What makes something bad morally is that an individual has the disposition that it's bad morally. That's what making something bad morally is. Things are morally good or bad to someone. — Terrapin Station

I understand what you are saying, and if I have missed it mea culpa ahead of time. But has this point actually been supported here. Again - not being difficult - but trying to understand.

This view that moral judgments are individual metal phenomena - and therefore by definition subjective.
is, i think at the core of the disagreement. But I have not seen this, or if i did, i did not recognize it as such, supported in any way.

I think there is some reasonable evidence to question the underlying assumption of de facto subjectivity simply because it is an individual metal phenomena.

I can think 2 + 2 = 5, and most would say that i was in error, it is objectively true it = 4, and so on for many physical and verifiable things. So I would say there is evidence that I can think things that are in conflict with objective and verifiable reality.

Both and myself have pointed to near universal moral judgments, and at least my underlying question on these is, as above, does it not show that there can be objectively moral views that individual thoughts can be in error of.

It seem the majority of your argument, at least to me rests on an assumption that has not been support yet as far as i can see.

Is there some support for: all moral judgments are individual mental phenomena and therefor subjective. ?

with out support the argument seems circular to me.

P1 - all individual mental phenomena are subjective
P2 - Moral judgments are individual mental phenomena

C - moral judgments are subjective

again - truly trying to understand

I'm going to flip the order of your post around a bit:

Both ↪tim wood
and myself have pointed to near universal moral judgments, and at least my underlying question on these is, as above, does it not show that there can be objectively moral views that individual thoughts can be in error of. — Rank Amateur

How would it show that, though? Why wouldn't it just show that (almost) everyone thinks in the same way?

So I would say there is evidence that I can think things that are in conflict with objective and verifiable reality. — Rank Amateur

Definitely. And what do we need in those cases? We need some evidence of the thing in question occurring extramentally. That's all we need to do. If we can provide some evidence of moral judgments occurring extramentally, then cool. Insofar as we're making a claim about those extramental moral judgments that we've provided evidence of, we'd be able to get correct or incorrect what those extramental moral judgments say.

Is there some support for: all moral judgments are individual mental phenomena

I'm assuming you'd want to include an "only" at the end of that--presumably that's what's at issue. The support is this: there's a complete lack of evidence of moral judgments occurring outside of minds.

and therefor subjective. ? — Rank Amateur

"Therefore subjective" is just a stipulation of definition. We're using "subjective" to refer to "occurs only in minds." That doesn't need any support. It's just a stipulation about how we're going to use a term.

there's a complete lack of evidence of moral judgments occurring outside of minds. — Terrapin Station

and as on many many many other things - lack of evidence, is just lack of evidence. And even that is in dispute. And at the core of point all along. Near universal moral judgments on some issues is evidence that the source of some moral judgments could have a source outside individual mental phenomena.

We will disagree here which is fine - just wanted to make sure I wasn't missing anything.

"Therefore subjective" is just a stipulation of definition. We're using "subjective" to refer to "occurs only in minds." That doesn't need any support. It's just a stipulation about how we're going to use a term — Terrapin Station

I know it is sufficient to you and yours, but to me at least the core basis for your entire argument is poorly supported at best, and in a very real way begs the entire question.

but thanks so much for a good and understandable reply.

Near universal moral judgments on some issues is evidence that the source of some moral judgments could have a source outside individual mental phenomena. — Rank Amateur

Again, how would that be evidence of that? You're not explaining this idea. You're just stating it, but it seems completely arbitrary to me.

I don't want to write anything else for a moment, because I want the only response to be asking you HOW that would be evidence of objectivity.

Question: we know that you think he did bad things. But did he do bad things? The question seems absurd, but it matters because it amounts to the question of what the ground of any standards will be. — tim wood

The question is not absurd *because* it removes the answer from psychology, which is the empirical doctrine of inclinations, and installs it into metaphysical doctrine of good. Does an action occur because it is good for something, in which case the means informs the good as a preferred end, or does an action occur because it is good in itself, in which case the means informs itself. Acting from preference is a means to an end which may be self-contradictory, hence immoral; acting from good in itself is a means entirely consistent with its ends and cannot be immoral.

The question may be asked, did he do bad things, but the question reduces to, did he think he did good things because he thought they were things good in itself to do? Such being the case, any semblance of preference immediately factors out of the moral equation, because if he acts from good in itself, he is acting on a subjective principle, the deviation from which is immoral for him.

Being not much more than merely kicking necessity can down the metaphysical road, and given the inherent imperfection of humans in general......there might not be a final answer to “is there a standard?”

I don't want to write anything else for a moment, because I want the only response to be asking you HOW that would be evidence of objectivity — Terrapin Station

firstly, this is your flying teapot, not mine. It should not be my job to prove your point is false. In pure argument form - I can just remain unconvinced that you have provided sufficient support for your position and remain skeptical. But being an agreeable sort -

Observation:
Almost all human beings on the entire planet have the same moral judgment on a particular action.

