I am reporting back with the findings :D It's not that I can't believe the pink elephants - it's that I don't want to believe it, and I can't make myself want to believe it. — Agustino

Excellent, thanks. :D

We need more samples for the experiment.

I found that honest belief in the elephants didn't come about as a matter of exercising "free will", sort of justifying that sometimes at least "seeing is believing".
On the other hand, I also believe there's snow on the peak of Mount Everest, and that there are exoplanets, though less "seeing", and more thinking, is involved.

"There was a pink elephant on the street"; SP. Kiwiyum; 1m:58s youtube; Jul 2012

It seems if the cosmological argument proves the universe to be contingent it necessarily implies there's something beyond the universe. — Marty

I thought the task was to show a (unique) first cause, like Craig, and then (perhaps) that the first cause is necessary?

can you give me examples of where propositions are fuzzy and ambiguous? — Marty

The principle of sufficient reason is just not unconditional. As per earlier posts, you can find examples to which the principle does not apply, so you have to rule those out before applying it.

• the principle of sufficient reason cannot apply to existence ("everything") without circularity, since otherwise the deduced reason would then not exist, which is contradictory
• 2+2=4 may be another example, as suggested by @Wayfarer, which converges on the strange Platonic realm of old
• thus, before applying the principle to some x, you must ensure x is not one such example (this is usually simple enough, or reasonable, for ordinary everyday trivialities)
• unconditional application can be misapplication, and has a logical structure of "everything and then some", which violates the first law, the law of identity
• if the whole universe is everything, then the principle cannot apply to the universe
• you must first show that the whole universe is not everything, or, more accurately, that the principle applies to the whole universe

@Wayfarer

Neither modal realism (Lewis) nor the many-worlds hypothesis (Everett) are particularly necessary, and remain more controversial than "problems". They're just speculation, pending research, until they can be verified/falsified. You could perhaps add M-theory, except a good lot of theoretical research has been put into this one.

Yeah, fine-tuning works best without modal realism and many-worlds, so maybe there's an odd sort of competition going on? Which do you think has the best chance of becoming verified/falsified (or scientific) anyway...?

Here's more theorizing, but at least it's not magical thinking:

• Every black hole contains a new universe: A physicist presents a solution to present-day cosmic mysteries; Nikodem Poplawski; May 2012
• No Big Bang? Quantum equation predicts universe has no beginning; Ahmed Farag Ali and Saurya Das, via Lisa Zyga; Feb 2015

Still a side-track from the opening post. Kick off a new thread?

(Y)

(quick comment, while on the move)

@Metaphysician Undercover, spatiality and objects are related much like temporality and processes, and they're all aspects of the universe.
At least when going by common ontological terminology.

It's not about chemistry, it's about what makes chemistry possible. — Wayfarer

I think the takeaway from the article, in this context, is that some chemistries (or whatever else we find in nature) cannot evolve life as we know it, and others can (of which the chemistry we know is just one).

And so, lifeforms like us could not evolve in any of the former, but could evolve in any of the latter, to subsequently wonder about "fine-tuning", which puts fine-tuning into perspective.

I think the argument is: the PSR is either false or true (LEM). — Marty

In that sense, it would then be false, as exemplified prior.

• the principle of sufficient reason cannot apply to existence (everything) without circularity, since otherwise the deduced reason would automatically not exist — which is contradictory

@Wayfarer seems to argue the same with 2+2=4.
A logical structure of "everything and then some" violates the first law, the law of identity.
That said, the principle does make sense, it's just not unconditional, and demarcation of applicability matters as well.
Rather, assuming the principle is easily justified inductively/abductively.

• therefore, applying the principle to the whole universe, automatically/implicitly presumes something "extra universal", that existence and the whole universe are different — which is petitio principii

As another member once expressed it:

the cosmological argument is an invalid a posteriori inductive argument because experience does not justify extrapolating from experience to "beyond" — 180 Proof

One has to appeal to the heart and to the will - not to the mind and the intellect — Agustino

In general, formation of beliefs can be fairly complex.
And not a mere matter of exercising (free) will, though sometimes exercising intellect will make a difference.
(Just try believing there are pink elephants on your lawn for five minutes sharp, and report back with findings.)

