How it's known is irrelevant to the discussion. The question is whether or not redness is present when nobody observes it in the same way that electromagnetic radiation is present when nobody observes it. The direct realist says that it is and the indirect realist says that it isn't -- the indirect realist says that redness is a purely experiential phenomena that represents (in the sense of having a mostly-unique causal relationship with) electromagnetic radiation. — Michael

My point wasn't about how anything was known. It was about what was known. This point is critical because "electromagnetic radiation," such as "~620–740 nm" is never observed. It is nothing more than our understanding of something which relates to things (colours, objects, energy measuring detector screens, etc., etc. ) which have have experienced. No-one perceives the object of "electromagnetic radiation" in this sense. A human who sees red when in the presence of ~620–740 nm electromagnetic radiation sees the colour red in the world , not"~620–740 nm electromagnetic radiation." In their experience of red, they actually know nothing about electromagnetic radiation at all.

Awareness of that is a different experience and it doesn't take any particular experience of sensation (a blind person, for example, may know about electromagnetic radiation perfectly well, even though they don't see coloured objects or light as a result of it). Critically though, like any other things we know about, electromagnetic radiation is known through experience. If I know about electromagnetic radiation, then it is not colours that I know, but rather the presence of electromagnetic radiation itself. My awareness is of things in the world as it exists.

The point is that on this level, electromagnetic radiation and the colour red are no different in this respect. One cannot say that "electromagnetic radiation" is "uniquely casual" because we aware of it though the same sort of means as the colour red: an experience generated by our body. Our knowledge of "electromagnetic radiation" is no less caused by our body than our knowledge of red. We know "electromagnetic radiation" as it is. We know the colour red as it is.

Both are things of the world we are aware of only through experience. In any instance where experience is aware of something in the world, it presents it as it is.

It isn't (in the sense you are talking about).

Electromagnetic radiation is no less known through experience than the colour red. And everything thing it does is, how it interacts, what it interacts with, is also only significant in terms of things which may be experienced.

That's not true. The experience of heat (the hot toast I am juggling) is not a representation of the energy at all. It is heat (what appears in my experience) experienced. The idea of energy doesn't even come-up in the experience of burning oneself on something hot. In that moment, I experience nothing about energy. I have no mental representation of it at all.

Yes, there is. That's the whole point of this conversation: that in any case, the direct realist by his own position can be mistaken about whether something is hallucinatory or not. Honestly, I wish people would read the discussion before commenting. — The Great Whatever

But that's not a problem because the direct realist isn't concerned with what is true in any specific instance. The direct realist doesn't have any particular care for an argument that any specific state if real or virtual.

Here you are back to attacking on the grounds that a direct realist doesn't know what is real or virtual, rather than arguing their position is internally inconsistent because there is no difference between the real and virtual.

Indeed, your objection presupposes discintion made by the direct realist here. If the direct realist can be mistake the real world for a virtual one, or a virtual one for a real one, then the distinction of real and virtual means something.

But it doesn't. There is no such question.

I have the experience the dragon can't eat me. There is no doubt present. I understand the dragon to be locked away in the virtual world.

Indeed. that's what being "part of the object" means. Same with sight or any other sense.

Parts of the object are, for the direct realist, what experienced when the object is perceived.

This is indirect realism. — Michael

No, it isn't. Under that argument, colours aren't added to the world by experience. They are parts of the world perceived. And they may be when no-one experiencing them.

But is redness identical to electromagnetic radiation at a wavelength of ‎~620–740 nm? It's not. The former is a representation of the latter. That's why indirect realism fares better than direct realism. — Michael

Direct realism has never argued this. Red is, for direct realism, red. It isn't identical to ~620–740 at all.

Electromagnetic radiation at a wavelength of ‎~620–740 may result in many possible experiences of colour. Some people might see red when encountering it. Other people might not (e.g. colourblind people). Other people might not even see a colour at all (blind). The colour red is not representation of 620–740nm electromagnetic radiation. It is representation of the colour red in the world, in instances where it is a showing of an object.

But it doesn't.

Taste and smell, like pain and sight, are merely parts of objects which are only experiences at certain points. The direct realist is pointing out they are all part of an object. Else we give-up unperceived objects, as take away the significance of an object when pervade and there is nothing of the object left, and so fall into the incoherence of idealism.

Nope.

We can only show something in an experiment provided we have the experience to do so. The blind person doesn't have the experience to show colours. Lacking this experience, the presence of colours is not something the blind person has evidence for. This doesn't mean the colours aren't there.

It is no different to any other instance where someone lacks experience to gather evidence of something. Just because I don't have the system to see bacteria doesn't mean they aren't there. People are always seeing different parts of the world such that they ahem evidence for somethings but not others. The fact someone person lacks evidence for something doesn't mean it is not there.

No, it doesn't. The knife doesn't contain the property of painfulness when not being used to stab someone. It's painfully obvious.

No more or less then the properties of mass, shape, colour, smell tastiness, etc.,etc. All aspects of an object are only encountered during specific interactions between the body and the object. Pain is no different. We only see something when an object it within our field of vision. We only hear something interacts between objects generate a sound our ear picks-up, allowing our body to generate the experience. Pain only occurs when object hit out body in specific ways. Aspects of objects are all alike in this way.