Possible explanations:
1. billions upon billions of individual mental phenomena all independently reach the same moral judgment.

2. there is some reason or basis external to individual and independent mental phenomena that is the source of the near universal judgment. Call it instinct, human nature, evolution, God, or what you please.

I find 2 a more logical explanation than 1.

We could just as well say that "every single person having a different moral stance on x" could have an outside source--and sure, it could. It's not impossible.

But how is that evidence of there being an outside source?

Mere possibility isn't sufficient to believe anything, because the contradictory is usually possible, too.

firstly, this is your flying teapot, not mine. It should not be my job to prove your point is false. I — Rank Amateur

I'm not asking you to prove anything. I'm asking you "Could you please explain what the heck you're thinking here, because it just seems completely mysterious to me."

I find 2 a more logical explanation than 1. — Rank Amateur

It seems to me like "logical" is the same as you telling me that you find it more intuitively plausible. Would you agree with that?

billions upon billions of individual mental phenomena all independently reach the same moral judgment. — Rank Amateur

Re this, do you find it plausible that billions of individuals have other bodily similarities, where the similar things are not given wholesale to the individuals from outside of themselves?

No worries - I think we are fine to agree to disagree now - i just wanted to check to see what the basis of your core assumption was, to make sure I wasn't missing anything. No need to keep repeating our positions back and forth. All good my friend.

By the way friend sent me a text reminding me yesterday was the anniversary of the Wall of Sound - thanks bear

Wall of Sound.....as in Phil Specter? And his all-girl groups of the 60’s?

https://livemusicblog.com/features/grateful-dead-wall-of-sound/

Cool. Wasn’t aware of that. Thanks.

The ground of any standards, for anything, is always persons' preferences. — Terrapin Station

You say this. You're consistent on it, and consistent seemingly all the way down. I'm obliged to respect the persistence. In a trivial sense sure. No mind, no nothing. But a moral sense presupposes a mind, and minds do lots of things, including reason. I think you dismiss the reasoning part, and in this I think you're dead wrong and obviously so. But I haven't made a dent. Maybe someone else can. A good point for us to disconnect.

Meanwhile, it seems to me that someone might do something that you feel is bad, maybe even to you. But I fail to understand how in that case you can move out of your personal preference mode to register any sort of complaint or argument that anyone should find cause to pay attention to, except as they prefer to.

I don't guarantee my terminology, but that seems to me a radical subjectivism that is at its core irrational.

This view that moral judgments are individual metal phenomena - and therefore by definition subjective - is, i think at the core of the disagreement. — Rank Amateur

Well said. I think you're correct, and in under twenty-five words. Had I been able of your thought,, it'd saved me hours. Thank you! Please try to make your rescues of clarity sooner, for all our sakes!

I think the problem lies in the fact that "objective morality", whatever it actually means, doesn't provide a function. You may as well state that there's a metaphysical shit on a wall that we all have an unconscious relation to.

Morality is about functionality and problem solving.

By definition, because this objective morality is supposedly independent of the individual, it is subjective in itself. It is meaningless to try to obtain guidance, if that is the aim, because we all have contextual desires.

Any instinctual agreements over moral action can be explained via evolution; But it's just an observation of what is, it doesn't hold relevance to how it should be.

"Therefore subjective" is just a stipulation of definition. We're using "subjective" to refer to "occurs only in minds." That doesn't need any support. It's just a stipulation about how we're going to use a term. — Terrapin Station

In this you're akin to a pre-Kantian idealist. To the idealist it all occurs only in minds. The question, then, is that if it really is all a matter of mind, then how do you know anything at all of the world? How do you know anything at all, period? How even do you get to the question of knowledge?

Near universal moral judgments on some issues is evidence that the source of some moral judgments could have a source outside individual mental phenomena.
— Rank Amateur

Again, how would that be evidence of that? You're not explaining this idea. You're just stating it, but it seems completely arbitrary to me. — Terrapin Station

Answer: collective community wisdom.

thanks Edward, really. But I'm good on opinions on this topic. I just checked back in to see if my understanding of the base assumption was correct and what the support for it was. I don't mine agreeing to disagree - but I wanted to make sure my understanding of the counter position was correct.

But I fail to understand how in that case you can move out of your personal preference mode to register any sort of complaint or argument that anyone should find cause to pay attention to, except as they prefer to. — tim wood

Yeah, either they already have the same moral preferences, or you have to try to "talk them into them" by appealing to other preferences they have, other things they believe, or you're out of luck. As it is, there are many moral stances that I'm simply out of luck on re having anything done about them. My stances in those regards are too unusual. Unusual enough that there's no way I'm going to be persuading anyone to them, at least without far more time and energy than I'm willing to put into it.