We just watched "Holy Hell" (2016) on CNN the other day.
A documentary exemplifying psychology and sociology involved in formation of beliefs, (induced) epic experiences, (emotional) needs and wants, belonging, ...
Worth watching, and giving some consideration, whenever you think of how people come to beliefs and hang onto them (perhaps how Jesus or Muhammad or someone else could have gained followers).

The principle of sufficient reason cannot apply to existence (everything) without circularity, since otherwise the deduced reason would automatically not exist — which is contradictory.

Therefore, applying the principle to the whole universe, automatically/implicitly assumes something "extra universal" — which just is a subtle form of begging the question.

This would be God, as a perfect being is a necessary being. — Marty

The subjunctive modalities, and Anselm's ontological argument, are separate arguments.
Stitching them all together may not be trivial.

I suppose you could show existential justification by existence and uniqueness:

1. characterize whatever is claimed so there's something to go by (thereby answering ignosticism)
2. existence: show the evidence thereof
3. uniqueness: show that it's not evidence of something else

If you define God as something necessary, then you might just end up with the usual (archaic) Platonic realm.
For that matter, you may end up with that just from defining God as somehow "atemporal", surely not something living, or thinking, or whatever the usual God of theism is.
Craig has a different goal with his argument, though (as mentioned earlier in the thread) the kalam/cosmological argument clearly fails (at least) on uniqueness.

if there was a definite earliest time (or "time zero"), then anything that existed at that time, began to exist at that time, and that includes any first causes, gods/God, or whatever else — jorndoe

The first cause doesn't have to be temporal. It's an instantaneous cause. — Marty

I'm not sure that makes sense...
The terms "instantaneous" and "cause" are already temporal, and "before time" is incoherent.
So, if said "first cause" did not begin at the definite earliest time, then what?
You could redefine "cause", but that would most likely be special pleading for the occasion.

As an aside, the kalam/cosmological argument is sort of common out there.
I know a reasonably intelligent, mild mannered theist, that would vote "Yes" in the poll.
Maybe I'll invite him over; he's a good guy, though of course he's wrong, and I'm right. ;)

Right @Michael, only 1-3 is deductive (a syllogism), whereas 4 is Craig's eventual conclusion/goal.
Don't think he's going for an ordinary, natural, plain explanation. :)
By the way, that was why I included the Aquinas reference @Marty, which was just intended as a more historical, sociological example of tradition, if you will.
To some, if you say "first cause", then they automatically think "God" — a sentiment successfully promoted by Aquinas it would seem — though 4 does not follow from 1-3.

It seems to me that the fine-tuning arguments tend to exemplify the diallelus.
Can there be answers that do not admit further questions, even in principle?
Doesn't really seem like it, in which case we may just find ourselves on some indefinite path of inquiry.
Except the religious variety terminates such inquiry (seemingly artificially) with a specific answer, as expressed by Swinburne (the British theologian):

If God is defined as 'explaining everything else,' then God wouldn't be God if there were an explanation of his existence. God to be God is 'the ultimate truth.' That's just how it is. We can't go further than that. — Richard Swinburne

Go ahead and try to exhaustively explain why π — defined as a circle's circumference divided by its diameter, in the Euclidean plane — is not 3. Or whatever else you might fancy.

Anyway, this is a sidetrack.

@andrewk, right, in practical terms, the opening argument serves mostly as confirmation bias.

The internet is too big and people are too ridiculous to be able to operate without blinkers and get even part way round the course. — unenlightened

8-)

@Wayfarer

The fine-tuning argument is different, though it might presuppose some kalam/cosmological argument.
But, as best I can tell, these apologist arguments have to work in tandem to go anywhere at all, if that was your point.