It makes no more sense than saying that there is a painful knife when not being used to stab someone. It's only painful once it's experienced a certain way, just as an apple is only tasty or red when experienced a certain way. — Michael

Given that, you know, does make sense, it doesn't bode well for your argument.

It makes just as much sense as saying an unseen book has pages or that the ball in my bag is spherical. All are nothing more than qualities of an object we experience.

We just tend not describe objects in terms of pain because we usually encounter pain events after perceiving an object some other way. An apple is only rounded to certain experiences too. It only has a certain mass to specific experiences. So it is for any aspect of an object.

How does a blind person experimentally show that there are objective colours?

Furthermore, "X has property Y when not seen" does not follow from "X sees Y when stimulated by X", so the above doesn't account for objective colour. I might see a chair in response to being poked in the brain by a neuroscientist but it doesn't then follow that the chair continues to exist when I stop seeing it (or even when I am seeing it). — Michael

Both those objections are incoherent.

Obviously, as the blind person doesn't see them, they do not perceive any of the objective colours of an object and referring to their experience doesn't show any of those colours. Perceiving something about an object requires experience that shows it. The blind person doesn't have this.

There is no X (chair) triggering your experience in the second example. You never perceived an object of a chair which caused your experience of a chair. You are confusing the given experience with the presence of the object.

How things are defined is irrelevant. What matters is whether or not the object's features when seen are also its features when not seen. Can you show that the apple is red and tasty even when I'm not looking at or tasting it? Does it even make sense to say that the apple is tasty when not being tasted? — Michael

Because it isn't question of showing them. Indeed, the point is about objects when they are no shown: that it doesn't take the showing of a red, tasty and large apple for such a thing to exist. It does make sense to say there is a tasty apple when not being tasted. Objects aren't always perceived. Any if them, an any aspect of them, may or may not be when they are not experienced.

The entire point is that apple-shape, tastiness, red, mass, etc.,etc. are not limited to when an apple is perceived. Any if those qualities, experienced when an apple is perceived, may exist when an object is not perceived. This is how there are unperceived objects.

If we follow your argument, take away all the aspects of a perceived apple (e..g it's shape, mass, redness, tastiness, etc.,etc.), no apple is left. An unperceived apple would be impossible.

So yes, it does make sense to say there is redness, tastiness, a large shape, a mass, etc.,etc. when no-one is experiencing them. That's what an unperceived object IS.

How does the perception of a tree differ from a mental representation of a tree? — Michael

It doesn't. Given that the perception if the tree (a tree experienced) is a mental representation of the tree. They are the same thing: the showing of (part of ) the object of a tree in experience.

The object of the tree, on the other hand, is a bit different. It is what is experienced in this instances perception. But it is also more than is present in the given experience (e.g. different colours, different shapes which aren perceived by the given experience, parts which aren't picked up by the present perceptual system). Crucially, any object (and any part of any object) has it existence defined by itself rather than by whether it is perceived. Perceiving objects doesn't create them or form the existence of an object triggering perception.

Notice that 1) is impossible if the two are phenomenologically indistinguishable. If for any particular case I cannot tell, then it cannot be that I can tell for the most part (or in other words, there is no way by his own criteria to tell whether or how often I can tell or not). So whether or not jamalrob wants to say this (perhaps he does), he can't. — The Great Whatever

That's not true. The fact it is impossible to tell whether sensation is real or virtual, as phenomenologically speaking, they are identical doesn't prevent us from having other experience which detail whether something is real or virtual. After seeing dragon on the screen, moving towards us, we may then have another experience that the dragon can't get out and shred our body with their death. We have experienced the dragon is "virtual," despite not being able to tell, form the sight of the daring anole, whether it was real or virtual.

Indirect realism merely strawmans direct realism. It falsely thinks direct realism is arguing perception just appears without any causal system, without any system of interaction within the body,without any sort of meditation between the existing object and experience.

This is, of course, not true. And something the direct rats has not argued. Each instance of perception is created out of system which shows only shows specific aspects of an object in question. What is perceived of an object (and which objects are perceived) is meditated by the body and what is present in the environment.

Indirect realism misreads the focus of the direct realist argument, how the meaning of things is what is experienced when they are perceived, for an argument about how experiences are caused.

Can one experimentally show that there are objective colours? — Michael

Yes. In any instance where a person sees a colour in response to an object, an objective colour is shown: it is true that the object in question has the relevant colour. This effect is then repeated when the person again sees the object. In this respect to is no different to something like object's shape (or any other part of the object), which is similarly shown through body produced experience.

1) I can tell the difference, for the most part. between veridical and non-veridical experience.

2) I cannot always tell the difference between veridical and non-veridical experiences. — John

More like:

1) I can tell the difference between vertical and non-verdical experience. It is given in experience which is distinct from the immediate sensation of an object-e.g. Seeing the presence of a tree (makes no comment on whether it is really or virtual) and then a different experience about he nature of the tree (e.g. "that tree is real" or "that tree is virtual" as the case may be).

2) I cannot tell whether an object is real or virtual from its immediate sensation. When I only have this, when I do not have experience of whether am object is real or virtual, I do not know whether or not the sensation I have is of a real or virtual thing.

By "found himself" I meant to suggest that this is what he experienced. One person experiences himself waking up in a post apocalyptic world and another doesn't. Who is having the real experiences and who is having the false ones? — Michael

Neither. Both experiences are of "real" worlds. Within the Matrix, the person is living out a life where interactions between their body (in the Matrix) have consequences for their life (in the Matrix). Even bodies in the outside world can be affected by events in the Matrix (people getting injured).

