how is this for a first principle of knowledge?

“when I am thinking, I know that I am thinking and not not thinking, and this is because, when I am not thinking, I still know, at least intuitively, that I possess the a priori potential to begin thinking; hence, I cannot deny the existence of thought without contradiction, and because that which thinks cannot possibly be non-existent, the fact that I think, and know that I think and have the potential to think, implies that I exist as a subject.”

I’d agree modal categories share the relationship of time with each other, but that’s the extent of my agreement so far. Mostly because I don’t consider the categories in accordance with your thesis. — Mww

for example, does the category of identity relate to the category of modality, that is to say, can something be is identical to itself and not possible, necessary, or contingent? absolute not, and further, can something be possible, necessary, or contingent without being self-identical, absolutely not. Hence, the categories of modality and identity are co-necessary.

What method? There may be an irreducible first principle employed by the method, but first principles do not describe the method that uses it. — Mww

It’s not an irreducible first principle, but an interconnected web of co-necessary first principles. the method is defined in relation to itself, in a circular fashion, but it isn’t fallacious because not all circular arguments are fallacious. The notion that they are is really just presupposed.

Precedence. As in ordered sequential priorities? So…Law of Ordered Sequential Priorities? Sounds an awful lot like plain ol’ cause and effect to me. Why isn’t it? — Mww

no. If x is contingent upon y (e.g. motion is contingent upon space), it doesn’t mean that y causes x, and this is because they could be mediated another entity z that causes.

is straight outta Aristotle, unequivocally applicable to objects whether in concerto or in abstractia — Mww

I’ve altered it to be defined in terms of time, that is, ontologically, and also in terms of the law of contradiction, rather than purely logically, that is, not defined in terms of time and ontological antitheses, so it’s not the same as Aristotle’s notion.

you had to reason to your first principle. — Mww

Yes. But there is no problem with this.

If it’s new, it shouldn’t have anything to compare with, insofar as the new cancels the established, or at the very least, makes it obsolete. — Mww

It’s just a new way of looking at things, and a way which guarantees certainty if used correctly. I think that the academics are going to ignore it because it’s “metaphysical,” and also written by a non-academic philosopher who writes under an alias (me). I am going to market the book to the general public and not the academic philosophers for this reason. eventually, the students are going to become better philosophers than their professors because they’ve read my book, and then the professors will have to acknowledge its existence. It’s going to create a second renaissance, I believe.

Does it escape Quine's deconstruction of that distinction in Two Dogmas? — creativesoul

Yes. His distinction is a categorical error.

In my parlance, and perhaps I should have made it explicit, the time I talk about is no more than the time I conceive as ground for something else also of mine that I can talk about. Hence, a mind considered as eternally existing is not a required antecedent for this conception of time. — Mww

I’m not entirely sure what this means exactly.

Perhaps in your parlance, time is being treated as a completely self-subsisting something-or-other, then the argument could be made that kind of time needs an eternally existing mind for its possibility. Dunno how an eternally existing anything can be shown beyond logical conditions. And logical conditions alone have no warrant for ontological existences. — Mww

in my philosophy, time is nothing but ‘the persistence in existence of that which exists.’ one could also call this “duration.” It is distinguished from relative time, which is defined in relation to the categories of space and motion. This is not the case for the category of duration (which I also call “absolute time,” for it pertains to that which exists outside of space, and is not contingent upon relative time.

In my philosophy, logical conditions are presupposed by ontological conditions and ontological conditions are presupposed by logical conditions. that is, the law of identity (for example) (X=X) is defined such that X represents a particular category, and that category is what it is and is not what it is not in each moment of time so long as it exists, meaning that that which exists is necessarily defined in relation to what it is not, and also, in relation to time because as a fundamental principle of ontology, nothing can exist that does not persist for a non-zero duration of time.

Ok, with qualifications, in that you assign categories differently than what I’m used to. Usually, the categories proper have no internal relation, at least to each other, which I take you to mean. — Mww

I think that the purely logical categories do share modal relationships with each other.

