I’m just trying to understand your distinction between behavior towards others and behavior not towards others, as it relates to morals.

If you don’t want to cooperate that’s fine. It’s entirely your choice.

I’m just trying to understand your distinction between behavior towards others and behavior not towards others, as it relates to morals.

If you don’t want to cooperate that’s fine. It’s entirely your choice. — praxis

But I'm neither drawing that distinction nor talking about it. The distinction is between considering behaviour towards another and considering one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour in a specific context that is not considering behaviour towards another. The latter is what The Fox and the Grapes is about. It's not about the former.

The distinction is being drawn as part of the comparison/contrast between two different criterions for what counts as a moral thing. The first criterion is my own. All moral things are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. The other criterion came from another participant. It claims that all moral things are about considering behaviour towards others.

With all universal criterions, it only take one actual example to the contrary to falsify them. The Fox and the Grapes falsifies the criterion is question. Not all morals are about and/or consider behaviour towards another.

I could not have been more cooperative.

Are you aware that you've been talking in prescriptive terms whereas I'm talking in descriptive.

Two very different methodologies...

Again, I’ve just been trying to figure out your distinction. I’m satisfied now and I agree with you.

I guess that I have a habit of being too loose in my interpretations, or I’m just slow.

I do not think of you in such terms. No worries. Someone needs to take me to task. That's the point of putting it out there.

Do you place much value in the rules of logical entailment?

How's it going Creative?

Some really good points here, praxis!

The distinction is between considering behaviour towards another and considering one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour in a specific context that is not considering behaviour towards another. — creativesoul

I think the point you are missing here is that in moral thought we are considering what kind of person we want to be, and that makes no sense in the absence of the other. The ethical question as to how to best live is a different matter. It might concern only oneself, but the idea of being a particular kind of person can only derive from interaction with others, and is introjected such that it will still imply the other, even in their physical absence.

Hey Sam! I'm good. How are you?

The distinction is between considering behaviour towards another and considering one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour in a specific context that is not considering behaviour towards another.
— creativesoul

I think the point you are missing here is that in moral thought we are considering what kind of person we want to be, and that makes no sense in the absence of the other. — Janus

I'm not missing that at all. I've even argued for the existential dependency that all morals have upon an other.

Rather, I'm arguing about the content of what counts as moral thought - in kind. Moral thought does not have to be about, and/or in the context of considering behaviour towards another. Some is. Not all.

I'm actually beginning to wonder why that seems to be something so troublesome to agree on for some here.

Do you agree with that?

I'm actually beginning to wonder why that seems to be something so troublesome to agree on for some here. — creativesoul

I think that I may have figured it out, and in the process identified a basic flaw in the project of attempting to develop a universal criterion for what counts as a moral thing, which is essentially that we may be blind to morals frameworks (and their particular sets of values) that differ from our own.

The value of morals, I believe, is in their capacity to promote and regulate cooperation in large groups. Large groups of people cooperating as a unit appears to be a highly successful adaptive survival strategy, to put it in evolutionary terms. With this in mind, I'll reconsider the claim that 'all moral things are about considering behavior towards others', starting with the premises that:

• Morals are always part of a moral framework or culture.
• A moral framework or culture always consists of people (others).
• A moral framework has value.
• There are categories of moral intuitions.

As I've tried to previously show, the fox in the Fox and the Grapes fable considers itself a failure for giving up and not working hard to go beyond its natural reach and tries to console itself for being a failure. It tries to save face. This indicates that it has adopted or has been inculcated by a culture with a particular moral framework that values industriousness. By not living up to the expectations or ethics of its culture it has failed its culture. It has failed others. When considering giving up on the grapes (considering behavior), the fox was considering being faithful or unfaithful to (towards) its culture (others).

If I consider being unfaithful to my wife, I'm considering being unfaithful to another person. If I were unfaithful, my wife, or anyone else, may never be aware of it.

Loyalty/betrayal may be a moral intuition that you are not considering, creativesoul, possibly because, as you've mentioned in another topic, you're "pretty damn liberal," and liberalism tends to devalue the moral intuition of loyalty/betrayal.

Rather, I'm arguing about the content of what counts as moral thought - in kind. Moral thought does not have to be about, and/or in the context of considering behaviour towards another. Some is. Not all. — creativesoul

I would say most is concerned with considering behavior towards others, and even if it is not a consideration of behavior specifically directed towards another, it will always be a consideration of the implications for others of whatever behavior is in question and/ or of how others would see me if they knew that I had behaved that way and so on.

I would say most is concerned with considering behavior towards others, and even if it is not a consideration of behavior specifically directed towards another, it will always be a consideration of the implications for others of whatever behavior is in question and/ or of how others would see me if they knew that I had behaved that way and so on. — Janus

That is true for socially motivated people. But what about the person whose moral thought/belief is motivated by principle?

I would say that moral principles always come from others and are always and only pertinent to relationship with an other or others. Perhaps there are exceptions, but I can't think of any.

