So intuitive, non-linguistic, subconscious — whichever you want to call it then? — praxis

I would go so far as to call it a second nature. Correct me if I'm wrong.

Can it? — creativesoul

I think so. But I probably have looser standards here.

I was under the impression that one was morally dumbfounded when and if they could not answer certain questions regarding why they believe something or other(strongly), and/or how they've come to such hold such conviction in moral belief. — creativesoul

I'm under the impression that "one was morally dumbfounded when and if they could not answer certain questions regarding why they believe something or other(strongly), and/or how they've come to such hold such conviction in moral belief", I would have to add: only when the question posed is done so rationally (by a relatively normal person), and is meant to elicit a rational answer. For the one who is morally dumbfounded, his reasons are perfectly rational and completely justify his position.

Indeed. Cognitive dissonance requires a pre-existing worldview be questioned by another. Moral dumbfounding is a kind of cognitive dissonance. — creativesoul

Nice point. The cognitive dissonance of moral dumbfounding is not capricious, like prelinguistic thought/belief. It is embedded in a complex infrastructure of inculcated thought/belief compounded by post-linguististc thought/belief (viz. reflection and deliberation) . . . Moral dumbfounding can perfectly explain why Socrates drinks the hemlock.

Agreed. I predict that thread will stir up a major shit-storm. It will probably require all my attention.

in the absence of any other criterion, this become the only ground to stand on.
— Merkwurdichliebe

You've stated this concern on several occasions. If we arrive at the absence of any other criterion, then we've missed and/or completely overlooked everything that existed in it's entirety prior to our account of it. — creativesoul

I agree with what you say here. It is just a round-about technique I use to arrive at an agreement. I believe the absence of any other criterion is only due to our/my failure to establish one. And clearly, this is the case with what I said above.

...modern day reductionism/analytics, which is not only guilty of perpetuating the nonexisting problem, but of compounding it, mutilating it beyond recognition, and into a greater delusion that, again, thinks something might actually be resolved.
— Merkwurdichliebe

That's a subject matter worthy of it's own thread. — creativesoul

I hate the prospect of starting a thread, but I might have to do it if nobody else does.

I have a hard time understanding how the same person can do both; acknowledge the inherent problems in philosophy and suggest their continued use. — creativesoul

Call it a paradox. Philosophy for me is analogous to Chuang Tzu and The Useless Tree: "Useless? You should worry!"

Logical possibility alone does not warrant assent/belief. — creativesoul

I agree. But in the absence of any other criterion, this becomes the only ground to stand on.

Banno wants to continue/limit it's use, for/in/to some contexts I suppose, but I find it fatally flawed in such a way that it's use loses all explanatory value. It is inadequate for taking account of the attribution of meaning, the presupposition of correspondence to what's happened, and thought/belief formation itself. — creativesoul

There are two approaches as I see it. One is to limit the variables so as to reduce the problem until it diminishes to the point that it effectively disappears, implodes. The other, is to include all possible variables so as to expand into a multivariate conception of the problem (as far as possible), in order to exhaust all potential issue. I don't think either can solve anything. But, this does not mean philosophy is without value.

I'm arguing that moral dumbfounding occurs at an advanced stage of morality, well beyond the primitive stage of prelinguistic thought/belief. I think the example of Socrates and the hemlock is precisely this case. My point is: the deeper the ethical existence, the more irrational it appears.

Do you not think/believe that there are many self-perpetuated problems, all of which are a result of people becoming bewitched by certain language use? Frameworks are language use. Dichotomies are a part of all frameworks. Some dichotomies are used - historically - as a means for doing something that they are inherently incapable of doing. — creativesoul

Indeed, I agree. I think that all philosophy operates by creating it's own problems in order to solve them; and, from a simplified perspective, it certainly can be traced to language use. But, I think the greatest problem is thinking there is a real problem to begin with. Thus, philosophers use all manner of methodology and conceptual framework (e.g. dichotomies) to battle a self created phantasm, and not being able to defeat it, they have a bigger problem. This is true up to and including modern day reductionism/analytics, which is not only guilty of perpetuating the nonexistent problem, but of compounding it, mutilating it beyond recognition, and into a greater delusion that, again, thinks something might actually be resolved. It is all a case of despair of the infinite.

