The impossibility of being 'the same X in two places simultaneously' isn't merely "practical", — 180 Proof

It's impossible if by 'same you mean numerically identical but not if what is intended is qualitatively identical.

When it is asked if two physically identical human copies are the same person, I don't think anyone is suggesting that they might be numerically identical.

I don't think it's a problem.

Shouldn't we have some idea, at this point? — RogueAI

I don't see why.

Yeah. It's a hard problem (of our own invention).

How can the quality of depth in a visual experience be explained within physicalism? — Harry Hindu

I have absolutely no idea. All anyone can do, whether it's within physicalism or any alternative, is produce untestable hypotheses (guesses).

Since you don't deny that humans have qualia, — TheMadFool

I don't deny that we have conscious experiences.

can it be explained with physicalism? — TheMadFool

I assume conscious experiences can be explained within physicalism.

I wasn't casting doubt on your interpretation of the hard problem.

I'm simply saying that there is no way in practice or in principle to determine if any entity, other than oneself, animate or inanimate, actually experiences 'qualia'. Therefore the claim that a robot cannot/does not experience qualia is an unwarranted assumption.

so where are we supposed to draw the line? — Outlander

Welcome to the hard problem.

You're on a computer right? Phone at least. Run a systems diagnostic or "CPU health" test or something of the like. It doesn't "feel" anything it only reports, when asked. — Outlander

This is what I'm challenging.

You have no way of knowing that It doesn't "feel" anything. It's an assumption.

Now, sure, you could program randomness into it and its operation, but that's all it really ever would be. — Outlander

You're talking about behaviour. I'm not.

I'm talking about what TheMadFool describes as "what it feels like (qualia)".

If it does, it is because it was programmed to. — Outlander

Not necessarily.

Edited to add: How would one confirm that the programming had worked? If we could confirm this then we'd have cracked the hard problem.

Yeah; I think you're alluding to "strong AI". — Mijin

That wasn't my intention.

I'm simply suggesting that we are not in a position to say with absolute confidence that a robot, as described by TheMadFool, cannot/does not experience 'qualia'.

since we could write a 2-line program that responds "Ouch!" when you press a key, but I assume we all would agree that such a program does not actually feel pain. — Mijin

Of course, but we seem to be talking about something quite different now.

Did you, by any chance, happen to see anything that contradicts me? — TheMadFool

No, but neither have I seen anything that corroborates your view.

There is an aspect of the needle-prick - what it feels like (qualia) - that is present in you but absent in the robot.

How can we be sure of this?

Yes, that's already been pointed out to me. :smile:

If you do the math, herd immunity would cost around 6 million American lives. — praxis

This isn't correct. Herd immunity could be achieved by the use of immunisation.

Thanks.

Everyone agreeing on some moral imperative, by this definition, would still not make it objective because those same people would still all agree that the only place that imperative could possibly be was within the minds of each individual, and if it arrives, or varies with culture, then it cannot be an innate property of those minds as objects (brains). — Isaac

This looks a little circular. How do we determine what is an "innate property" of minds other than by observing overwhelming intersubjective agreement?

No, I wouldn't want to make that case and nor would anyone nowadays, but that's not because an objective morality exists for all moral dilemmas, it's because an objective morality exists for this particular moral dilemma. — Isaac

What sense of "objective" are you using here? I may be mistaken but I get the impression (not just from you) that overwhelming intersubjective agreement is regarded by many as convincing evidence of 'objective morality".

My assertion was only that mask-wearing was more conducive to human flourishing than to assert personal liberty as a justification for not wearing a mask. — Thomas Quine

No, it was more than that.

You said:

Those who argue that to mandate mask-wearing is immoral believe that individual liberty and personal choice is more important to human flourishing.

Science can tell us who is right. — Thomas Quine

Science cannot "tell us who is right".

To be clear, I'm not actually disputing the claim so much as trying to find out how the OP (and others) believe it to be the case. — Isaac

Apologies for inadvertently misrepresenting you.

I asked for the science that tells us that mask-wearing is better than personal liberty in the long term.
— Isaac

Are you serious?
— creativesoul

Of course he is.

"Better than" is a value judgement. Science doesn't make value judgements.
— ChrisH

Isaac is perfectly capable of speaking for himself, but since you answered...



So what? I mean, that's not even in question here... is it? — creativesoul

It's precisely what's in question here.

This was the original claim:

Those who argue that to mandate mask-wearing is immoral believe that individual liberty and personal choice is more important to human flourishing.

Science can tell us who is right. — Thomas Quine

Isaac is (in my view perfectly reasonably) disputing this claim.

I asked for the science that tells us that mask-wearing is better than personal liberty in the long term.
— Isaac

Are you serious? — creativesoul

Of course he is.

"Better than" is a value judgement. Science doesn't make value judgements.