Quoting "Sorry, the universe wasn't made for you" (Sep 2016):

This study is hence another demonstration that a chemistry complex enough to support life can arise under circumstances that are not anything like the ones we experience today. — Sabine Hossenfelder

There may be an element of incredulity in thinking that, what we know of as life (and what we think of as complex), is somehow "ultimate" of what can come about naturally.

feminist — Bitter Crank

Can't help but think you're on to something.

There were, and are, examples of discrimination.

However, the heavily intellectualizing, reality-removed feminist philosophy you sometimes see these days, seems a world apart from issues that some face daily.
Who cares about all that abstract arguing, when there are real-life problems to do away with?
It's instead become an intellectual sport, sort of a new, ideational, detached battle of wits, using fancy words, ready to get picked up by edgelords.
(I've encountered such real-life discrimination personally, by the way.)

I'm sympathetic with the ignorant and deluded, in so far as the tons of good, solid, reliable, useful information are not always accessible and actionable; are not always readable (too complicated); and aren't always practical. — Bitter Crank

Right, there is a point to be made I suppose.

Also, as far as I'm concerned, the medical consensus isn't really replaceable, but can (at most) be supplemented, by whichever alternatives people may find comforting.

To even ask the question is already to give too much credit to the anti-vaxxer wingnuts. — Thorongil

:D Had to try being impartial. Not all that successful.
I suppose there is the political question, like enforcing vaccination?

In my virtual travels, I've come across a few varieties of views/arguments.

Some appear to be motivated by a general distrust, an anti-establishment sentiment.
Those folk seek to subvert any perceived authority, and medical science then gets in the way (usually via the political aspect).
Many assorted assertions can be found here, including that medical schools (like Oxford, Harvard and Karolinska) are lying, "Big Pharma" lies, the government lies, and family physicians withhold truth of the matter (perhaps due to peer pressure or pride).
There are other, parallel movements.

Some hold that "parents know best", and if they associate health problems of their children with vaccination, then medicine is to blame.
Jenny McCarthy comes to mind.

Others generalize from events that suggest a conspiracy may have taken place.
Allegedly the CDC in the US has swept some evidence under the rug, that might suggest vaccination could cause autism.
Collecting examples of malpractice, errors and wrong doing, seems to have become a hobby here, for better or worse.

It's worth noting that it's not terribly hard to find trained scientists that has jumped on the anti-vaxxer bandwagon.


<sub>15 Myths About Anti-Vaxxers, Debunked (Tara Haelle, Forbes, 2015)

No MMR-Autism Link in Large Study of Vaccinated vs. Unvaccinated Kids (Autism Speaks, referring to The American Medical Association, 2015)
Vaccines and Autism: A Tale of Shifting Hypotheses (Clinical Infectious Diseases, Oxford University Press, 2009)
Vaccines and Autism - A Deadly Manufactroversy (Harriet Hall, 2009)
Why Does the Vaccine/Autism Controversy Live On? (Chris Mooney, Discover Magazine, 2009)
The Autism-Vaccine Myth (Emily Willingham and Laura Helft, PBS)
A Wild-Polio Outbreak in Nigeria (Robinson Meyer, The Atlantic, 2016)

Meet The Children (Barbara Loe Fisher, VaxTruth, 1996)
Immunization Ploys (Neil Z Miller, 1995)
How Big Pharma Dupes Medical Journals (Antony Barnett, Guardian, 2003)
March 2015 Settlements in Vaccine Court: 117 Vaccine Injuries and Deaths (Brian Shilhavy, Health Impact News, 2015)
The US Government Has Paid out $3 Billion to Vaccine-Injured Americans Since 1989 (Lily Dane, The Daily Sheeple, 2015)
Vaccination: The Hidden Facts; Chapter 11 (Ian Sinclair, 1992)
Doctors speak out: Vaccines don't work, but do cause brain damage and death
Vaccines: U.S. Centers for Disease Control Manipulated Data, Covered-Up Higher Incidence of Autism in African American Boys (Global Research (referring to Focus for Health), 2014)
Vaccination Statistics (Mercola)</sub>

:D Isn't Cantor's night shelter just one infinitely large, continuous room? With regularly spaced signs giving directions? Never visited, but fortunately, no matter where you are, you're always still a finite distance from the main exit.