The Matrix may be the single worst example of a "virtual" world there has ever been. There is nothing illusionary about it. Neo did not find out the world he was in wasn't real. He merely found out there was another (or maybe "wider" ) real world.

So, is it possible on your view that all of your experiences could be hallucinations? If not, why not? — The Great Whatever

Insofar as immediate sensations go, yes. Since there is no yet any experience which shows them to be real or a hallucination, no relation of the sensations to other experiences which amounts to knowing the difference of "real" and virtual," it is possible that any such immediate sensation could be an hallucination.

But that tells us nothing. Possibility is not actuality. Nor does it get removed when one possible outcome is actual as opposed to another. It is possible, for example, that I will make submit this post. It is also possible I will not submit this post. Both possibilities are present, whether I submit the post or not. Both are so whether I know I'm going to submit this post in the future or not. Possibility has no consequence for either what exists or what we know (that's really just member of the former set; our instances of knowledge are states of existence).

So the possibility of hallucination is irrelevant to the direct realist. They are interested in the actual (whether "real" or "virtual"): what exists, how the things we experience relate to others, and what is true any time we are aware of these existing states.

No, I don't agree. I was hallucinating then, and now I'm not. But wait, I can't know that I'm not now hallucinating either: what if it's all hallucination? I really don't think the problem you've uncovered amounts to anything more than this. — jamalrob

The problem is the significance TGW is reading into the question of whether or not we are experiencing an hallucination. Asking that question, having doubt about whether we know an event is virtual or not, doesn't actually say anything about if we are aware of a real or virtual world. TGW's argument is really trying to ask this: if a distinction between the real and virtual world cannot be identified, how then is there a real and virtual world at all? If the real an virtual cannot be said to be different, how then can there be any difference at all? If real and virtual don't somehow talk about a difference about between states of existence, which we may know, experience and identify, then it is nonsensical to talks of such worlds. There would be no distinction of real and virtual. It would be outside what could be known and talked about. Direct realists are seeming arguing a contradiction in the very definition of their position- "States of existence are as we experience, even when they are outside our awareness. The distinction of real and virtual is something we cannot experience."

But the problem for TGW's argument is the direct realist has never argued there is no difference between the real and virtual world. They have NEVER take the position we can't tell the difference. We can, in fact, tell the difference all the time. We have experiences of "real" and "virtual" events. We know about them. Though it may be true there is no difference, in immediate sensation, between a "real" world event and a "virtual" world event, it is NOT true when is comes to our wider experience (and so our knowledge).

We notice the dragon the in the computer game doesn't touch our body, not matter how real it might look. It "virtual" nature is shown in our present experience. We know it can't roast us or eat us. The entire premise that there is no knowable difference between experience of the "real" world and hallucination is wrong. There is one. We just don't know it in the immediate experience of a sensation. It comes with a later experiences, where a sensation has been related to others we have had. TGW is ignorant of this because he isn't considering experiences other than the immediate sensation of an object.

It is only in the timeless world of logic that such feedback becomes a contradiction demanding both states at once. — unenlightened

It's even worse than that. The timeless world of logic, by definition, cannot be either the state of Pinocchio lying nor his nose growing. Both those events are states of existence. Each is a moment of time. The argument is trying to talk about Pinocchio does when that's exactly what it says nothing about. Here there is not even a contradiction in the world of logic; the argument is entirely incoherent.

If we pay attention to states the world, what happens is obvious when Pinocchio tells the lie.

Pinocchio (nose not growing) claims "My nose grows now." A falsehood.

Then a moment later, since he lied about his nose growing at the previous point in time, his nose grows.

Is there any problem with saying the real world is the original one, the one the virtual world was modelled on? — John

Yes.

The "real" and "virtual difference is about the relation of specific objects to each other. What world is "original" doesn't matter. If I began life hallucinating it will have always been "virtual" because it things cannot impact on my body the same way "real" things can. Not to mention "virtual worlds"are frequently not "modelled" on the real one at all. Dreams, imagination, etc.,etc. frequently break with the nature of the "real world" and have not been deliberately set to mimic one any part of the real world.

(similarly, the virtual world is just as real, as an existing state. It only differs form the "real" in the sense of how it has different impact. It is not somehow a "fake" moment which really means nothing- contrary to what some imply when the talk about the virtual world compared to a real one).

A red-herring.

What matters is not whether there are painful consequences for the body. I get frustrated by the outcomes of virtual worlds all the time. My body is affected by what happens in a virtual world. When my character dies, when I missing is failed, it impacts on my body. The contents of a virtual world affects how I think and feel. Sometimes it does have terrible and painful consequences.

Rather the distinction between the "real" and "virtual" is about how someone is affected. It is about the ways in which a body interacts with objects. If my "real" body was invincible, it wouldn't necessarily mean a pain causing world was not virtual. If someone programmed a game to inflict pain on the body as my character got injured in-game, its world would still be "virtual," as it was still impossible for the dragon to take my real body in its mouth and ingest it. All an invincible "real" world body means is that someone couldn't be harmed by the things of "real" world. And yes, people would take liberties with their real bodies rather than actives in virtual worlds which caused them pain. This doesn't affect the difference between the "real" and "virtual." The pain causing dragon of the game still can't ingest my "real" body.