Even in the case of, for example, a moral proscription against masturbation; it is generally considered wrong because, or insofar as, it is thought to make you unfit for sexual relationship with another. If it were condemned because it was thought to cause blindness, then it would be considered to be morally wrong because you would become a burden on your friends and family and society in general (you might then be on welfare for example).

I would say that moral principles always come from others and are always and only pertinent to relationship with an other or others. Perhaps there are exceptions, but I can't think of any. — Janus

What about Socrates? He drank the hemlock motivated by personal obligation to moral principle. The sentiment of the entire city was forgiving of Socrates despite the judgement they had passed upon him, they even gave him a free pass, which he refused out of moral duty. I don't see how choosing to death was ethically pertinent to the rest of Athens, but I certainly see how it was to Socrates.

Even in the case of, for example, a moral proscription against masturbation; it is generally considered wrong because, or insofar as, it is thought to make you unfit for sexual relationship with another. If it were condemned because it was thought to cause blindness, then it would be considered to be morally wrong because you would become a burden on your friends and family and society in general (you might then be on welfare for example). — Janus

"Self improvement is masturbation." ~Tyler Durden, Fight Club

Leave masturbation out of it, what did it ever do to you? It made me blind. :cool: :joke:

As I said somewhere else I don't consider ethical and moral pertinence to be necessarily coterminous. The difference for me would be something like:
Ethics: how should I live?
Morality: how should I be in relation to others (most specifically people)?

So, you have for example Bioethics, but the idea of Biomorality seems somehow wrong to me.

So, I see ethics as inclusive of, but not restricted to, moral thought. But they're just my definitions, and I hold to them because they seem most consistent with general usage. My mind can always be changed by good counterexamples, though.

:rofl:

A good friend of mine who is self-admittedly addicted to masturbation, says that it is training for being able to delay ejaculation when involved in a "real" sexual encounter.

I had another friend who used to say "Women are alright, but you can't beat the real thing!" I never found out what the real thing is; perhaps I was lucky!

I had another friend who used to say "Women are alright, but you can't beat the real thing!" — Janus

Now that is funny! :rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

I think if we could reconcile our terms here, you would be more agreeable to my meaning.

Earlier, while conversing with @creativesoul, I loosely defined the terms we were discussing.

To what extent must one consider an other in order for her/him to be thinking ethically about the other.
— creativesoul

That is something that we can now make a distinction about, but only because the variables have been existentialized, right?

Ethical thought/belief it would seem, pertains to the stages of prelinguistic thought/belief and cultural indoctrination (predominantly the latter). It opens up onto ethical existence for the individual.

In ethical existence, the individual internalizes ethical thought/belief. Somewhere here, in the internalization of ethical thought/belief, is where moral thought/belief should first appear (I can't exactly pin point it yet).

At a the most superficial level, moral thought/belief would be likely to appear identical to the ethical thought/belief from which it was derived. But the deeper one sinks into moral thought/belief (i.e. the more serious his conviction and responsibility become), the more ethical existence becomes a reality for him... the more likely (but not necessarily) his morality will come to differ from the ethical thought/belief from which it is derived.

It seems reasonable to suggest that at a deep enough level of moral thought/belief, it ceases to be a cognitive process, and becomes more akin to feeling and intuition. If this is accepted, then the more that ethical thought/belief is internalized, the more irrational it becomes. — Merkwurdichliebe

So in regard to the example of Socrates, you can better understand my position.

@creativesoul seems to be particularizing the question; do I have another specifically in mind when I am morally deliberating (he says "ethically", but I think it will save confusion to stick to "morally" regardless of the question as to whether the terms are equivalent). If I do not have another specifically in mind when I am morally deliberating, does that not mean that my moral deliberations are not concerned with others? I would say that it does not mean that although of course the distinction as such is useful.

You then say that we can make a distinction (presumably about moral thinking which is specifically about others and moral thinking which is not?) because we have "existentialized" the "variables". So, I am not clear what you mean by this, but that may be because this has been lifted out of the context of the whole conversation.

Next, I don't know what it means that moral thought "pertains to the stages of pre-linguistic thought/ belief", because, firstly I don't accept that there are any clearly formed pre-linguistic thoughts or beliefs, and secondly because, even if there were, they would not be linguistically formed thoughts and beliefs and I can't see how something.like linguistically formed moral thought could pertain to anything pre-linguistic. I can see how linguistically formed thought could evolve out of pre-linguistic mental processes, but how it could ever pertain to them if "pertain" is meant to signify anything like 'justify' or 'be justified by' I am unable to say.

So, perhaps we would be best to clear up these issues first before going on to the rest.

perhaps we would be best to clear up these issues first before going on to the rest. — Janus

That's always best.

creativesoul seems to be particularizing the question; do I have another specifically in mind when I am morally deliberating (he says "ethically", but I think it will save confusion to stick to "morally" regardless of the question as to whether the terms are equivalent). If I do not have another specifically in mind when I am morally deliberating, does that not mean that my moral deliberations are not concerned with others? I would say that it does not mean that although of course the distinction as such is useful.

