence is a new experience which happens after the event. So, I think, is spacial significance. We don't see or think of the room in the moment we first see a letter on a screen. We don't see or think what comes after or before the latter we are looking at. All those things happen later. They are different experiences.

Our acts of individual will (in the sense of a moment of experience) are always distinct form and proceed us placing that experience in space and time. Intelligible in a temporally ordered sequence they might be, but there is no moment of our lives which is also the moment of us placing that moment in space and time.

You're leaving out a fifth option: the it-in-itself is nothing. A feature which has no element to describe or phenomenological manifestation to talk about. Something humans can understand perfectly well because there is nothing more to say about it. A logical feature which isn't more than "the thing itself' and so does not manifest as any sort of chainlink (which we might describe as steel, strong, long, grey, etc. etc., ) between the objects and language/experience.

This seems like a cognitive-sci-phi talking point misplaced. I don't disagree that we can be mistaken during introspection, but I don't see what bearing our introspective fallibility has on our capacity to understand objects as they'd be outside human perspective. — "csalisbury

The point is they are not, in the relevant sense, outside human perspective. Everything in existence is linked in causality. Human perspectives are stuck connected to everything else. Any state of the world is X.... to a human perspective. "Introspection" is a problem because it slices the world into what is "for us," things of human perspective, and that which is not, things which cannot have anything to do with human perspective. The interconnection of causality shows this separation incoherent. Our world cannot be split into what is "for us" and that which is "outside us." The error of introspection and correlationism is not to demand the rest of the world is connected or meaningful in relation to us. Rather it is in its use of the dichotomy of "for us" and "outside of us." In thinking in terms of the world being "for us," we use the dichotomy of separation which forms incoherence around ancestrality.

(2) "Worldless" experiences (of the sort TGW often likes to discuss.) — csalisbury

Philosophy has trouble with this because tends not to think of things-in-themslves. It attempts to make them a matter of correlation to language. Supposedly, we must be able to encompass an experience in language for us to have felt it or understand something.

The reference of "the thing itself" the the only way we have to think and speak about wordless experiences in language. We can say: "I felt something, but I cannot put it into words" and actually communicate to others about the worlds experience. In some cases, our reference to the object (as any experience is an existing object) even causes them to understand this wordless experience, despite language not describing anything about it.

The "wordless" is not hard to describe. We know it doesn't, in words, have one. Whatever the "wordless" might mean (which we may well know), we know it can't be given in words. The correlationist project, where everything about any object is linked to a form significant in language, fails spectacularly. Our experiences and the world are not limited to the concepts we use in language.

That issue is avoided by the condition of omniscience. If I know everything, then I would know I was omniscient. Assuming I'm interested in being truthful, then I would identify myself as omniscient.

A possible issue for omniscience, in practice, is limited window of any instance of knowledge. Since each instance of understanding is a specific instance, which can be found nowhere else, the experience of knowledge is always limited. If I'm thinking about a tree, then I'm not thinking about yesterday's game of cricket. One cannot think of everything all at once, even if they were to have a consciousness which held all the ideas "at once (each idea is still a separate moment of their existence)."

Though, it's fair to say that our notion of knowledge probably accounts for this issue anyway. When we think of knowledge as a sum, we aren't talking about what someone knows in an immediate moment, but rather to information they have stored, which they can recall when prompted. In this sense, there is no logical barrier to omniscience. For someone to be able to recall any information is logically coherent.

The example that I gave earlier was that of the lump of bronze that constitutes, over some finite time period, a statue of Hermes. One can point at the statue (and thereby also point at a lump of bronze) while being unclear over what kind of object it is. Now, Brassier would say that the object pointed at exists regardless of one's knowledge of what it is. (See paragraph 42). But what object is it that Brassier believes is being pointed at? There are at least two of them -- a statue, and a lump of bronze -- and arguably an indefinite number of different objects that different possible understandings of the ways in which the empirical world can be carved up could single out as the object being pointed at. It could be Hermes' nose, of even, supposing Hermes were a person, Hermes himself (with the demonstration of his statue being a conventional means of referring to him). — Pierre-Normand

You are missing that, in that instance, the statue is named. You began by pointing at a statue. The object you were thinking of has been there all along. Similarity, Brassier begins by talking about Saturn. What object someone is pointing at is always, assuming a coherent claim about the world is made, given in talking about some state of the world (statue, Saturn, etc.,etc.).

