I'm not sure how you can extricate ontology from epistemolog, other than as an epiphenomon of taking an absolutist stance.

Firstly I don't think any non-linguistic idea could be rightly thought of as an abstract idea. You might say that prior to language thinking is "private/ subjective" but I think that is kind of misleading,because it seems that such non-linguistic thinking of existence would be akin to an unmediated apprehension of existence and hence instinctive, which would be native to and shared by all members of whatever species we are considering.

I'm not sure how you can extricate ontology from epistemolog, other than as an epiphenomon of taking an absolutist stance. — fresco

That is what empiricism attempts. Of course it has been completely debunked, so you are probably right. And Nietschze point this out in his own particular manner.

Wait a second, I think you are setting me up. I'm gonna assert something that doesn't exist, and you are going to tell me how the non-existing thing derives a virtual existence within the presupposed content of my assertion.

So...unicorns? — Merkwurdichliebe

Right, so in accordance with what I said about different kinds of existence, I would say that unicorns have a fictional or imagined, as opposed to a physical, existence.

Firstly I don't think any non-linguistic idea could be rightly thought of as an abstract idea. You might say that prior to language thinking is "private/ subjective" but I think that is kind of misleading,because it seems that such non-linguistic thinking of existence would be akin to an unmediated apprehension of existence and hence instinctive, which would be native to and shared by all members of whatever species we are considering. — Janus

That is a nice point.

But, let me propose a few more things:

I would say that thinking is dependent on existence, and for the existing thinker, "existence" is primary, and "thought" secondary. Then, thinking about existence would be tertiary.

So ...

When you mention "non-linguistic thinking of existence" as "akin to an unmediated apprehension of existence and hence instinctive, which would be native to and shared by all members of whatever species we are considering", I cannot agree that this qualifies as "thought" without further qualification. As it stands here, it would say that it represents cognitive immediacy, in which a primitive, nonlinguistic mode of thought may or may not exist. But the abstraction of primitive ideation into linguistic thought, is where direct existence (including primitive ideation) is properly mediated into a rational concept.

One more thing, just for fun

One's direct existence/cognitive immediacy can never be communicated directly, for it is dependent on its abstraction into a rational concept in order to be adequately communicated, hence all communication of "existence" can only come indirectly.

would say that unicorns have a fictional or imagined existence. — Janus

Could it be stated as: unicorns are existentially dependent upon fiction/imagination?

(Add. That one is for @creativesoul. :wink: See, I'm trying)

I guess so, for if there were no humans to imagine them they would have no kind of existence at all.

I would say that thinking is dependent on existence, and for the existing thinker, "existence" is primary, and "thought" secondary. Then, thinking about existence would be tertiary. — Merkwurdichliebe

This seems pretty much right to me.

When you mention "non-linguistic thinking of existence" as "akin to an unmediated apprehension of existence and hence instinctive, which would be native to and shared by all members of whatever species we are considering", I cannot agree that this qualifies as "thought" without further qualification. As it stands here, it would say that it represents cognitive immediacy, in which a primitive, non-linguistic mode of thought may or may not exist. But the abstraction of primitive ideation into linguistic thought, is where direct existence (including primitive ideation) is properly mediated into a rational concept. — Merkwurdichliebe

I tend to agree with you and I have had this very discussion with @creativesoul more than a few times. I believe animals definitely think, but they do not hold or stand by their thinking such that we could say they "have thoughts". this latter comes about only with language where the thoughts can be precisely formulated and therefore "grasped" and "held".

I also agree with your last paragraph.

I believe animals definitely think, but they do not hold or stand by their thinking such that we could say they "have thoughts". this latter comes about only with language where the thoughts can be precisely formulated and therefore "grasped" and "held". — Janus

That is a great point! For our purposes here, we could say that any thought that can be grasped or held can be called a concept. And any concept can be rendered into linguistic form, given an adequate degree of language aquisition. (consider "god", it is possibly one of the first concepts to emerge out of the primitive idea of "existence". Who knows. . ."Where she goes, nobody knows."? :joke: {Ren & Stimpy Show})

I would also be so bold as to speculate that non-linguistic thought is nearly identical between all animals equipped with the faculty of primitive ideation. This could probably be corroborated by neuro-biology, particularly regarding its speculation on the evolutionary developmen of the brain.

I also agree with your last paragraph. — Janus

Nice! :cool:

All use of the term "existence" is language use.
All language use is existentially dependent upon language acquisition. [. . .] The presupposition of existence does not require language use for it happens in autonomous fashion within non-linguistic thought/belief.
That which is prior to language use cannot be existentially dependent upon language use.
The presupposition of existence is not existentially dependent upon language use.
All notions of "existence" are. — creativesoul

I agree with almost everything you said here. In fact you are onto something good, maybe genius. But if your name is "creativesoul", then you need to put some more creative soul into it. There is something robotic about such formulaic speech, and I think you can 'get down' much better. :grin: Whatever the case, you present an honest and reasonable counterbalance to speculative philosophers like myself, and I value your contributions.

Then the mistake, imo, is that we can escape from the domain of 'language' at all. — fresco

• Language is the one and only tool we currently have that will allow us to communicate.
• Without communication, and there can be no discussion.
• This is a discussion....