Anyway….this new philosophical method. How does it work? What’s the irreducible starting point? — Mww

the irreducible starting point is the first principle shown above in my original post. I call it the Law of Precedence. There are other variations of it that I have not yet divulged. I am very excited about it. I’m having my book edited right now.

That would be interesting. What does a propositional account of such axiom look like? In a tripartite logical human cognitive system, the categories are the mediator. Being pure conceptions themselves, it would seem self-destructive of the system for the pure mediator to be mediated. — Mww

my categories are not purely abstract, as is the case with Kant’s, but natural categories. My main categories of the mind are memory, understanding, and intentionality, not modality, quality, quantity, and relation. I think that Kant went too far in his deduction, and this is because there are no categories beyond’ the understanding that exist independently of the understanding.

I might caution, perhaps unnecessarily, that metaphysical reductionism can only go so far before it becomes logically absurd. — Mww

I am not sure what you mean by this, but I probably disagree with it and have a sound reason for doing so.

“but also by” negates “alone”. Minor self-contradiction, to be sure, but might warrant some re-consideration. — Mww

I went back and edited my comment shortly after posting, it is supposed to say “not” conditioned by time alone.

If you say intuition is conditioned by time alone, are you referring to the faculty of phenomenal representation in itself, without regard to sensibility? I ask because intuition of real physical objects by which our internal phenomena are possible, are also equally conditioned by space. — Mww

I would never claim that intuition is conditioned by time alone unless I’ve made a typo. Also, I would contend that the category of understanding can exist independently of the categories of sensation (touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing), and can prove rather easily using my method that this must be the case.

Time and intuition are co-necessary…..for what? For cognition in general, sure. Intuition, whether faculty or representation created by that faculty, without time is impossible for humans, but time is already given whether there be intuition or not. Your thesis should demonstrate how time is in fact a given, if it is, or, how the system would operate if it is not. — Mww

co-necessary for each other, and also, for memory, and also, intentionality. the totality of which formulate cognition (although, I would never use that word because it is too robotic and lifeless), or rather, as I like to call it “subjectivity.”

time is given whether or not there is intuition, if and only if the mind is not an eternally existing entity. I can show that the mind is eternally existing, and therefore that time and mind are eternally co-necessary for each other.

Finally….do you have a connection between the conception “memory” and the conception “consciousness”? — Mww

consciousness is an ambiguous term, hence the reason I don’t use it very often. but my conception is that consciousness pertains to the logical relationships between the categories of the mind and the categories of sensation (and also, the categories of perception), while subjectivity, or the mind in itself, pertains to the internal relationships between the categories of the mind considered in themselves (independently of the categories of sensation and perception).

I'm not doubting that you have not laid it all out. I'm rejecting using the notion of "necessary" as a means to discriminate between kinds of true statements. — creativesoul

I am using a variation of Kant’s definition of synthetic and analytic truths, one which is defined in terms of necessity and contingency and not containment and non-containment.

“….. It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding….” — Mww

the intuition is grounded in self-intuition, and my method is grounded in the structure of self-intuition, or rather, in the axioms that mediate the categories of the mind.

I have also used my method to establish an original philosophy of mind. I believe that philosophers will find this section to be very profound, and even, one of the most profound sections on the mind ever written.

….then you haven’t created an entirely new system of philosophy at all, but instead, merely clothed an established transcendental philosophy in a different colored dress, insofar as the understanding, being conditioned by time alone, makes temporal priority explicit in the deduction of its categories. — Mww

there is no method like mine, so far as I am aware, although, there maybe similar methods which are not widely known because a prior methods are presupposed by many today to be less preferable than empirical methods.

also, I would say that intuition is not conditioned by time alone, but also by memory, and also, that time and intuition are co-necessary.

I have worked the relationship between time and precedence out in a way that is sufficient for me to use my method in a apodictic way, and to establish the precedence relationships between all of the most fundamental categories.

Still…..cheers for diving into the deep end. Most folks don’t even realize there is one. — Mww

Thank you for your response. I have had the most rewarding experience while writing this book, I am no longer just conceiving of spirit anymore, I have become it.

