Thanks. I'm happy to see that their are some who have the courage to answer questions clearly and directly.

So, it is correct to say social animals have a greater chance of long term survival. That is, each species has moved beyond the immediate survival instinct to some degree. The primary stimulus for the behavior of the social animals can be attributed to "emotion in the form of 'fellow feeling [toward the pack]': affection, empathy"...at least to some degree.

To be clear, I was asking this in the context of: what is the source of morals?

Now, turning to the self-reflective being, although he possesses the same survival instinct as any other social animal (qua. survival of his tribe), he is able to negate his necessary biological relation to the group through self reflection. In this, he discovers he is a sovereign individual who, in essence, stands alone from the group.

When the self-reflective being derives its reality from the group, it would seem that biology is the primary determinant. However, when he transcends his relation to the group, could it be said, he liberates
himself and takes upon a new form of existence which is qualitatively antithetical to the mechanistic determinations of biology?

If so, at this stage the reflective being has moved past the immediate survival instinct, through the social instinct (where the individual's biological relation to the group determines his behavior), and into the understanding that he is capable of determining his own behavior independent from the group. Here an aesthetic assessment has been made. The instant the self-relfective being realizes the smallest extent of his agency, he is confronted with the primary choice: to remain subservient to the group, or to take responsibility for himself (which may, on occasion, require him to conform to the group). Perhaps he enters the ethical sphere by choosing the latter?

Hopefully this moves us further along in our examination of the topic. Please feel free to correct any of my ellipses of reason, or to go further if you will.

I have always found it counterintuitive that a biological organism would naturally evolve a neurological mechanism (viz. emotion) that would override the fundamental survival instinct in which evolutionary biology is based. I have considered that evolution has made it this far on the merits of survival-of-the-fittest in relation to an adversarial world. So, perhaps emotion is just a more sophisticated form of survival instinct. But that wouldn't explain how a total stranger would react empathically by sacrificing himself to save another (say for example, as soldiers have been known to do during battle).

Or, maybe I have it wrong, and perhaps those emotions which are associated with altruism and selflessness merely belong to those people who are most unfit for survival, and it is only a matter of time before emotion is phased out by our evolutionary development. But then I am forced to consider why evolution would develop such a redundant mechanism as emotion to begin with.

I am interested how such concerns can be resolved.

Agreed: all models are simply models, and can never be what they are modeling. — Janus

The assumption that models are (or can be) identical to what they are modeling is the biggest mistake that philosophers make. And in fact, much of what philosophy does is posit and examine models of existence. It is nothing but immature naivety whenever one subscribes to a single perspective, and argues as if it is the only correct perspective or explains everything.

As Schopenhauer tells us, the aesthetic response is to what is of no practical significance to us. It is what transports and transforms our consciousness. — Janus

I would say it can be considered of no practical importance to us, because in aesthetic existence, the individual is simply a passive spectator. Without responsibility, there is no teleological imperative.

As Schopenhauer tells us, the aesthetic response is to what is of no practical significance to us. It is what transports and transforms our consciousness. — Janus

That is the general perspective I'm coming from. It is my understanding that the philosophers following Hegel (perhaps up to the point of Nietzsche) spoke of the aesthetic as a broad category of phenomenological existence. It was not merely restricted to works of art, but all human artifice. I, personally, derive much edification from this perspective, but I understand it to be only one perspective amongst infinite perspectives, some better than others, but all are mere approximations at best.

I agree with much of what you said there, though, and often apparently contradictory ideas just reflect the existence of different possible ways of interpreting concepts such as <reason>, < emotion>, <interest>, <responsibility> and so on, and the different ways in which they can be related together to produce diverse and perhaps apparently incompatible perspectives on our common human experience. — Janus

Indeed, thought is infinite in its reasoning capacity.

Or was your reply one of dry funniness? — javra

I suppose there is a portion of dry funniness (perhaps satire) in everything I say. But get what your talking about .

There is no sufficient reason known to mankind as to why there is existence rather than nothingness. Given this, then neither can there be any presently known sufficient reason for why there someday will be nothingness rather than some form of existence. Reasoning not composed of valid reasons is commonly considered irrational. Again, the reality of nothingness is conceivable but, I so far think, cannot be established. This despite many treating it as an established metaphysical fact. — javra

Yes that is the problem: it is impossible to qualify nothingness. It is a more mysterious notion than God.