You then say that we can make a distinction (presumably about moral thinking which is specifically about others and moral thinking which is not?) because we have "existentialized" the "variables". So, I am not clear what you mean by this, but that may be because this has been lifted out of the context of the whole conversation — Janus

@creativesoul and I have been proceeding methodologically, not so much to determine some absolute truth about the source of morals, but to ensure we are conforming to the same criterion in our discourse. Even if we've gotten nowhere, we are, at least, not bogged down by the semantics of divergent concepts.

So far, we have qualified an existential constant as 'thought/belief', and agreed upon one variable: that a certain mode of thought/belief is "moral in kind" . The methodological schematic begins by tracing thought/belief through its various stages up to the point that it becomes "moral in kind". We have proceeded through a consideration of ethics as it pertains to prelinguistic thought/belief, up through the cultural inculcation/indoctrination of societal ethics, and then as it appears to circle back upon the individual where he internalizes a moral code. Up to this point, we have agreed on this methodological survey of the source of morals, more or less.

Next, I don't know what it means that moral thought "pertains to the stages of pre-linguistic thought/ belief", because, firstly I don't accept that there are any clearly formed pre-linguistic thoughts or beliefs, and secondly because, even if there were, they would not be linguistically formed thoughts and beliefs and I can't see how something.like linguistically formed moral thought could pertain to anything pre-linguistic. I can see how linguistically formed thought could evolve out of pre-linguistic mental processes, but how it could ever pertain to them if "pertain" is meant to signify anything like 'justify' or 'be justified by' I am unable to say. — Janus

I agree with you here. I don't hold prelinguistic thought/belief to be ethically charged. It is has no capacity beyond aesthetic assessment, that is, it lacks the faculty requirements of ethical judgment (viz. ethical thought/belief). I don't even think it can be called quasi-ethical, because I don't think the ethical consciousness is awakened prior to language acquisition and cultural inculcation/indoctrination. Moreover, I hold the stage of cultural inculcation/indoctrination to be the most superficial level of ethical existence, and, as such it remains rather insignificant for the individual.

I don't hold prelinguistic thought/belief to be ethically charged. — Merkwurdichliebe

It might be helpful, to me at least, to distinguish between prelinguistic (instinct) and, I’ll call it non-linguistic (subconscious), thought/belief or intuition.

‘Moral dumbfounding’ may strongly indicate the existence of either or both, and attest to it charge.

I'm arguing that moral dumbfounding occurs at an advanced stage of morality, well beyond the primitive stage of prelinguistic thought/belief. I think the example of Socrates and the hemlock is precisely this case. My point is: the deeper the ethical existence, the more irrational it appears.

I'm actually beginning to wonder why that seems to be something so troublesome to agree on for some here.
— creativesoul

I think that I may have figured it out, and in the process identified a basic flaw in the project of attempting to develop a universal criterion for what counts as a moral thing, which is essentially that we may be blind to morals frameworks (and their particular sets of values) that differ from our own. — praxis

Indeed. It does not follow that their morals are different in kind. They are still morals. They are different in terms of approval/disapproval. They are different in all sorts of ways. However, they are all about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

...moral dumbfounding occurs at an advanced stage of morality, well beyond the primitive stage of prelinguistic thought/belief. — Merkwurdichliebe

Indeed. Cognitive dissonance requires a pre-existing worldview. Moral dumbfounding is a kind of cognitive dissonance.

Indeed. Cognitive dissonance requires a pre-existing worldview be questioned by another. Moral dumbfounding is a kind of cognitive dissonance. — creativesoul

Nice point. The cognitive dissonance of moral dumbfounding is not capricious, like prelinguistic thought/belief. It is embedded in a complex infrastructure of inculcated thought/belief compounded by post-linguististc thought/belief (viz. reflection and deliberation) . . . Moral dumbfounding can perfectly explain why Socrates drinks the hemlock.

Moral dumbfounding can perfectly explain why Socrates drinks the hemlock. — Merkwurdichliebe

Can it?

I was under the impression that one was morally dumbfounded when and if they could not answer certain questions regarding why they believe something or other(strongly), and/or how they've come to such hold such conviction in moral belief.

Was that the case with Plato's own personal superhero?

Projection?

:yum:

Can it? — creativesoul

I think so. But I probably have looser standards here.

I was under the impression that one was morally dumbfounded when and if they could not answer certain questions regarding why they believe something or other(strongly), and/or how they've come to such hold such conviction in moral belief. — creativesoul

I'm under the impression that "one was morally dumbfounded when and if they could not answer certain questions regarding why they believe something or other(strongly), and/or how they've come to such hold such conviction in moral belief", I would have to add: only when the question posed is done so rationally (by a relatively normal person), and is meant to elicit a rational answer. For the one who is morally dumbfounded, his reasons are perfectly rational and completely justify his position.

...moral dumbfounding occurs at an advanced stage of morality, well beyond the primitive stage of prelinguistic thought/belief.
— Merkwurdichliebe

Indeed. Cognitive dissonance requires a pre-existing worldview. Moral dumbfounding is a kind of cognitive dissonance. — creativesoul

So intuitive, non-linguistic, subconscious, whichever you want to call it then?