Perhaps more critically, Brassier's argument doesn't merely concern itself with a specific object. He has a major point about the logical expression of any object. In making the argument objects don't need experience to exist, Brassier is making a metaphysical argument not an empirical one. In talking about "the thing-itself" one doesn't actually point to any object at all. That's not what the concept is about. One is stating a logical truth about any object, not saying any particular thing exists. It is to say how the statue, the lump of bronze, each atom, the many collection of atoms, Hermes' nose, an object representing Hermes, etc.,etc., etc. (extended to all objects), are given in themselves, as opposed to being dependent on something else to be logically defined.

In Fregean terms, for the object to exist just is for it to fall under the intelligible and objective concept (regardless of anyone actually grasping the concept) that determines what kind of object it is (together with its persistence and identity conditions). — Pierre-Normand

This doesn't make sense because existence is never in question here. All that deal with is the meaning of an object. It says: "For an existing object to make sense, it falls under an intelligible and objective concept, which is how its defined as a distinct object."

What it takes for an object to exist, that an object is present rather than not, isn't spoken about.

Naive realists believe that there is a fact/value dichotomy, where values are placed on the side of our contingent sensibilities and understandings. They thus believe science ought to be tasked with peeling off (or explaining away) the appearances that our use of secondary quality concepts yield. What would remain of reality after mere appearances (to us) have been thus peeled of is the objective world as it is in itself. But if the dichotomy is illusory, as I believe it is, then the peeling off leaves nothing. — Pierre-Normand

The problem is naive and direct realism doesn't realism advocate this. The peeling is only present when it has been presumed that reality (things-in-themselves) has a nature which is separate to appearances (things which appear). For the naive and direct realist, this separation doesn't exist. Reality is (in part) as it appears. Things-in-themselves, objects as the are, appear to us. That's the naive and direct realist's position. We experience (partly) what is there.

The "peeling off" is actually an indirect realist/anti-realist position, whether appearance are considered to have nothing to do with the nature of independent objects. Claims of the naive and direct realist are literally being ignored, in favour of those prescribed by to them those of indirect realist/anti-realist position. The indirect realist/anti-realists are inserting there own position of separation between appearances and objects, and then claiming it is what the naive and direct realist argues.

I'd say you are good: intimate relationships don't exist. A relationship is not any state of the world. It's a logical expression expressed across many. An intimate relationship isn't formed by any one state, a hundred states of a person, or even ten billion states of a person. Intimate relationships are not objects. This is why trying to define what states of existence make a intimate relationships (or basically any other sort of relationship really) doesn't work. Such relationships can't be reduced to any one or multiple objects.

In the simplest terms, religious claims about the world are the metaphysical (the necessary) and contingent (the finite, states of the world) confused. Metaphysics deals in logic: in what is true regardless of what exists in the world. Religious claims about the world (at least the sort that you seem to be referring to) are confusion of an imagined existing state (e.g. God) with the metaphysical. This can consist in the claim that some state of existence is logically necessary (e.g. that the Creater Being must exist, or else the world does't make sense) or the claim that an undefined or non-existent Being must be (e.g. the "unknowable", "unobservable" God).

This error is not limited to religious claims though. Humankind has delivered many examples of this confusion about the world and metaphysics. Essentialism, Utopianism, etc.,etc. Basically, anytime someone says "this must necessarily be" when talking about a state of the world, they are committing some version of this error.

You can understand what motivates his denial though.

Do sortal concepts (or sortal conceiving) exist in the absence of conceiving beings?
If no, and if Saturn's independence of sortal concepts is implausible, then there cannot be a Saturn without such beings.
If yes, then what exactly is this 'minimal conceptual ground' which is independent of conceiving beings? And how can we maintain such a ground without reverting to idealism? — csalisbury

That's a misplaced question. Conceptual expression doesn't exist. It is a question of logic, not of states existence. Existing objects express concepts, they aren't the presence (existence) of concepts. Someone conceiving, therefore, has no need to exist do avoid the incoherence of things without concepts. Concepts are expressed regardless of whether we know about them. Both in terms of present objects (if an object exists, then it is there expressing concepts) and in other logical truths which don't deal with the definition of existing things (e.g. 2+2=4, the idea of a tree, etc.,etc. )

Saturn is not independent from conceptual expression. Brassier is not making any such suggestion. Rather he is pointing out that the presence of someone experiences is not required to define conceptual expression, as it isn't a state of existence. Objects are what exists or does not exist.