You cannot have one without the other. Earlier you spoke of necessary truths didn't you? — creativesoul

I didn’t say that you could. I speak of relatively necessary truths and then absolutely (eternally) necessary truths.

I’ve laid all of this out as clearly as I possibly can in my previous comments.

Yeah, I'm not keen on using "necessary" to discriminate between kinds of true statements. I prefer the way I set out in that OP. We may discuss the differences, or not. — creativesoul

my philosophy is defined in terms of contingency (dependency) and not necessity, I just see them as being logical opposites (e.g. if x is contingent upon y, y is necessary for x).

It would benefit this community if after publication you'd kindly let us know the publisher, the publication, and the venue (in case it's a paper you present) and the corresponding details so we could follow the events. This of course is not a demand but a request. Thanks. — god must be atheist

I would like to do this. As of right now, I am having trouble finding people in academia who are willing to help me, I am also thinking about presenting my work in a YouTube video after my book is released, and then just making a condensed “bare bones” academic paper which does not include any of my prose sections, but only the method and it’s application, and applying to present it at a graduate conference.

my doctoral dissertation is pretty much done, as I’ve created an entire original system of philosophy and this, I think, probably makes me worthy of a receiving a PhD (at least in some places?), but I don’t even have my bachelors yet because I am self-taught, so I am not sure if it is possible to just apply for a PhD and get it without getting my bachelors (which is what I would prefer to do).

You could always quote something from that link and discuss it. — creativesoul

he thinks that because he can imagine the existence of a past eternal contingent being that past eternal contingent beings exist, and therefore that it isn’t necessarily the case that all eternal beings are contingent beings, and I told him that and eternal being is, by definition, a necessary being, because it’s non-existence is logically impossible, which is not the case for contingent beings (which have a non-existence that is logically possible). he thinks that when I say necessity, that I am saying that something is eternally necessary, and that that isn’t necessarily the case, and I keep trying to tell him that I conceive of a difference between eternal necessity and relative necessity, which does not entail relative necessity (e.g. trees are necessary for paper, therefore trees are logically prior or even temporally prior to paper (but not eternally existing because they are “necessary”).

of course, I would deny that one cannot deny the existence of naturally existing (non thought dependent) modal relationships without denying the existence of time and mind as natural (non thought dependent) categories of being.

I did see that you said that, but it doesn’t make any sense to me as to why anyone would just doubt it as a presupposition when it is so clearly self-evident. Is there a reason for your doubting a truth that appears ti be undeniable? or is just to be contrarian for the sake of being contrarian because that’s what it seems. look at the discussion between me and the Barticks above, is your reasoning similar to his because if it is, I don’t think that it is sound.

this is interesting, although, if I were you, I would define my starting axioms in terms of the concepts of necessity and contingency for the purpose of clarity.

as I said in my comments above, I have already created an entire method and system of philosophy using axioms such as these, as well as others. my conclusions prove mental monism true. It really is quite a spectacular system. I am almost ready to publish and am looking for editors. I’m also ready to present my work in a formalized setting.

You think that existing eternally and existing of necessity are the same. — Bartricks

I have already cleared this up. I think that you are confused here. I think that there is a difference between relative necessity and absolute necessity, and that absolute necessity implies eternal necessity because it’s non-existence is absolutely logically impossible, and then there’s relative necessity, which doesn’t imply absolute necessity, which is what my method pertains to (e.g. “apples necessitate apple trees, therefore apple trees are logically necessary for apples.” I don’t claim that because apple trees are logically necessary for apples that apple trees are eternal. This is where you misunderstand me.

However, I do think that if something is eternal, that it is absolutely necessary and not relatively necessary, unless it is co-necessary with another eternal thing (then it is both relatively and absolutely necessary). But I think that we are getting beyond what you have the potential to comprehend here.

You cannot claim that something eternal does not exist of necessity, or rather, that it’s non-existence is logically possible. This is what you are saying, and this is a blatant contradiction.

