, might depend on what's meant by subjective/objective.
If subjective means
ad hoc fiat, discretionary opinion, random, then morals don't seem subjective.
On the other hand, with
• subjective: existentially mind-dependent
• objective: existentially independent
consider some analogies:
1. some are loved, some are hated, many have known love, many have known hate
2. after an extinction, love and hate could be rediscovered
3. so, love and hate are existentially
independent of any one person
Further:
4. love and hate are phenomenological experiences, qualia or whatever
5. phenomenological experiences are existentially mind-dependent
6. so, love and hate themselves are
subjective
The likes of love and hate can be parts of us, but not of rocks.
They're ontological constituents of us when occurring, and can also be wholly absent (e.g. pre-life, extinct) and come about again (e.g. rediscovered recurrence), without themselves existing independently.
Asserting otherwise might be charged with externalizing hypostatization or the like.
Seems (to me at least) that the objective versus subjective dichotomy is misleading here.
There are many two-legged individuals, they all have that in common, fairly simple
information, two legs.
Yet, we don't therefore conclude that "two-legged-ness"
itself somehow exists independently.
Commonality does not entail independence.
Likewise for morals and autonomous moral agency.