Functionally, any virtual world has already taken place of a real one. That happens the moment of experiencing the virtual world. When I step into a virtual world, I have no choice in whether i am affected by it. The moment I join it, it starts indicating with my body and impacting on my experience.

No, they don't. Whether or not something is of a virtual world or a real one makes no difference to them. What they care about is the presence of things regardless of experience.

The "real" world is merely, for less the thorough realists, the representation of a world which is there even when experience is not. Since hallucinations are drawn into the opposition to the world we are experiencing (e.g. that dragon Willow hallucinates isn't actually going to breath fire on us), they express the presence of a world (the one NOT experienced in the hallucination) which is present despite it being outside the experience of the person who is hallucination. Realist like talking about the "real" world so much because it is a (somewhat poor) example of how things are still there even when not in experience.

When a realist says: "but there is a real world," they are imploring how existing of things isn't dependent on experience. They aren't obsessing about some quality of real or virtual which makes a profound difference to our experience irrespective of our experience (that's an oxymoron).

But if you were born 'plugged in,' and saw 'unplugging' as the exception, the roller coaster we deem 'real' would be the 'virtual' one, and vice-versa. — The Great Whatever

No more or less than someone who lived in the other world. When someone is "unplugged," there experience is changes to the point where they know their body is not in the virtual roller coaster, where they know the virtual roller coster is not wood and steel rising many metre in the air. They know their body in the 'real' world can't fall out and die when the a riding the virtual roller coaster.

Here there are no question of "exceptions." Both experiences are "real" (they exist) and, when someone is thinking about it, they have experience of the relationships of those experiences. They know what they see on the screen can't run their body through. The question "real" or "virtual" is a non-starter because we never encounter a situation where there is doubt about that. If we have the experience of a "real" or "virtual" world, we don't have any doubt on the matter; the idea is the particular experience of that instance.

So the dilemma you propose is a joke. Who cares if the computer in front of you is "real" or "virtual?" If all you are experiencing in the moment is the sensation of the computer, you are not making any sort of comment of whether the computer is "real" or "virtual." It has no relevance. If, on the other hand, you are making comment on whether the computer is real of virtual, which is to say how it relates casually to other sensation you have had or might have, then you either have your answer or can wait it out until the relevant experience emerges (of fails to emerge). There is no significant to the dilemma of is it "real" or "virtual." Just what are you expecting to find in trying to answer that question?

The "problem of hallucination" is of no problem to the direct realist. They have no care for whether any sensation is "real" or "virtual." To merely have a sensation doesn't say anything about a real or virtual world at any time. They aren't looking out at an object and using something about it to tell whether it is real or virtual. "Real" and "virtual" are measures of the relationships of different things people have encountered. They are always given in themselves in the first instance. We don't understand there to be a real or virtual world by looking at an object (e.g. roller coster), we do it by having experience which identifies them (e.g. that my body remains unharmed and untouched by the twisting metal of the crashing virtual roller coster).

When I look at abstract expressionism or conceptual art or Dada or pop art or whatever label one gives art from ca.1860 to the present... I don't look to see concepts. The first and (honestly) most important criteria is does it appeal to me and not what statement does it make or what concepts it is here to proclaim.

In my experience, Rauschenberg or Johns speaks more to my senses and I have a far greater aesthetic experience than if I look at the works of Turner or Rembrandt, where all I can see is technique, process and concepts (for me endlessly boring concepts!). — Mayor of Simpleton

Conceptual art is, using Thorongil's terms, "aesthetic" too. People have those "timeless" moments when standing in awe of an object which express an idea. Its presence, its aesthetic, what people see and feel, whether it be for blotches colour (e.g. a painting of red and orange blocks) themselves or because they are an aesthetic expressing some concept (non-representionally).

Description of art trends to falter because it often turns aesthetic into concept. When we are talking about art, most of do so on conceptual terms: we talks about what the painting represents, state information about how it affects or tell people off for filling to recognise the quality of a work. Our descriptions of art tend to be information rather than statements which provide insight to the presence of the object, the sensations it affects us with, the aesthetic which constituted the expression of an art work (nor matter how conceptual or non-reprsesentaional it might be). It makes it difficult to show what art to someone in any instance. Even for someone doing their best, giving insightful descriptions of how the aesthetics of a work affects them, it can all end-up in failure, for even the best description can suffer for registering as a "concept" of an aesthetic rather than an aesthetic experience itself.

In a situation where someone is actively looking to exclude a whole range of aesthetics from worth (which Thorongil does, so art can focus on a representational sublime), it becomes very tricky to describe art indeed. The very aesthetic you are trying to describe is one the other person thinks ought to wiped out. Such a pre-set prejudice tends to guard against any exploration of the aesthetic in question.

This is interesting Streetlight, but I still think that the virtual space of video games is categorically different than natural perceptual space, even if not phenomenologically so. I think it is categorically different by virtue of its being able to be exhaustively explained in terms of the mechanisms by which natural space is simulated. It seems to me that it would cease to be able to be exhaustively explained only at a point where explanation is demanded for natural perceptual abilities. — John

The problem with this is such video game functions no differently to "real space." We may miss something occurring in virtual space just as readily as in "real space." It isn't necessary exhaustively explained(or rather, that should be, described) at all. Moreover, there is actually no such difference when considering our capacity to describe our the functioning of the world. That, for example, a biologist knows how some part if the body reacts with the world is no more or less exhaustive than the model that runs under the hood of a virtual world. And both are ruling of nothing more than what we happen to perceive about a world. Whether "virtual" or "real," our experience shows it insofar as we perceive it.