Hence, people who refer to Saturn without knowing that it is a planet must at least know that it is something like a 'celestial body', say, that is, something objective that can be seen in the sky and will likely not reappear under the bed. This means that Saturn, thus conceived, falls under a determinable (vague) sortal concept that awaits further determination or revision. But the sortal concept under which it falls, however imprecise, still is a part of our conception of Saturn, and partly determinative of what it is. — Pierre-Normand

This is a strawman because Brassier is not attacking the conceptual nature of anything that we know. Indeed, he makes exactly the same criticism: that a state must have conceptual expression, else be incoherent, as it isn't any specific finite state. "Meaningless" independent worlds are Brassier's targets here.

You've completely missed the role of the conceptual in Brassier's argument. His argument about Saturn is dealing in anything but vagueness. It's about a specific instance of knowledge, Saturn as the planet Saturn, and when this is present. His entire point is that Saturn doesn't fall under a vague sortal concept at all. It is, in the instance of the example, understood to be something it is not (e.g. the face of a mighty sky god), while the fact it is the planet Saturn is unknown. It is not about what awaits whether determination or revision (those are different instances of knowledge!!! ), but rather about specific instance of knowledge and how the relate to specific conceptual expression of an object.

Brassier IS NOT attacking that people understand Saturn in various ways conceptual ways, some right (bright light in the sky, the planet Saturn) and other wrong (mighty sky god). Rather he is pointing out that the conceptual expression of Saturn is present even when no-one understands Saturn to be there. Here the way Saturn is "sorted" conceptually by us at a given time has no relevance to Brassier's point. He's pointing out the object Saturn expresses the meaning of Saturn no matter how we might understand it.

According to the second reading, for Saturn to exist is independent of the sortal concept under which it falls when we think of it, perceive it, or talk about it, as whatever it is that it indeed is (in this case, arguably, a planet). But this is quite implausible. The reason is that reference just can't get any grip on anything objective without some minimal conceptual ground with which to anchor conditions of persistence and individuation that determine what it is one is referring to (in thought, talk, or demonstratively). — Pierre-Normand

Brassier is actually arguing the conceptual expression of Saturn is independent of the presence of our concepts (i.e. it is present whether or not Saturn is present in our knowledge; the position which avoids the idealism of saying someone needs to know the conceptual expression of Saturn for an object with such meaning to exist), as opposed to suggesting it is independent conceptual expression. The definition of reference is maintained because Saturn still expresses the concept that defines its reference to a statement. Hence those who don't know about Saturn ("It's a mighty sky being") or know about it in some other way ("bright light in the sky" ) are still talking about Saturn. Despite not knowing the concept of Saturn, they are talking about the object which expresses the concept of Saturn.

He's describing difference between concepts expressed in expereince and objects there. Objects are never the means by which we know them (our experiences of an object). What this means is not that objects don't express concepts, but rather that such expression is NOT the presence of our experiences. Here he is pointing out our thoughts about objects are not the objects themselves.

How rapidly do events happen in our absence, in the absence of any experience? In a sightless, soundless, tasteless, touchless world with no perspective from which to establish a spatial or temporal scale, how do the experienceless postsentient years unfurl? Try - really try - to imagine this. — csalisbury

This the problem Brassier is addressing. Such a world is meaningless. Brassier brings this-up precisely because the "independent world," separate to the conceptual, does not make sense. Unknown things must be something. They must have a conceptual expression to qualify as existing states. Without this conceptual expression, no "how" to the unfurling of the world can be defined. Hence conceptual expression is not, as is commonly thought, a mere feature of awareness in experience but rather of objects too.

Thus, Saturn is present (object), and is Saturn (concept expressed by the object), and can be pointed to, even when no-one holds the concept in experience.

Are we not tacitly making use of the scales and perspectives we inhabit in trying to understand the truths we utter? — csalisbury

Indeed, but's that a strawman. Brassier is taking about expression of objects, not what we are aware of in our experience. The fact we are using our own scales and perspectives to understand something (including objects in the absence of our experience) has never been contested. Brassier is talking about something else which has no impact on the fact that what we know is always contained within our perspective.

It really depends on you mean by "perfectly correspond."

We tend to get fooled and confused when we approach this topic because while all instances of knowledge must be "perfect" (i.e. one must have the exact idea of what they understand), it is also true that any instance of knowledge is incomplete.

