For what it's worth, I understand exactly the point you're making.

It seems you're agreeing that moral positions are grounded on personal values and that those values are based on a hidden objective moral truth (but presumably only when those moral positions align with your own).

This looks as though you're assuming the truth of what's in question here.

Ok.

I always understood that objective moral truths, if they exist, do so without regard to anybody's personal values.

if people believe stoning someone to death for a minor crime is moral, it is. A moral relativist has no grounds to say that it isn't. — Tzeentch

That doesn't follow. What I think you mean to say is that they have no objective grounds.

From this it doesn't follow that there are no grounds for disagreement. Moral disputes are routinely couched in appeals to common human values.

↪ChrisH If all moral views are equally valid, — Tzeentch

I don't know what you mean by this. Equally valid in what sense?

But is moral discourse an essential feature of morality? — Pantagruel

I think so (I include unspoken demonstrations of approval/disapproval in the general term 'moral discourse').

Do you think morals are more explicit or implicit in nature? — Pantagruel

Not sure what you mean.

Not sure what point you're making.

Are you saying that proselytizing is a feature or purpose of morality? — Pantagruel

I certainly think it's an important aspect of moral discourse. It seems inconceivable to me that one could take the position that X is immoral but not be concerned if anyone actually does X.

That's an open door, isn't it? If everything can be moral, then it is exceedingly easy to defend one's subjective values. — Tzeentch

As I see it, the point of a moral position is not simply to defend one's views but, more importantly, to persuade others.

If I understand correctly that is your position, since you mentioned you weren't a moral relativist, but do make said distinction. — Tzeentch

I don't identify as a moral relativist because it is much misunderstood (particularly by moral objectivists).

You appear to to take the view that moral relativism entails normative moral relativism - the view that
moral relativism implies that we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when it runs counter to our personal or cultural moral standards. This is an extreme form of moral relativism that is not endorsed by most philosophers.

Most moral relativists hold that it is perfectly reasonable (and practical) for a person or group to defend their subjective values against others, even if there is no universal prescription or morality.

(Much of this is taken straight from the Wiki entry on Moral Relativism)

What those arguments tend to boil down to is that when many people believe a thing, it is moral. — Tzeentch

No this does not follow. All that follows is that it is moral in the opinion of many people not "it is moral".

The first describes any value/opinion/preference broadly encompassed by what is generally agreed to be the human activity, morality.

The second (the usage you're using I think), is "moral" as shorthand for morally good/permitted.
— ChrisH

If morality is "opinions that one believes ought to be adopted by everyone", then having such opinions is moral in and of itself, no? — Tzeentch

I don't know what you mean by moral in and of itself.

Such opinions are moral opinions (in my first sense above) but as I said:

It simply doesn't make sense to ask if their values are moral in the second sense without specifics.
— ChrisH

Indeed, but if one holds a moral relativist view, the specifics cannot matter.

The reason all of this might sound confusing, is because moral relativism makes the term 'morality' become meaningless (and therefore it makes little sense, in my view). That's the point I'm trying to get across. — Tzeentch

I haven't identified as a moral relativist and so it would be helpful if you directed your comments at what I actually say rather than at what you believe moral relativism entails. I'm still not sure you've grasped the distinction I've drawn between the two senses of "moral".

But then it makes no sense to believe morality, personal or collective, are aesthetic preferences. — Tzeentch

I thought I'd clearly said I didn't think they were the same?

Is what they are doing moral? — Tzeentch

I think you're confusing two meanings of moral.

The first describes any value/opinion/preference broadly encompassed by what is generally agreed to be the human activity, morality.

The second (the usage you're using I think), is "moral" as shorthand for morally good/permitted.

So I would answer that what they are doing is moral[ity] in the first sense. It simply doesn't make sense to ask if their values are moral in the second sense without specifics.

Personally, I'm not a moral relativist. I think morality loses all its meaning when it is viewed through moral relativism and you simply end up with morality being whatever the strongest group manages to impose on the rest of the people — Tzeentch

Isn't that what happens now?

"might makes right." — Tzeentch

Only if you believe that what ever is imposed is necessarily "right". I don't.

What I was attempting to say was that a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others is not, in my view, really a morality - it's aesthetic preference. My understanding is that it's the intention to influence others which distinguishes moral values and aesthetic preferences
— ChrisH

Assuming a moral relativist view, any and all notions of morality are nothing but personal fancy (aesthetic preference), and the only question is who gets to impose their personal fancies on other people; "might makes right." — Tzeentch

I broadly agree with the view that all 'notions of morality' are essentially 'nothing but personal fancy' (personal values).

