Once or the other must be right, either it is rational or or isn't.

You believe in psychological continuity, so what do you think? — hypericin

I'm not sure what you're asking. For me bodily continuity arguments simply don't work. As far as I can tell psychological continuity is what is important to most people.

I'm not sure if you understand. — hypericin

I'm pretty sure I do.

I'm not sure if you understand. It is a very queer situation. In the intended sequence (original is killed before the clone wakes up), there is no doubt: the original will wake up as the clone (assuming he wakes up at all). But in the scenario I gave, original woke up, then was killed. So to the original, as he woke up, it might have seemed horribly unlucky. Why couldn't he have been the clone? — hypericin

It doesn't matter what scenario you construct, neither the original nor the clone know which they are when they wake (and it's quite possible to construct a scenario where no one knows which is which).The point being that If the two are treated differently, it's because we choose to do so.

As far as I can see nothing you've said impacts in the slightest on whether or not personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity.

But really, it is quite difficult to conceive of this splitting. Suppose the split happened, and the clone was a "valid descendent". To what does this benefit the original? The original, post split, is still the original, the copy is as "other" as any stranger. Somehow, the original also woke up as a clone. But as soon as the split happens, the clone has interests that are opposed to the original. Would you pay $1000 for another version of you to be a millionaire? — hypericin

This is an argument against the wisdom of undertaking human cloning. For what it's worth I think non-destructive human cloning would be both morally and practically disastrous. However this has no bearing on whether or not humans could survive cloning or not.

Is it somehow a matter of chance which path you take? Does the original wake up and think "damn I got unlucky! I wanted to wake up as a clone!" — hypericin

I can't tell if this was meant as a serious comment but I'll respond anyway. In my view, neither the original nor the clone will be aware of which they are. The only way they can deduce who they may be is from external information which may or may not be trustworthy.

To be clear, I don't think 'valid' is a moral/ethical claim here as it can be elsewhere. It's just stating that one is derivative, and people would care about that. — AmadeusD

But this does bring a moral dimension into the assessment.

A clone of you isn't you, basically. It just might not matter that it isn't. — AmadeusD

My view is that it doesn't matter and I think there are moral reasons why it shouldn't matter.

What you haven't done is show that the clone and post-cloned-original cannot both be considered equally valid descendants of the pre-cloned-original
— ChrisH

They may be. But why is that the question? The patient (or teleportee), isn't asking if the clone (or teleported) will be a "valid decedent", whatever that means. They ask if they will survive the procedure. It is not in my interest to create a 'valid descendent " who lives happily. It is my interest to live happily. — hypericin

My point is that, in my view, both successfully survive as continuations of the pre-cloned-original. Pointing out that from the perspective of one, the other is a different person doesn't seem to me to invalidate this.

The pirated person isn't not a valid 'you' (as long as we know which is which at all times). — AmadeusD

If I understand you correctly, you're saying that, in your view, only the original can be deemed "valid". However you imply that If we haven't got firm evidence of which of the two people is the original then we can never really know which is the valid 'you'. Why would we want to call one "valid"?

The point of the story was to give a visceral sense that the clone is certainly not you. — hypericin

I don't think it works. As far as I can tell, all you've done is show (not surprisingly) that the clone and original are different people. What you haven't done is show that the clone and post-cloned-original cannot both be considered equally valid descendants of the pre-cloned-original

I think both sides have valid arguments. But to me this is a pretty convincing one for the bodily continuity side. Why not you? — hypericin

It wasn't clear to me what argument you were making. You stated the following but it appeared to me to be unargued.

The moral of the story seems clear. From your perspective, your clone is absolutely not you. The clone is somebody else entirely, who has stolen your life and will now enjoy it free from illness. — hypericin

You appear to take it as given that the clone is not endowed with "your perspective" this seems unwarranted. I agree the original and clone have different perspectives but (in my view) they both view the world from the perspective of someone who was the original prior to cloning.

Given any scenario where it is even logically possible to meet your twin, then you are not your twin, and personal continuity does not hold between you and your twin. — hypericin

I don't think it makes sense to talk about personal continuity between you and your twin. I'd have thought what is pertinent is the degree (or lack) of continuity you and your twin have with the the 'you' prior to cloning. I'd have thought both have equal psychological continuity - physical continuity, in my view, is not important.