Even one has (perfect) knowledge of an entire library, there is always something else to know, and sometimes it relates to what they do know in important ways (what good is it knowing the stove is hot if you don't know it is damaging you?).

Our world is simultaneously exhausted in the conceptual (there can't be something without meaning, viz Wittgenstein), but never completed in the concepts of our knowledge (each concept we have leaves out knowledge of everything else). We "perfectly correspond" in our knowledge all the time, but it is a mere drop in the ocean of "what is." What our "perfect knowledge"does just doesn't fit with the notion of the exhaustive account we are sometime prone to chasing.

Objects in nature (let alone those in the human world of artifacts) don't come into existence labeled with their own criteria of persistence and individuation — Pierre-Normand

Indeed. It runs all together deeper. Objects which are, later named and categorised by us, ARE something which we later identify (tall, short, soft, round, heavy, a chair, a cat, a tree, etc.,etc.). There is NO criteria of persistence and individuation.

An object, by definition, is persistent (else it would be a given language/experience that was talking about something else) and individuated (else it wouldn't be a specific finite state). All objects express these qualities, regardless of what they might be.

Another way to phrase this would be to ask: how can we come to detect interesting patterns in the empirical world, patterns, that is, that are relevant to our human practices and interests, and hence that we can pick up conceptually, if there aren't distinct and 'ontologically primary' (and 'pre-conceptual') entities there to be patterned by us? — Pierre-Normand

That's the dead end/error which drives much of the nonsense about theory of truth. There isn't a "how." At some point we are simply found with awareness of particular empirical or logical patterns. We never sit outside this knowledge to somehow derive it. Our knowledge is given by the presence of the object(s) which is(are) the understanding of something else. It is a question of (our) existence rather than of reasoning.

"Ontologically primary"and "the pre-conceptual" are incoherent. Existence doesn't preceded existence. There is just existence. Anything which does exist, which can be expressed language, expresses the conceptual by definition. There can't be a computer, for example, I discover and learn to talk about if such objects fall outside conceptual expression.

Willow also is arguing that the attack on the very idea of "correspondence" is motivated by a tacit rejection of metaphysical realism (which he calls "realism"). Michael is right to point out that the specific notion of 'correspondence' that underlies 'correspondence theories of truth' can be challenged by people who don't commit to a specific metaphysical stance. That is, one can coherently reject the correspondence theory of truth while being a realist (like me), or while being an anti-realist (like Michael?) who nevertheless acknowledges a semantic distinction between things that belong to language proper and the things referred to to. — Pierre-Normand

I should clarify I'm talking about how most people use actually "correspondence" more so than its status as a theory of truth, at least going off by what most here are describing as a "theory of truth."

The difficulty here is the nature of the requirement of "correspondence". What you and Michael appear to consider the "correspondence," something which sits on top of what falls within the linguistic realm, as if there was something other than merely and object and experience which defined the presence of "correspondence" is not how most people use the term.

My point is very few people actually means this when they talk about the requirement of correspondence. For most "correspondence" isn't the requirement in excess of an object and how it is known experience (as you and Michael are reading it), but rather merely the presence of the relevant object and experience, such that an object is spoken about/thought of/observed. It the identification that, for us to speak about an object, the relevant object and speech are required.

Basically if X, then X is required. Most arguments for correspondence are actually a statement of the deflationary truth. This is what John was alluding to in his OP. In most instances where someone argues correspondence, they are actually making a statement about deflationary truth in the context of relating language/experience to objects.

The correspondence theory of truth which you are attacking, and rightly so, isn't actually held by most people who argue for truth in terms of correspondence. Even the somewhat careless "independent world" realists who fail to identify the connection of the world to linguistically and experiential expression don't really follow it. For most correspondence signifies the requirement of an object and experience of that object, for instances where an object is spoken about.

So Michael is missing the point entirely. It is certainly true one can be realist (non-realist) while rejecting correspondence as used in most instances (i.e. deflationary truth in relation to objects and experiences), but it has never been said otherwise. Rather, the argument is that one cannot have a coherent position if they reject correspondence (and realism) in this sense.

But that's wrong. It's exactly the opposite: we know the nature of (your) consciousness. We know its a particular state which has emerged from other particular states. So it is in any instance where we know about an existing consciousness.

A mystery is exactly what we do not have.

Exactly. More or less. "Logic" says nothing. The difference in question is given entirely by "not about language" or "about language." If we want to describe how a logical difference is about language or not, we don't do so by saying "logic." We say say: "about language" or "not about language." "Logic" merely points something is an infinite expression rather than a state of existence.

