I earlier advised you to read Scott Soames' book Understanding Truth. I make that same recommendation again. :)

Thanks, I'll certainly check that out and see if I can afford it. :-$ . I have Soames' history of analytic philosophy in my shelves somewhere, but I am yet to read it.

Soames is the man. His history of AP is excellent.

What is said about any thing, event or situation could never correspond completely to the thing, event or situation, and this is Frege's point, I think, but what is said about the particular facts or attributes of whatever thing, event or situation we are talking about, that are highlighted in the saying could correspond to these particular fact or attributes, in fact it logically must in order that it be just those facts or attributes that are being highlighted. — John

What you say here would be correct, it seems to be, if you would restrict it to (Fregean) objects and attributes (Fregean concepts); and drop the idea of correspondence with facts. As I urged earlier, the idea that you seem to be groping for (though I might be wrong) simply is reference. If you believe that A is F, and can accurately express this belief with the sentence "A is F", then for this belief to be true, it must be the case that the object A be suitably related to your thought about it, and likewise that the property F that A possesses be suitable related to the property that you express with the predicate "... is F". But those necessary correspondences that must hold in order for you statement to be meaningful (and for the belief that is purports to express to be an intelligible belief at all) just are relations of reference between the words that you use and the objects and properties that you are talking (and thinking) about.

Thus, those 'correspondence' relations, that really are referential properties of linguistic items, and of the (Fregean) thought components (Sinne) that they express, are necessary conditions, not of truth, but of meaningfulness. The conditions for truth isn't for the full sentence to refer to the fact. (On Frege's account, the reference of a sentence is The True of The False.) The condition for the truth of the sentence (and the thought that is expresses, which is its sense, according to Frege) rather is that the object thought about have the property ascribed to it. But this is just to say that "A is F" is true iff A is F and nothing more than that.

I think you're probably right that I am groping towards what is conventionally thought of as reference. For me, to say that 'A' refers to A seems to be pretty much equivalent to saying that 'A' corresponds to (or with) A. I guess I am a little prejudiced against the idea of reference because it seems to imply a magic arrow that flies from word to object, whereas the idea of correspondence just seems to consist in the notion of a conceptual pairing. Although having said that, thinking of reference as an indexical relation could capture the idea of conceptual matching without the 'arrow' association, I guess. I am very untutored when it comes to AP, as I have already acknowledged, so I don't doubt that some of my intuitions may seem, from an AP perspective, pretty naive.

Many of the landmark papers on meaning and reference from 20th century analytic philosophers are collected in the book Meaning and Reference, edited by A.W. Moore. Those are papers by Russell, Strawson, Quine, Davidson, McDowell, Dummett, Putnam, Kripke, Wiggins and Evans. There are many such thematic anthologies on various topics (e.g. free will, epistemology, etc.) This is one of the best.

But, of course, you already have a rather long reading list (and so have I -- it never gets shorter!). Just remaining active in this forum will afford you more opportunities to get acquainted with some of the relevant ideas. Consider also the usually excellent entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Let me add that starting off with the topics of meaning and reference is much easier than digging into contemporary debates about theories of truth (many of which might be fundamentally misguided if we trust Hornsby). The latter topic still often causes my brain to overheat and makes me wish for a graft of 40 additional IQ points.

I'm looking again at Wittgenstein's Blue Book, just a reminder of how it begins if you're interested:
' WHAT is the meaning of a word?
Let us attack this question by asking, first, what is an explanation of the meaning of a word; what does the explanation of a word look like?
The way this question helps us is analogous to the way the question "how do we measure a length" helps us to understand the problem "what is length?"
The question "What is length?", "What is meaning?", "What is the number one?" etc., produce in us a mental cramp. We feel that we can't point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something.(We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.) '

Missing the point, Michael. My argument was pointing out that criticisms of correspondence mean in the language (and so the claim) they are attacking. The issue here is not whether critics of correspondence have literally said (or think): "There is nothing we can talk about in the world," but rather what attack on correspondence means with respect to how most people use correspondence.

Since correspondence usually means "talking about something in the world," a suggestion it is incoherent registers as saying that talking about the world is incoherent, as the criticism professes that what the correspondence argument is suggesting (talking bout things in the world) is impossible.