(I've been following your arguments in The imperfect transporter thread and agree with just about everything youv'e been saying - it's only your recent comments on physical continuity that have lost me)

I really think everyone is over-thinking... — Mp202020

Surely not???

This couldn't possibly happen on this forum. :razz:

I changed the OP to help dissolve this dispute:

C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

Yes that more accurately reflects what you're attempting to say. The original was open to Michael's criticism.

I admit it can be confusing, and this is why we have to be very careful: the proposition "I believe <...>" is about a belief of the subject-at-hand, but whether or not it is true is not dependent on any beliefs about it. — Bob Ross

I think Michael's making a distinction between "beliefs about it" and "beliefs".

A claim that "john "believes X" is not dependent on any belief about John' s beliefs (your point) but it is dependent on John's beliefs (Michael's point). In other words the truth of the proposition is clearly dependent on an actual belief - something you appeared to deny when you wrote.

C1: Therefore, a belief cannot make a proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

that "I believe that aliens exist" is not dependent on what we believe about it, so you have failed to demonstrate what belief makes the proposition true or false." — Bob Ross

I don't think Michael is saying that the the truth of the proposition is dependent on what "we" believe. He is saying that the truth is dependent on what the person referenced by "I" believes in that proposition.

Apologies, you're right - It's Bob who's missing your point.

"a belief cannot make a proposition true or false" is false. — Michael

Yes, but a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false (which is maybe what Bob is claiming)

"I believe that aliens exist" is true iff I believe that aliens exist. Therefore your conclusion that "a belief about the proposition cannot make a proposition true or false" is false. — Michael

I think you're missing Bob Ross's point.

A belief that "aliens exist" is not the same as a belief about the proposition "I believe that aliens exist"

For what it's worth, I understand exactly the point you're making.

It seems you're agreeing that moral positions are grounded on personal values and that those values are based on a hidden objective moral truth (but presumably only when those moral positions align with your own).

This looks as though you're assuming the truth of what's in question here.

Ok.

I always understood that objective moral truths, if they exist, do so without regard to anybody's personal values.

if people believe stoning someone to death for a minor crime is moral, it is. A moral relativist has no grounds to say that it isn't. — Tzeentch

That doesn't follow. What I think you mean to say is that they have no objective grounds.

From this it doesn't follow that there are no grounds for disagreement. Moral disputes are routinely couched in appeals to common human values.

↪ChrisH If all moral views are equally valid, — Tzeentch

I don't know what you mean by this. Equally valid in what sense?

But is moral discourse an essential feature of morality? — Pantagruel

I think so (I include unspoken demonstrations of approval/disapproval in the general term 'moral discourse').

Do you think morals are more explicit or implicit in nature? — Pantagruel

Not sure what you mean.

Not sure what point you're making.

Are you saying that proselytizing is a feature or purpose of morality? — Pantagruel

I certainly think it's an important aspect of moral discourse. It seems inconceivable to me that one could take the position that X is immoral but not be concerned if anyone actually does X.

That's an open door, isn't it? If everything can be moral, then it is exceedingly easy to defend one's subjective values. — Tzeentch

As I see it, the point of a moral position is not simply to defend one's views but, more importantly, to persuade others.

If I understand correctly that is your position, since you mentioned you weren't a moral relativist, but do make said distinction. — Tzeentch

I don't identify as a moral relativist because it is much misunderstood (particularly by moral objectivists).

You appear to to take the view that moral relativism entails normative moral relativism - the view that
moral relativism implies that we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when it runs counter to our personal or cultural moral standards. This is an extreme form of moral relativism that is not endorsed by most philosophers.

Most moral relativists hold that it is perfectly reasonable (and practical) for a person or group to defend their subjective values against others, even if there is no universal prescription or morality.

(Much of this is taken straight from the Wiki entry on Moral Relativism)

What those arguments tend to boil down to is that when many people believe a thing, it is moral. — Tzeentch

No this does not follow. All that follows is that it is moral in the opinion of many people not "it is moral".

The first describes any value/opinion/preference broadly encompassed by what is generally agreed to be the human activity, morality.

The second (the usage you're using I think), is "moral" as shorthand for morally good/permitted.
— ChrisH

If morality is "opinions that one believes ought to be adopted by everyone", then having such opinions is moral in and of itself, no? — Tzeentch

I don't know what you mean by moral in and of itself.

