I didn't say we were doing anything right. Even if we aren't.

:rofl: — creativesoul

:rofl:
I just assume I'm always doing everything wrong, especially when it seems right. But wait...

that seems right, so I guess that's wrong too.

If we equate being rational to being consciously thought about and we suppose that thought/belief somehow loses it's rational aspect when it becomes an unconscious operator.

I would disagree with both of those presuppositions. — creativesoul

I'm not suggesting thought/belief loses its rationality, that is a necessary aspect of thought/belief. I am suggesting, upon reaching a certain intensity of moral thought/belief, it vanishes into/becomes subdued by/is superseded by irrational moral feeling/intuition - something like a second nature.

Fine then, just the last sentence, forget the first two. :wink:

"By trying to please everybody, he had pleased nobody, and lost his Ass besides."

:rofl:

I want to attempt a translation in my own terms. Hopefully it will be as well received as the last. — creativesoul

Your interpretation is necessary for me. It helps me to know we are on the same page. Also, you are probably much more intelligent than me. :grin:

To what extent must one consider an other in order for her/him to be thinking ethically about the other. — creativesoul

I like this question.

The most basic mode of ethical thought, probably as you pointed out: "[is] about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour." To be thinking ethically about the other, would seem, at minimum, to require an ethical assessment of another in those general terms. But I wouldn't call this a moral judgement, for, in a sense, moral judgment is an ethical assessment of oneself.

Love me some Aesop. Should be mandatory reading for all TPF members. :cool:

Thanks!

It's a great thing when philosophy is done right, right?

I want to return to the discussion when it pertained the distinction between moral thought/belief and ethical thought/belief.

Particularly, the bit about considering others.

To what extent must one consider an other in order for her/him to be thinking ethically about the other. — creativesoul

That is something that we can now make a distinction about, but only because the variables have been existentialized, right?

Ethical thought/belief it would seem, pertains to the stages of prelinguistic thought/belief and cultural indoctrination (predominantly the latter). It opens up onto ethical existence for the individual.

In ethical existence, the individual internalizes ethical thought/belief. Somewhere here, in the internalization of ethical thought/belief, is where moral thought/belief should first appear (I can't exactly pin point it yet).

At a the most superficial level, moral thought/belief would be likely to appear identical to the ethical thought/belief from which it was derived. But the deeper one sinks into moral thought/belief (i.e. the more serious his conviction and responsibility become), the more ethical existence becomes a reality for him... the more likely (but not necessarily) his morality will come to differ from the ethical thought/belief from which it is derived.

It seems reasonable to suggest that at a deep enough level of moral thought/belief, it ceases to be a cognitive process, and becomes more akin to feeling and intuition. If this is accepted, then the more that ethical thought/belief is internalized, the more irrational it becomes.

Common Sense, I'll check her out.

My underlying thought/belief about government as an entity is largely along the lines of Thomas Paine. — creativesoul

I'm only loosely acquainted with him. Maybe you can clue me in.

Pre-linguistic thought/belief must exist in such a way that it is able to evolve into linguistic.

Agree?

If so... we're done talking about the role of evolution. — creativesoul

I've been done with that for a while. So agreed.

I asked because I've already been using it throughout. Universal claims, while being prone to reductio, are nonetheless the strongest possible justificatory ground, especially when they are verifiable/falsifiable.

That's exactly what's been going on. — creativesoul

I had that feeling.

Pre-linguistic thought/belief must exist in such a way that it is able to evolve into linguistic.

Agree?

If so... we're done talking about the role of evolution. — creativesoul

I'm primed :fire:

You still open to the idea of existential quantification? — creativesoul

Yes, I think it is worthy of investigation.

We'll have all the time in the world to talk about that when we get there. It's about much more than the role of evolution. I don't talk in such terms to begin with. There's much more to it than meets the eye... — creativesoul

Indeed. I just wish to ensure we are primed for when that time arrives.

Like thought/belief, there are different 'levels' of evolutionary complexity. — creativesoul

At a certain level, the explanatory usefulness of the role of evolution in the source of morals becomes exhausted. In all subsequent discourse, the role of evolution is automatically implied as a necessary factor in the source of morals. Any further talk of it is redundant.

Hence... the unresolvable issues. — creativesoul

I always like to revisit these topics with a fresh eye - "a fish I" (that's for @banno).

The big mistake is in thinking that there are any issues to resolve in the first place. All we can ever do is methodically trace out the logical consequences of self-evident/groundless premises (we have to "kick the ladder out from under us"). If we do this thoroughly, one might arrive at some type of personal clarity. But we will never resolve anything of any great significance amongst each other.

So that I prefer vanilla to chocolate ice-cream is a subjective fact - or if you prefer, it is a subjective truth. It's truth is dependent on my own taste. — Banno

The proposition "I prefer vanilla to chocolate ice-cream", is not a subjective truth/fact. The proposition functions to abstract your subjective conception into a mode of objectivity (viz. language). The sentiential truth is found in the propositional transmission of the objectified sense of one's subjective meaning. The "I" simply contains the subject as a grammatical device, it does not represent subjectivity in any existential/metaphysical sense. Propositional truth is only determined by the coherence of its objective sense, never by any subjective meaning.

I was being facetious. It is ridiculous to say that an immediate experience is a delusion. Delusion does not relate to being, only to becoming.

one of the most underrated and unknown is Paths of Glory. Also an ethically charged story. :wink: strangelove

Applied, that is... right? — creativesoul

Indeed. Here, possibly?