We may have more "exhaustive" descriptions of how a virtual world works, even to the point of being able to tell the precisely what happens at any point, but that's merely a function of happing to know more about a virtual world. Take away the expert's knowledge and it is just "uncertain" as the normal world. Players often have to learn how a virtual world functions through experience, much like our interaction with our "real" surrounding environment. We must not confuse the amount of knowledge we have for some "fundamental difference" of "existence."

Virtual space is actually categorically different than "real space." There are things is virtual space which aren't in "real" space. I am not a super man with a gun in real space. My hands on the controller aren't in the virtual world. I can't see my hands in the virtual world. In the real world, my body is unaffected by the recoil of my gun in the virtual world. Such difference, however, is always a function of the objects themselves and how they can interact with each other. The difference between the "real" an "virtual" world is not found in some abstracted quality of "real" or "virtual," but rather in the specific sensations themselves and how they relate to each other. When we say something is "real" or "virtual," we are actually talking about what it can to outside that moment of sensation; the ways something relates to the rest of our life. The difference between the real monster, who can snap your body in two and end your life, and the virtual monster, which can't touch you (no matter how many times it might kill the character you are controlling on the screen).

We can certainly imagine other works which have similarities to the Mona Lisa (even to the point of being an exact replica). Such works are, however, never the Mona Lisa we are talking about. They are a different objects and, if they are art, are art on their own merits, not merely because something about them is similar to the Mona Lisa. In such a case, all the relevant variables have actually changed.

The replica Mona Lisa will never be the one we are talking about. It is a different object. It has a different history. It has different author. It is made by a different method. It has a different set of molecules. It cannot be art as the Mona Lisa is art.

As to whether the replica is art, I would actually think it probably would be. Some creator had to design the print or paint the replica. Someone intended it. It is just not the art of the Mona Lisa. Rather it is the altogether different artistic merit of the replica Mona Lisa.

So the speaker has a specific thought, then an idea/meaning/mental grouping is chosen which conveys that thought (i.e. the thought fits the conditions), then the associated word or expression for that meaning is uttered, then the hearer receives the meaning (i.e. the mental grouping), and you've just had successful communication. — "invizzy

The flaw is in the relationship of language to ideas. Here the meaning of the (unspoken) idea/meaning/mental grouping is the same as the associated word or expression. In meaning, there is no separation between the unspoken idea and what is meant by words said to communicate it. Ideas, in terms of meaning, are clearly not independent of language. More critically, the specific thought speaker has, if it is given by idea/meaning/mental grouping is not distinct from that idea/meaning/mental grouping. Ideational theories use an incoherent relationship between ideas and meaning. They make a distinction which is not there.

The distinctions used under ideational theories are more akin to distinction of states of the world related to thinking and communicating. I might, for example, have the thought I need to explain something (initial thought), think and work what meaning I need to say to communicate it to others (idea/meaning/mental grouping which, critically, does not convey my initial thought; I am not telling people I need to tell them something when I explain the issue), then move on to speaking the words which represent the idea/meaning/mental grouping I had.

The Mona Lisa IS art. It isn’t made art by some idea separate to the painting. It is art ITSELF. No definition for determining what is art and what is not art is present. Art is defined by the existence of an artwork, not by anyone’s idea about the world or what topic are value for expression.

To theorise about what makes the Mona Lisa art doesn’t make sense. Since the painting is one specific object, it is incoherent to suggest there could be a Mona Lisa of any other sort. An argument about some quality of Mona Lisa making it art over some other creative work can’t get off the ground. There is no opportunity of a Mona Lisa which lacks any of its qualities. If something is different, then there is a different object and description of the Mona Lisa won’t say anything about it. We could pick out any aspect of the Mona Lisa, any feature of the art work, but is would say exactly nothing about the artistic nature of this other object, for it is not the Mona Lisa. Any artistic merit (or otherwise) of the object will be given by its nature, not by what is seen in the Mona Lisa.

When I speak about trying to talk about art where there is none, I mean that trying to define “what features make an art” is a failure to name any object. It actually doesn’t talk about any presence of art at all.

If we say: “The Mona Lisa is art because of X,” we take away everything that matters to this instance of art, The Mona Lisa (the painting), and try to define artist merit irrespective of any instance of art. We try define art as “X” in our heads, despite the fact that “X,” the feature which supposedly makes art, our idea, isn’t actually an artwork at all.

And yes, this is “weirdness” in the context of much art criticism. Most art criticism begins with the idea we are judging something as “art,” that we have an idea of what is the most important thing, what is the most beautiful, what matters greatly for us to express through creation, with which we then proclaim to there world and save it from it frivolous and banal expressions.

But this is simply not how art works. Art is about an object which affects us. It is about the presence of a valuable expression in an object (as opposed to an expression which "makes" an object valuable), rather than question of judging what is “the best expression of creation” or discovering some underlying aesthetic principle common across many (or few) works. Searching for “The Definition of Art” is nothing more than a popularity contest which ignores art.