Believing in objective morality makes no difference in this regard, by the way. If the right other people (read "people with the power to do anything about it") don't share your beliefs about which moral stances are the objectively correct ones, you have to try to talk them into your view or you're out of luck.

I argue that the monstrousness of these bad actors is bad in itself — tim wood

No, you state that "the monstrousness of these bad actors is bad in itself". Haven't actually heard an argument yet.

Question: do you suppose reason and its products to be universalizable? — tim wood

No. Reason cannot 'produce' anything on its own and therefore its products are only applicable to its factors.

2+2=4 is an expression of a certain kind of reason. Is it true, or is it true-for-you but not true, or maybe not true at all, but you just go with it? Which, please? — tim wood

No it isn't. It is a description of a rule, or the application of reason to a set of axioms. This is basic mathematics. Maths is based on axioms. The Peano axioms, if assumed, for example, will lead to 2+2=4,but nothing in the world simply makes it the case by reason alone, how could it possibly?

Quite a while ago I distinguished between murder and killing; you must have missed that. — tim wood

No I didn't, that's exactly the point I was making. You distinguish between murder and other killing. Murder is different. Jealous murder is different from all other murder (even carrying a different sentence in some countries). Jealous murder committed by men is different from all other jealous murder...and so on.

Your remarks about Kant and generalization simply make clear you have no understanding of his ideas. — tim wood

And we're back to this childish shit again, didn't take long. Is this your counter argument to everyone who disagrees with you "you obviously don't understand..."? My argument is exactly that of Elizabeth Anscombe in "Modern Moral Philosophy" where she argues that Kant's Categorical Imperetive "... is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it.”. So unless you're also claiming that your understanding of Kant is better than hers, then can we just try to have an adult discussion about the issues rather than waive criticism away with a vague claim of misunderstanding?

In this you're akin to a pre-Kantian idealist. To the idealist it all occurs only in minds. The question, then, is that if it really is all a matter of mind, then how do you know anything at all of the world? How do you know anything at all, period? How even do you get to the question of knowledge? — tim wood

Morality is subjective. But morality isn't the entirety of the world. There are plenty of objective things. Morality just ain't one of them.

Answer: collective community wisdom. — tim wood

Collective community wisdom is evidence of what the consensus is in a community, right?

I understand what you are saying, and if I have missed it mea culpa ahead of time. But has this point actually been supported here. — Rank Amateur

I don't understand what you mean by supported. I presume you don't deny that "Things are morally good or bad to someone.". It is a given that moral views are the property of people right? So what you're trying to argue is that in addition to being something people experience, moral views come from somewhere.

So the relativists, not believing that to be the case, have nothing to support. We are saying only that with which we all agree "people have moral views". It is the objdctivists who are positing some additional thing. Now if you want to just say "I believe this additional thing exists, can you prove overwhelmingly that it doesn't" then I have no issue with you. The answer is, no, I cannot prove to you overwhelming that it doesn't.

If, however, you're saying that it is a fact that this additional thing exists and I must prove it doesn't in order to sustain my position, then I'd take issue with that.

I also believe that Occam's Razor has proven itself to be a useful technique, which make my presumption of no additional factor a better argument to start with, but if you don't believe that, then we must simply disagree on the matter.

I don't understand what you mean by supported. — Isaac

I meant what is the basis of TS's and I think your core belief that all mental phenomena is by definition subjective.

TS has already acknowledged and I think you would agree that the "all" is not correct. Things that can be shown to have objective truth outside this, such as physical reality, are not subjective by the definition above. The cat is on the chair is objectively true no matter the mental phenomena of an individual who says otherwise. So we are capable of objective thought and about thinking incorrectly about things that are objectively true. But to TS and you this does not apply to moral judgments. And as best I can tell the reason for this, just is, and has no support. TS's case is a pure no seeum argument - I don't see any evidence that there is any other way, so there is not any other way. Yours seems to be pure denial that such a thing is possible.

So the relativists, not believing that to be the case, have nothing to support — Isaac

And you do understand how completely circular that is.

Cutting to the chase - I do think it is very possible as I have said a few times, that it is very possible that there is an outside source to some moral judgments. Call it human nature, instinct, evolution or God.

And I find this a better explanation of the near universal moral judgments on some issues than your explanation.

I don't feel either of us has any certain advantage one over the other with the basis of our core beliefs and that is what I wanted to check. And with that the case, I am happy to agree to disagree.

I meant what is the basis of TS's and I think your core belief that all mental phenomena is by definition subjective. — Rank Amateur

I don't think all mental phenomena are subjective. Terrapin and I differ on this significantly. Personally I find the most successful definition of the subjective/objective divide is that subjective refers to truths which others cannot possibly verify to their satisfaction, and objective are truths which others can verify.