Your thought experiment doesn’t imply the existence of eternal contingency (i.e. just because you can imagine a contingent being existing eternally it doesn’t follow that it is necessary that that is the case), and I’m not sure why you would think that that’s the case. You can’t imagine a contingent being existing eternally without being eternal, what you’re saying is ‘I can imagine a contingent being existing for a short duration of time, therefore, I can imagine a contingent being existing for an eternal duration of time, and this isn’t necessarily possible unless you are also eternal.” Is this what you’re claiming, that you are eternal and contingent? Where is your proof? Because you’re making an a valid induction here.


also, this is checkmate. I have to move on to having meaningful discussions now. be well, and remember, if you don’t question your own skepticism, you are a dogmatist and not a skeptic.

No big deal, I am okay with this, it's only a small mistake in composition. But now it seems you are moving the goalposts, nevertheless. — god must be atheist

I have edited the original post. I have removed the poll and posted that I intend to use it as a fundamental axiom for an entire system of philosophy.

I am actually ready to publish and am looking to hire editors, but I cannot seem to find any competent ones, and this is because I've probably been looking in the wrong places.

sorry, I do not mean to say that it is in need of proof, either a priori or a posteriori; but rather its truth is self-evident and therefore not in need of any proof, and this is because one cannot deny it without presupposing that it is true (i.e. because it pertains to the structure of thought itself, which cannot possibly be organized differently).

if the occurrence of geometric points is necessary for the occurrence of geometric figures, then this would be one example of logical necessity devoid of temporal priority: the geometric figure logically necessitates geometric points thought both are fully concurrent. — javra

one can speak of the relationship between precedence and geometry without invoking temporal relations, but one cannot speak of the relationship between knowledge and geometry without invoking temporal relations.

Out of curiosity, if this happens to make a difference: Are you addressing this issue in regard to what does or can ontically occur or, else, in regard to our human capacity to conceptualize various forms of logical necessity (whether or not our conceptions be illusory)? — javra

I am looking to use the a priori analytic truth: "If A is necessary for B (and B is not necessary for A), then A is necessarily either logically prior or both logically and temporally prior to B in time (in terms of the absolute first possible occurrence of B), as a foundation for a new modal method which is based, not in the concepts of necessity and possibility (as antitheses), but the concepts of necessity and contingency (antitheses).

of course, I have already created this new method and philosophy, and am ready to publish it. Using this fundamental a priori axiom as a foundation for my methodology, I have determined the precedence relationships between the natural categories of physics (e.g. space, time, mass, velocity, volume, etc) and the natural categories of the mind (e.g. memory, understanding, and intentionality, etc), and have shown, undeniably (I believe) that the categories of the mind are logically necessary for the categories of physics.

According to my understanding, the only possible way to disprove my philosophy is to disprove the truth "If A necessitates B , then B is logically prior to A," hence the reason why I am posting it here.

Of course, as expected, I was gracefully met by those who deny the possibility of logical necessity while (unknowingly) using thoughts that necessitate the category of logical necessity. But would this even be a philosophy forum if I were not greeted by sophists first?

I agree with the first sentence. the second sentence is an opinion, and I think it is irrelevant. — god must be atheist

what is an opinion to you may be an analytic a priori truth for me (which is proven elsewhere).

To show that the answer is no experimentally, you need to obsrve all events, examine the events in which such precipitation occurs, and see that they all follow the rule of intuition. If they ALL follow, including all events ever in the future, then you proved experientially that the answer is no, it can't. — god must be atheist

even if it were to be shown to be false, empirically, it wouldn't negate the analytic necessity of the a priori truth; it would simply mean that time has a bi-conditional arrow, that there are two different directions in which logical necessity can flow (which is always in the direction in which time is flowing, I presume).

On the other hand, while developing qm behavour's math models, the logic has shifted to observing calculated events that are logically impossible with an explanation using only classical logic. — god must be atheist

I do believe that we must use non-classical logic to understand QM, but not that classical logic is derived from non-classical logic. according to my understanding, if classical logic is necessary for non-classical logic, then classical logically is at the very least logically prior, and at the very most both logically and temporally prior to the categories of non-classical logic.