However, it doesn't follow that because 'notions of morality' and aesthetic preferences are both
based essentially on personal values that they are the same.

For me, the crucial distinction is that moral values are those values we wish to see adopted by others. One way of saying this is that we feel these values ought to be shared by others.

Isn't a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others no different to personal aesthetic preference?
— ChrisH

I think they are the same in that they are expressions of personal values and feelings as opposed to reason. Is that what you mean? — T Clark

What I was attempting to say was that a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others is not, in my view, really a morality - it's aesthetic preference. My understanding is that it's the intention to influence others which distinguishes moral values and aesthetic preferences

Isn't a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others no different to personal aesthetic preference?

The mere appearance of 'suppression' (insistence on preconditions that Trump would never accept) would reinforce Trump's supporters' sense that he's (again) being treated unfairly.

even if Cooper is right in saying that public awareness of Trump's malignant delusions is required. — Wayfarer

I think Cooper is absolutely correct.

Any (perceived) attempt to suppress Trump's idiotic ramblings would be counterproductive.

While I'm at it, I'll make another request that moderators notify affected members when they delete a post or thread. At the very least it will help avoid unwelcome kvetching from loudmouth members like me. — T Clark

I'm surprised this doesn't happen as a matter of course.

Yes, this was pretty much my take on Strawson's position.

Thanks.

In an Interview with Galen Strawson:

"I just want to stress the word “ultimate” before “moral responsibility.” Because there’s a clear, weaker, everyday sense of “morally responsible” in which you and I and millions of other people are thoroughly morally responsible people."

I don't know what he means by "ultimate" responsibility.

Any oncologist will tell you that the patients that beat cancer are the fighters, — Olivier5

Sure, and all those who died were quitters. Absolute nonsense.

Behaviorally, its absence makes little difference — hypericin

What difference? Or do you mean to say "no difference"?

On the one hand, they often praise science for being value-free: objective, unbiased, neutral, a pure source of facts. Just as, as often, however, they speak of it as being itself a source of values, perhaps the only true source of them.' — Jack Cummins

This isn't my experience.

Of course some people will make all kinds of wild claims but "just as often" seems like hyperbole.

If it's courageous to bow out, is it cowardly to soldier on?

The impossibility of being 'the same X in two places simultaneously' isn't merely "practical", — 180 Proof

It's impossible if by 'same you mean numerically identical but not if what is intended is qualitatively identical.

When it is asked if two physically identical human copies are the same person, I don't think anyone is suggesting that they might be numerically identical.

I don't think it's a problem.

Shouldn't we have some idea, at this point? — RogueAI

I don't see why.

Yeah. It's a hard problem (of our own invention).

How can the quality of depth in a visual experience be explained within physicalism? — Harry Hindu

I have absolutely no idea. All anyone can do, whether it's within physicalism or any alternative, is produce untestable hypotheses (guesses).

Since you don't deny that humans have qualia, — TheMadFool

I don't deny that we have conscious experiences.

can it be explained with physicalism? — TheMadFool

I assume conscious experiences can be explained within physicalism.

I wasn't casting doubt on your interpretation of the hard problem.

I'm simply saying that there is no way in practice or in principle to determine if any entity, other than oneself, animate or inanimate, actually experiences 'qualia'. Therefore the claim that a robot cannot/does not experience qualia is an unwarranted assumption.

so where are we supposed to draw the line? — Outlander

Welcome to the hard problem.

You're on a computer right? Phone at least. Run a systems diagnostic or "CPU health" test or something of the like. It doesn't "feel" anything it only reports, when asked. — Outlander

This is what I'm challenging.

You have no way of knowing that It doesn't "feel" anything. It's an assumption.

Now, sure, you could program randomness into it and its operation, but that's all it really ever would be. — Outlander

You're talking about behaviour. I'm not.

I'm talking about what TheMadFool describes as "what it feels like (qualia)".

If it does, it is because it was programmed to. — Outlander

Not necessarily.

Edited to add: How would one confirm that the programming had worked? If we could confirm this then we'd have cracked the hard problem.

Yeah; I think you're alluding to "strong AI". — Mijin

That wasn't my intention.

I'm simply suggesting that we are not in a position to say with absolute confidence that a robot, as described by TheMadFool, cannot/does not experience 'qualia'.

since we could write a 2-line program that responds "Ouch!" when you press a key, but I assume we all would agree that such a program does not actually feel pain. — Mijin

Of course, but we seem to be talking about something quite different now.

Did you, by any chance, happen to see anything that contradicts me? — TheMadFool

No, but neither have I seen anything that corroborates your view.