"I like this pizza" is subjective because nobody could possibly verify that I do (I might only be pretending to enjoy it). There's no external evidence which proves the matter.

"The cat is on the chair" is objective because generally if someone else looks, finds the cat to be on the chair, they are satisfied.

This division is a of course, not always clear. If, in theory, we could mri scan somebody and neuroscience had advanced to a level where we can identify likes and dislikes, "I like pizza" might one day become objective.

Anyway, that aside the issue with morality is about relativism, not subjective Ness. I believe moral statements are only relatively true. It is true that I think murder is wrong (generally), but it is nonsensical to ask if murder is wrong absent of any person thinking it.

This has nothing to do with subjectiveness and everything to do with the location of the 'wrongness'. The idea that murder is wrong is contained within the minds of individual people. That much I presume we agree on. I see no reason to presume it is also contained elsewhere. As Terrapin has said, noses are contained within people too, we are not surprised that they are all similar. The 'blueprint' for noses is contained within DNA which has been inherited from a common ancestors, so it's obvious why they're all much the same.

Again, I'm just saying that moral sentiments are contained within minds, and everyone already agrees with that so I feel no need to support it. I don't see any reason to think they also occur elsewhere.

I do think it is very possible as I have said a few times, that it is very possible that there is an outside source to some moral judgments. Call it human nature, instinct, evolution or God.

And I find this a better explanation of the near universal moral judgments on some issues than your explanation. — Rank Amateur

Evolution is not an outside source. The means by which evolution acts is by inheritance of genetic material, mutation in an individual and environmental selection. There is no mechanism by which it ensures we all have the same moral sentiments, and even if there were, I don't understand how that would make a person without those sentiments 'wrong'. Are people who are born without a nose 'wrong' for not having one?

Again, I'm just saying that moral sentiments are contained within minds, and everyone already agrees with that so I feel no need to support it. — Isaac

that could actually be the worst philosophic argument I have ever heard.

Isaac - I completely understand your point, and I completely disagree. Nothing wrong with that. The core base of your belief is on as shaky ground as mine. That is the reason there is so many different views on the basis of morality. If that was not the case - we wouldn't be disagreeing, and we would not be at 49 pages.

that could actually be the worst philosophic argument I have ever heard. — Rank Amateur

Really? Are you saying that moral sentiments are not in people's minds? That when I think "murder is wrong" that thought is not taking place in my mind? That's all I mean by it.

- understand, my bad - my issues is source - mea culpa - typed too fast - apologies

Kant's Categorical Imperetive (sic) “...is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it.”. — Isaac

Anscombe MMP, 1958)

The categorical imperative is a misrepresentation. Anscombe actually said “...his rule on universalized maxims is useless without stipulations....”.

“....A maxim is the subjective principle of volition...”
(Kant FPMM, 1785)

"...Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same time will it to be a universal law"; this is the sole condition under which a will can never contradict itself; and such an imperative is categorical....”
(ibid)

It is clear the maxim, the subjective principle, being universalized is antecedent to an imperative behavior. It is the rule that’s claimed to be useless, and the categorical imperative is not a rule. It is a law. The difference is critical to deontological moral philosophy in general, and Kant’s mandate for pure practical reason, the concept of an autonomous, freely determinant will, in particular.

“....there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, (...) and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that is, must be followed, even in opposition to inclination. (...) the categorical imperative, is not limited by any condition, and as being absolutely, although practically, necessary, may be quite properly called a command....”
(ibid)

Hypothetical imperatives are rules, and if Anscombe’s thesis is to have power, she must only refer to these alone, in which case the they would be useless without a stipulation, which is not necessarily given:
“....When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition...”
(ibid)

The view to constructing a maxim, with respect to hypothetical imperatives, is nothing more than addressing whatever arbitrary want the description of the action provides. The view to constructing a maxim, with respect to a categorical imperative, involves a command of will, by which the description of the action must abide without exception.

Furthermore, there are as many hypothetical imperatives as there as circumstances that call for a moral determination and their respective maxims are just as many, as suits the mood of the will determining them. But there is one and only one categorical imperative, which demands the maxim one wills to become universal law, from which a certain act must follow necessarily by rule of law such that the act and the law do not contradict themselves, be chosen wisely. This proposition reduces to the proposition that the determinant will (the law) and the judgement of volition (the act) do not contradict themselves.

Is there remaining a question as to what form a relevant description of an action corresponding to a universalized maxim would have? While it is true Kant does not include a description per se, he makes it quite clear what the action is doesn’t matter. If one acts as if the maxim to which the imperative relates were a universal law, he is justified in calling himself morally worthy.

But, as I said before, I’ll never be famous, so....who cares.

If, in theory, we could mri scan somebody and neuroscience had advanced to a level where we can identify likes and dislikes, "I like pizza" might one day become objective. — Isaac

Which makes it, in principle, objective.