You did change the raw quesiton; you made a question whereby the cause is or prior event is necessary for the ensuing event. — god must be atheist

I’m not evening talking about causation here, but about the relationship between logical necessity and temporal precedence.

Its logic has spit in the face of human intuition based on logic. — god must be atheist

I think that the logic of quantum mechanics is ultimately derived from classical logic. this is because quantum logical pertains to spatial categories, and space is not eternal.

That one thing depends on another does not entail that the former existed before the latter. As I keep explaining. — Bartricks

I understand that you’re claiming this, without proof. I’m just asking for your proof that something which is logically necessary for something else, can come into existence after that thing (in terms of the first possible occurrence of that thing).

bones are necessary for human bodies, so all you have to do is prove that human bodies can exist independently of bones (in terms of the first possible occurrence), and you will have proven me wrong and you right.

If you wish to call yourself a philosopher, here is your chance to prove yourself.

What do you mean by 'necessity' then? Why do you think it implies 'exists before anything else'? — Bartricks

you cannot have an atom without a nucleus, so the existence of atoms is contingent upon the prior existence of nuclei, so to deny that logical necessity does not imply temporal precedence, you would have to prove that something can come into existence after the things which are necessary for its existence, and you would thus have to prove, for example, that an atom can exist without a nuclei. In other words, you would have to prove the logically impossible to be possible.

it may not be so for all. — Agent Smith

for all? how can it be true for some and not for all? do you have any examples of things that can come into being independently of the things which are necessary for their existence?

right.

you ask me to define my terms. you then disagree with the definitions. and then we spend the whole time talking about definitions and not of what those definitions mean, and then we talk in circles all day getting nowhere, and this, by definition, is where the sophist wins his battles, on the battlefield of definitions, and of our supposed inability to define things and relations with absolute certainty. It’s not like I want to go down this road either, as it only ends in disagreement.

I'm a philosopher. — Bartricks

not until you have a soul.

so you guys have chased all the philosophers away, and now there’s only sophists left here? it’s a barren wasteland on this forum, a body without a soul, it seems.

An interesting OP. :up: — Agent Smith

thank you.

Mill's 5 methods (to establish causality). — Agent Smith

if one denies causality, that doesn’t mean that one also denies necessity, and this is because the category of necessity can exist independently of the category of causality. that is to say that if ‘x is necessary for y’ that it doesn’t necessarily follow that ‘x causes y’ (e.g. glass is necessary for glass jars, but glass doesn’t cause glass jars), but that if ‘x causes y,’ and only x can cause y, then the existence of c is necessary for the existence of y (so causality implies necessity).

I think it's always been true. — Bartricks

Then it exists necessarily and not contingently because it’s being false is logically impossible.

on that note. I think I call it a night. I need to get your poop smell off of me now.

I think that's true. — Bartricks

ok. Is it eternally true, or did it become true in some moment of time, and if so, how long will it be true and when will it become false again?

if it is not eternally true, it is by definition contingently true because it’s existence depends upon its truth maker, and if it is eternally true, it is necessarily eternally true because it cannot not be eternally true, that is, because its non-existence is logically impossible.

Presumably you realize that if something exists contingently, then that can be consistent with it actually existing? Or do you not understand that? — Bartricks

by definition, if something exists contingently, it does not exist necessarily, and therefore had the potential to come into and out of being (which is not true of something that exists necessarily because it is eternal).

if I imagine that a contingent being exists in every moment of time, which I cannot actually do, for that would take an eternity, then it wouldn’t necessarily follow that that contingent being is eternal because my mere conception that something is physically possible doesn’t make it physically possible.

I didn’t say that the word necessity necessarily refers to eternally existing entities, for something can be necessary for the existence of something else and not be eternal (e.g. space is necessary for motion and space is not eternal); however, it is logically impossible for an entity to exist eternally and not exist necessarily. this follows necessarily from the law of non contradiction. if you do not make the distinction between necessary and contingent beings, you cannot make a distinction, conceptually, between eternal and non-eternal beings (or relations), and you cannot simply presume that non-eternal beings do not exist without proof (which I presume is what you’re going to do next).