Progress in the technical sense is enormous but in the ethical sense we are almost at the level of the Middle Ages. — MrSpock

Leaving out the nitpicking, this is analogous to the notion that humanity is too far ahead of its time. Consider how the more technologically advanced we become, the more problems seem to emerge. This is antithetical to what should be the case: that technology should be solving problems. At this point we should have seen major improvements in the human condition, but there is a disparity between our level of wisdom and our level of technology. We have never seen any significantly concentrated effort by humanity to figure out how to best use technology (an ethical question), only the blind marching forward of technological progress. Essentially we are toddlers with loaded guns.

But what is the teacher going to present --a set of words a la a set of sounds or text marks? I — Terrapin Station

From a certain perspective yes.

Is that what concepts are? — Terrapin Station

Concepts are abstractions from what I've appropriated in my immediate existence, which are communicated via referential signifiers, not necessarily words.

Then it is law

I'm inclined to agree, but you might have to convince me.

Derrida — StreetlightX

Derrida :vomit: !

So thinking is an error of abstraction. — javra

Isn't it the reverse, abstraction is an error of thinking, or are you regarding thinking as an abstraction in this case?

Consider that a person yearning to reach the horizon will also live a meaningful life in so yearning—this while reaching the horizon is a physical impossibility. Hence, just because a concept is meaningful does not then imply that its referent is real or, hence, obtainable. — javra

May I add: ... and just because a referent is unreal or unobtainable, does not necessarily imply that it is not meaningful.

There are alternative ways of thinking about being. Instead of the easily conceived dyadic categories of being and nonbeing one could, for example, present the two extremes of a complete chaos of being and a complete order of being — javra

I'm not disagreeing, I just think it relevent to point out that the dialect of order/chaos is qualitatively and categorically different than the dialectic of being/nonbeing. This, for no other reason than the former carries being through the entire dialectic, so that it is quiessentialy unaffected; whereas in the latter, being itself is negated, so that we are forced to consider the implications of an absolute negative that nullifies anything that is related to being. It is a philosophically radical consideration, but nevertheless, I believe it to be a potential source of philosophic gold. Just call me the prospector.

I'm not going to play out a Socratic dialogue with you, and the topic is whether it is immoral to do illegal drugs. — S

I get the impression that you really dislike philosophy.

It would better be said that emotion is founded in moral and aesthetic judgement. Moral and aesthetic judgements are the foundation of our communal, that is to say emotional, lives, and it is within that context that emotions are possible. — Janus

I would argue emotion is more closely related to aesthetic judgement, whereas reason corresponds closer to ethical judgement.

Aesthetic preference is developed through the immediate experience of the pleasurable, and emotive valance comes to be attached to those preferences. It is important to understand that aesthetic judgement is ethically indifferent. It is not concerned with good and evil, but rather with the interesting and the irrelevent (qua. the emotionally stimulating versus the emotionally extraneous). Aesthetically, reason only factors insofar as it relates to emotional impulses. But, sensu stricto, reason cannot be said to factor into the aesthetic because in aesthetic judgement, the emotional impulses are simply swept along without any rational intention.

Ethical judgement is predominantly determined by reason, and although incidental emotional effects might coincide, they remain insignificant. Whereas the aesthetic excludes the sovereign individual, the ethical reinstates him as the deciding agent.

Before the movement into the ethical sphere, the individual is necessarily oriented within the aesthetic. The movement represents a negation of the aesthetic and all that it entails. It is a qualitative reversal, in which the individual turns from an outward focus on interest, to an inward focus on his personal responsibility. In other words, the focus of his judgment no longer pertains to his relation to the world (where his interest lies), but to the world's relation to him (where his responsibility lies). The judgement accounts for the aesthetic existence (how the world seems to be), and makes an ethical determination: how the world ought to be. The individual is subsequently beset with the task of conforming himself to the world as it should be, which generally requires him to subdue his emotional impulses through the power of reason.

...