But in reality infinity is not infinite, but it has an END. — Apple

No, there's no last room, only a first room.
Rather, what's finite, is the distance from any given room to the lobby, or to any other given room.
What's infinite is the number of rooms - like a quantity that's not a number.
I don't think the thought experiment can derive a contradiction.

"Plenty of room at the Hotel California", but unlike Hotel California, you can actually leave Hilbert's Hotel.

Hi mcdoodle (apologies for my absence).

Yes, you're right, my rendition definitely tend towards realism of some sort (perhaps physicalism).
There may be other renditions.
It was mostly a matter of contextualizing Chalmers' hard problem and solipsism, or that's how it ended up anyway, with the basic explanatory assumption being onto/logical identity.

Typed the musings in over on wordpress, with a bit more detail:

https://aniarasite.wordpress.com/yet-another-mind-body-hypothesis/

Comments welcome of course.

Assume I've gotten myself a headache; I'm sure most can relate, unfortunately.
No aspirin at hand. Instead I go scan myself, fMRI or whatever the latest may be, doesn't really matter.
I now have two different angles, the experience of the ache, and a visual overview of my gray matter (need not be visual alone).
I'd say only the angles differ, in an ontological sense, so what makes them different?
(Does anyone really doubt that feeling hungry means the body needs replenishment?)

Someone elsewhere asked (not my quote):

Does a neurophilosopher who performs an awake surgery on his own brain to investigate the body-mind problem carry out a thought experiment or scientific research?

Understanding the scan, in this context, would converge on understanding the headache; a straight identity may not be readily available (or deducible).
The headache itself is part of my self-experience, or, put simpler, just part of myself — bound by (ontological) self-identity, like self-reference, regardless of any scans or whatever else.
Others cannot have my headaches, but others can check out the scans.

Hey mcdoodle, thanks for the comments.

The mentioned "boundary" (in lack of a better word), is inherited more or less directly from solipsism and Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness. (It's not so much a brick wall everyone carries around.) :)
A focus on one's own mind is self-reference, and thus "bound" by self-identity.
But then (a bit unexpectedly) it seemed that such "bounds" appeared in a few places.
This angle does not "solve" these things as such, but just contextualizes them in a kind of basic way.

In this particular context, a notion of personal identity only goes as far as mind and body.
(Personality is something else, like psychology, traits and behaviors and such.)

Hmm.. Your examples (doctor, wife) may actually exemplify the idea, need more morning coffee to tell.
By the way, I typed the stuff into a wiki page elsewhere; may be formulated/organized better there; sending you the link.

Leap to Hypothesis

Central to these musings is identity, be it as reasoning (logical), or worldly structure (ontological).

The hypothesis can now be expressed, in brief, as: what separates introversal and extroversal is simply onto/logical identity.

• We're subject to a dichotomizing boundary condition, as a result of identity.
• A number of recurring dichotomies are partitioned by similar boundaries, where the halves of each dichotomy does not entail the other.
• Along with solipsism, the mind-body problem expresses an aspect of said boundary.

Anything essentially self-referential, remain introversially stuck. And, like indexical information cannot be derived from non-indexical information, the extroversial does not imply the introversial. Where introversial identity (post 5 above) is phenomenological alone, extroversial non-identity (post 5 above) is also empirical.

As per Freud and Wittgenstein above, I surmise one of the ways these conundrums have come up, in philosophy, originally, is the difficulty in grasping how something like one's own 1st person experiences could come about, from the world of 3rd person perspective things. That is, how on Earth can the more introspective world of experiences, thoughts, qualia, etc, come about from the extrospective spatiotemporal world of objects, processes, etc? Limitations of introspection compound the difficulty.

