There is nothing natural in quantum. — Rich

Natural is science's escape word when it can't explain something. — Rich

What are you trying to convey? Quantumatics isn't science? :o

SP says that for an object in a void there is no true statement about its motion. Period. — Mongrel

Isn't that Galilean invariance? (SP = special relativity?)
There are a few things, like the equivalence principle and constant light speed, playing roles in relativity.

There is nothing natural in quantum. — Rich

Huh? The microworld is unnatural or something? :o

Seven wonders of the quantum world (Michael Brooks, New Scientist) — jorndoe

I don't get it. Why postulate that such idealism is popular/prevalent/undeniable among academics, when that's just not the case?

Source: https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl
^{(Here skepticism should perhaps be read as parsimonious skepticism, albeit not radical.)}

In an ontological sense, such idealism will have it that the Moon is not actually the Moon, but rather is Moon-experiences. There may be all kinds of chatter about the Moon as if it's real, but, on idealism, I'm led to understand that experiencing the Moon cannot be separated from the experiencer (even in principle), such chatting is like a kind of pretense (maybe even hypostatization), or just linguistic practice perhaps. So there's no mind-independent Moon as such, it's dissipated according to this inquiry, rather it's relata among the experience (e.g. qualia, phenomenological) and the experiencer (the self). All I (the self) can ever know is the experience, and so that's where the road ends, more or less literally. The Moon = those Moon-experiences.

It's been discussed plenty, and remains sort of strangely artificial. OK, maybe "artificial" isn't the right word, but you catch my drift. Sure is self-elevating. I'm not omniscient, since otherwise I'd know that I were. I don't have to experience someone else's self-awareness to take it's independent existence for granted; I don't have to become the Moon to take it's independent existence for granted; I learn of both much the same way, by interaction, observation, whatever.

I'm aware of Hameroff's Orch-OR. Wave-function collapse does not take consciousness. But of course mind is also part of the world per se, whatever exactly it all may be. As mentioned, hijacking quantumatics for idealism is not philosophy, neither scientific.


Is “information is physical” contentful? (Scott Aaronson, Jul 2017)
Seven wonders of the quantum world (Michael Brooks, New Scientist)

@Rich, are you conflating the theory itself and what it describes (it seems you were conflating epistemology and ontology earlier)?
The statement you quoted is referring to the latter.

Have you discovered a derivation of qualia from quantum mechanics? — jorndoe

@Rich, hijacking quantumatics for idealism isn't philosophy, it's common in New Age woo though.
Have you discovered a derivation of qualia from quantum mechanics? (I suppose that would be something.)
The observer effect illustrates a difference between causation and interaction.
I haven't come across anything in quantum mechanics that necessitates what we think of a minds, nor derive minds, nor is incompatible with minds; maybe you've come across something otherwise?

You Aren't Living in a Hologram, Even if You Wish You Were (Ryan F Mandelbaum, Gizmodo, Jan 2017)

I incidentally came across this illustration the other day:



Outsider test (Iron Chariots Wiki article)
Ignosticism (Wikipedia article)

@Joseph, @fishfry, technically these are well-formed propositions with mixed quantifications:

• ∀x∈S ∃y∈S φ(x,y)
• ∃x∈S ∀y∈S φ(x,y)

I'm not sure anyone wrote up a concise grammar for their syntax in general, but that'd be interesting to take a look at (feel free to point me in their direction if you know any).

In computing there are analogies to be found in comprehensions.

[...] if it's problematic, it's logic that has a problem, not existence. If existence declares that particles are waves or whatever quantum weirdness you care to mention, logic will just have get it's act together about it. — unenlightened

Yep.

Apologies @unenlightened, skim-reading is poor reading, my bad. The two propositions, "existence is not a predicate" and ∃x∈S [ φx ], are sufficiently different that I couldn't formulate the former as an example of the latter.

• ∃ ∉ Φ, where Φ is all φs (no unrestricted comprehension please)

Is "to be a predicate" a predicate? I suppose so, but haven't figured out whether that's problematic.

why should we care about answering this question? — Agustino

Philosophy and forums? In my own case, also looking for (in)consistencies among different things, e.g. ∃ and quiddity (old post).