I think biology should replace religious morality. Understanding ourselves, and sensing wrong and right, should be an extrapolation of biological realities. Where there isn't a place yet met, go with practical wisdom, religious or not. — Josh Alfred

A very utilitarian approach.

The general term for the process is learning. But I suppose you could also say conditioning.
— praxis

Let's get more specific, though. How does someone literally learn a concept? — Terrapin Station

I'll provide you an answer to work with.

One way is by education. A process of communication between teacher and student in which the student appropriates the concept as presented by the teacher. But the student can only be said to have learned something if he knows it. And one knows something by remembering what they have appropriated. Finally, the individual cannot be said to know something until he shows it, by correctly communicating what he remembers.

Biological affect is theorized to consist of two basic dimensions, namely pleasure vs. displeasure and high arousal vs. low arousal. How these feelings are interpreted in different circumstances conforms to a conceptual framework, a framework imparted to us by our culture. — praxis

There is no explaining the source of morals without including the societal component. We are not only born with a predetermined biological makeup, but when one is born he also inherits the historically developed pathos of the society into which he is born. The Geneology of Morality explains it all.

Per my education, and subject to correction, this nutshell sketch. The original virtues were the virtue of the warrior king winning his wars - and protecting or bringing glory to himself and his people or both. This devolved to the idea of the king who was good even if he lost, good in terms of his other actions or his intentions. And this to the idea of the good man, good as to both actions and intentions, with a slow evolution to considerations of intentions. — tim wood

Allow me to go further...

The warrior king ("the Homeric ideals, of Achilles and Odysseus, and earlier) is the depiction of the ethical ideal. The individual found his ethical reality in relation to the warrior king, and the victory of the warrior king signified an ethical victory for the individual. The stage of "considerations of intentions" (Kants contribution, which resolved Hume's dilemma), marks the completion of the dialectical movement into subjectivity for the ethical consciousness (the conscience).

Beforehand, the ethical reality of the individual was mediated through the warrior king, so that, in effect, the ethical existence of the individual was negated. The indirect relation of the individual to the ethical was expressed in depictions of the warrior king as tragic hero, who must make the ultimate sacrifice to save the world. After, the cultural movement into a subjective awareness, the individual no long related vicariously to ethical existence through the victories of the warrior king, but became directly related to the ethical as the responsible moral agent. This dialectical shift of culture into a subjectively dominated conscience rendered the ethical into a matter of personal choice, an individual conviction rather than a conviction determined directly by cultural identity (as embodied by the warrior king).

In gaining the freedom of subjective conscience the nobility of the king, by which the individual ethically oriented himself, was lost. This was alluded to in Nietszche's "death of God" and "slave revolt". After the world historic contribution of Kant, the ethical became nothing but the right to individual opinion.

Edit: they will indeed. Lol

Fuck all ye who dwelleth here! Banish me from this place of intellectual woe... I await in eager anticipation
— praxis

And in the fullness of time it came to pass, as he desired, that he was panned, damned, canned, and banned. — Bitter Crank

And now, to honor the memory of Nobody, a moment of silence.

I'm characterizing money in politics, and it will take deeper reform than shifting money to ameliorate our electoral systems as a whole — VagabondSpectre

Campaign finance reform is a viable and direct solution. It would level the playing field and revolutionize the electoral system.

Then perhaps I'd vote, but until then, I refuse to give my assention to a muppet.

The Source of Morals.

Per my education, and subject to correction, this nutshell sketch. The original virtues were the virtue of the warrior king winning his wars - and protecting or bringing glory to himself and his people or both. This devolved to the idea of the king who was good even if he lost, good in terms of his other actions or his intentions. And this to the idea of the good man, good as to both actions and intentions, with a slow evolution to considerations of intentions.

The time frame from inclusive of the Homeric ideals, of Achilles and Odysseus, and earlier, through to Kant and his deontology, the categorical imperative. Still a work in progress, though apparently and for the most an argument between Utilitarianism and Deontology, which is to say an argument that on one side is a little older than the US, at around 1760, and on the other, the mid-1800s.