What do you actually mean by “A is right for Joe”? Do you mean “Joe thinks A is right and therefore I think Joe should do A” or do you mean “I think Joe should do A whether or not he thinks it is right”? The first position is relativist, the second is objectivist. — Congau

That doesn't seem quite right.

What about the situation where “I think Joe should do A whether or not he thinks it is right” because I think it is right. I don't think that makes me an objectivist.

Different kinds of moral objectivism will give different answers to that. — Pfhorrest

Ok. I think I now understand what you were getting at in your OP.

What you were asking for in your explanation of what you meant by a "moral objectivist" was simply anyone who believes there are "correct" moral evaluations regardless of anyone's opinions or feelings. I mistakenly thought you were attempting to get at something more nuanced.

Some moral propositions, not just non-moral ones? — Pfhorrest

Just non-moral propositions.

I’m asking about your views, so correct according to you. But not correct just because you say so, or because anyone says so. — Pfhorrest

This doesn't really answer what I was asking. If it's not correct because I or anyone says so then just what what is it that determines whether or not a moral evaluation is "is correct for everyone to make".

Just, do you think that there is something correct, independently of whoever says so? — Pfhorrest

I think it's possible for some propositions to be 'correct' regardless of anyone's opinions or feelings (that's pretty much what objective means).

I mean only what's also called "moral universalism", which is just the claim that, for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make — Pfhorrest

"Correct" according to what/whom?

Your use of language was wrong. — RogueAI

I disagree. 'Awkward, possibly, but not wrong.

Usage, and rules of usage, of a word like 'you' has developed in a universe in which perfect human duplication has never happened. In a universe in which human duplication were commonplace my use of language would make perfect sense.

I'm going by the definition we've all agreed on for "you" and "me" and "I". Those are singular pronouns. They can't refer to more than one person (well, "you" can, but not in the context we're using it). — RogueAI

Are you saying saying multiple instantiatons of people with identical self-identities could not exist because of the rules of grammar?

I can't tell whether you're objecting to my use of language or to the concept of multiple instantiations.

One of the transporter people could be you, or none of them could be you, but logically, they both can't be you. — RogueAI

That doesn't follow. It depends on how you define "you" in this context.

If "you" is the entity with all the physical and mental attributes we normally associate with RogueAI there is no logical reason why two or more of these entities couldn't exist simultaneously.

To claim that only one such entity is truly RogueAI would be an arbitrary distinction.

I don't think there is a significant difference, — Tarrasque

I agree. Perceived differences are either based on a subjective opinion (an attitude based on one's intuition that one's identity simply cannot be duplicated) or one believes that there's a non-physical component to identity (a soul or something similar).

Would your attitude towards the case change if the teletransporter malfunctioned, leaving Earth-you alive? — Tarrasque

No (identity is preserved whether Earth-you survives or not). But I think there would be disastrous moral and practical consequences.

Does one of you have a stronger claim? — Tarrasque

No. Both have equal claim to be "me" (thereby leading to disastrous moral and practical consequences)..

How can you be sure that it’s really you who will appear on Mars? Might it be a mere copy? — Tarrasque

Can you explain the (discernable) difference(s) you're alluding to between an an entity which was "really you" and a "mere copy"?

Thanks for that.

If I understand correctly, the 'consciousness' you're talking about (assumptions based on neural activity) is not the same as the philosophical sense of consciousness (as in the 'hard problem' and p-zombies).

But modern science has discovered signs of consciousness in almost all animate (self-moving) organisms. — Gnomon

I'm intrigued. What are the "signs" that "modern science" has discovered with regard to consciousness in non-human organisms?

I should make it clear that I don't doubt that non-human organisms are capable of consciousness, I just wasn't aware that there were any scientific criteria by which consciousness could be detected in any organism.

An individual who reports a specific attitude, professes sincerity, or claims to be in love is reporting their own feelings. Feelings are mental states. Mental states are brain states. Brains are physical.
— ChrisH

Let's see, I'm not sure that captures the explanation of consciousness, or does it? — 3017amen

I wasn't attempting to explain consciousness.

I don't think this is leading anywhere. Thanks anyway.

Using your concept "attitude" and "sincerity" along with my concept "love" how do we reconcile materialism with those concepts from conscious/physical existence? — 3017amen

Not sure I understand your question.

An individual who reports a specific attitude, professes sincerity, or claims to be in love is reporting their own feelings. Feelings are mental states. Mental states are brain states. Brains are physical.

I'm afraid you're comparing apples and oranges as it were. Of course that's an objective fact about your material physical existence. How is that germane to the question about my love of ice cream? — 3017amen

When you report your (sincere) love of ice cream, you're reporting your brain state (attitude). Brain states are commonly regarded as having material physical existence.

Claims about one's height and claims about one's love of ice cream are both claims about aspects of one's own material physical existence.

Absolutely spot on.

a reason to live?

To find out what happens next.