Correspondence – in the sense you described – doesn't lead to realism. Correspondence – in the sense you described – has nothing to do with metaphysics.

Almost everyone says that we can talk about things and almost everyone says that some of the things we talk about exist. But not everyone is a realist and not everyone accepts the correspondence theory of truth. Therefore realism and the correspondence theory of truth aren't simply the positions that claim that we can talk about things and that some of the things we talk about exist.

You accuse others of using straw men to attack your position but then use red herrings to defend it.. — Michael

Indeed, it doesn't form realism. People with other understandings may exist,even as the claim to accept or reject correspondence. The point is, however, logically, realism is the only position which make sense. If there is distinction between language and the things in the world language talks about (what most uses of "correspondence" are talking about)," then realism obtains. Things are defined in themselves rather than by the presence of experiences.

So, indeed, realism and (logically reasoned) correspondence "theory" of truth (i.e. pointing out states of our language talk about other states of the world) is not merely saying we can talk about things. It constitutes a metaphysical claim. In this form, it supposes there are objects which are defined in themselves which we talk about. It's a metaphysical position.

The issue is, of course, this argument is made not on the grounds of what people believe (e.g. whether is possible to, for example, proclaim can talk about things while rejecting realism. Or proclaim correspondence while suggesting objects are not defined in themselves).

Thus, rather than a red-herring, it is actually talking on a level objectors to correspondence are not. This argument is about the logical consistency of one's positions regrading the relationship of things to experience. It's merely daring to mention something that those who don't look beyond immediate experience (e.g. thinking we can talk about things, thinking there is correspondence) are unwilling to examine.

I don't know how much simpler to put it, Willow. Almost every theory of meaning says that we can talk about things, and almost every theory of truth says that some of the things we talk about exist. But they're not all correspondence theories.

To say that we can talk about things and that some of the things we talk about exist says nothing about metaphysics.

I know that.

The (realist) argument here is going beyond merely whether or not we say there are things we can talk about. It is asserting something about metaphysics: pointing out that talking about things which are distinct from language only make sense under a realist framework, when the existence of things is defined by other than by the existence of a use of language. Here the point is about more than whether or not we say we can talk about things. It is about the relationships of things we can talk about to our language.

If we there are things we can talk about, and the presence of our language is distinct from the state we talk about, then we have an experience which "corresponds" to a thing in the world (i.e. talks about). There are things, defined in themselves (e.g. a chair), and then there is language/experience of thing (someone thinking about the thing of chair). Any position other than realism (although possible) is incoherent. Certainly there are not only "correspondence theories," but only "correspondence theories" (where "correspondence" means a state of language use/experience which talks about/is awareness of a state the world) make sense.

It's not clear to me what you mean by "defined in themselves". Definitions are to do with language, so to say that something which is putatively apart from language has a definition doesn't make sense.

Are you just trying to say that a cat and "a cat" are different things?

That's what your account is missing. It's not just a question of language. Things are not the language used to speak of them. When the cat is sleeping and no-one is talking about it, it still exists. Its presence is not defined by language. It's a thing on its own terms. It is defined not by the presence of language, but by its existence. Here definition is not to do with language, but rather with objects. It is a question of what it takes for a cat or "cat" to exist, rather than what it means to talk about a cat.

So I am saying a cat and "a cat" are different things, but its more than just that. I am also talking about what it takes for the presence of cat and "cat." I'm not merely (as you are) distinguishing things and talk about things. I'm also dealing with the additional question of what it takes to form cat and "cat." And their relationship to each other (e.g. Do we need to say of think "cat" for there to be a cat? ).

See, now you're engaging with the actual metaphysics and the criteria for correspondence.

As I said before, it's not just "we can talk about things (and some of these things exist)". One can reject realism and correspondence without rejecting this.

But's that's your strawman. There is no criteria. "Correspondence" is merely when there is one thing (language/experience, "cat" ) which talks/is awareness of another (cat ). There isn't a thing about an object or experience which "makes it" correspond to other. In any case it is feature of this objects (i.e. states of the world) themselves. Some things ARE cats. Some experiences ARE "cat." "Correspondence" IS the match between an experience and object, as opposed to how we judge whether or not we know whether someone's aware of something or if a state is talked about in an experience.

