What? That's your actual quote.

You admit! (in relation to a certain other discussion)
— Edward

I suppose.

Wtf is this

No, they inform our thoughts, I would say.

Well, anything that affects our body could effect our emotions, sure. Drink, drugs, fitness, etc.

Yeah, there is an abyss of sorts. We can find relative value in what we have despite this.

I've already had this discussion with you. All value is relative because it's meaningless to try and apply objectivity. You admitted it yourself.

In the same way that The Beatles aren't objectively The best band, drinking isn't objectively wrong.

The only reason I see them as authentic is that they're what defines our value and gives us motive. They surely don't have much relevance to the world without thought but too much thought and it's different.

Urm... Not really I suppose. Claws and tails? :)

Sorry, I don't know what you mean exactly and by the word unhabited and do you mean uninhabited?

Yes.

Theoretically dismantling one mood doesn't leave us without any mood. There is always affectivity as a background comportment or attitude toward the world. An attitude of neutral, calm focus is still being in a mood. The world always matters to us, is significant for us, strikes us, is relevant for us, , affects us in some way.

100% agree.

My issue is with a calm focused mood. I think, with philosophy this can too easily be a depressed mood. It's life affirming to be riled up and not entirely thought out.

He would consider his ontology of the becoming of value systems to be a liberating, authentic approach to ethics.

I'm not well read on nietzsche. How exactly do people claim to obtain fulfillment from creating ones own value? I understand it as a principle but what is an example of self made value and fulfilment? It always seems vague.

Hmm, I agree with open mindedness and abstracting. Im not sure about ambiguity or b&w thinking.

Philosophy is about love of knowledge by definition. To know something I think it's more debilitating to have a loose definition of things.

I'd also argue that this depends on the subject. Philosophy of logic can't really entertain ambiguity.

Relativists do not say or think that - or at least those here who have recorded their views.

I am a relativist and I think that. Why are you getting hung up on semantics? You've admitted that at a base level there is no objectivity. When relativists use moral terms it depends if they're speaking generically or philosophically.

I don't think that anyone in this forum would choose for murder to be legal. They simply know it to be subjective in a basic sense.

Problem drinking always effect others.

Yes, I knew you'd say that, but that is the subjective part of the argument, whether it effects others.

The problem is that those moral frameworks do not discuss the context. They objectively declare the sole act of drinking as wrong. That's not useful and is functionally meaningless.

You could lock someone in a room with a bottle of whiskey for a week and somehow they'd still be objectively wrong for drinking it. Objective rules are meaningless without context.

I agree that there's reason to continue without being constantly emotionally engaged.

My point is, or at least my question: does a realisation of the absurd not constantly dampen our instinct to feel? Our thoughts inform our feelings and if our thoughts negate the inclination towards meaning then what is the result? Apathy.

:grin:
It's "whys" all the way down.

But why do you think you weren't satisfied with initial answers? Stubbornness?

In even more direct terms, "how does camus' sisyphus believe in himself?"

A concrete dilemma:

How does a person motivate themselves to protest against animal cruelty when the initial instinctive emotional reaction subsides and they're acting upon rationality, but rationally they know ethics to be absurd/relative/meaningless without emotional conviction.

Okay, I get what you're saying. Relativism, when taken to extremes is socially destructive.

No one lives like this though (or at least very few). You're mixing theoretical philosophical debate with practical social existence. Everyone does agree that, for society, we should not murder. No one debates this in government.

Still, when we discuss less impactive moral laws, the relativity is useful. For instance, if we hold that directly harming others physically or mentally is a definite "wrong", but we're debating a law that does not involve other people, then we can deem it relative and therefore not wrong. Drinking alcohol for instance. If this does not directly effect anyone but the drinker, then we can deem it beyond moral judgement.

That might sound silly or obvious, but there are many objective moral codes in religions that prohibit this. Objectively.

True, but I think nsmith was just pointing out the evolutionary development of perceived common morality. It certainly explains why some actions are near universally frowned upon.

No way out. Best just to be as certain as possible and beat back the nihilists and the relativists with a stick. At some level they're probably correct,

You admit! (in relation to a certain other discussion)

but it's not a level compatible with human living and values that if not certain are mostly and mainly well-tested and work.

If it's true then it doesn't matter that it's not compatible. Like you and everyone else we do live with values that are tested and work. We are all in the same universe. You live in a relative universe even if you'd like to pretend you didn't, and that's fine, because we all do it.

It must seem then that "certainty" is really just code for "certainty with respect to," "in light of..," and so forth.

You've hit the nail on the head! That is all relativity is about... "certainty with respect to" means "subjective to". What was so hard about that?

If there are no conflicting statements under subjective moral relativism, then it fails miserably as a means for taking proper account of the way things actually are.

No one is debating the way things actually are and anyway, that isn't a problem for ethics it's just hard science and observation of an indifferent world.

Purely observing the world never offers an answer as to how humanity should behave. That's all ethics is concerned with, how humanity behaves.

So if we strip human psyche of emotion we're left with a cold, hard robot in a cold, hard world. How would such a machine react to the question, "perform a morally right action"?... It wouldn't inherently know what a morally right action is. It would require context, a goal and a motive.

Within a moral construction context is clearly subjective; We need to know what scenario we're talking about. The motive is also subjective; we make actions to fulfill our emotional needs. There is not one emotion, there's infinite hues. This concludes that the goal will be subjective; Subjective to our situation and motive.

All of the above is subjective. You can't apply objectivity to action.

The reason the "brain in a vat" theory exists is precisely because of our inability to prove anything outside of our own experiences.

What you describe there is an example of why we reasonably presume other people have consciousness, but it's not a proof. It is strong evidence, but the "brain in a vat" theory is more of a thought experiment to highlight our inability to know something.