The reason I cannot say what principle “defines” art is because there isn’t one. Art is a question of the object, of the art work itself. Any artwork is not art because of some “quality.” It is itself, the particular object with all its features, which apply in no other on other instance of art (as that involves a different object and its specific features), the instance of art in question.

I, unusually, also agree,with respect to knowing about art.

But I don't think there is a problem with articulating the presence of art. We do that all the time- "Look at that work of art." What seems to be the issue is when we try to "define art," we shift from talking about works of art to merely talking about ideas of art. The art disappears.

If I say: "Art is made by possessing X quality," my statement is fake, no matter what "X" might be. No art is present. I have not been affected by creation which is art. I'm trying to talk about art when I have exactly none to speak of. No matter how hard we try, there is no method be which we can define system of ideas which will account for "what makes art." Art is only found in objects which are art. Looking at them is the only way to notice the presence of art.

That sort of isn't a problem if you are fine with reading something, whether it turns out to be rubbish or not.

If you've got a prejudice against reading anything you don't already know, on the chance you might end-up encountering some rubbish, your reading list of new material is going to be extremely small.

I don't think Schopenhauer's meta-level analysis of suffering creates suffering. He is just describing it. I don't feel suffering because I read Schopenhauer. Rather, I feel suffering and am drawn to a fellow thinker who so eloquently states what I feel. — schopenhauer1

No doubt he gives descriptions of the suffering which is the anxiety about suffering too. In the sense that he is describing this of suffering some people are in, he is talking about suffering what is already there. The problem is his position then goes on to advocate this position continue. Instead of recognising the anxiety about having to suffer is state we may (and ought to) avoid, he confuses it with the inevitable suffering of life. His philosophy increase suffering because it drags more people into the state of anxiety about the suffering of life and helps keep those who are already there in that state.

It is no wonder you feel drawn to written which describes what you feel. Everyone one does. The point is not that you shouldn't be drawn to such writing, but rather that what you feel (and what Schopenhauer describes, the (almost) ever present anxiety about having to suffer) is an unnecessary state of suffering. And that his philosophy advocates maintaining this.

So this huge insight is that we are to accept suffering as inevitable? That is just a given. We have to deal with the challenges of life. Recognizing that suffering will happen doesn't make me feel any better about it. Again, this just seems to say "suffering happens, deal with it". Unless we are dead, we are dealing with it, what else can you tell me? — schopenhauer1

But it is anything but a given. The world is full of people who don't accept suffering as inevitable. People deny that all the time. They give ridiculous rationalisation of why suffering is present. Some ignore it under the impression there is something can be done about it. Some still insist the world must be otherwise and the fact it's not means we must be in constant pain (e.g. Schopenhauer). Our world is full of people who don't accept the suffering of life, even amongst those who know its absence is impossible.

The fact you are still thinking of suffering to be "dealt with" clearly shows you don't accept it. You are still thinking of it as something which can be resolved. As if it were possible to somehow take a state of suffering and remove that it was suffering. That's why suffering is so bad. No-one deals with suffering. It is impossible. Nothing can make it better. We just live in a given pain until that pain stops. In life we are never dealing with suffering. We are just hurting until the hurting stops.

My point doesn't ask you deal with suffering. It argues that one form of suffering (anxiety about having to suffer) ought to be eliminated (as much as possible). This is what the acceptance of suffering achieves.

I think you have it backwards. Philosophical pessimism is the ultimate version of the idea that suffering is inevitable. Your contention should not be with phil. pess. but with the more "optimistic" worldviews that overlooks suffering or tries to downplay it in official rhetoric. However, as stated with Agustino, this doesn't mean they don't deal with it just because they spew out optimistic rhetoric..after the dust is cleared, they still have to live the down and dirty business of life like the rest of us lesser fortunate souls. — schopenhauer1

My problem isn't with philosophical pessimism per se; I more less agree with that. Suffering is inseparable from life. To create life is to make a person who will suffer. The antinatalist has a strong argument for not bringing new life into the world. If I was to asked to suggest the defining attribute of philosophical pessimism, it would be recognising the suffering of life and that there is no joy in the world which can undo it.

It is Schopenhauer's particular brand of philosophical pessimism which I have an issue with:

He is just describing what goes on on a meta level, like stepping back and trying to look at the situation from afar. Whether one "knows" the situation from the meta level or one is actually just living out the situation, that doesn't change or amplify the suffering. One person is just living through the suffering and the other is just recognizing what is going on. — schopenhauer1

Indeed. And that is the problem with his arguments. Suffering it not meta. It is lived. Rather than metaphysical, suffering is of the world. The "restlessness" Schopenhauer identifies is neither a description of any state of suffering nor any particular states of suffering he is worried about. It is "meta" description which says absolutely nothing about any state of suffering. There is no such thing as "meta" suffering. Most critically, a description of instances of suffering is not the state of living through them.

So there is a great deal of difference between a lived moment of suffering and talking about it on a "meta level." The latter is distinct in that it is never the suffering being spoken about. If the "meta" description is suffering at all, it must be its own unique state of anxiety, pain or restlessness which it doesn't say anything about. Rather than a profound insight into the nature of suffering, Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism is merely one more state of suffering we might encounter. Instead of a description of a states of suffering, it is the state of suffering because one knows there is suffering which one cannot avoid. It is to put an extra scoop of suffering on top all the other suffering we have. Schopenhauer notes the inevitability of suffering and then demands we must suffer for that too.