The problem with you criticism is it completely fails to engage with the idea of language and objects being separate. So much so that you posit the laughable question of what "criteria" makes language and the object separate. As if they were, in the first instance, the same thing and needed something to make them distinct from each other. They are separate by definition. (i.e. it's not all about language).

As if they needed anything to make them be separate. They are separate by definition. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes. But that they are separate by definition is a matter of semantics, not a matter of metaphysics. If all you're arguing for is a semantic distinction between words and their subject matter then you're not arguing for realism and you're not arguing for correspondence.

Anti-realists can accept a semantic distinction, too. They describe cats as four-legged animals and "cats" as a four-letter word. This way of talking is perfectly within the purview of pretty much anyone, whatever their metaphysical inclinations. And that's because it's not a matter of metaphysics but a matter of using language properly.

Nope. It's not semantics. Logically (i.e. metaphysically), language is not the object it talks about. I'm not just arguing for a semantic distinction. I'm arguing for a logical distinction between language and the objects it talks about. The distinction that some things are not language. (and hence the semantic argument fails because it restricts its commentary to distinctions within language).

And it this metaphysical distinction which the anti-realist does not accept and you cannot envision. So caught-up in language, you only talk about our language. You talk about our description of cats and "cats" (our semantics) rather than thinking of cats themselves. You actually leave out any and all of the relevant metaphysical commentary.

You fail to talk about what, logically, is need for a cat or a "cat" and so always come-up with a circumstance where no metaphysical position is present. You are literally ignoring the issue the realist is commenting on and the proclaiming their argument must be wrong because you don't want to talk about metaphysics.

I'm arguing for a logical distinction between language and the objects it talks about. — TheWillowOfDarkness

What's a logical distinction (if not a semantic distinction)?

So caught-up in language, you only talk about our language.

No I don't. I also talk about cats, and unicorns, and Harry Potter. But this doesn't make me a realist or a correspondence theorist.

I'll say it again. One doesn't need to be a realist or a correspondence theorist to accept that we can talk about things (other than language). And so to criticise realism or the correspondence theory is not to say that we can't talk about things (other than language).

Logical distinctions don't need to be about language. Some distinctions are not about language.

Semantics is a type of logical distinction, that which is expressed in language, but it is not exhaustive of logical difference. There are logical differences which are not about language.

No I don't. I talk about cats, and unicorns, and Harry Potter. But this doesn't make me a realist or a correspondence theorist. As I've said before, to reject the correspondence theory and to reject realism is not to say "there is nothing we can talk about in the world." — Michael

For sure. The point was never that you were a realist. It was that the only logical position to hold is realism. No-one's saying you are a realist. They are saying your metaphysical (as opposed to your empirical position) position is incoherent. Even as you talk about cats, Harry Potter and unicorns. It's your metaphysics which the problem here, not your ability to describe or think about specific things which are in (or not in) the world.

Logical distinctions don't need to be about language. Some distinctions are not about language.

Semantics is a type of logical distinction, that which is expressed in language, but it is not exhaustive of logical difference. there are logical differences which are not about language. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Then could you explain what a non-semantic logical distinction is?

For sure. The point was never that you were a realist. It was that the only logical position to hold is realism. No-one's saying you are a realist. They are saying your metaphysical (as opposed to your empirical position) position is incoherent. Even as you talk about cats, Harry Potter and unicorns. It's your metaphysics which the problem here, not your ability to describe or think about specific things which are in (or not in) the world.

Except this very discussion was over you claiming that if one criticizes the correspondence theory or realism then one is saying "there is nothing we can talk about in the world". Are you now accepting that this is false? That I can talk about the world even though I'm not a realist or a correspondence theorist?

You are, again, asking for criteria when it doesn't make sense. Some logical distinctions are merely not about language.

Except this very discussion was over you claiming that if one criticizes the correspondence theory or realism then one is saying "there is nothing we can talk about in the world". Are you now accepting that this is false? That I can talk about the world even though I'm not a realist or a correspondence theorist? — Michael

There is a difference in what one says and what they understand on an issue. One can say things they don't believe or which is not reflective of their understanding. This is one of those times.