I didn’t say that the word necessity necessarily refers to eternally existing entities, for something can be necessary for the existence of something else and not be eternal (e.g. space is necessary for motion and space is not eternal); however, it is logically impossible for an entity to exist eternally and not exist necessarily. this follows necessarily from the law of non contradiction. if you do not make the distinction between necessary and contingent beings, you cannot make a distinction, conceptually, between eternal and non-eternal beings (or relations), and you cannot simply presume that non-eternal beings do not exist without proof (which I presume is what you’re going to do next).

Can't you see that 'eternal' and 'necessity' are different? — Bartricks

they are not different. if x exists eternally, x exists necessarily, meaning that it’s existence is logically impossible. if x exists contingently, it is dependent upon the prior existence of something else, and is therefore not eternal (unless that contingent entity is co-contingent with some eternally existing entity).

how is this not obvious to you?

Yes I can. There are no necessary truths or contingent truths. But it is true that time exists. There. — Bartricks

what you mean to say is that “there are no necessary or contingent truths except for the truth that “there are no necessary or contingent truths,” and this is a self-contradiction.

also, you cannot make the claim that “time exists” without also implying that the present logically follows from the past and this invoking the category of necessity, and also contingency (and this is because they are logical opposites).

No, you're conflating 'exists of necessity' with 'exists eternally'. They're different. The first entails the latter, the latter does not entail the first. You're affirming the consequent. — Bartricks

how can it be possible for something to exist eternally and exist not necessarily, but contingently. this is another logically impossible state of relations here…

No it isn't. That's question begging. Explain how it is logically impossible. (It's from Kant) — Bartricks

this is an easy one, because buildings cannot exist eternally. they are contingent upon the prior existence of manmade building materials, and also of humans. are you prepared to also make the claim that humans are eternal, that the earth is eternal, and also the solar system?

Imagine that for all time there has been a two storey building. Imagine the first storey exists of necessity, but the second does not. The second depends on the first. but the first did not exist before the second. — Bartricks

firstly, this is a logically impossible hypothetical scenario, so there’s no point of even trying to use it as a mental experiment. secondly, it contains contradictions, for the first like part of the statement says that both floors are eternal and the second part says that the second is it eternal. if they both exist eternally, they are both exist necessarily. you cannot claim that they are both eternal and then subsequently that because the second necessitates the prior existence of the first, that the first is temporally prior to the second. this is a contradiction in terms here. this I why you shouldn’t use logically impossible hypothetical scenarios in thought experiments.”

You cannot deny the existence of the categories of necessity and contingency without denying the existence of time. Are you also prepared to deny that fact that the present logically follows from the past and that the past and present do not exist simultaneously? Where is this absurd belief that “the categories of contingency and necessity are manmade constructs” coming from?

when you say that “logical necessity is logically impossible,” you cannot do so without contradicting yourself, for the proposition is either necessary or it is not necessary and therefore contingent, and if it is contingent, it is true sometimes and not at others, and also, necessarily continent and not possibly contingent. do you see how your using the category of necessity to deny the possibility of necessity here?

I am not sure what you mean by “skeptic about necessity?” how can you be a skeptic about necessity if your claim that “necessity does not exist,” is either a necessary truth, and if it is not a necessary truth, it is a necessary falsehood?

but of course, I am not using the word “necessity” here in the absolute sense, as in “A ‘necessarily’ exists because the existence of A is logically impossible, and hence that A exists eternally,” I am using the term in the relative sense such that “if B exists, and A is necessary for the existence of B, then B implies the prior existence of A (so long as A and B are not co-necessary).”

they could be, yes, if A and B are co-contingent. I have altered the original post to account for this.

you have to convert it into ontological terms, because as it stands, the sets in Russell’s paradox are empty referents, and because of this, the conclusion of Russell’s Paradox has no significant value whatsoever, and definitely doesn’t rule out the possibility of an Absolute Being.

The answer is simple: the study of metaphysics pertains to the study of the logical relationships between the ontological categories of being which are necessary for physics and science. I'm not sure why anyone would define metaphysics in any other way.