There isn't an example you can give that is provable independent of your experience. We know experience can be falsified, ergo we can never truly trust our experience.

I personally think that it doesn't matter, because like you say, if we are observing what appears to cognitive ability then what's the difference?

The concept is just useful for imagining abstract sci-fiesque worlds. What if the person is a computer, absent of consciousness but highly cognitive? What if you're never making decisions but merely "asking" predetermined questions to a predetermined "person" in a virtual landscape that you simply observe? What if the people you encounter do not exist if they're outside of your perception? Etc.

Agreed, but the point of a brain in a vat is that you can't prove the existence of other brains independently of them telling you they exist.

Hence the brain in a vat. The brain exists but all the information you're gathering from your senses could be produced through a virtual reality of sorts. You wouldn't watch a film of mickey mouse telling you that he's conscious and believe it to be true.

Unless one can prove that another "consciousness" is in play then ofcourse it doesn't rule out "brain in a vat". That's the whole point of brain in a vat.

You could look at sime and say, ah-ha! He's a brain. But alas, he's a mannequin!

Can we make decent national democratic decisions? No. Is there another way? Not short term.

"Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others."
Winston S. Churchill

Ofcourse what you're suggesting is true. However, I see democracy as a kind of natural conclusion for the decision making of mankind.

Every individual is born with a voice and to this extent, a degree of power. We can all be reduced to an individual with subjective opinions and a voice. Over time, this concludes in laws that protect our individual right to a voice; Because no matter your education, the greatest minds can't disagree that they are too, just a voice. As much as some might like to do, it would be philosophically dishonest to remove rights from an individual.

If these rights are removed, you've got a revolution brewing. Strength doesn't require intellect and people will fight for their freedom.

I suppose that democracy isn't really a choice, it is a predictable outcome of self aware, intellectual and compassionate animals. An intelligent, bloodless way of having a tribal war.

Correct, the public aren't experts on Brexit, but they're not really experts on anything. You can't really tell people that they're incapable of making their own decisions and leaving the EU couldn't be done discreetly. There isn't really another way, I'd say.

Like another commentor said, I can't distinguish patriotism from nationalism.

In my opinion, the line you're discussing is crossed when a feeling of objective superiority and xenophobic views develop.

My view is that you can't demonstrate a difference between subjective "unrealness" and external reality. Experience is as real as you can get. A subjective, yet consistent world of "fake" other people is still a world to live in. In fact, that's what life is.

ALL of what else seems to exist MAY BE nothing but an illusion within ME.

From a functional perspective though, this doesn't mean anything. The nouns have changed, but the setup is the same.

perspectives are value systems.

I suppose my point is, if your perspective is one of existential absurdity then how does one reconcile this with an authentic moral system.

Moods are no longer a subjective window-dressing on privileged theoretical perspectives but a background that constitutes the sense of all intentionalities, whether theoretical or practical.

What if our "background that constitutes the sense of all intentionalities" drives us to theoretically dismantling our mood?

There is no strategy that is good for all ends. That is not a good reason to let go of the steering wheel and just let everything play out without making selections.

Agreed. However, it doesn't answer the question of being morally authentic when you don't have a baseline to choose from.

Arousal being stimulation from experience (not sexual if that's what you imagined).

So intense situational circumstances naturally arouse strong emotive response in people. However our literal, intellectual understanding of a situation informs how we might emotionally react.

Im suggesting that, while some people might be biologically highly emotional, a certain intellectual awareness might dampen emotional response.

I realise that you didn't even make a statement, this is just a tangent but that's it, explained.

Actually, what I mean is, while there is a biological environment of arousal, does arousal not also relate to what is perceived and understood about a situation? So, an easily aroused person could also have an extremely analytical perception of life, resulting in low arousal of a high arousal brain.

Point taken.

A specific question, how do I get angry (like, I'ma protest this shit now angry) about something that doesn't immediately arouse anger? Do you think arousal levels are fixed?

You mean by discussing it?

Thanks, that's a great explanation.

So, am I right in thinking that the hard sciences have an easier time building upon theories and can perform experiments with functional conclusions, despite not having watertight presuppositions?

Despite this illusion, would you say that perhaps the "mess" of philosophy is a result of reductionism and a fundamental inability to prove anything, on which we might build?

Is there not a "comity for the sorting out of what we do and do not know", or SOOWWDADNK Comity, for short? Why can't the information be compiled into a thesis of everything?

It is not always logical or is it a exact science.

How can a subject be so obsessed with logic yet not have to be logical?

But, would you say anything is learnt, or is it more of an art form, to be appreciated?

Btw, you're likely moving to my hometown. What are the chances.

I think the problem lies in the fact that "objective morality", whatever it actually means, doesn't provide a function. You may as well state that there's a metaphysical shit on a wall that we all have an unconscious relation to.

Morality is about functionality and problem solving.

By definition, because this objective morality is supposedly independent of the individual, it is subjective in itself. It is meaningless to try to obtain guidance, if that is the aim, because we all have contextual desires.

Any instinctual agreements over moral action can be explained via evolution; But it's just an observation of what is, it doesn't hold relevance to how it should be.

Lucky you!

Perhaps I'm being presumptuous about most of the world, but certainly your average person on the street would be mistaken. Not necessarily mistaken... but ignorant to the concept.

Hmm... I suppose that most wouldn't be objectivists when it comes to aesthetics, but most wouldn't be inclined to draw comparisons between aesthetics and morality.

Thanks guys, some content for me to look over.

Yes, which is most of the time, I'd say.

That's what making something bad morally is. Things are morally good or bad to someone.

The problem is that, semantically, the terms "morality, right and wrong" have connotations of objectivity.