Due to an (unstated) metaphysical position, the critics attack the realist's argument about "correspondence" because it suggests their metaphysics position is incoherent. The realist ties "correspondence" (language/experience which talks about/is awareness of a state of the world) to the realist metaphysical position (things defined in-themselves), so people are compelled to object to it, as it a point the significance of the realist argument depends on. Deny "correspondence" an/or its link to realism, and the idea realism is the only metaphysical position coherent with talking about things disappears.

Thus, people are found saying something "correspondence (talking about things) is incoherent, due to lack of criteria," they don't actually believe.

You are, again, asking for criteria when it doesn't make sense. Some logical distinctions are merely not about language. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, you keep saying this, but you're refusing to explain the meaning of "logical distinction". As far as I can see, it doesn't mean anything.

There is a difference in what one says and what they understand on an issue. One can say things they don't believe or which is not reflective of their understanding. This is one of those times.

Due to an (unstated) metaphysical position, the critics attack the realist because their argument about "correspondence" claims their metaphysics position is incoherent. The realist ties "correspondence" (language/experience which talks about/is awareness of a state of the world) to the realist metaphysical position (things defined in-themselves), so people are compelled to object to it, as it a point the significance of the realist argument depends on. Deny "correspondence" an/or its link to realism, and the idea realism is the only metaphysical post incoherent with talking about things disappears.

Thus, people are found saying something "correspondence (talking about things) is incoherent, due to lack of criteria," they don't actually believe.

I don't know what you're trying to say here.

Exactly. More or less. "Logic" says nothing. The difference in question is given entirely by "not about language" or "about language." If we want to describe how a logical difference is about language or not, we don't do so by saying "logic." We say say: "about language" or "not about language." "Logic" merely points something is an infinite expression rather than a state of existence.

It similar "correspondence" or "truth." They are equally "meaningless." All those teams do is point to other meanings. If you want to know what's true or what someone is aware of, you actually have to describe it. "Correspondence" or "truth" describe nothing about anything themselves.

I don't know what you're trying to say here. — Michael

You, for example, agree with the realist on what correspondence entails (something talked about), and that it occurs, but are you compelled to oppose the notion because you are concerned about defend your unstated metaphysical position.

The realist ties correspondence (talking about things) to a certain metaphysics, so you attack it out of a concern for opposing that connection. You are trying to avoid a situation where realism is recognised as the only coherent metaphysical position where language is distinct form the things it talks about. You are saying something you don't believe: "talking about things is incoherent (i.e. correspondence is incoherent due to lack of criteria)" to protect your (unstated) metaphysics.

I think what Willow means by "defined in themselves" is something like "definite in themselves" or "distinct in themselves'. A perceptible object's definiteness or distinctness from its surroundings cannot be dependent on language otherwise we would never be able to identify such an 'object' to learn its name in the first place. In other words the dependency is the opposite; the possibility of language depends on the distinctness of its objects. I also think something like that is what Willow is implying in the idea of a logical distinction which is not (necessarily or yet) a semantic distinction; semantic distinctions are necessarily underpinned by pre-semantic distinctions which may well be thought of as logical since all perceptions incorporate conceptual content.

Exactly. More or less. — TheWillowOfDarkness

So your claim that language is "logically distinct" from the things it talks about is meaningless? If not then you need to explain what it means to be logically distinct.

The realist ties correspondence (talking about things) to a certain metaphysics, so you attack it out of a concern for opposing that connection. You are trying to avoid a situation where realism is recognised as the only coherent metaphysical position where language is distinct form the things it talks about. You are saying something you don't believe: "talking about things is incoherent (i.e. correspondence is incoherent due to lack of criteria)" to protect your (unstated) metaphysics.

No, this isn't about attacking realism or correspondence, or about defending my metaphysics. This is about your claim that "correspondence" equates to "talking about things". It isn't. Correspondence is one of the theories that explains what it means (or is required) to talk about things (or for the things we say to be true) – but it isn't the only one.