Again, I just read this as "just deal with it and stop talking about it". — schopenhauer1

I'm actually calling something far more excessive and, fortunately, possible: the elimination of a particular state of suffering.

To ask someone to "deal with suffering" does not make sense. The whole thing about suffering is one does not deal with it. It's impossible. Suffering always hurts. One cannot turn suffering into non-suffering. At best one manages to live through a moment of suffering to be relieved at its passing (or perhaps, dies, so they no longer have to endure it).

What I am calling for here is the elimination of the state of suffering which is Schopenhauer's anxiety about having to suffer. We suffer enough otherwise. We don't need to add to that be worrying about how we can't escape it.

Critically, from the point of view of mitigating suffering, Schopenhauer's philosophy is deeply unethical. It implores are to be anxious about our inability to avoid suffering. If we aren't, it accuses us of failing to understand suffering and grossly misrepresenting what it manes to life a life of suffering. Schopenhauer's philosophy attempts to increase suffering, to make people anxious about how they will inevitably be suffering, because it mistakes suffering at the knowledge of the inevitable suffering for the inevitable suffering of life.

I just don't see what the intellectual love of god really means in practical terms. — schopenhauer1

In terms of the context of this discussion: to be free of anxiety about the contingency of the world. To accept the inevitable outcomes of the world for what they are. Not to, as Schopenhauer does, feel entitled to a world which never exists.

God is the infinite substance immanent in all states of the world. For us to love God means, without exception, to "love" all that happens; to recognise the world for what it is and avoid the notion it "must be" something else, merely because what exists is so painful. It is to recognise suffering for what it is (including the inevitability of suffering and what that means for ethics). It is to recognise the absence of suffering for what it is (and what this means for ethics).

The direct realist has nothing to be concerned about though, for whether or not they are dreaming is of no consequence. Direct realism is not an argument over whether or not any particular experience is a dream or not.

It is a logical point about existence, that states are defined in themselves, and a logical point about the perception of objects, that any perceived object is how it is present in experience. Pick out any experience. It is inconsequential to the direct realist. Dream or not, something manifests in experience.

If its a dream, well, no object of the "real world" is perceived and so it holds no consequence for arguments about when an object of the "real world" is perceived. On the other hand, if an object is perceived, then its nature (as far as the person perceives it) present in their experience. Nothing conflicts with the direct realist's position. Direct realism was never a means of judging "what is real." There is no method for that, as we are always stuck within whatever experience we have.

A direct realist has nothing to fear because knowing what is and is not a dream is irrelevant to their point. It is a question without significance because, no matter what happens, a person only has their experience to distinguish dreams and the world. Trying to find some an object, something independent of experience, which shows what is a dream and what is not is absurd: unperceived objects don't show anyone anything. Any knowledge or showing involves someone experiencing.

Trying to get outside experience, with respect to perceived objects, is exactly what direct realism avoids- perceived objects are experienced as they are. If one perceives an object, it is by experience.

Yes, but I believe the direct realist and indirect realist arguments against one another are generally cogent, with the result being that realism itself in perception is not tenable — The Great Whatever

Indeed. Realism is a metaphysical point: any object defined itself. This doesn't have any empirical manifestation and so is not visible in perception (and so dreams are, in the moment, indistinguishable from "the real world." ).

The telling of dreams from the "real world" does not happen by "realism," but rather by our experiences of what is a dream and what is not; the (experienced) relation of our experiences to other experiences.

and the direct realist who wants to minimize one’s role in perceiving in order to maximize the role of the object: we simply see things as they are, and thus there is little role for perception other than to just open us up to that way. — The Great Whatever

The direct realist actually maximises the object in experience. When the direct realist argues perception is "immediate," they are not suggesting experience plays no role in the experience of the object, but rather that there are no extra state of representation to the object in experience. Anytime someone experiences an object, what they experience is that nature of the object. What someone experiences when they perceive an object isn't merely a representation creation of there bodies. They see the object as it is.

So everything is, indeed, a duckrabbit. And a duck on its own. And a rabbit it on its own. And some unclear shape which isn't yet known. Any of which are immediately present in the experience someone who perceives the object in the given manner.

The fact that we have to deal with life in the first place leads to philosophical pessimism. The fact that we are dealing with it, is just a given if we are alive and awake. The idea that we don't want to make new individuals have to deal with life leads to antinatalist stances. There is nothing wrong with taking account of the situation and explicating about it. If you don't want to see it, then don't engage with it. However, saying "stop writing about it and deal with it" doesn't make the statements any less true. Trying to ignore it won't make it go away. By definition, whether one acknowledges it in some cohesive theory or not, people must deal with life- its responsibilities, burdens, and suffering. People will also, whether they acknowledge it, seek positive experiences, pleasure, happiness, contentedness or what have you thus I am acknowledging people make do with what they are given. — schopenhauer1

Philosophical pessimism is its own particular state of discourse. It is the existence of a particular experience. An idea in someone's head which is actually distinct from their other states (and so the many instances of suffering in their life). The fact people are dealing with life does not necessarily result in philosophical pessimism. Philosophical pessimism is a certain state in addition to all other states (including suffering) of their life.