In what other case would your proposition not be the case? It seems to me that you would simply be talking about something else entirely (a different case), and therefore making a category error or talking past each other. — Harry Hindu

Different case indeed, that is probably what it would be. But I've qualified the particular case I presented, so unless the case you are presenting is quantifiable under the constant that I specified in my particular case, it has no pertinence, and you are the one talking past me.

But don't get me wrong, you could reconceptualize the whole enterprise, and actually arrive at a conclusion that has great significance for human existence (unlike the case I presented). I would be willing to hear it out.

perhaps we would be best to clear up these issues first before going on to the rest. — Janus

That's always best.

creativesoul seems to be particularizing the question; do I have another specifically in mind when I am morally deliberating (he says "ethically", but I think it will save confusion to stick to "morally" regardless of the question as to whether the terms are equivalent). If I do not have another specifically in mind when I am morally deliberating, does that not mean that my moral deliberations are not concerned with others? I would say that it does not mean that although of course the distinction as such is useful.

You then say that we can make a distinction (presumably about moral thinking which is specifically about others and moral thinking which is not?) because we have "existentialized" the "variables". So, I am not clear what you mean by this, but that may be because this has been lifted out of the context of the whole conversation — Janus

@creativesoul and I have been proceeding methodologically, not so much to determine some absolute truth about the source of morals, but to ensure we are conforming to the same criterion in our discourse. Even if we've gotten nowhere, we are, at least, not bogged down by the semantics of divergent concepts.

So far, we have qualified an existential constant as 'thought/belief', and agreed upon one variable: that a certain mode of thought/belief is "moral in kind" . The methodological schematic begins by tracing thought/belief through its various stages up to the point that it becomes "moral in kind". We have proceeded through a consideration of ethics as it pertains to prelinguistic thought/belief, up through the cultural inculcation/indoctrination of societal ethics, and then as it appears to circle back upon the individual where he internalizes a moral code. Up to this point, we have agreed on this methodological survey of the source of morals, more or less.

Next, I don't know what it means that moral thought "pertains to the stages of pre-linguistic thought/ belief", because, firstly I don't accept that there are any clearly formed pre-linguistic thoughts or beliefs, and secondly because, even if there were, they would not be linguistically formed thoughts and beliefs and I can't see how something.like linguistically formed moral thought could pertain to anything pre-linguistic. I can see how linguistically formed thought could evolve out of pre-linguistic mental processes, but how it could ever pertain to them if "pertain" is meant to signify anything like 'justify' or 'be justified by' I am unable to say. — Janus

I agree with you here. I don't hold prelinguistic thought/belief to be ethically charged. It is has no capacity beyond aesthetic assessment, that is, it lacks the faculty requirements of ethical judgment (viz. ethical thought/belief). I don't even think it can be called quasi-ethical, because I don't think the ethical consciousness is awakened prior to language acquisition and cultural inculcation/indoctrination. Moreover, I hold the stage of cultural inculcation/indoctrination to be the most superficial level of ethical existence, and, as such it remains rather insignificant for the individual.

@frank
@VagabondSpectre
Can I post a video too?

I think if we could reconcile our terms here, you would be more agreeable to my meaning.

Earlier, while conversing with @creativesoul, I loosely defined the terms we were discussing.

To what extent must one consider an other in order for her/him to be thinking ethically about the other.
— creativesoul

That is something that we can now make a distinction about, but only because the variables have been existentialized, right?

Ethical thought/belief it would seem, pertains to the stages of prelinguistic thought/belief and cultural indoctrination (predominantly the latter). It opens up onto ethical existence for the individual.

In ethical existence, the individual internalizes ethical thought/belief. Somewhere here, in the internalization of ethical thought/belief, is where moral thought/belief should first appear (I can't exactly pin point it yet).