I think what Willow means by "defined in themselves" is something like "definite in themselves" or "distinct in themselves'. — John

Yes, that's how it sounds to me too. TheWillowOfDarkness seems to be defending the metaphysical stance that Putnam argued against and labeled 'metaphysical realism' (and that some call 'naïve realism'). Willow also is arguing that the attack on the very idea of "correspondence" is motivated by a tacit rejection of metaphysical realism (which he calls "realism"). Michael is right to point out that the specific notion of 'correspondence' that underlies 'correspondence theories of truth' can be challenged by people who don't commit to a specific metaphysical stance. That is, one can coherently reject the correspondence theory of truth while being a realist (like me), or while being an anti-realist (like Michael?) who nevertheless acknowledges a semantic distinction between things that belong to language proper and the things referred to to.

A perceptible object's definiteness or distinctness from its surroundings cannot be dependent on language otherwise we would never be able to identify such an 'object' to learn its name in the first place.

I don't think that's true. Objects in nature (let alone those in the human world of artifacts) don't come into existence labeled with their own criteria of persistence and individuation. At what point do some arrangements of wood, glue and screws come to materially constitute a chair, and at what point of disrepair or disfunctionality does the chair cease to exist? This seem to depend on our interests and practices, and those interests and practices leave an indelible trace in the empirical concept of a chair (that is, the criteria of 'chairhood' always are tainted by our practices and interests).

Scientific realists can grant that much for the case of human artifacts but assert the possibility of a conceptual reduction into more primitive terms (i.e. scientific concepts that refer to alleged 'natural kinds') that are said to carve nature at its (natural) joints. This scientific realism is another form of naïve realism, in my view, but my main point is to stress that one need not commit either way (regarding metaphysical realism) in order to grant both that individual chairs exist, in a robust sense (non-idealist), and are distinct from our talk about them, but that, nevertheless, our concept of chairs (or 'chairhood') hardly can be said to 'correspond' to what chairs allegedly 'are in themselves' irrespective of our interests and linguistic practices.

I don't think that's true. Objects in nature (let alone those in the human world of artifacts) don't come into existence labeled with their own criteria of persistence and individuation. At what point do some arrangements of wood, glue and screws come to materially constitute a chair, and at what point of disrepair or disfunctionality does the chair cease to exist? — Pierre-Normand

What would enable us, pre-linguistically, to reliably pick out objects, or non-linguistic animals to pick out objects ( or "affordances") if there were no ontological distinctiveness, or relevant joints to carve, to produce reliable distinctions. How would a child learn the meaning of words by ostensive definition if there was really 'nothing there' to be pointed at? This is not to say that when we point to a chair, say, to teach a child its name ( we probably don't need to point at it anyway because she has already sat in it long before she knows its name) that there is a real substantive embodied identity or essence of chair-ness there, but it is to say that what reliably appears to us as a chair does so and could only do so by virtue of some pre-linguistic difference from other things that appear as tables, windows, floors, balls, cats, dogs and so on.

So, I am not talking about the ways in which we conceptualize things; particularly when it comes to artifacts which have assigned uses, as constituting ontological fundamentalities, but I am saying that those ways would not be possible without fundamental 'carveabilities'.

To answer your last question, I would say the chair ceases to exist (as a chair) when it is so altered that we cannot use it as a chair. But it will still be some kind of damaged structure, or heap, or mess of wood or plastic or whatever. Of course, this 'wood-ness' or 'plastic-ness' or 'heap-ness' or 'mess-ness' or 'whatever-ness' cannot be fundamental either, they are all conceptual categories, but again there must be some natural ontological carveability or fundamental difference of structure that allows the damaged chair to be categorized reliably as whatever of these things it is.

What would enable us, pre-linguistically, to reliably pick out objects, or non-linguistic animals to pick out objects ( or "affordances") if there were no ontological distinctiveness, or relevant joints to carve, to produce reliable distinctions. — John

Another way to phrase this would be to ask: how can we come to detect interesting patterns in the empirical world, patterns, that is, that are relevant to our human practices and interests, and hence that we can pick up conceptually, if there aren't distinct and 'ontologically primary' (and 'pre-conceptual') entities there to be patterned by us?