I'm not arguing anyone should needs to stop writing about the inevitable suffering of life and "just deal with it." My point is that Schopenhauer's philosophy turns philosophical pessimism into a state of anxiety. Rather than accept that suffering is an inevitable part of life, he ties himself up in knots over our inability to avoid it. To Schopenhauer we are failures because we cannot compete the task of eliminating suffering.

I am specifically arguing Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism is a state of needless suffering.

Why chastise ourselves for being incapable of a life without suffering? Do we not already suffer enough, without adding restlessness and anxiety over our inability to avoid suffering? Why not a form of philosophical pessimism which recognises we cannot escape suffering, but avoids the practice of beating ourselves up for that inability?

In the most profound way, you do not acknowledge people make do with what they a given. You utterly reject the idea of being comfortable with what we are given. Is life, suffering, something we can accept as inevitable? You don't think so. In your heart you are still desperate to avoid it. You think the world owes us a way to avoid suffering, even when it is impossible. Supposedly, we are miserable failures because we lack the ability to end suffering. You are not comfortable with idea suffering is an inevitable part of life (which is what we are given).

Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism is a manifestation of pining for this impossible world. It is not a description of how life is suffering. It is a demand for extra suffering; that we ought to be restless and anxious, on-top of any (other) states of suffering we might encounter, because there is suffering we can't avoid.

That being said, Spinoza's solution is also a non-starter. I don't see how understanding that we are one part of a bigger whole solves much of the suffering more than reading a good book about science satisfies us that we learned something new. We walk away from the interesting book with a bit of a buzz from the interesting insights we have learned, but then we are met with the problems of life. Nothing metaphysically changes. — schopenhauer1

It doesn't solve much suffering at all. Maybe it might change someone understanding of the world such they experience a little bit less suffering, such as replacing anxiety over not belonging to the finite, but it is a description of ourselves and the world, rather than a means which will necessarily resolve suffering in the world. With respect to preventing most suffering, it has no role. Spinoza isn't even a "non-starter" with regards to solving the inevitable suffering of life. Such a goal was never the point and isn't attempted by the argument.

And of course nothing "metaphysical"changes. "Metaphysics (i.e. logic)" never changes. The metaphysical is the infinite, unlike any state of suffering, which is of the world, which is finite.

And there just isn't a way to close that gap, other than as a correlation. Brain state ABC correlates with feeling XYZ. But why? Nobody can say convincingly. — Marchesk

For good reason: there isn't a "why." Brains are not a description of explanation of feelings and vice versa. They always fail to account for each other because they are distinct states. The mistake was to propose the account for each other in the first place. No "gap" exists because each has no role in explains the other. The entire approach to consciousness which understands it something to be explained by logic (the meaning of other states) is flawed. It ignores exactly what states of consciousness are: their own state of existence.

Experiences aren't "subjective." Like any state of the world, they are their own state, "objective" and within the realm of language (like any state of the word). They are even "mind-independent": the presence of an experience doesn't require someone be aware of that experience. I can, for example, feel happy without being aware I am experiencing happiness. It doesn't take me thinking are talking about my own happiness for me to be happy. it just requires the existence of a happy state.

All the consternation over "first person" and "third person" is nonsensical. The controversy over "what is it like to experience" is one giant category error. By definition, the being of an experience is distinct from any description we might give, so to attempt "first person" description is to literally try to turn language about something into the state being described. Is it any wonder it always fails?it is exactly what language never is.

So when we are asked: "But what is it like to be a bat (or bee, or rock)?" the question is really asking us to be the bat. Only then, it is assumed, can we understand the experience of a bat (or bee, or rock). It is an incoherent argument which makes a mockery of language and description. The very point of language, of description, is that it is an expression of meaning which is not the thing described. To understand something is, by definition, not to be the thing you know in your present state, but be aware of it anyway. The absence of "first person" IS understanding (even within the one individual: if I understand that I am making this post, then my being has changed from making the post to a state of knowing about making the post. Making the post has been lost to my "first person." It is nowhere in this state of knowing about making the post. I am distant from it).

In other words: the "gap" argument utterly misunderstands what states of awareness are. It proposes to understand involves being what is understood, as if knowledge, awareness or understanding something constituted its existence. It is no coincidence the obsession for the authenticity of "first person" is offered by the idealists. It is the ultimate expression of their position: (only) experience as existence.

Perhaps I should say rather that faith is expressed in action — unenlightened

I'm not sure. It seems more like faith is its own action. To be faithful to an idea of what someone ought to be is something a person does. Yet, it is seemly, it may still be present when someone acts which would indicate they don't believe something will happen- I might decide not to drive a car because I believe its breaks aren't working, but I might also say: "I still have faith the car's breaks are working" Though, it does seem to become questionable when my "faith" seems me unwilling to risk myself on the idea the car will work as it ought to. But then people still profess "faith" in a deity when they have thoughts it isn't there. Still, this does make me a little uncomfortable. In situation where someone locks another person-up and takes away capacity to take certain designs in the world, it seem rather dishonest to say, for example, that someone has "faith" another will behave as they ought to.

Perhaps the trick is that, sometimes, faith is independent of other actions, while other times it is not. Since it is a measure of what ought to be, maybe it's uniquely tied a specific stance someone is talking about, such that sometimes it is its own action (e.g. the presence of faith in God, even though belief is lacking) and other times it is not (e.g. whether you have faith in me to drive your car safely ).