At a the most superficial level, moral thought/belief would be likely to appear identical to the ethical thought/belief from which it was derived. But the deeper one sinks into moral thought/belief (i.e. the more serious his conviction and responsibility become), the more ethical existence becomes a reality for him... the more likely (but not necessarily) his morality will come to differ from the ethical thought/belief from which it is derived.

It seems reasonable to suggest that at a deep enough level of moral thought/belief, it ceases to be a cognitive process, and becomes more akin to feeling and intuition. If this is accepted, then the more that ethical thought/belief is internalized, the more irrational it becomes. — Merkwurdichliebe

So in regard to the example of Socrates, you can better understand my position.

I had another friend who used to say "Women are alright, but you can't beat the real thing!" — Janus

Now that is funny! :rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

Even in the case of, for example, a moral proscription against masturbation; it is generally considered wrong because, or insofar as, it is thought to make you unfit for sexual relationship with another. If it were condemned because it was thought to cause blindness, then it would be considered to be morally wrong because you would become a burden on your friends and family and society in general (you might then be on welfare for example). — Janus

"Self improvement is masturbation." ~Tyler Durden, Fight Club

Leave masturbation out of it, what did it ever do to you? It made me blind. :cool: :joke:

I would say that moral principles always come from others and are always and only pertinent to relationship with an other or others. Perhaps there are exceptions, but I can't think of any. — Janus

What about Socrates? He drank the hemlock motivated by personal obligation to moral principle. The sentiment of the entire city was forgiving of Socrates despite the judgement they had passed upon him, they even gave him a free pass, which he refused out of moral duty. I don't see how choosing to death was ethically pertinent to the rest of Athens, but I certainly see how it was to Socrates.

Hey you guys!

Goobacks are being oppressed in the future. If we don't get some solidarity soon, they'll take our jobs.

I would say most is concerned with considering behavior towards others, and even if it is not a consideration of behavior specifically directed towards another, it will always be a consideration of the implications for others of whatever behavior is in question and/ or of how others would see me if they knew that I had behaved that way and so on. — Janus

That is true for socially motivated people. But what about the person whose moral thought/belief is motivated by principle?

I guess I'll get a head start. I will found the Gooback's Rights Movement. From there we will launch the Goobacks political party. The rest is history in the making.

It's only horrible if white people say it. In a couple of centuries the average American will be brownish and sort of Latino looking. The N-word won't be a thing. — frank

Goobacks: we will become a hairless, uniform mix of all races, with the same skin color (a yellowy, light-brownish, whitish color), while our language will become a guttural mixture of all world languages.

As Tim considers it beneath him, and you seem to understand his point... — ZhouBoTong

I don't understand what he's saying about immorality and law, but I somwhat understand what his point is from a philosophical perspective.

Can you explain to me why Schindler breaking the law to help people is immoral? — ZhouBoTong

Because whenever ethical divergence occurs between two or more people, the ethical becomes relativistic.

So you agree there can be situations where EVERY option open to the individual is immoral? What is the point of morals if they do not inform us as to how we should act? — ZhouBoTong

Yes, any situation where the ethical becomes relativistic, we can find that every option open to the individual becomes immoral (especially when an ethical perspective is considered from its necessary antithesis). Schindler was absolutely immoral in relation to the Nazi ethic.

So be it. . .then the point of morals is simply to instill the individual with a personal conviction over his personal responsibility for himself as the decisive moral agent. Furthermore, even if the moral agent is capable of perfectly fulfilling his moral obligations, he can never determine whether or not his morality stands on absolute ground.

is not a subjective truth/fact regardless of whether you claim it and Banno believes it? — Harry Hindu

Hey!!! Leave @Banno out of it, or I'll cut you. :cool:

non-mental objects. — Harry Hindu

I have no objection to eternal forms.

everything must proceed as necessary, no?

Are you suggesting that most people no longer know quite what they mean when a large number of people disagree with them? — Isaac

What is the criterion which justifies a unified concept???

To what alternative weakness do you suppose most lesser mortals succumb? — Isaac

They succumb to the weakness of stupidity, qua. gullible. I think @Tim wood is making a great point, in a most ironic manner. Call it a paradoxical statement.