Although Haugeland's paper Truth and Rule Following doesn't seem to be available online, the paper Pattern and Being fortunately is provided here. (It's very nice from the people at the University of Chicago to have left Haugeland's page up after his untimely demise). This paper is a forerunner of some of the ideas further developed in Truth and Rule Following. It's also a criticism of Dennett's quasi-realism about mental states. But is has a much broader ontological import. Haugeland is effectively arguing that reality is conceptually structured all the way down, as it were, but not any less real for all that. He is agreeing with Heidegger that Zuhandenheit is ontologically prior to Vorhandenheit and hence that the latter can't epistemically or ontologically ground the former (my quick gloss on Haugeland's thesis).

I don't wish to burden you with yet another reference to the literature. I only provide it because it's especially good and relevant to your question. But if you would rather prefer that provide my own more detailed response and arguments, I will.

Willow also is arguing that the attack on the very idea of "correspondence" is motivated by a tacit rejection of metaphysical realism (which he calls "realism"). Michael is right to point out that the specific notion of 'correspondence' that underlies 'correspondence theories of truth' can be challenged by people who don't commit to a specific metaphysical stance. That is, one can coherently reject the correspondence theory of truth while being a realist (like me), or while being an anti-realist (like Michael?) who nevertheless acknowledges a semantic distinction between things that belong to language proper and the things referred to to. — Pierre-Normand

I should clarify I'm talking about how most people use actually "correspondence" more so than its status as a theory of truth, at least going off by what most here are describing as a "theory of truth."

The difficulty here is the nature of the requirement of "correspondence". What you and Michael appear to consider the "correspondence," something which sits on top of what falls within the linguistic realm, as if there was something other than merely and object and experience which defined the presence of "correspondence" is not how most people use the term.

My point is very few people actually means this when they talk about the requirement of correspondence. For most "correspondence" isn't the requirement in excess of an object and how it is known experience (as you and Michael are reading it), but rather merely the presence of the relevant object and experience, such that an object is spoken about/thought of/observed. It the identification that, for us to speak about an object, the relevant object and speech are required.

Basically if X, then X is required. Most arguments for correspondence are actually a statement of the deflationary truth. This is what John was alluding to in his OP. In most instances where someone argues correspondence, they are actually making a statement about deflationary truth in the context of relating language/experience to objects.

The correspondence theory of truth which you are attacking, and rightly so, isn't actually held by most people who argue for truth in terms of correspondence. Even the somewhat careless "independent world" realists who fail to identify the connection of the world to linguistically and experiential expression don't really follow it. For most correspondence signifies the requirement of an object and experience of that object, for instances where an object is spoken about.

So Michael is missing the point entirely. It is certainly true one can be realist (non-realist) while rejecting correspondence as used in most instances (i.e. deflationary truth in relation to objects and experiences), but it has never been said otherwise. Rather, the argument is that one cannot have a coherent position if they reject correspondence (and realism) in this sense.

Another way to phrase this would be to ask: how can we come to detect interesting patterns in the empirical world, patterns, that is, that are relevant to our human practices and interests, and hence that we can pick up conceptually, if there aren't distinct and 'ontologically primary' (and 'pre-conceptual') entities there to be patterned by us? — Pierre-Normand

That's the dead end/error which drives much of the nonsense about theory of truth. There isn't a "how." At some point we are simply found with awareness of particular empirical or logical patterns. We never sit outside this knowledge to somehow derive it. Our knowledge is given by the presence of the object(s) which is(are) the understanding of something else. It is a question of (our) existence rather than of reasoning.

"Ontologically primary"and "the pre-conceptual" are incoherent. Existence doesn't preceded existence. There is just existence. Anything which does exist, which can be expressed language, expresses the conceptual by definition. There can't be a computer, for example, I discover and learn to talk about if such objects fall outside conceptual expression.

I actually do agree that in an important sense experience is, must be, conceptual all the way down (as I stated in the 'Logical Content of Experience' thread).

But would this commit me to assent to the claim that reality is conceptual all the way down? I suppose it would depend on whether reality is exhaustively equated with experience or not. I don't tend to support that equation.I tend to be more concerned with questions about what we can sensibly say than with questions about 'what is'. I think there is a subtle distinction between claims about what is and claims about what we should say about what is. My realism consists merely in acknowledging that what we experience could never exhaust, and what we say could never perfectly correspond with, what is. Of course all my views are potentially subject to revision.

Thanks for the link to the Haugeland paper; I will certainly read it.