There are many who pretend to despise and belittle that which is beyond their reach.

thought the point of you sour grapes example, in the context of its use, had to do with trying to establish the universal criterion of weather or not morals require other sentient beings. — praxis

I think they do. Rudimentary level pre-linguistic thought/belief aren't sufficient. Having morals requires understanding them to some - at a minimum - basic extent. Understanding them requires thinking about the meaning. The story is comprised of thought/belief statements. All thought/belief statements are meaningful. Thinking about the underlying meaning requires thinking about thought/belief statements. Thinking about thought/belief statements requires common written language. Common written language requires another human. Humans are sentient beings. Morals require other sentient beings.

All use of "requires/require" can be replaced with "is/are existentially dependent upon"...

Is it pretend? In any case, it only matters in relation to other beings of its group. If It doesn’t belong to a group then there is no moral. If a man living alone in the forest hates the fruit he can’t reach it is of no consequence to anyone else, or to himself.

Is it pretend? — praxis

No, it's not pretend...

It's the groundwork upon which a teacher can plant the seeds of practical thought. How to get what one could not first attain/acquire...

Don't be like the fox.

Or alternatively, when faced with an unattainable goal, accept it. Again...

Don't be like the fox.

It's all about the attitude!

In any case, it only matters in relation to other beings of its group. If It doesn’t belong to a group then there is no moral. If a man living alone in the forest hates the fruit he can’t reach it is of no consequence to anyone else, or to himself. — praxis

We're in agreement here regarding the need for others.

But a man in forest - all alone - would not have the fable to begin with. A baby in a forest will not ever become a man. So, it's a moot point. We're interdependent social creatures by our very nature... necessarily so.

I thought everyone had read Aesop's fables... My naivety rears it's head once again.

Don't you have similar moral lessons in your worldview?

How to get what one could not first attain/acquire... — creativesoul

Giving up may not have been a mistake. Further effort could have been better spent simply looking for low lying fruit elsewhere.

The mistake was choosing to believe a fiction. That kind of behavior can have serious negative consequences within a group.

But a man in forest - all alone - would not have the fable to begin with. A baby in forest will not ever become a man. So, it's a moot point.

The implication is that if you remove yourself from all other sentient beings you will still have a moral life?

How to get what one could not first attain/acquire...
— creativesoul

Giving up may not have been a mistake. Further effort could have been better spent simply looking for low lying fruit elsewhere. — praxis

Alternatively...

Did you miss that part?

The mistake was choosing to believe a fiction. That kind of behavior can have serious negative consequences within a group.

I'll grant this for no other reason than it doesn't matter. We're not deliberating - yet - which moral thought/belief is best given some specific situation or other. We're getting there.

Do you follow me?

I'm just taking account of the fable and it's moral lesson. The only reason it needed to be invoked here was as an exception to a criterion for what counts as "moral" - in kind. A criterion for what counts as being moral - in kind - that claims that all morals are about considering behaviour towards others is rendered inadequate by virtue of conflicting with the way things are. It cannot take proper account of The Fox and the Grapes. That's a story with a moral. That moral is about one's own thought/belief and/or attitude. It helps promote self-reflection. It's not about considering behaviour towards others. Thus, the proposed criterion is rejected as inadequate, insufficient and/or lacking explanatory power. It could easily and sensible be called "false"...

Some morals are about considering behaviour towards others. Not all.

That's just a bit of the further parsing that needed to be done earlier...

Pre-linguistic thought/belief must exist in such a way that it is able to evolve into linguistic.

Agree?

If so... we're done talking about the role of evolution. — creativesoul

I've been done with that for a while. So agreed.

My underlying thought/belief about government as an entity is largely along the lines of Thomas Paine. — creativesoul

I'm only loosely acquainted with him. Maybe you can clue me in.

Roughly...

A motivational speaker often accredited with being very influencial in both the American and French Revolutions.

A rabble-rouser...

Google Thomas Paine's Common Sense. I think it's readily available.

Common Sense, I'll check her out.

Here are Aesop's fables. Stories with moral lessons. Lessons about thought, belief, and/or behaviour...

I want to return to the discussion when it pertained the distinction between moral thought/belief and ethical thought/belief.

Particularly, the bit about considering others.

To what extent must one consider an other in order for her/him to be thinking ethically about the other. — creativesoul

That is something that we can now make a distinction about, but only because the variables have been existentialized, right?

Ethical thought/belief it would seem, pertains to the stages of prelinguistic thought/belief and cultural indoctrination (predominantly the latter). It opens up onto ethical existence for the individual.

In ethical existence, the individual internalizes ethical thought/belief. Somewhere here, in the internalization of ethical thought/belief, is where moral thought/belief should first appear (I can't exactly pin point it yet).

At a the most superficial level, moral thought/belief would be likely to appear identical to the ethical thought/belief from which it was derived. But the deeper one sinks into moral thought/belief (i.e. the more serious his conviction and responsibility become), the more ethical existence becomes a reality for him... the more likely (but not necessarily) his morality will come to differ from the ethical thought/belief from which it is derived.

It seems reasonable to suggest that at a deep enough level of moral thought/belief, it ceases to be a cognitive process, and becomes more akin to feeling and intuition. If this is accepted, then the more that ethical thought/belief is internalized, the more irrational it becomes.

I love it. Thanks for the challenges! I'll think on that.

Thanks!

It's a great thing when philosophy is done right, right?

Love me some Aesop. Should be mandatory reading for all TPF members. :cool:

I didn't say we were doing anything right. Even if we aren't.