Well, what does it mean to exist? — Michael

In this case, any such meanings (including hypothetical) already exemplifies existence. Seems in some ways, existence is auto-presupposed.


Anyway, using existence as a predicate can sometimes lead to nonsense, and other times make sense. So, ∃ is not just another φ, except sometimes it is?

@TheMadFool, how to demarcate fictional and real entities?
If you suppose that a fictional entity exists, then what would it take for it to be real?
It seems like fictional (not real) entities exist as their hypotheses (or definitions) alone.

@unenlightened, according to those pesky objectivists "existence exists", though I think Russell argued otherwise.
Does existence then not exist...? Maybe we should have a poll on that one as well.
How about this one? "There exists an apple in the bowl of apples, so that apple does not exist." :)

There are cases where "existence is a predicate" comes through as nonsense, which makes me think that (generally) "existence is not a predicate".
As far as I can tell, there isn't anything further that "to exist" can reduce to; existence is ground if you will.

Another angle:
We commonly characterize things by predication, quiddity — what those things are.
These are different propositions from merely existing though — that something exists.

By the way, is the King of France bald or not?
Russell and Whitehead:

It is hard to filter through all of that, and to ascertain any religious influence that would enable people to become susceptible in believing either for or against such as whether it is apocalyptic in nature or whether it is simply impossible unless deterministically willed otherwise is really hard to tell. I would assume that the large masses of religiously devout who also tend to have conservative leanings fall into a trap of climate change denial because of the political rather than the religious. — TimeLine

Yep.

Though, one of the reasons for posting the poll was that a climate-change-denier elsewhere wrote (paraphrased) "God is in control", "There's nothing we can do", and some others seemingly agreed.
Made me think if such sentiments can have unfortunate consequences, hence the bottom part of the opening post (education, informing).

, yeah, effective regulation is a problem.
That said, you'd hope the ethics is informed by the science, and the politics informed by both.
Worst case could resort to sanctions I suppose, it's been done before anyway albeit with mixed success.


Free-rider problem (Wikipedia article)
Tragedy of the commons (Wikipedia article)

, dang, got me. :)

(Let me just add, Danish cities don't have anything on Amsterdam when it comes to bicycle-rule.)

Oh, sorry, I didn't mean "parallel universes" necessarily like modal realism (possible worlds), many worlds (quantum mechanics), multiverse (e.g. ensemble, M-theory, brane collisions), or whatever.
Just "other realities" that are temporal, as per the previous posts.


_{Principle of charity (Wikipedia article)}

, the plot thickens. :)
Souls are then defined as parts of us living in parallel universes?
But why, what's all this stuff for, what's it supposed to account for...?
And how would we differentiate it all from fiction?

A field is a concept based in spacetime. The fact that the position of the particle cannot be determined through the use of the field indicates that there is activity outside of the field (not covered by the field), and quite likely outside of spacetime. — Metaphysician Undercover

An activity outside of spacetime? Activities take time.
Not exactly parsimonious to come up with a parallel universe of sorts. :)

I cannot discuss you without utilizing my perceptions of you. — Rich

Right. What other than perception would you suggest?

It's impossible to discuss the moon without discussing both our perception and the linguistic dynamics of our perceptions and representation of the moon. There may be an object preceding those things, but it's impossible for us to access that except through our perception and language, which are greatly linked. — Thanatos Sand

Let me try to misquote you for the occasion:

It's impossible to discuss jorndoe without discussing both Thanatos Sand's perception and the linguistic dynamics of Thanatos Sand's perceptions and representation of jorndoe. There may be a jorndoe preceding those things, but it's impossible for Thanatos Sand to access that except through Thanatos Sand's perception and language, which are greatly linked.

If anything significant differentiates fictions/fantasies/hallucinations/dreams (which do exist) and perception, then it must be the perceived (the Moon, jorndoe).
Hopefully you wouldn't (rudely) suggest that I'm not self-aware because you cannot experience my self-awareness? :)

Seems like we could discuss ...