The Greek virtues of Aristotelian balance, Stoicism, and Epicurean acceptance were more essentially attitudinal than behavioral. Please, correction/refinement welcome! — tim wood

A perspective seeking to exit the merry-go-round:

Suppose that all our “dos” are driven by “wants” … this including our doing of reasoning: since wants are emotive, as per Hume, reasoning is foundationally driven by underlying desires. Further suppose that our wants are in search of a resolution to that wanted. Reasoning, then, is arguably an optimal means of discovering how to best obtain and thereby satisfy our wants.

Given any degree of realism (here not confused with physicalism), there will then be constraints to how these wants can obtain their sought after aim of resolution. These constraints will then—in some way or another—(pre)determine which actions can factually satisfy our wants and which actions (though intending to so satisfy) cannot.

Those behaviors that factually satisfy our wants will then be logically correct means of so satisfying. They will be the right behaviors for us. And, since what we want is for our wants to be satisfied, right behaviors will constitute good, beneficial, behaviors for us. That aim, whatever it might be, that satisfies all our wants will then be conceptualized by us as complete good: “the Good” as Plato worded it.

And vice versa: all our intentions and subsequent acts to satisfy our wants that are fallaciously conceived to so satisfy our wants will then be wrong behaviors to engage in—for they always lead to frustrated wants and, in due measure, suffering. They will be deemed to be bad behaviors by us for this very reason.

To the same degree that there occur universal and fundamental wants among all humans (or mammals, or life in general), there will then also logically result aims that are universally good to that cohort considered. Being universally good, these aims will hold existential presence in manners that are impartial to the (sometimes fallacious/wrong) intentions of individual beings to satisfy their wants. In this sense, then, this universally good aim (or maybe aims) shall then, by certain definitions, be validly labeled that which is objectively good.

Within this general train of thought, then, subjective want-driven good entails there being some objective good—which can be expressed as “that end which satisfies all wants”—that, whether or not obtainable within our current lifetime in complete form, is nevertheless pursued by all subjective beings.

Discerning what this objective good is can itself be a fallacy of reasoning (a wrong/bad appraisal) or a discovery of what is in fact true (a right/good appraisal). Disparity between discernments of what is objectively good then leads to divergent ethical norms—as well as to, at times, what are labeled acts of evil by the society at large.

***This hypothesis is to illustrate that there is no entailed logical contradiction between subjective good/bad and objective good/bad.

As to Hume’s dilemma when looked at from this offered vantage: figure out what the logically and factually correct aim is that satisfies your wants (this factually correct aim being an “is) and then you logically derive what should be done to get there (this being an “ought”) … thereby deriving ought from is.

So, here, good and bad are determined by wants which naturally entail their own resolution as aim/goal--and this within the constraints of some form of realism. — javra

:up: :up:
Pay attention you saps, this is what philosophy looks like.

A perspective seeking to exit the merry-go-round — javra

Exactly!

I give up on this conversation :( — Devans99

Don't give up, persist and if necessary, prevail.

People cannot express a preference for woman politicians unless there are women politicians for whom to vote. — Banno

Is that because political preference is, in the strict sense, only expressed through voting?

I would say that that's naive, unless you just mean to express an opinion. — S

I'm just expressing opinion, its not necessarily true, it's just one perspective amongst a vast web of perspectives, hopefully with the effect of inciting more useless debate.

because I have had too many arguments dismissed with "well you don't even vote" - terrible ad hom, but I got sick of dealing with it — ZhouBoTong

Don't be discourage by ad hom, it is likely an indication that your on the right track. In this case, again, it is a group morality, they can't accept you as a sovereign individual, they need you to belong to the system to which they subscribe. And the fact is that most, if not all, evangelistic voters don't even want you to vote (i.e. choose for yourself), but only to demonstrate that you think like them by voting for their pick. That's not a prescription, just the way I approach evangelistic voters.

That is why even though I spend a good deal of time studying history, politics, etc, voting is quick and easy. — ZhouBoTong

Then you have the key systemic change: improving yourself.

Ok, then, I'll give you a chance to convince me. Tell me, how does the limbic system directly and immediately cause the emotional experience of love.

My prediction, you will completely dodge the question like you do every time.

You cannot talk about what religion is because it is an immediate relation or direct existence. But you can talk about what it isn't, and communicate it indirectly (viz.metaphorically, allegorically, figuratively, &c.)