:rofl:

I wanted to comment on this...

It seems reasonable to suggest that at a deep enough level of moral thought/belief, it ceases to be a cognitive process, and becomes more akin to feeling and intuition. If this is accepted, then the more that ethical thought/belief is internalized, the more irrational it becomes. — Merkwurdichliebe

If we equate being rational to being consciously thought about and we suppose that thought/belief somehow loses it's rational aspect when it becomes an unconscious operator.

I would disagree with both of those presuppositions.

Love me some Aesop. Should be mandatory reading for all TPF members. :cool: — Merkwurdichliebe

I don't know about all of that. Just a few examples of morals.

That is something that we can now make a distinction about, but only because the variables have been existentialized, right?

Ethical thought/belief it would seem, pertains to the stages of prelinguistic thought/belief and cultural indoctrination (predominantly the latter). It opens up onto ethical existence for the individual.

In ethical existence, the individual internalizes ethical thought/belief. Somewhere here, in the internalization of ethical thought/belief, is where moral thought/belief should first appear (I can't exactly pin point it yet).

At a the most superficial level, moral thought/belief would be likely to appear identical to the ethical thought/belief from which it was derived. But the deeper one sinks into moral thought/belief (i.e. the more serious his conviction and responsibility become), the more ethical existence becomes a reality for him... the more likely (but not necessarily) his morality will come to differ from the ethical thought/belief from which it is derived. — Merkwurdichliebe

I like the aesthetic feel of this...

I want to attempt a translation in my own terms. Hopefully it will be as well received as the last.

To what extent must one consider an other in order for her/him to be thinking ethically about the other. — creativesoul

I like this question.

The most basic mode of ethical thought, probably as you pointed out: "[is] about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour." To be thinking ethically about the other, would seem, at minimum, to require an ethical assessment of another in those general terms. But I wouldn't call this a moral judgement, for, in a sense, moral judgment is an ethical assessment of oneself.

I want to attempt a translation in my own terms. Hopefully it will be as well received as the last. — creativesoul

Your interpretation is necessary for me. It helps me to know we are on the same page. Also, you are probably much more intelligent than me. :grin:

This is something I find hilarious! Not so much what they meant at the end... bit what it now means...

:smile:

I want to attempt a translation in my own terms. Hopefully it will be as well received as the last.
— creativesoul

Your interpretation is necessary for me. It helps me to know we are on the same page. Also, you are probably much more intelligent than me. — Merkwurdichliebe

I wouldn't go that far.

"By trying to please everybody, he had pleased nobody, and lost his Ass besides."

:rofl:

Fine then, just the last sentence, forget the first two. :wink:

If we equate being rational to being consciously thought about and we suppose that thought/belief somehow loses it's rational aspect when it becomes an unconscious operator.

I would disagree with both of those presuppositions. — creativesoul

I'm not suggesting thought/belief loses its rationality, that is a necessary aspect of thought/belief. I am suggesting, upon reaching a certain intensity of moral thought/belief, it vanishes into/becomes subdued by/is superseded by irrational moral feeling/intuition - something like a second nature.

I didn't say we were doing anything right. Even if we aren't.

:rofl: — creativesoul

:rofl:
I just assume I'm always doing everything wrong, especially when it seems right. But wait...

that seems right, so I guess that's wrong too.

Just doing a survey of our methodology (existential quantification):

Thought/belief is formed when a creature draws a mental correlation between different things. All thought/belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content regardless of subsequent further qualification. — creativesoul

This is the only necessary qualification for us to proceed.

[...] They all have the same basic elemental constituency, so to speak. As a result of having knowledge of the basic minimalist criterion of all thought/belief, there is ground to talk of the origen of one particular kind. Some would agree that there is no stronger justificatory ground than a conceptual scheme following from and/or built upon uncontentious true premisses. — creativesoul

Let's call the premise "the qualification". No need to further qualify. Now we can quantify the variables in relation to the constant. We are now as unjustifiably committed to the method (not to imply it is unwarranted by the power of it own device) as to the self-evident premise (which is warranted by the methodological schematic) -
we can assume it exists (V).

If there are no actual examples to the contrary, that's falsifiable/verifiable. — creativesoul

One method of quantification that fits into the overal methodological schematic of existential quantification.

There's more. . .

(If nothing else, this is demonstrating that agreement upon a methodology is imperative to further philosophical discourse.)

Alternatively...

Did you miss that part? — creativesoul

We have no choice but to accept the fact. In theory, cognitive dissonance can be positive or negative so choosing a fiction may not be the mistake. I guess it boils down to self-reflection, as you later say...

It helps promote self-reflection. It's not about considering behaviour towards others. Thus, the proposed criterion is rejected as inadequate. — creativesoul

Why is self-reflection good if not in relation to considering behavior towards others? In solitude, it doesn’t matter what fictions we create to console ourselves, and why would we have an inclination to do so if there were no group in which we had an image of ourselves to uphold?

Some morals are about considering behaviour towards others. Not all.

I’m not at all convinced, if that matters. Your fable fails to illustrate this point... and this is not an expression of sour grapes.

@creativesoul

Paine makes a distinction between societal ethics (cultural indoctrination) as being a positive sort of cooperation amongst the collective, and government as a counter balance to evil nature of the individual (or in terms of this discussion, as an impediment to the individual who may go on to further develop his moral thought/belief in an adversarial or sociopathic manner).

This is worthy of further consideration.