If the hypothesis holds (that the "disconnect" or boundary is due to basic identity), then we may have to contend with our predicament.
Incidentally, this emphasizes a need for strong epistemic standards, i.e. justification.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness

The Chalmers style mind-body problem derives from a dichotomy:

• the format of 1st person phenomenological experiences, qualia (introversal)
• the 2nd/3rd person world of objects, processes, bodies, brains, etc (extroversal)

And the apparent intractability:

• 1st person experiences do not derive others' self-awarenesses and such, and are thus incomplete — solipsism
• physicalism (or whatever) does not derive qualia, and is thus considered incomplete — the hard problem of consciousness

From mind to body:

the leap from the mental process to a somatic innervation — hysterical conversion — which can never be fully comprehensible to us — Sigmund Freud (Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis)

the puzzling leap from the mental to the physical — Sigmund Freud (Introduction to Psychoanalysis)

From body to mind:

412. The feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and brain-process: how does it come about that this does not come into the consideration of our ordinary life? This idea of a difference in kind is accompanied by slight giddiness — which occurs when we are performing a piece of logical slight-of-hand. (The same giddiness attacks us when we think of certain theorems in set theory.) When does this feeling occur in the present case? It is when I, for example, turn my attention in a particular way on to my own consciousness, and, astonished, say to myself: THIS is supposed to be produced by a process in the brain! — as it were clutching my forehead. — Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, Part I)

So we have a context where solipsism and the hard problem of consciousness comprise yet another dichotomy.

More on those pesky dichotomies and dualities and what-not

At a glance, it seems there are a few somewhat related dichotomies, that crop up in various contexts.
In terms of solipsism, or parsimonious skepticism, a similar dichotomy could perhaps be expressed as existential certainty versus uncertainty.



Substance dualism is out, rather identity itself creates a different sort of apparent dualism.
The Cartesian cut — res cogitans (thinking substance, mental) versus res extensa (extended substance, material) — is an expression of a duality like the dichotomy above.
By substance, Descartes meant an ontologically independent, real thing.
In the context here, res cogitans is instead subject to an inwards self-blindness (possibly tending towards "soul" ideation or mysticism), and the identity boundary outwards.
This account is thus is compatible with monism of some sort, and there isn't anything in particular preventing an "artificial" organism from experiencing the world akin to us.

Okiedokie, let me resume a bit with this stuff; first a summary of identity, because the dichotomy already shows up here.


There are two important senses of identity — ontological and logical — encompassed by this 1st of the 3 classic laws of thought.

Ontological identity simply states that anything that exists is self-identical. This is both self-evident and intuitive, allowing us to talk about and differentiate things, and usually taken to be fundamental.

Logical identity is technically a formalized axiom, a rule that pertains to propositions and reasoning (tautology, x=x, p⇔p), and can be a more linguistic expression of ontological identity. The excluded middle (the 3rd law), along with its complement, non-contradiction (the 2nd law), are correlates of identity. Because identity intellectually partitions the world into exactly two parts, like "self" and "other", it creates a dichotomy wherein the two parts are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Non-contradiction is merely an expression of the mutually exclusive aspect of that dichotomy, and the excluded middle is an expression of its jointly exhaustive aspect.

The two senses of identity are intimately related, and somewhat interchangeable depending on context.

Whatever is, is. — Bertrand Russell (The Problems of Philosophy, Chapter VII)

Michael, so this snippet is the wrong part (or translated incorrectly to the logic stuff)?

I, for one, can safely say that I don't know if I'm omniscient or not, as a matter of certainty I mean. — jorndoe

Isn't this taking the metaphysical concept of omniscience and treating it as a logical concept? A category error. — Cavacava

This seems to be a well formed proposition, yes?

ω = I'm omniscient — jorndoe

For some proposition, p, using standard notation
Kp = I know that p (is true)

And let's define the following proposition
ω = I'm omniscient

Then, by definition of omniscience, we must have that
ω ⇒ Kω
and by contraposition
¬Kω ⇒ ¬ω

I can safely say that I don't know if I'm omniscient or not, I don't know either way
¬Kω ∧ ¬K¬ω
so, both of these hold
¬Kω
¬K¬ω

From not knowing, i.e.
¬Kω
I find that I'm not omniscient
¬ω
which I then know, since I deduced it, i.e.
K¬ω
but this is contrary to ¬K¬ω above, thus a contradiction

The standardized test

I think it might be worthwhile extending "emotive" with semi/intuitive as well.