I could have been clearer there. When I said 'no one knows', I meant that - at least to my knowledge - it cannot be proven philosophically/logically (or any other way) with absolute certainty. — EricH

Re science methodology 101, empirical claims are not provable period. So of course, since this is an empirical claim, it's not provable. That's not a liability here. It's just a truism about empirical claims.

Yes

Physical existence, fictional existence, conceptual existence, possible existence, desired existence. — Janus

So, these are all different kinds of the same thing... purportedly. That 'thing' is existence itself(whatever that is). That is the problem for me. What do these different 'kinds of existence' all have in common such that having that commonality is what makes them all a kind of existence?

All use of the term "existence" is language use.
All language use is existentially dependent upon language acquisition. [. . .] The presupposition of existence does not require language use for it happens in autonomous fashion within non-linguistic thought/belief.
That which is prior to language use cannot be existentially dependent upon language use.
The presupposition of existence is not existentially dependent upon language use.
All notions of "existence" are.
— creativesoul


I agree with almost everything you said here. In fact you are onto something good, maybe genius. But if your name is "creativesoul", then you need to put some more creative soul into it. There is something robotic about such formulaic speech, and I think you can 'get down' much better. :grin: Whatever the case, you present an honest and reasonable counterbalance to speculative philosophers like myself, and I value your contributions. — Merkwurdichliebe

Genius and five bucks will get you a cup of coffee just the same as ignorance and five bucks.

The more I engage with this talk of existence as a subject matter in it's own right, the more I abhor the practice.

I believe animals definitely think, but they do not hold or stand by their thinking such that we could say they "have thoughts". this latter comes about only with language where the thoughts can be precisely formulated and therefore "grasped" and "held".
— Janus

That is a great point! For our purposes here, we could say that any thought that can be grasped or held can be called a concept. — Merkwurdichliebe

That's a great point?

:yikes:

That is to say that thinking is not having thoughts. That's nonsense.

We talk about our thought/belief. We have them prior to talking about them(some anyway).

There is an actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. The latter requires language, some thought/belief does not.

Janus fails to draw and maintain that distinction.

That is to say that thinking is not having thoughts. That's nonsense.

We talk about our thought/belief. We have them prior to talking about them. — creativesoul

He might have said it better. But his point is well taken. That, unless a thought is held onto, thinking is as fleeting as sense experience.

He denied that animals can have thoughts at all. He's wrong. Having thought is drawing correlations between different things. Thinking is the same.

Whatever the case, you present an honest and reasonable counterbalance to speculative philosophers like myself, and I value your contributions. — Merkwurdichliebe

Oh, where are my manners?

Thanks.

He denied that animals can have thoughts at all. — creativesoul

Then why did he say:

I believe animals definitely think, — Janus

???

Just one of Janus' many powers.

I suppose he thinks/believes that thinking does not require having thoughts. You'll have to ask him "why?". That's a psychological question.

I believe animals definitely think, but they do not hold or stand by their thinking such that we could say they "have thoughts". this latter comes about only with language where the thoughts can be precisely formulated and therefore "grasped" and "held".

The answer to your question is right there, is it not?

Having thoughts, according to Janus, requires language whereas thinking evidently does not.

Of course, if we examine the above carefully, we'll see a bit of a problem in the parsing. Thoughts are there, but not held. The animal thinks but does not have thoughts, until the animal uses language to think about the thoughts(precisely formulate them via language use).

Not at all clear or helpful.

As before...

There is an actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief that Janus has neglected to draw and maintain.

@Janus Correct me if I'm wrong, but you just mean that animals don't store or recall thoughts other than immediately during thinking, right?

Think Pavlov's dog here...

If a creature draws a correlation between the sound of a bell and eating, then the creature has formed rudimentary thought/belief. The creature is capable of forming/having/holding thought/belief - however shortlived. The duration of the correlation doesn't matter. The expectation that stands as evidence of forming/having the thought/belief is shown later when the creature hears the sound of the bell once again.

Ring the bell and - only as a result of having already drawn the correlation between the bell and eating - Pavlov's dog thinks/believes that it's about to eat(once again). It's involuntary behaviour proves this. It goes to the feeding place. It begins salivating. It gets excited.

That is behaviour driven by thinking/believing that it is about to get fed. The result of hearing the bell and already having drawn correlations between the sound of the bell and eating.

don't store or recall thoughts other than immediately during thinking — Shamshir

The duration of the correlation doesn't matter. — creativesoul

Well, it matters if it's what @Janus means when he refers to holding thought. As he'd then be right that they can't hold thoughts, but clearly can have thoughts, which is different when looking at thinking as a river.

They are just different kinds of existence as generally conceived is all.

Yes, pretty much, language allows us to store and transmit thoughts in more or less precisely determinate forms, and written language even more so. We can think the same thought over and over. We can stand by a thought; live our lives by that thought even.

The duration of the correlation doesn't matter.
— creativesoul
Well, it matters if it's what Janus means when he refers to holding thought. — Shamshir

A bit of context for you...

That's a critique from Janus regarding my practice of saying that non-linguistic creatures can form, have, and/or hold thought/belief.

Seems we all agree that the way humans have and/or hold belief is more complex than the way non linguistic creatures' do.

Denying those differences results in denying the ability of having and/or holding thought/belief to non linguistic creatures.

That's what I think is going on here.