It similar "correspondence" or "truth." They are equally "meaningless." All those teams do is point to other meanings. If you want to know what's true or what someone is aware of, you actually have to describe it. "Correspondence" or "truth" describe nothing about anything themselves.

I don't know what you're trying to say here. — Michael

You, for example, agree with the realist on what correspondence entails (something talked about), and that it occurs, but are you compelled to oppose the notion because you are concerned about defend your unstated metaphysical position.

The realist ties correspondence (talking about things) to a certain metaphysics, so you attack it out of a concern for opposing that connection. You are trying to avoid a situation where realism is recognised as the only coherent metaphysical position where language is distinct form the things it talks about. You are saying something you don't believe: "talking about things is incoherent (i.e. correspondence is incoherent due to lack of criteria)" to protect your (unstated) metaphysics.

You are, again, asking for criteria when it doesn't make sense. Some logical distinctions are merely not about language.

Except this very discussion was over you claiming that if one criticizes the correspondence theory or realism then one is saying "there is nothing we can talk about in the world". Are you now accepting that this is false? That I can talk about the world even though I'm not a realist or a correspondence theorist? — Michael

There is a difference in what one says and what they understand on an issue. One can say things they don't believe or which is not reflective of their understanding. This is one of those times.

Due to an (unstated) metaphysical position, the critics attack the realist's argument about "correspondence" because it suggests their metaphysics position is incoherent. The realist ties "correspondence" (language/experience which talks about/is awareness of a state of the world) to the realist metaphysical position (things defined in-themselves), so people are compelled to object to it, as it a point the significance of the realist argument depends on. Deny "correspondence" an/or its link to realism, and the idea realism is the only metaphysical position coherent with talking about things disappears.

Thus, people are found saying something "correspondence (talking about things) is incoherent, due to lack of criteria," they don't actually believe.

Logical distinctions don't need to be about language. Some distinctions are not about language.

Semantics is a type of logical distinction, that which is expressed in language, but it is not exhaustive of logical difference. There are logical differences which are not about language.

No I don't. I talk about cats, and unicorns, and Harry Potter. But this doesn't make me a realist or a correspondence theorist. As I've said before, to reject the correspondence theory and to reject realism is not to say "there is nothing we can talk about in the world." — Michael

For sure. The point was never that you were a realist. It was that the only logical position to hold is realism. No-one's saying you are a realist. They are saying your metaphysical (as opposed to your empirical position) position is incoherent. Even as you talk about cats, Harry Potter and unicorns. It's your metaphysics which the problem here, not your ability to describe or think about specific things which are in (or not in) the world.

Nope. It's not semantics. Logically (i.e. metaphysically), language is not the object it talks about. I'm not just arguing for a semantic distinction. I'm arguing for a logical distinction between language and the objects it talks about. The distinction that some things are not language. (and hence the semantic argument fails because it restricts its commentary to distinctions within language).

And it this metaphysical distinction which the anti-realist does not accept and you cannot envision. So caught-up in language, you only talk about our language. You talk about our description of cats and "cats" (our semantics) rather than thinking of cats themselves. You actually leave out any and all of the relevant metaphysical commentary.

You fail to talk about what, logically, is need for a cat or a "cat" and so always come-up with a circumstance where no metaphysical position is present. You are literally ignoring the issue the realist is commenting on and the proclaiming their argument must be wrong because you don't want to talk about metaphysics.

But's that's your strawman. There is no criteria. "Correspondence" is merely when there is one thing (language/experience, "cat" ) which talks/is awareness of another (cat ). There isn't a thing about an object or experience which "makes it" correspond to other. In any case it is feature of this objects (i.e. states of the world) themselves. Some things ARE cats. Some experiences ARE "cat." "Correspondence" IS the match between an experience and object, as opposed to how we judge whether or not we know whether someone's aware of something or if a state is talked about in an experience.

The problem with you criticism is it completely fails to engage with the idea of language and objects being separate. So much so that you posit the laughable question of what "criteria" makes language and the object separate. As if they were, in the first instance, the same thing and needed something to make them distinct from each other. They are separate by definition. (i.e. it's not all about language).