I bet there are at least 3 more Kubrick films in that top twenty. :grin:

Unshakable certainty(conviction) in one's own thought/belief is not always 'a bad thing'. It is certainly not enough for one to be a sociopath. All sociopaths may have such conviction, but not everyone with such conviction is a sociopath. — creativesoul

You are correct. I only intended to use the sociopath as an extreme example, in order to illustrate that sociopathy can be found in societal ethics equally as much.

Here we're getting into the realm of that which did not exist in it's entirety prior to our account of it. Such is true of many common notions, including many used in ethical/moral discourse. — creativesoul

Indeed. Thing's are not always what they at first appear to be. Sometimes you have to smash it to pieces and reconstruct it, other times you have to throw it far into the distance and rediscover it. Philosophy is so versatile in its methodology, it is rendered useless.

@Janus
@creativesoul

As much as I hate to, perhaps we should all rewatch our favorite movie: A Clockwork Orange.

I disagree because it is the negative effects that such actions will inevitably have on any society, on others who matter to you, that is the reason those actions are wrong. Of course they may also negatively impact you if you commit them, but only insofar as you are a socially concerned and motivated person and not a sociopath. — Janus

But if you are generating your ethical judgments from the utilitarian principle, then all that needs happen is for the utility to shift (whether in perception or reality), and so much for the decisive ethical agent. But in the sociopathical delusion of the ethically convicted one, abides an unalterable principle, which no reason or societal authority can hope to budge.

Societal ethics are very closely aligned to appearances, or how it seems to be for another. Whereas, the ethical existence of the individual is focused on how closely do I appear to align with how I should be (as in not a murderer, not a rapist, &c.); here, society has no bearing on my ethical status.

If it doesn't then there is something terribly wrong with the most intelligent, sophisticated and thoughtful strata of a society. In other words the collective ethical consensus must in that case be motivated by something corrupt. — Janus

I can't deny that you may be laying out a sad fact of societal ethics. If I were to place it in a single concept, it would be "ideology"

the individual's ethical commitments are always answerable to the most intelligent, sophisticated, and thoughtful inter-subjective consensus. — Janus

That is only true if their ethical commitment is predicated on the authority of another. And, then the commitment is indeed rather capricious, in that it lies outside the jurisdiction of the immediate decision of the ethical agent.

You know I'm a sucker for a nicely wound thread. :scream:

(Add. I've been waiting to use the screamface for a while now.)

The toughest part of using thought/belief - as a foundational criterion - is being able to effectively account for all the different ones by virtue of translating them all into terms of the content of the correlation themselves. I myself am not even close to being sold that I am capable of doing so.

Work in process. — creativesoul

I believe in you. Just don't try to convince me. :cool:

I haven't denied that morally responsible individuals can rationally defy the state; so I don't know where this is coming from. — Janus

I didn't mean to imply that, I was just bringing up a point I'm having a difficulty understanding.

As to conscientious objection, I don't see that as sociopathic at all; such individuals just have a more comprehensive sense of compassion and empathy and a wider sense of community. — Janus

My point in bring up the conscientious objector is: 1)societal morals are practicalogical; 2)that individual ethical commitments constitute a much greater reality to the moral agent (in that they are not based on utility, but principle); and 3) that the individual commitment is absolute, and has greater existential weight, in contrast to the relativistic societal mandate.

To circle back to the point I'm making: once thought/belief is awakened to the ethical imperative of culture, then all subsequent talk of morality is necessarily predicated on the infrastructure of thought/belief.

So when I say that moral feeling is deeper than moral belief, mean to point at a qualitative shift, in which the landscape of moral belief is swallowed up and vanishes into an acute ethical conviction.

Just to be clear, on my view a thought/belief is justified if it is well grounded. Being well grounded does not require being argued for and/or convincing anyone else. Hence, a justified belief does not require convincing anyone else either. This makes perfect sense in light of each and every paradigm shift. — creativesoul

I will add that this is to be considered in contrast to active thinking, which can, at best, be approximated through the notion of thought/belief.

Although it does not yet seem germane, it may become so later. — creativesoul

Definitely. If it does not become so after everything has been said, then we are doing something wrong.

How about I just have drink and consider it equal. :wink:

That's a great summary of how we have justified the premise from which we have been building. And I think we've made some decent progress.

I agree with your first paragraph, but not with the second. I think sociopathy is on account of distorted or absent moral feeling; the inability to empathize sufficiently or at all. I don't believe sophisticated defenses of ethical positions such as that it is OK to murder, rape, and so on are possible in those who actually care enough about others to qualify as socialized individuals. Which is not to say that you cannot act as though you are properly socialized, i.e. care about others even if you are not and do not. — Janus

I understand where you are coming from, and I don't want to digress too much but... You are speaking about very ordinary conditions. The more subjective ethical judgement becomes, the more complicated it gets.

Consider when the socio-ethical obligation permits sociopathic behavior, such as going to war (to essentially murder for the state). How do we account for that? Especially after we factor in the conscientious dissenter, who makes the more sociopathic choice to rebel against the system, not for himself or for another, but by the sheer strength of his commitment to an ethical principle.

Once a certain level of ethical sophistication is reached the contextual logic of ethics and morality is internalized, and the individual becomes properly socialized as opposed to being more or less sociopathic. — Janus

The internalization of social norms, I would attribute to inculcation/indoctrination. This is where the youngster learns the basic game of ethics, so to speak. But it is the most superficial level of ethical existence.

The deeper one is submerged into ethical existence, the less relevent social norms become. The deeper the ethical existence, the greater the potential for sociopathy.

I thought that the conversation was getting to the point where we were drawing a distinction between the different complexity levels that moral thought/belief can arrive at. Ethical ones were being described as the more complex conscious ones replete with thinking about one's own adopted moral basis. — creativesoul

I concur.

Moral discourse... — creativesoul

"I'm right, you're wrong."