Sadly, defining and categorizing us all into demographic categories for the sake of appeal is almost necessary to be successful under our current incentive structures. And in so doing, we can't help but see "others" as the editorialized caricatures that our established mainlines feeds to us. — VagabondSpectre

Couldn't have said it better

In the early days that kind of thing never entered their mind. Once the new regime had a firm clamp on the levers of power (and demanded more for less) it was something they resorted to. In their minds it was wholly pragmatic and necessary... — VagabondSpectre

In the present political climate, it's not a far stretch to imagine that certain forms of behavior or speech could be outlawed (I'd be willing to bet that it's already occurred in many countries that are, quote unquote, part of the free world). And that is all that is necessary to incite a landslide of tyranny.

tribalism — VagabondSpectre

Excellent point.

Through sympathy we can suffer along side individual victims, but not to the same degree as their actual suffering (else we're over-reacting?)... — VagabondSpectre

Indeed, nothing measures up to actual existence.
Perhaps I'm using vicariously a bit loosely, but I think we more or less share common ground on this point. But I would say the identification is deeper , so to speak, than sympathy (I can have sympathy for roadkill), it is empathic.

funniness sometimes happens. — javra

I believe in funniness

It is ridiculous that I am pointing out linguistic challenges rather than just answering the question — SethRy

I thought it was ridiculous that I was just answering the question rather than pointing out the linguistic challenges

I would say living without religion is to either: 1)to will to be another and despair in not being a self, or 2)to despair over willing to be oneself, because will is illusory in that it has nothing absolute by which it can orient itself.

Each of those forms of existence is unnatural, because in each, the thing that does the existing is lost. And it is impossible to live naturally when lost in existence.

we're not in fact representatives of our respective races — VagabondSpectre

I agree. We are individual's, who, ideally, represent ourselves. Nevertheless, anyone who constitutionally identifies himself with a race, believes himself to be a representative of that racial demographic.

I cannot help but think that one of the most inferior assumptions an individual can make, is that he is defined by one race or another. In other words, racial identity (as a defining characterictic) is an indication of a primitive mind - or should I say: stupidity.

Hate crimes — VagabondSpectre

I'm not saying it's the cause. I was just using hate crimes to illustrate a point. Nevertherless, they are a manifestation of that same system in which racism and sexism exist, a system that relegates every individual to a group.

I find the idea that someone who shares the race of a victim can be vicariously affected to the same degree as the actual victim to be utterly dubious. — VagabondSpectre

Ever hear of "black lives matter", or "police lives matter"? (Add. And emotionally speaking, why not? In fact emotional damage can have far worse effects than physical damage.)

I don't think we would get that deep into the fever dream, but you never know... — VagabondSpectre

I wonder how many Russians were saying that during the Bolshevik revolution.

Give him some slack, English isn't his first language.

But I gotta say, I'm gonna miss him. :cry:

I can see myself taking up an opposing position: The overall impact of racism necessarily comes from the cumulative effects of individual acts of discrimination. — VagabondSpectre

I agree that the racist individual is the most essential component. But a hate crime that is perpetrated on an individual is, as they say, not personal, its business. A hate crime is not directed at the individual, but at the group to which he belongs, the individual is incidental. Furthermore, the racist identifies herself with what she considers to be a superior race, so that her decisions are made on behalf of her race, and not on behalf of herself as individual.
(Add. If she identified herself as an individual (not belonging to any group identity), she would relate to the victim as an individual, making it not a hate crime, but a personal one.)

A racist act towards one individual might symbolically be a racist act toward an entire race, but it does not actually impact all members of that race. — VagabondSpectre

Allow me to argue: Anyone that constitutionally identifies themselves with the victim race would be vicariously affected to the same degree as the actual victim. And then the actual victim, the victimized individual, matters only anecdotally.

I don't see how the notion of compensating an entire demographic to correct inequality can be effectively and equitably applied in practice. And if all we're doing is correcting the effects of discrimination after the fact (as opposed to arresting the unjust discrimination to begin with), aren't we chasing our own tails? — VagabondSpectre

Indeed. I don't think that compensating an entire demographic to correct inequality can be effectively and equitably applied either. I predict it would end with something that looks like the Soviet g.u.l.a.g.