• the Moon
• perception of the Moon
• linguistic practices of Moon discussion

They're not the same, so shouldn't we keep them as such?

Thanks for further showing that "round" is just a linguistic concept dependent on other equally non-materially based linguistic concepts as itself. So, use whatever words you want when you chat about the moon. All you'll be doing is using words, not accurately describing the moon itself. — Thanatos Sand

Are you claiming that language is only ever about language? Or about concepts? :o
That doesn't seem right.

All you have done is describe the moon after observation.

Now, describe it before observation. — Rich

Huh?
Maybe I should ask you to describe my colleague.
If you're conflating ontology and epistemology, then you'll conclude there's no such colleague.
And maybe there isn't for all you know.

Thanks for further showing that "round" is just a linguistic concept dependent on other equally non-materially based linguistic concepts as itself. So, use whatever words you want when you chat about the moon. All you'll be doing is using words, not accurately describing the moon itself. — Thanatos Sand

Well I'm not trying to be exhaustively accurate with error-free certainty, just chatting about the Moon.
If you'd written "the Moon is a regular tetrahedron", then you might need new glasses or a new encyclopedia or something. :)
As mentioned, I'm not chatting about English, but about the Moon.
Not about the word "Moon" either, but about the Moon.

As an aside, I just noticed the Wikipedia page has a list of characteristics, mean/equatorial/polar radius, flattening, circumference, surface area, volume, ...
I guess you could register and fix the page?

All we know is that the moon is quanta which is essentially nothing. Anything you observe in your life is necessarily the result of the interaction between you, the observer, and the observed quanta. This is absolutely fundamental without any wiggle room. — Rich

Allow me to misquote you:

All jorndoe knows is that Rich is quanta which is essentially nothing. Anything jorndoe observes in jorndoe's life is necessarily the result of the interaction between jorndoe, and the observed quanta. This is absolutely fundamental without any wiggle room.

Solipsism.

"There is no Moon"? :)

, you introduced "smooth-edged orb"; "a spheroid within some margin of variation" is a bit better.
Not that it matters much, though.
Would you prefer using other words when we chat about the Moon?

And since the moon isn't a smooth-edged orb, it's not actually "round." — Thanatos Sand

The shape of the Moon is largely a result of gravity and composition and whatever, a spheroid within some margin of variation, round. — jorndoe

Emphasis added.
In this context, the term round is how we already characterize the Moon, along with whatever other things.
It's not a definition of the Moon's shape (we don't define things into existence), it's observation.
In case I'd written "the Earth is flat", I'd be wrong. Not so with "the Moon is round".

I'm not referring to our concepts or words, but the shape of the Moon.
Feel free to chat about the former; meanwhile I'll chat about the Moon. :)

Here "round" doesn't mean

$(x - x_0)^2 + (y - y_0)^2 + (z - z_0)^2 = r^2$

The shape of the Moon is largely a result of gravity and composition and whatever, a spheroid within some margin of variation, round.
It had that shape long before homo sapiens walked the Earth.

Depends?

If I observe "I'm in a great mood", then that fact is observer-dependent.
If I observe "The Moon is round", then that fact is independent of me observing it.

An observation may be observer-dependent, the observed may not be.

? — Thorongil

Just uhh surprised I guess. Don't throw yourself off a tall building ya' hear.

:o

Doesn't logic tend to start with self-identity (the 1st law)?

Something like ...
x = x (ontological, anything that exists is itself and nothing else)
p ⇔ p (propositional, statements (not baby-talk) are themselves)

Anyway, attempting to abandon identity (and individuation for that matter) seems to void all our talk, thinking, making sense of things, etc, sort of like a kind of intellectual mental suicide (figuratively).
Maybe identity is auto-presupposed.

Without the hope of salvation, which religion provides, life is demonstrably not worth living. Your typical atheist, like Dawkins, seems to realize this on some level, but the fact is clearly too much for him to bear, as shown above. — Thorongil

... strikes me as a textbook example of wishful thinking, appeal to consequence.
Do you think an emotional existential crisis somehow makes this yearning true...?