On my part, disbelief in the claims of a God of theism does not really hinge on any one specific argument, though such arguments are cumulative. Some knowledge of history also plays a part, like how insights and claims have advanced over time.

For the most part, theist/scriptural claims are introduced at some young age, be it by peer pressure, parental indoctrination (even instilling desire and hope for eternal bliss and fear of eternal punishment in some cases), implicit social and cultural expectations, or (preferably) information presented in a less biased fashion.

When it comes to scriptures, I find every reason to not take them as authoritative in any significant sense.

If I were to speculate, say, with respect to reincarnation and heaven/hell, then I simply find more mystery without any good reasoning. A more "neutral" scenario would be one where an "afterlife" would present new opportunities (e.g. to learn), as opposed to being beamed up to "everlasting bliss" or tossed down into "the grand barbecue roasting forevermore" (as taught by Christians and Muslims).

Live a good life. If there are gods and they are just, then they will not care how devout you have been, but will welcome you based on the virtues you have lived by. If there are gods, but unjust, then you should not want to worship them. If there are no gods, then you will be gone, but will have lived a noble life that will live on in the memories of your loved ones. — Unknown but sometimes attributed to Marcus Aurelius (121-180)

I decline wasting my life preparing for death. :)

Sad news.

To Mars Man:

Get well into 2016 everyone.
And remember to take care of yourselves and others.

(opens an Erdinger Weißbier)

Thanks for the comments.

I'm headed in a different direction. (Descartes was just an example.)

Identity can be the propositional tautology or ontological (whatever exists is self-identical).
The solipsism thing in the opening post exposes a dichotomy originating from identity, or at least that's the working hypothesis for investigation, supported by the opening post.
The overall idea is that identity also leads to other, somewhat similar dichotomies, with whatever boundaries.

Going by the opening post, 1st person experiences do not derive others' self-awarenesses, and are thus incomplete. Going by the hard problem of consciousness, physicalism (or whatever) does not derive qualia, and is thus considered incomplete.
If the hypothesis holds — that these various "disconnects" or boundaries are simply due to identity — then what of our predicament? Maybe the world is "dichotomized by identity" (not lobotomized, mind you :)), with these intrinsical boundaries?

Anyway, I'll try to give it some more thought, and post, when time permits.

(I've been tricked into North American spelling. Neighbour without the 'u'.) :)



Your impressions of your neighbor is, or is derived from, your experiences, yes?
Similar to your memories thereof.
None of which are your neighbor, though.

Note, hallucinations themselves do indeed exist.
What makes them hallucinations is just that they're not what they're taken to be.
So I think the categorization holds for phantom pain.
What makes pain "phantom", is confusing non-identity for identity.

Consider the following dichotomy, a common categorization of experiences:

• Non-identity: Say I have a chat my neighbor. My experiences of my neighbor ≠ my neighbor. (My better half may also experience the neighbor.)
• Identity: Say I have a headache. My experience of the ache = the ache. (My better half don't have my headache (I sure hope not anyway).)

By this categorization,

• hallucination is confusing non-identity for identity, and
• solipsism is confusing identity for non-identity.

Paraphrasing Searle, if anything significant differentiates perception and hallucination, then it must be the perceived.

As in the opening post, non/identity sets the stage for a dichotomizing boundary condition.

I think the issue gets too much attention, and it's because of a misreading of Descartes, or perhaps because of some lack in Descartes' development of the implications of the cogito. — Wayfarer

I agree, to an extent at least. It is, however, a philosophical problem, regardless of Descartes.
That said, I think there are some other conundrums that are somewhat related. I'll try to formulate something, if time permits.