If were to doggedly insist that the earth were flat in the face of the entire scientific community dissenting, would that be admirable? — Isaac

Absolutely. There is no measure by which I can judge your subjectivity. It is yours. But I, as "I", decide what is deserving of respect, or not. Please challenge me.

And this is a weakness? To be confronted by a large number of people all arguing against your position but to maintain it nonetheless, is a strength for you is it? — Isaac

Actually it is a power, but yes.

Are you suggesting that most people no longer know quite what they mean when a large number of people disagree with them? — Isaac

Yes! Indeed, to the fullest.

All moral things are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. — creativesoul

This is the existential constant. What more qualification is needed?

Mister @tim wood, I have the utmost degree of respect towards you. It is an awesome feat to procure such a vast quantity of dissenters, while conserving the basic sense of your meaning. I say, keep it up.

What the fuck do I know? In my ignorance, it appears to be quite effective.

Well, we differ here and we agree. I've found this conversation to be quite interesting. It's nice having you around as well. Dissenting opinions are welcome. — creativesoul

That MF @praxis never addresses me. we probably agree too much.

Cheers. If I could buy you a drink... we'd all be buzzed!

:wink: — creativesoul

@praxis We've (me & @creativesoul) have been drinking for a while now. You should have a drink too.

A bridge of mutual understanding needs to be maintained. We've a good start, I think. — creativesoul

This is my primary mandate. I think we might accidentally prove something else, than what is meant here.

We talk about smashing things into pieces that are able to be smashed into pieces. Moral things aren't such things. Moral things do indeed consist of other things, of simpler things. All of these elementary constituents/ingredients exist in their entirety prior to becoming part of one of the multitude of different things that we've chosen to call "moral".

All moral things are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. — creativesoul

:up:

@creativesoul

Paine makes a distinction between societal ethics (cultural indoctrination) as being a positive sort of cooperation amongst the collective, and government as a counter balance to evil nature of the individual (or in terms of this discussion, as an impediment to the individual who may go on to further develop his moral thought/belief in an adversarial or sociopathic manner).

This is worthy of further consideration.

Is it actually the case that the proposition "I prefer vanilla to chocolate ice-cream", is not a subjective truth/fact regardless of whether you claim it and Banno believes it? — Harry Hindu

In this case, it is the case. In another case it may not be. Both cases may be equally sensible internally, and totally contradictory externally. But that is okay since the constant of each is independent of the other, and each uniquely contains it's own exclusive subset variables.

By disagreeing with someone you are essentially telling them that their version is wrong and yours is right and that there is a state of affairs independent of what you both are claiming and that language is simply a means of representing some state of affairs that is either more or less accurate than another claim about that state of affairs. — Harry Hindu

That is accurate. Unfortunately thought is infinite, and the range of possible perspectives is inexhaustible. Thus, it should be noted, what you say is also true for alternative cases that do not necessarily disagree.

Just doing a survey of our methodology (existential quantification):

Thought/belief is formed when a creature draws a mental correlation between different things. All thought/belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content regardless of subsequent further qualification. — creativesoul

This is the only necessary qualification for us to proceed.

[...] They all have the same basic elemental constituency, so to speak. As a result of having knowledge of the basic minimalist criterion of all thought/belief, there is ground to talk of the origen of one particular kind. Some would agree that there is no stronger justificatory ground than a conceptual scheme following from and/or built upon uncontentious true premisses. — creativesoul

Let's call the premise "the qualification". No need to further qualify. Now we can quantify the variables in relation to the constant. We are now as unjustifiably committed to the method (not to imply it is unwarranted by the power of it own device) as to the self-evident premise (which is warranted by the methodological schematic) -
we can assume it exists (V).

If there are no actual examples to the contrary, that's falsifiable/verifiable. — creativesoul

One method of quantification that fits into the overal methodological schematic of existential quantification.

There's more. . .

(If nothing else, this is demonstrating that agreement upon a methodology is imperative to further philosophical discourse.)