I'm not sure what "religious salvation" is exactly (though "salvation" often is preached by Christians), and how it supposedly satisfies your yearnings, but feel free to explicate.
Some sort of predetermined purpose (or predestination perhaps) bestowed upon you by something else?

It seems odd to claim that these atheists you refer to do not enjoy living.
Feel free to demonstrate that "life is demonstrably not worth living" unless your yearnings are the case.
Perhaps Dawkins agrees that it'd be nifty to get together with his grand/parents and other loved ones again, in some sort of afterlife, but admits that doesn't make it so?
(I haven't read much of his stuff, so I don't know.)

In The Illusion of God's Presence: The Biological Origins of Spiritual Longing (Jan 2016), John C Wathey discusses what he dubs an "innate model of the mother", which seems to shed some light at least on some psychological phenomena related to emotional existential crises.
Whether there's something to it or not, who knows, but it's not wishful thinking nor appeal to consequence fallacies.

Existence is all over the place? By what particular definition? — Michael Ossipoff

Not by definition.
You exist, I exist, my coffee cup exists ☕, heck even my dreams exist, you're walking on it, your walking exists (when occurring), ...
Darn unavoidable!

Definitions can be helpful for expressing what we mean when we say something. — Michael Ossipoff

Yes.

By the way, I’d like to add that, so far as I’m aware of, the words “Real”, and “Exist” aren’t metaphysically-defined. Better to not use them. Of, if I use them, it’s with the understanding that they don’t say anything definite or meaningful. You can define them as you like, and people do. — Michael Ossipoff

If they want to define existence in terms of something else, then that something else cannot exist.
But it's rather trivial to exemplify, can't miss it, it's all over the place. ;)
It's one of those things, like truth perhaps, where you strand on rock bottom as it were.
I've become a bit wary of (always) demanding definitions; doing so may also be susceptible to a regress anyway.
Conversely, if we were to exemplify something that does not exist, it could only be by non-referring definitions or nonsense, something like that.
Incidentally, in some older thread, I tried to sort of assert "real on top of existence" as per:
• x is real ⇔ x exists irrespective of anyone's definitions
Not sure it's any good though (maybe some day).

A related inquiry:

Suppose in a few centuries no living person has ever encountered the Harry Potter stories. It's a thought experiment. All that remains of them is a dusty box with the (by then) old books, hidden away somewhere, all else long since having been recycled.
Can it then be said that Harry Potter still exists (as a fictional narrative), perhaps as a kind of extended memory found in that dusty box?
Or, can Harry Potter only "come back to life", as it were, once someone has read the old books?
Can one speak of any ontological status worth mentioning?

It is said that Zeno devised 40 thought experiments, paradoxes, though only 9 are known, and only second-hand. We might suppose they could still be uncovered in ancient texts of course, perhaps even Zeno's own words, however unlikely it seems by now.
What might be the ontological status of these alleged 31 thought experiments supposedly devised by Zeno?
After all, I just referred to them, hypothetically at least.

But fictions, fantasies, hallucinations, dreams and such do exist.

Yet, if anything significant differentiates fictions/fantasies/hallucinations/dreams and perception, then it must be the perceived.

We sometimes come up with fictions and share them among us, which language and whatnot are sufficiently flexible to do.

Such fictions, fantasies, hallucinations and dreams are still confined to us, though, and could perhaps be contrasted with "real" things, depending on how we use the term "real".

@Wayfarer might have a dream in which he slapped Donald Trump, though (unfortunately perhaps) the real Trump never felt a thing. :)

At the first go I got Epicureanism, and Humanism on the second.

Wait, @Bitter Crank, except according to some theologians, their deity can do the impossible, creatio ex nihilo.
So much for the old metaphysical thesis, nihil fit ex nihilo, I guess.
It may be sort of wrong anyway, after a fashion, e.g. the zero-energy universe, expansion of the universe.

:D

1. No, "nothing" is the missing complement of everything.
2. No, of course not.

if it be nothing, I shall not need spectacles — Gloucester

_{Nothing (Wikipedia)
Nothingness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)}

Suppose there is absolutely nothing. How could something come into existence? — Metaphysician Undercover

I guess, in that case there couldn't have been anything preventing it either?