Here is what I meant as the point of contrast:

One without language can have the tree in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "tree" simply by drawing a correlation between the tree and other things. — creativesoul

One without language can have existence in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "existence" simply by drawing a correlation between the existent and other things that may or may not exist.

I do not appreciate the misquote. — creativesoul

Please, everything in brackets "[...]" is me. Sorry, I assumed it to be obvious.

I'm trying to understand this shit, and I'm attempting to show you that in nonlinguistic thought, existence is just as possible as tree.

One without language has no such background, and thus cannot think about a thing's "existence". — creativesoul

And

One without language can have the tree [or existence] in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "tree" [or "existence"] simply by drawing a correlation between the tree [or the existent] and other things [things that may or may not exist]. — creativesoul

What about when nonlinguistic correlations don't pan out as expected? E.g. I see a riverbed in the distance, riverbed correlates with a source of hydration, but when I arrive, the riverbed is dry. That would seem to be grounds for thinking about existence in the absence of language . No?

'language' and 'languaging' — fresco

The former seems to merely be a medium of thought. The latter seems to be the practical application of thought, perhaps thought in action.

the command 'no' to a dog — fresco

The command: "no" to a dog, indicates some mode of thought in the dog. I wonder, is that mode of thought nonlinguistic for the dog? After all, it cognitively responds to language (as opposed to passively reacting to stimuli), and to a distinct and meaningful term at that: "no". No?

The second, exmplified perhaps the command 'no' to a dog, merely interrupts or facilitates changes in behavior. It looks like we don't require the word 'thought' at all, unless we take an anthropomorphic view of other species. — fresco

I'm not a big fan of thinking about how nonhumans think...in fact, I think its fucking stupid. But I am aware of the evolutionary implications posited through neuro-biology, in which the developmental structure of the brain is recapitulated in evolutionarily related species. So I will entertain animal thought just so I don't have digress into this debate.

I have no idea what 'basic thought' can mean other than a state of suspension or interruption of an S-R sequence. — fresco

I can agree with that. I have been trying to really enter the core of nonlinguistic thought. At best, it seems to occurs as an immediate cognitive distinction/correlation, overlayed on my direct experience. I would agree that this operates to disrupt the autonomic S-R sequence of the creature.

Where 'language' might come in (at the crudest level) is as a facility to delay any automatici stimulus response linkage, by allowing for internal 'considering' (aka 'thinking') . — fresco

I would say, this is probably a function of 'thought' at some basic level, not 'language'. Language is a form into which thought can be mediated, and a means by which thought can be communicated/expressed and carried into further correlation with other linguistic thoughts.

perception is 'active' not 'passive', whan can 'direct experience' mean ? — fresco

Direct experience refers to the nondescript content that is mediated through perception into basic thought.

How about 'non linguistic creatures' don't 'think' ! — fresco

I'm totally willing to consider that point.

The thing I can't get past, is the idea that there is some indication of cognitive activity occurring in certain nonlinguistic species, the ability to draw basic distinctions/correlations from direct experience.

Nonlinguistic creatures cannot think of "existence" for it is a word. Non linguistic creatures cannot think of existence because it is not directly perceptible. — creativesoul

Even if nonlinguistic thought could hypothetically apprehend "existence" as some unnamed distinction/correlation, it cannot be identified as "existence" until it is correlated with the linguistic form. And even then, it isn't really existence, it is only the idea of existence that is retroactively imposed on an unnamed distinction/correlation.

"Trees" is a word. Trees are not. The tree is not a "tree" in linguistic thought. It is part of a correlation which attributes meaning and as such makes the tree meaningful/significant to the creature. — creativesoul

Wait a second.

This needs to be further explained. How it is a tree not a "tree" in linguistic thought?