Such opinions are moral opinions (in my first sense above) but as I said:

It simply doesn't make sense to ask if their values are moral in the second sense without specifics.
— ChrisH

Indeed, but if one holds a moral relativist view, the specifics cannot matter.

The reason all of this might sound confusing, is because moral relativism makes the term 'morality' become meaningless (and therefore it makes little sense, in my view). That's the point I'm trying to get across. — Tzeentch

I haven't identified as a moral relativist and so it would be helpful if you directed your comments at what I actually say rather than at what you believe moral relativism entails. I'm still not sure you've grasped the distinction I've drawn between the two senses of "moral".

But then it makes no sense to believe morality, personal or collective, are aesthetic preferences. — Tzeentch

I thought I'd clearly said I didn't think they were the same?

Is what they are doing moral? — Tzeentch

I think you're confusing two meanings of moral.

The first describes any value/opinion/preference broadly encompassed by what is generally agreed to be the human activity, morality.

The second (the usage you're using I think), is "moral" as shorthand for morally good/permitted.

So I would answer that what they are doing is moral[ity] in the first sense. It simply doesn't make sense to ask if their values are moral in the second sense without specifics.

Personally, I'm not a moral relativist. I think morality loses all its meaning when it is viewed through moral relativism and you simply end up with morality being whatever the strongest group manages to impose on the rest of the people — Tzeentch

Isn't that what happens now?

"might makes right." — Tzeentch

Only if you believe that what ever is imposed is necessarily "right". I don't.

What I was attempting to say was that a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others is not, in my view, really a morality - it's aesthetic preference. My understanding is that it's the intention to influence others which distinguishes moral values and aesthetic preferences
— ChrisH

Assuming a moral relativist view, any and all notions of morality are nothing but personal fancy (aesthetic preference), and the only question is who gets to impose their personal fancies on other people; "might makes right." — Tzeentch

I broadly agree with the view that all 'notions of morality' are essentially 'nothing but personal fancy' (personal values).

However, it doesn't follow that because 'notions of morality' and aesthetic preferences are both
based essentially on personal values that they are the same.

For me, the crucial distinction is that moral values are those values we wish to see adopted by others. One way of saying this is that we feel these values ought to be shared by others.

Isn't a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others no different to personal aesthetic preference?
— ChrisH

I think they are the same in that they are expressions of personal values and feelings as opposed to reason. Is that what you mean? — T Clark

What I was attempting to say was that a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others is not, in my view, really a morality - it's aesthetic preference. My understanding is that it's the intention to influence others which distinguishes moral values and aesthetic preferences

Isn't a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others no different to personal aesthetic preference?

The mere appearance of 'suppression' (insistence on preconditions that Trump would never accept) would reinforce Trump's supporters' sense that he's (again) being treated unfairly.

even if Cooper is right in saying that public awareness of Trump's malignant delusions is required. — Wayfarer

I think Cooper is absolutely correct.

Any (perceived) attempt to suppress Trump's idiotic ramblings would be counterproductive.

While I'm at it, I'll make another request that moderators notify affected members when they delete a post or thread. At the very least it will help avoid unwelcome kvetching from loudmouth members like me. — T Clark

I'm surprised this doesn't happen as a matter of course.

Yes, this was pretty much my take on Strawson's position.

Thanks.

In an Interview with Galen Strawson:

"I just want to stress the word “ultimate” before “moral responsibility.” Because there’s a clear, weaker, everyday sense of “morally responsible” in which you and I and millions of other people are thoroughly morally responsible people."

I don't know what he means by "ultimate" responsibility.

Any oncologist will tell you that the patients that beat cancer are the fighters, — Olivier5

Sure, and all those who died were quitters. Absolute nonsense.

Behaviorally, its absence makes little difference — hypericin

What difference? Or do you mean to say "no difference"?

On the one hand, they often praise science for being value-free: objective, unbiased, neutral, a pure source of facts. Just as, as often, however, they speak of it as being itself a source of values, perhaps the only true source of them.' — Jack Cummins

This isn't my experience.

Of course some people will make all kinds of wild claims but "just as often" seems like hyperbole.

If it's courageous to bow out, is it cowardly to soldier on?