That's what your account is missing. It's not just a question of language. Things are not the language used to speak of them. When the cat is sleeping and no-one is talking about it, it still exists. Its presence is not defined by language. It's a thing on its own terms. It is defined not by the presence of language, but by its existence. Here definition is not to do with language, but rather with objects. It is a question of what it takes for a cat or "cat" to exist, rather than what it means to talk about a cat.

So I am saying a cat and "a cat" are different things, but its more than just that. I am also talking about what it takes for the presence of cat and "cat." I'm not merely (as you are) distinguishing things and talk about things. I'm also dealing with the additional question of what it takes to form cat and "cat." And their relationship to each other (e.g. Do we need to say of think "cat" for there to be a cat? ).

I know that.

The (realist) argument here is going beyond merely whether or not we say there are things we can talk about. It is asserting something about metaphysics: pointing out that talking about things which are distinct from language only make sense under a realist framework, when the existence of things is defined by other than by the existence of a use of language. Here the point is about more than whether or not we say we can talk about things. It is about the relationships of things we can talk about to our language.

If we there are things we can talk about, and the presence of our language is distinct from the state we talk about, then we have an experience which "corresponds" to a thing in the world (i.e. talks about). There are things, defined in themselves (e.g. a chair), and then there is language/experience of thing (someone thinking about the thing of chair). Any position other than realism (although possible) is incoherent. Certainly there are not only "correspondence theories," but only "correspondence theories" (where "correspondence" means a state of language use/experience which talks about/is awareness of a state the world) make sense.

That's a different question. Now you aren't asking how your consciousness came about, but rather whether there are any other conscious states emerging from atom and void. Each proposed instance of that would have to be judged units own merits. You can't simply take that because you have conscious states that are emergent out of a complex system, that the presence of something complex and emergent also means the emergence of consciousness.

Missing the point, Michael. My argument was pointing out that criticisms of correspondence mean in the language (and so the claim) they are attacking. The issue here is not whether critics of correspondence have literally said (or think): "There is nothing we can talk about in the world," but rather what attack on correspondence means with respect to how most people use correspondence.

Since correspondence usually means "talking about something in the world," a suggestion it is incoherent registers as saying that talking about the world is incoherent, as the criticism professes that what the correspondence argument is suggesting (talking bout things in the world) is impossible.

Correspondence – in the sense you described – doesn't lead to realism. Correspondence – in the sense you described – has nothing to do with metaphysics.

Almost everyone says that we can talk about things and almost everyone says that some of the things we talk about exist. But not everyone is a realist and not everyone accepts the correspondence theory of truth. Therefore realism and the correspondence theory of truth aren't simply the positions that claim that we can talk about things and that some of the things we talk about exist.

You accuse others of using straw men to attack your position but then use red herrings to defend it.. — Michael

Indeed, it doesn't form realism. People with other understandings may exist,even as the claim to accept or reject correspondence. The point is, however, logically, realism is the only position which make sense. If there is distinction between language and the things in the world language talks about (what most uses of "correspondence" are talking about)," then realism obtains. Things are defined in themselves rather than by the presence of experiences.

So, indeed, realism and (logically reasoned) correspondence "theory" of truth (i.e. pointing out states of our language talk about other states of the world) is not merely saying we can talk about things. It constitutes a metaphysical claim. In this form, it supposes there are objects which are defined in themselves which we talk about. It's a metaphysical position.

The issue is, of course, this argument is made not on the grounds of what people believe (e.g. whether is possible to, for example, proclaim can talk about things while rejecting realism. Or proclaim correspondence while suggesting objects are not defined in themselves).

Thus, rather than a red-herring, it is actually talking on a level objectors to correspondence are not. This argument is about the logical consistency of one's positions regrading the relationship of things to experience. It's merely daring to mention something that those who don't look beyond immediate experience (e.g. thinking we can talk about things, thinking there is correspondence) are unwilling to examine.

I'd say it all about (perceived) Correspondence Theory of Truth and realism. In the OP, they are defending correspondence as instances where language talks about some other existing state (including our experiences).

They are arguing there is a "match" between what we talk about and what exists, a difference between a state of language and things in the world which language might talk about, that objects are given in themselves rather than by our language which talks about them: realism. The OP is attacking the strawman objections to "correspondence" which lead to a denial of realism.

In the language of those who understand "correspondence" to mean "talks about an existing state" it does. For this language, "correspondence" means "instance of language which talks about the world."

If you are to insist, referring to this use of language, as your objection purports, and say "correspondence" is incoherent, you are literally saying talking about existing things is impossible.