The only way I can parse it is that no concept can be identical to any nonlinguistic thought, and that all linguistic thought begins with a nonlinguistic distinction/correlation that comes to be correlated with a linguistic form that holds conceptual significance. Linguistic thought cannot apprehend the nameless thing present in nonlinguistic thought, it can only apprehend the idea of it, and retroactively impose its conceptualization on that nameless thing. In this way, I can completely agree that a tree is never really a "tree", for any notion of "tree" is nothing but a correlation.

every theory need a 'theoretician' to function... — fresco

Even the theory of "languaging", right?

And re Nieztsche, I am taking Rorty's 'pragmatist interpretation' of it which can be found by googling the video clip for 'Rorty on Truth' — fresco

I think Nietzsche is best approached directly, and not through the interpretation of another. There are probably less than a handful of historic philosophers that are best approached directly, or maybe all should be approached directly. Who knows?

Now it may be that starting another thread may be more appropriate. Let me know what you think. — fresco

I would gladly contribute to that thread. I think you might get across to some people here on TPF. But be prepared for immense criticism from the knowing ones.

Okay, but you did use the phrase 'non negotiable' somewhere above (I think) — fresco

Yes, absolutely. And I have the ability to speak from other perspectives which are not compatible with my own personal beliefs. That means you will never be able to access, nor discuss these non-negotiable positions that I occupy.

I am Merkwurdichliebe...my love is strange. :grin: :kiss: :death:

Then go nowhere. :cool: — Shamshir

But I'm already there. :nerd:

Nietzsche's point that there can be no operational distinction between 'description' and 'reality'. Some descriptions are simply more useful than others in particular contexts. — fresco

That wasn't Nietzsche's meaning at all. It was much more fundamental. His point was that there is no necessary correspondence between direct experience (viz. nerve stimuli) and the concepts which supposedly correspond to it, up to and including any notion of functional context. It's all in is essay: "truth and lies in a nonmoral sense". That is a very powerful piece of literature. Conclusion: all knowledge is a lie.

He makes sense to me from a number of pov's ranging from constructivism via pragmatism to post modernism. If any of these is a no go area for you — fresco

I am a philosopher, there is nowhere I won't go

So let's do it.

cling to your 'absolutist stance' — fresco

That is a bold accusation. I always argue from the relativist perspective. And I mean always, in capital letters.

The answer is ironically solution. — Shamshir

That kind of irony is very unnerving. :grin:

that 'languaging' (Maturana) always has an 'organizational function'...there are no 'neutral descriptions' as such. — fresco

Could you elaborate?

Thinking about blue as opposed to thinking blue.

See the difference? — Shamshir

I do. So then, round it off for me. Don't expect me to fill in the blanks, I haven't the means.

Words' can be thought of as any repetitive behavioral gesture used to facilitate 'structural coupling' between individuals, or to internally resolve behavioral uncertainties within individuale. Those 'gestures' could manifest at any level, from the neural to the muscular. — fresco

Does this mean...

...that the fundamental experience of the observer is reducible to behavioral gestures? That these gestures appear at any conceivable level of behavior, including language. And language is a peculiar gesture with the power of structurally coupling distinctions made by the observer...

...?

Remove it - non linguistic.
Add it - linguistic. — Shamshir

Come again?

That is the essential difference to me. Linguistic thought has the potential to be communicated. Nonlinguistic thought does not.


And, my personal opinion is that nonlinguistic thought is more closely related to actual existence than linguistic thought.

Let me add...

Language is the expression of concept. Language use is dependent upon language aquisition, which is dependent on conceptual abstraction. Most humans, including the mute and telepathic, have the capacity for conceptual abstraction, and therefore language acquistion, despite the ability to use it.

linguistic thought — Shamshir

Thought predicated on language use.

There is no logical restriction on 'words' being confined to a phonetic or graphemic domain. — fresco

Interesting, please elaborate.

This would mean the existence can be thought of independent of language.

What about telepaths and mutes? — Shamshir

They are anomalies. Nevertheless, capable of linguistic thought, simply through their natural capacity for conceptual abstraction.

What about Helen Keller?

Non linguistic animals cannot talk about thought/belief. Thus, they cannot think about thought/belief. Since entertaining a thought is to think about it, it makes no sense to say that a creature without the capability to think about thought/belief can entertain thought/belief. — creativesoul

Thanks bud.

This makes sense.

My question is, how can we say the prelinguistic creature cannot think of "existence" as it does a "tree"? After all, the tree is not a "tree" in prelinguistic thought, it only factors as something distinct that correlates to something else distinct. So, it is very possible that "existence", like the "tree", can be thought by the nonlinguistic creature.

Yet, I find a problem here, it seems to be beyond the scope of linguistic thought, to speculate whether or not "existence", like the "tree", can factor as something distinct, with some correlation to something else distinct, in prelinguistic thought. As it stands, it is impossible for the linguistic thinker to enter into the mind of the nonlinguistic thinker without going silent...from our perspective, we can only understand the "tree", "existence", or the nonlinguistic thinker through language.

Absolutely zero humor taboos here.

That some people have humor taboos helps the impact of some humor, though. — Terrapin Station

:up:

Except for slapstick, real, effective humor has teeth. If a joke doesn't offend someone somewhere, it probably is not very funny.

It makes no sense whatsoever to say that non linguistic animals can entertain thought/belief that they cannot have. Entertaining thought/belief is thinking about it. Thinking about it requires being able to talk about it. — creativesoul

Could you clarify this? Maybe rephrase it?

Animals can entertain thoughts that they cannot hold. — creativesoul

It is very reasonable to say that an animal could have a transient thought which might compel it to act. But it is hard to imagine that such primitive ideation could be retained beyond its immediacy. Hence it is possible for a thinking creature to continue entertaining a thought, even if it has ceased to hold onto it.

The only way to show that you are having a specific thought is to to be able to repeat it; to be able to have it in mind again and again at will. That is what I would call holding a thought. — Janus

Actually, there is another way. We show a "holding onto thought" whenever we sustain a line of reason.

He denied that animals can have thoughts at all. — creativesoul

Then why did he say:

I believe animals definitely think, — Janus

???

That is to say that thinking is not having thoughts. That's nonsense.

We talk about our thought/belief. We have them prior to talking about them. — creativesoul

He might have said it better. But his point is well taken. That, unless a thought is held onto, thinking is as fleeting as sense experience.

All use of the term "existence" is language use.
All language use is existentially dependent upon language acquisition. [. . .] The presupposition of existence does not require language use for it happens in autonomous fashion within non-linguistic thought/belief.
That which is prior to language use cannot be existentially dependent upon language use.
The presupposition of existence is not existentially dependent upon language use.
All notions of "existence" are. — creativesoul

I agree with almost everything you said here. In fact you are onto something good, maybe genius. But if your name is "creativesoul", then you need to put some more creative soul into it. There is something robotic about such formulaic speech, and I think you can 'get down' much better. :grin: Whatever the case, you present an honest and reasonable counterbalance to speculative philosophers like myself, and I value your contributions.

I also agree with your last paragraph. — Janus

Nice! :cool:

I believe animals definitely think, but they do not hold or stand by their thinking such that we could say they "have thoughts". this latter comes about only with language where the thoughts can be precisely formulated and therefore "grasped" and "held". — Janus

That is a great point! For our purposes here, we could say that any thought that can be grasped or held can be called a concept. And any concept can be rendered into linguistic form, given an adequate degree of language aquisition. (consider "god", it is possibly one of the first concepts to emerge out of the primitive idea of "existence". Who knows. . ."Where she goes, nobody knows."? :joke: {Ren & Stimpy Show})

I would also be so bold as to speculate that non-linguistic thought is nearly identical between all animals equipped with the faculty of primitive ideation. This could probably be corroborated by neuro-biology, particularly regarding its speculation on the evolutionary developmen of the brain.

would say that unicorns have a fictional or imagined existence. — Janus

Could it be stated as: unicorns are existentially dependent upon fiction/imagination?

(Add. That one is for @creativesoul. :wink: See, I'm trying)